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
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THE SOCIALISTS AND THE WAR

A DOCUMENTARY STATEMENT OF THE
POSITION OF THE SOCIALISTS OF ALL
COUNTRIES; WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THEIR PEACE POLICY

*Including a Summary of the Revolutionary State Social-
ist Measures Adopted by the Governments at War*

EDITED BY
WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING

Author of
"Socialism as It Is," "Progressivism and After," etc.



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1915

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PREFACE

THIS book was prepared at the suggestion of the Inter-collegiate Socialist Society—of whose Executive Committee I am a member. I have to thank Miss Jessie Wallace Hughan, author of "American Socialism of the Present Day," and Mr. Leroy Scott, members of this Committee, who read over the documents.

In the selection of documents the editor has aimed to choose as far as possible those of the greatest political and economic importance. No material has been omitted or included merely because it seemed creditable or discreditable to Socialists in general or to the Socialists of any particular country. I have not tried to explain away any of their acts or failures to act, nor on the other hand have I endeavored to pass any final judgment. I have merely undertaken to offer in a condensed and connected form all the materials necessary to reach an opinion on any of the leading phases of this great question: the attitude of the Socialists of all countries towards war and peace, and especially towards the present war and the peace that is to follow.

I have carefully restrained all editorial comment because the leading purpose has been strict accuracy and non-partisanship. Even in cases in which the quotations are not as clear as might be desired, I have not felt justified in unduly lengthening my editorial notes, since it is difficult to make lengthy editorial statements without leaning to one side or the other. The purpose of the editing has been not to comment upon the statements of the Socialists, but merely to set forth the con-

ditions under which they were made, and to indicate some of the reasons why they must be considered as important.

A part of the materials utilized has appeared, under my editorship, in *The New Review*.

WM. ENGLISH WALLING.

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PART I

THE GENERAL POSITION OF THE SOCIALISTS ON WAR

**INCLUDING THEIR ATTITUDE ON RELATED
SUBJECTS: NATIONALISM; MILITARISM;
IMPERIALISM**

CHAPTER I

QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE PRESENT WAR

"SOCIALISM never looked better than now" was the title of a much-quoted editorial in the *Springfield Republican*, shortly after the beginning of the present war. We may paraphrase this slightly and say: "Socialism never interested more people than now." The reasons are obvious. Socialism is the one great international and popular movement opposed to war. And Socialism is the only philosophy that even *promises* to do away with the social evils that are now recognized as being the chief causes of wars, namely, commercial competition, the erection of economic barriers between nations, and the cultivation of racial differences for commercial purposes.

Immediately after the war broke out the attitude of the Socialists everywhere began to attract more attention than the attitude of any other class or group. Soon after war was declared it was found that some, though not all, of the Socialist parties had cast their lot with their national governments. Yet, in spite of this apparently contradictory action, public interest in the Socialist position grew greater rather than less. Why did this happen? The war disclosed the fact that a very large part of the public expected the Socialists to take some effective action in this great world crisis. The general public, that is, felt greater confidence in the Socialists' powers than the Socialists themselves had ever felt. When they failed to live up to public expect-

tation, a part of the public believed that Socialism was bankrupt. But a far larger part showed greater interest than ever. The Socialists at least had done all in their power to prevent the war from breaking out. It is true that the governments participating also claim to have tried to prevent the war. But while the sincerity of some or of all the governments is widely questioned, almost nobody has the slightest doubt as to the sincerity of the Socialists. Public opinion seems to say: This international movement is not as powerful as we had believed, but it is the most promising international movement in existence; it could not stop the war, but it may influence the way it is carried on, it may help to bring about the right kind of a peace, and above all, it may do more than any other one force to put an end to those forms of nationalism that are responsible for war.

This is undoubtedly the prevailing public feeling. Most people do not go so far as to think that the Socialists are the only power that is likely to fight effectively against war, but they think it is the chief force that can be relied upon. They do not any longer feel that all Socialists can be trusted to take a firm stand against nationalism, but they are convinced that a very large part of them can be trusted.

Accordingly, no subject whatever has so much importance to-day as the Socialists' world-wide war against war, nationalism, and militarism.

People want to know: By what reasoning the Socialists have reached their internationalism, how they hope to put an end to war, how they would handle international problems, and above all, how they hope to make peace permanent after the present war. That is why all newspapers and periodicals have given so much more space to the Socialists than ever before.

People want to know just how the Socialists of all the leading countries received the present war, why they supported or opposed their governments, their influence for peace, and the kind of peace for which they are working, the possibility that they may secure a voice in the reorganization of governments after the war. For in all the countries engaged the Socialists are the most *authentic*—as the most fearless and articulate—expression of the people.

People want to know whether the Socialists, who in every country of Europe are the chief spokesmen of the common people, were unanimous (in those nations where they favored the war). It is known that there was a division of opinion in Great Britain. How did this come about? What is the relative power of the two groups—those that favored and those that opposed the war? And what is the difference in their attitude towards peace? It is very little known, on account of the false statements that a very powerful minority in Germany, representing hundreds of thousands of Socialist Party members, and perhaps a million Socialist voters, opposed the action by which the party indorsed the war. Public interest is keen to know the extent of this anti-militarist disaffection, its character, and its prospects of winning over still more of the Socialists, who are one-third of the German nation.

People want to know whether the Italian Socialists really were the chief factor in preventing Italy from entering into the war on the side of Germany and Austria—as was widely stated by the non-Socialist press.

What was the power of the Italian Socialists to enforce their will on the government? Are they still in favor of neutrality? Or is it true that a large part

of them are for war on the side of the Allies, and if so, how large a part, and for what reasons?

People want to know whether the leading and most reliable popular parties in Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and Bulgaria are for or against the entrance of their governments into the war, and the reasons for the stand taken.

Everybody—or at least every well-informed person—is interested in the stand taken by the Socialists of that neutral nation which is likely to have more to say than any other of the non-combatants when peace is made. American Socialists will not only have much influence on the action of the government of the United States, but their influence will be great upon the Socialists of the fighting nations also. The public is interested in the American Socialist attitude because it is beginning to realize that a very radical difference of opinion exists. For some Socialists favor an immediate peace, which would necessarily mean a preservation of the *status quo*—which implies that all governments are considered equally militaristic and reactionary and that the war is attributed to “capitalism.” Another group, however, regards the war as being one between modern capitalism and a pre-capitalistic or military form of society. This group wishes to see a victory of the semi-democratic nations, France and England, but without a material gain on the part of Russian autocracy. Which of these views is the more powerful among American and other neutral Socialists, and why is it more powerful? What is the practical difference in the two groups in their attitude to peace?

And finally, everybody wants to know whether this great international movement is temporarily dead now that the Socialist parties of France and Germany have definitely taken the sides of their warring governments.

Nobody has questioned the fact that the Socialist "International" is likely to be reorganized. But the question arises, if it is reorganized, will it really be international? That is, will it really consist of anything more than a loose association of entirely independent and more or less hostile nationalistic Socialist parties, ready on some future occasion, as at present, to support their governments in making war? Or will internationalism now be made an absolute condition for admission, as was the case of the first international organization inaugurated by Karl Marx just fifty years ago? Or, since the working classes already have two parties in many countries, is it possible that we shall now see two "international" Socialist movements, one consisting of a federation of entirely autonomous nationalistic organizations, many of them participating in governments by furnishing ministers to "coalition" ministries, and with whom disarmament, for example, is merely an "ultimate ideal," and another, a radically international organization, that will have nothing to do with the existing governments, at least until disarmament has begun and commercial antagonisms and racial hostilities, all of which rest upon a purely economic foundation, are in the process of being done away with? Or may there be a division along some other lines?

These important questions it is the purpose of this volume to answer, in so far as they can be answered, by original Socialist documents relating, as far as practicable, to the present war and the approaching peace.

CHAPTER II

THE POSITION OF LEADING SOCIALISTS

FOR fully half a century Socialist congresses and Socialist periodicals in all the leading countries of the world have been deeply concerned with the problem of war and the Socialists have discussed it, year in and year out, from every possible angle. Practically all Socialists have agreed in the realization that the greatest obstacle in the development of social democracy is the latent or expressed hostility of the nations to one another. Indeed, this is the very meaning of the great Socialist watchword, the flaming appeal of Karl Marx: "Workers of the World, Unite!" All Socialists are agreed that Socialism cannot completely evolve until the nations are permanently at peace, and most Socialists still take the position of Marx that there can be no Socialism until the leading countries of the world are finally united politically, and above all economically, in some kind of a federal union.

Our chief purpose is neither to discuss historically the development of Socialist thought on this great subject, nor even to attempt a complete statement of the present-day Socialist view of war in general, but to review the Socialists' attitude during the present struggle, their present hopes for peace, and their plans for preventing future wars. It is decidedly worth while, however, to begin with a brief statement of the general Socialist position, and nothing could better indicate how closely Socialists have studied these questions than the

remarkable predictions of Marx, made at the time of the Franco-Prussian War. These, our first two documents, not only show some of the leading features of the Socialist position to-day, but apply them to the present conflict. Moreover, they indicate the essential soundness of some of these positions; and they suggest, when read in connection with the documents following, the line of change and development in Socialist thought.

THE PREDICTIONS OF KARL MARX

The following paragraphs, contained in a manifesto issued by the Social Democratic Party of Germany, entitled "To the German Workers," were written three days after the battle of Sedan, September 5, 1870:

So long as the mercenaries of Napoleon threatened Germany it was our duty as Germans to defend the independence of the Fatherland. Such a defensive war does not exclude offensive measures. It includes, as does every war, the necessity of forcing the enemy to accept peace.

But now, in the hour of victory, it becomes our duty not to be swept away with the drunkenness of the victory, but to remain cool and thoughtful and to ask ourselves what shall be done.

The new Republic must and will seek peace with Germany. It must and will recall the declaration of Napoleon.

Was it the French people who declared war against us? No, it was Napoleon. Let us not be deceived by the circumstance that the victorious invasion of the German army turned the hearts of France toward war.

Now that the empire was overthrown and the republic established, Marx not only demanded peace, but he opposed all annexation of French territory, and predicted that the conquest of Alsace and Lorraine would inevitably lead to a Franco-Russian alliance and to another war. He continues:

10 GENERAL POSITION OF THE SOCIALISTS

But, we are told, it will be at least necessary that we take Alsace and Lorraine from France. The war camarilla, the professors, the burghers, and the tavern politicians claim that this is the only way to protect Germany for all times from a French war. On the contrary, it is the surest way to transform this war into a European institution.

It is the infallible means of converting the coming peace into a truce to be broken as soon as France has recuperated sufficiently to recapture the lost territory. It is the infallible means of ruining France and Germany by mutual slaughter.

The knaves and fools who claim that they have discovered a guarantee for eternal peace should have learned something from Prussian history, from the Napoleonic horse medicine after the peace of Tilsit—how these violent measures for the pacification of a virile nation produce the exact opposite result. And what is France even after the loss of Alsace and Lorraine as compared with Prussia after the peace of Tilsit?

Whoever is not totally stupefied by the noise of the moment, or has no interest in stupefying others, must realize that the war of 1870 bears within its womb the necessity of a war with Russia, even as the war of 1866 bore within its womb the war of 1870.

I say necessarily, inevitably, except in the doubtful event of a Russian revolution.

If this doubtful event does not take place, then the war between Germany and Russia must be treated as an accomplished fact.

If they take Alsace-Lorraine, then Russia and France will make war on Germany. It is superfluous to point out the disastrous consequences.

We must not allow Marx's striking prediction and condemnation of the present war to eclipse other points of this extraordinary document. It shows Marx's attitude to war generally. He was opposed to waging war on France as soon as *she became a democratic republic*, and *had favored war against her when she was an aggressive and militaristic empire*.

Marx, in another manifesto, written for the General Council of the International at London, and issued four

days after the preceding one, continued his protest against the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine in the following words:

Do the Teutonic patriots seriously believe that the independence, liberty, and peace of Germany may be secured by driving France into the arms of Russia?

If the luck of arms, the arrogance of success, and the intrigue of the dynasties lead to the robbing of French territory, then there are only two ways open for Germany.

It either must pursue the dangerous course of being a tool for Russian aggrandizement, a policy which coincides with the tradition of the Hohenzollern, or it must, after a short pause, prepare itself for a new "defensive" war. Not one of those new-fangled "localized" wars, but a race war, a war with the united Slav and Latin races. This is the peace prospect held out by the brainless patriots of the German middle class.

History will not measure her retribution by the circumference of the square miles conquered from France, but by the intensity of the *crime of having re-established in the second half of the nineteenth century the policy of conquest.* (Our italics.)

Of especial moment in this second document are Marx's satirical prophecies that the German Government would attempt to picture the war he predicted as being "defensive" and that it would also make a pretense of trying to "localize" it—in a way, of course, to secure a German preponderance. He also shows that he feared the Russian-German alliance, which is again so much dreaded by German Socialists as a probable result of the present war. (See Chapter XIX.)

FREDERICK ENGELS ON THE COMING WAR

An article written by Engels in 1892 emphasizes a no less important feature of the Socialist position, the idea that a general European war, undesired by the

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people, though fought by them, would surely lead, sooner or later, to a general European revolution.

In an article written by Engels for *Die Neue Zeit* in 1892 occurs the following passage:

No Socialist of whatever nationality can wish the triumph of the present German Government in the war, nor that of the bourgeois French Republic, and least of all that of the Czar, which would be equivalent to the subjection of Europe, and therefore the Socialists of all countries are for peace. But if it comes to war nevertheless, just one thing is certain—this war in which fifteen or twenty million armed men will slaughter one another, and all Europe will be laid to waste as never before—this war must either bring the immediate victory of Socialism, or it must upset the old order of things from head to foot and leave such heaps of ruins behind that the old capitalistic society will be more impossible than ever, and the social revolution, though put off until ten or fifteen years later, will surely conquer after that time all the more rapidly and all the more thoroughly.

Engels, then, expected the advance of Socialism from a general European war, not through the patriotic defense of each country by its Socialists, but through the revolutionary action of all at the proper moment. The victory of Germany would be almost as bad as the victory of Russia.

Engels, as we have said, favored the Germans in the War of 1870, but after the republic was declared, he even went so far as to offer his services to the French, as has been testified by the French Socialist leader, Vaillant, in *L'Humanité*.

MARX AND ENGELS NOT PACIFISTS

The following extracts from a *Neue Zeit* article are important as showing the position of not only Marx and Engels, but of Edward Bernstein, leader of the German revisionists.

In his interpretation of Marx's position, Bernstein

uses the expressions about the "national existence" being at stake and "military necessity," which figure in such an important way in the official defense of the German Government. Bernstein attributes to Marx the belief that "the national existence" of Germany was at stake in 1870, and that her conduct up to the predatory peace (which he denounced, as we have seen) was justified by "military necessity":

But just as the time for a demonstration against the war on the ground of principle could not last indefinitely, this applies also, according to Marx, to the period of recognition and support of the war. This he shows in the letter in which he treats of the abstention of Bebel and Liebknecht [*i.e.*, their refusal to vote in the Reichstag on the war loan of 1870—see below]. Decisively he agrees to the plan of an answer of the International to the German Party Executive, which Engels had laid before him on his own request, in which it is said (see the letter of Engels, August 15, 1870): "I think the German Social Democracy can:

"1. Take part in the national movement in so far as and as long as it limits itself to the defense of Germany (which under certain conditions does not exclude the offensive, until peace is declared);

"2. Emphasize the difference between German national interests, and dynastic Prussian interests;

"3. Work against any annexation of Alsace-Lorraine;

"4. As soon as a republican, non-chauvinist government is at the helm in Paris, to work for an honorable peace with it;

"5. Continue to keep in the foreground the unity of the interests of German and French workingmen, who did not justify the war, and did not make war upon one another;

"6. Indicate the menace of Russia in the background, as in the International address."

In the manifesto issued after Sedan [above quoted] Marx and Engels scrupulously pointed out the period for which the support of the war by Social Democrats was proper. This period for them was marked by the change of the war from one of defense to one of conquest. In making this distinction they allowed a wide place to the war of defense.

They recognized that such a war also justified measures of attack, since the goal was the crippling of the power of attacking, and the desire for attack on the part of the enemy. In this point they showed themselves free from all prejudice. As to anything, however, that went beyond this, where it was no longer a question of the demands of military necessity, but of the future of the relations of the civilized people of Europe, where the politics of the peoples were at issue, they made their position unmistakable.

It is needless to point out that several interpretations of the views of Marx prevail among German Socialists. For our purpose, it is necessary to note only those interpretations that are held to by some large group. The party is divided roughly into three more or less equal groups, the "revisionists," of which Bernstein has been the theoretical spokesman, that of which Kautsky has been the theoretical spokesman (the center group), and the radicals, of which Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg are the leading figures.

BEBEL AND LIEBKNECHT IN 1870

Kautsky showed in the official weekly of the party, *Die Neue Zeit*, several months after the present war began (November 27th), that the position of Bebel on war followed on the same lines as that of Marx and Engels. (See below, Chapter XIX.) Bebel and Liebknecht, unlike their successors in the present Reichstag, abstained from voting the war loan in 1870, though they did not vote against it. We quote the passages referring to this historic act of Bebel and Liebknecht at this point, leaving other parts of Kautsky's article for a later chapter.

It is true that in 1870 Wilhelm Liebknecht was in favor of rejecting the war credits. But his colleague in the North German Parliament, August Bebel, did not agree with him on this question.

Bebel thought the rejection of the credits a mistake, as it would mean taking sides with Napoleon. On the other hand, he could not get himself to support Bismarck's policy. Bebel advocated abstention from voting on the credits, and succeeded in convincing Liebknecht of the propriety of that course of action. In justifying that step Bebel wrote:

"The present war is a dynastic war, undertaken in the interests of the dynasty of Bonaparte, as the war of 1866 was one in the interests of the Hohenzollerns. We cannot vote for the credits demanded from the Reichstag for the conduct of the war, as that would mean a vote of confidence in the Prussian Government which has prepared the present war by its actions in 1866. Nor can we refuse the required moneys, for that might be interpreted as supporting the mischievous and criminal policy of Bonaparte."

Whilst Bebel and Liebknecht abstained from voting, the Lassallean Socialist members of the Reichstag voted for the war credits.

Liebknecht's and Bebel's course of action aroused great opposition in the Executive of the Labor Party, who considered it a tactical mistake. The members of the Executive were dominated by the idea that the war should be prosecuted until the downfall of Napoleon should give the French democracy more breathing space, and that the struggle would end in the unification of Germany and thus solve the national question, which had hitherto disturbed and prevented the growth of a great Social Democratic Party.

The debates and recriminations which ensued were most acrimonious. On August 13, 1870, Bebel wrote in a letter: "If the executive proceeds against Liebknecht [who was then editing the party organ, *Volksstaat*] we shall renounce all co-operation in the *Volksstaat*. Judging from your letter, you all seem to have fallen victim to a kind of nationalist paroxysm; you appear to desire at any price a scandal and a disruption in the party." And Liebknecht wrote to Bracke, a prominent member of the Executive, on September 1st, that he felt inclined to emigrate to America "out of disgust with these patriotic junketings."

In 1870 then, as in 1914, the majority of the Socialist representatives in the parliament were in favor of sup-

porting the war. And it was only a few years later (1875) that the two factions were united to form the present German Socialist Party.

KAUTSKY ON IMPERIALISM AND WAR

Since the death of Liebknecht, several years ago, Kautsky has been the leading thinker of the German Party. The present German Socialist theory on war is best expressed in an article written by Kautsky immediately before the present conflict, to which he added the first few paragraphs after the war had started. While he represents the orthodox Marxian view, he does not pretend to leave the Marxian doctrine intact on war or on any other matter. Indeed, he has done more than any other living writer to *develop* that standpoint, and this is why, no doubt, he is known as the world's leading Marxian. Kautsky here develops the Marxian view of international relations to its modern form.

To-day commercial "imperialism" is held by Socialists to be the chief cause of wars and of militarism; and we have been living in a period in which capitalism necessarily expresses itself, internationally, in the form of competitive imperialism. But in the period that is approaching, competitive imperialism, like competitive industry, is doomed to be replaced by combination. Imperialism, which is now militarist and nationalist, may then become pacifist and international through a combination of empires, through ultra-imperialism. Capitalism will be stronger than before, but so also will be the resistance of international Socialism. The class struggle will become world-wide and more intense than ever. This view appears, for example, in the following selection from another Kautsky article in *Die Neue Zeit* (September):

The effort to subdue and hold agrarian regions has given rise to serious conflicts between the great capitalist powers. These conflicts brought about the tremendous competition in armaments which has finally resulted in the long-prophesied world-war. Is this phase of imperialism necessary to the continued existence of capitalism? Will it disappear only with capitalism itself?

There is no economic necessity for the continuation of the great competition in the production of armaments after the close of the present war. At best such a continuation would serve the interests of only a few capitalist groups.

On the contrary capitalist industry is threatened by the conflicts between the various governments. Every far-sighted capitalist must call out to his associates: Capitalists of all lands, unite!

In the first place we have to consider the growing opposition of the more developed agricultural regions, which threatens not only one or the other of the capitalist governments, but all of them together. This refers both to the awakening of eastern Asia and India and to the pan-Islamite movement of Asia Minor and northern Africa.

In the same category is the increasing opposition of the proletariat of industrial nations to additional taxes.

To all this was added after the close of the Balkan War the fact that the cost of armaments and colonial expansion reached such a point that the accumulation of capital was threatened, and so the very basis of imperialism was placed in danger.

Industrial accumulation in the interior did still go on, thanks to technical development of industry. But capital was no longer pushing itself into foreign fields. This is proved by the fact that European governments had difficulty in floating their loans. The rate of interest was constantly rising.

Here are figures showing prices paid during ten years:

	Three per cent. Imperial Loan	Three per cent. French Bonds
1905.....	89.....	99
1910.....	85.....	97
1912.....	80.....	92
1914.....	77.....	83

This will grow worse rather than better after the war if the increase in armaments continues to make its demands on

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the money market. Imperialism is digging its own grave. Instead of developing capitalism it has become a means of hindering it. . . .

This policy cannot be carried on much longer. . . .

We can say of imperialism what Marx said of capitalism: Monopoly creates competition and competition creates monopoly.

The violent competition of great concerns led to the formation of trusts and the destruction of small concerns. Just so there may develop in the present war a combination of the stronger nations which will put an end to the competitive building of armaments.

From a purely economic point of view, therefore, it is not impossible that capitalism is now to enter upon a new phase, a phase marked by the transfer of trust methods to international politics, a sort of super-imperialism. The working class would be forced to fight this new form of capitalism as it did the old, but the danger from it would lie in a new direction.

Not all the consequences of the present struggle are yet apparent. It may lead to an increase of armaments. In this case the peace which will follow will be only in the nature of truce. But from a purely economic point of view there is nothing to hinder its resulting in a holy alliance of imperialists. The longer the war lasts, the more it exhausts all participants, the nearer we shall approach the latter solution, no matter how improbable it may appear at present.

This sums up an enormous amount of Socialist discussion which has been going on for years in Europe, and especially in Germany. It is to be noted, however, that Kautsky here renounces the widely prevalent Socialist belief (often seen in the following documents) that capitalism necessarily means war, or that permanent peace must wait for Socialism. He takes the contrary view.

Also, at the end of his article, he mentions another economic force that brings nations into conflict besides imperialism, namely, nationalism. Imperialism implies capitalistic expansion, *new markets* or *new fields* of in-

vestment, economic nationalism means the interest in normal foreign trade, etc. But nationalism is also to express the belief that the economic interests of a nation as a whole, including all classes, may be in conflict with those of another nation. This is the view of Otto Bauer, who, after Kautsky, may be taken as the leading Marxian authority on this subject.

The all-important problem of imperialism was to have been discussed at the proposed International Socialist Congress, planned to be held in Vienna, on August 21, 1914. Otto Bauer, undoubtedly the most eminent of Austrian Socialists after Victor Adler, was to have reported to the International Congress on this subject, and was delegated to bring in a resolution, which would have been the most important of all Socialist declarations on the causes of war. We do not have his resolution or his report, but we are able to give, in his own words, the central thought of his great work, *Imperialismus und die Nationalitätenfrage*.

THE PRESENT NATIONALISTIC SYSTEM OF PRODUCTION AS THE CAUSE OF WAR

“We do not say that there are no conflicts of interests between the nations, but we say, on the contrary, that as long as exploitation and oppression continue there will be conflicts of interests between nations.” But exploitation and oppression, according to the Socialist view, as presented by Bauer, will continue until the establishment of a Socialist society, in which there will be *no economically or politically independent nations*. International trade instead of being discouraged will be encouraged, so that all would rapidly become parts of one economic whole, so dependent on one another that no hostilities would be practical, while complete political independence would also become unthinkable.

That is, as long as the present capitalistic form of society lasts, with its division of the world into economic units called nations, the economic interests of *all the people* of the various countries, including those of the wage-earners, will continue to conflict with one another. As far, then, as the working people confine their calculations to the immediate future and to social and labor reforms to be carried out under the present nationalistic system, they may be economically interested in war—provided, of course, their nation is victorious, and the cost of the war is not too high. This is true, however, only as long as capitalism and nationalism last, and it is always to the *ultimate* interest of the working people, as opposed to their *immediate* interest, to stand for internationalism as against nationalism. According to the view of Bauer, which would probably have been indorsed by the International Congress, since the official report is usually indorsed, *those Socialists who place immediate interests before ultimate interests have motives for entering into a policy of nationalism and imperialism, similar to those of the capitalists and other social classes which have become militaristic and now support war.* From Bauer's standpoint, the only consideration that could hold such Socialists back from war would be the possibility of defeat or the too great cost of victory, a consideration which is evidently of equal weight with non-Socialists. It is hardly necessary to point out the bearing of this view on the action of those Socialists who have favored the present war. A radical himself, Bauer holds that only radical Socialists who place the larger expediency above the smaller (to use an expression of Morley's), can be relied upon to oppose war.

The present position of the majority of Socialists as to the questions connected with war, however, does not

go so deeply into the question, and may be best given by a few quotations from Morris Hillquit, the leading spokesman of the American Socialists. These quotations are from articles written shortly after the outbreak of the present conflict. They do not take into account any of the new positions taken by various Socialist groups as a result of the war, and may, therefore, be taken as a summary of the Socialist attitude *before* the great world drama we are witnessing. Bauer, like Kautsky, is a leader and creator of Socialist thought, but his mature views had not yet been fully accepted and no official action had been taken by an International Congress. Hillquit, on the contrary, is an exponent of Socialist policy in that form which it had already assumed before the war and still holds at the present moment. If we wish to know what the Socialist thought on war was becoming immediately before the present struggle, we must look to Kautsky and Bauer. If we wish to know what it *actually was*, we must look to Hillquit. It is true, as Kautsky points out in passages we have quoted below (see Chapter XIX), and as the views of Bauer and Kautsky we have just quoted clearly demonstrate, that the actual Socialist policy entirely overlooked some of the most fundamental and practical phases of the subject. But we are concerned in the present volume with the Socialist position in connection with the present war, and if we are to understand how the Socialists have *applied* their policy, or *adapted* it to the present struggle, it is necessary, *as a point of departure*, first of all to state the exact condition of the Socialist policy as to war (and related questions) immediately before the war—even if this policy should prove, at some points, and by the later confessions of the Socialists themselves, to have been inadequate, contradictory, and erroneous.

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We shall, therefore, conclude this chapter with Hillquit's summary:

SUMMARY, BY MORRIS HILLQUIT, OF THE SOCIALIST POSITION BEFORE THE WAR

(Morris Hillquit has for years been a member of the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party of America, and is now its representative in the International Socialist Bureau. As far as one individual can express a party's attitude, Hillquit best expresses the majority opinion of the American Party. These excerpts are from the *Metropolitan Magazine*, 1914-15.)

To begin with, there always has been a radical difference between the Socialist conceptions of war and the philosophy of the non-Socialist peace movements. The bourgeois peace advocates usually consider war and militarism as deliberate institutions voluntarily maintained by modern governments in pursuance of a mistaken policy. Their condemnation of the evil is based mainly on business reasons or ethical grounds. They argue that war and armaments involve enormous losses in lives and property and constant unproductive expenditures, and they naively believe that as soon as it will be demonstrated to the powers that be that war does not pay, they will suspend that branch of their business. The Socialists, on the other hand, realize that under existing conditions wars are inevitable.

The Socialists assert that wars are bound to become more frequent and violent as the capitalist system of production approaches its climax. The modern capitalists, especially those engaged in large-scale industries, make more profits than they can consume or profitably employ in their own business. They are forced to look for new investments, and as the resources of their own country are fully exploited, they must turn to new fields. Thus arises the necessity for foreign trade, with a particular predilection for colonies and dependencies. The latter leads to the modern policy of imperialism.

"Imperialism" is a comparatively new term in the political dictionary of Europe, and its definition is somewhat vague. It means more than the traditional colonial policy for centuries pursued by the governments of Spain, Holland, England, and France. It implies not only the possession of colo-

nies beyond the direct geographical boundaries of a nation, but also the endeavor to unite all such colonies with the mother-country into a dominant international power—an empire, and to steadily extend the territory of such empire. Usually it includes a programme of monopolizing the natural resources and trade of the colonies and securing their aid for the defense of the empire without giving them a voice in its government.

The Socialist diagnosis of the causes of modern wars may thus be summed up in one sentence: The basic cause is capitalism; the contributory causes are imperialism, militarism, social unrest, international grudges, and pseudo-patriotism.

This is the accepted Socialist view as it has gradually evolved from 1866, when the subject was first discussed in the Congress of the old International in Geneva, until 1907, when the International Congress at Stuttgart formulated the most complete and authoritative Socialist expression on war and militarism. . . .

And so the nations of Europe prepared for war. They were ready for it. For years they have been watching and threatening one another. For years Europe has been an armed camp. The clash might have come somewhat earlier. It might have been delayed somewhat. But in the long run it was inevitable. It is idle to place the blame for the monstrous crime on any particular nation or government, to seek the aggressor. Capitalism has made this war, and all the nations are the victims. . . .

The Socialists believe that modern wars are mainly caused by the industrial competition between nations. In this view wars must continue so long as the capitalist system prevails, and will only be ended with the establishment of the Socialist co-operative commonwealth and the federation of non-competing nations.

This undoubtedly expresses the view of the average Socialist before the present war. There has been a great deal of open disagreement, however, about these questions among Socialists in recent years. And the movement has been nearly equally divided on some of the most important issues. Hillquit, for example, as we have just seen, says that the interests of capital

make for war and the interests of labor make for peace. The former view is contradicted by Kautsky, the latter by Bauer (as we have shown), and they are far more influential in the international movement than Hillquit.

This radical division among Socialists may be most clearly seen in the discussions of the International and National Congresses. A very strong tendency to modify the position held by the average Socialist before the war, as formulated by Hillquit, will be noted. This tendency has naturally become more rapid since the present war began, as the reader will note from documents of Parts IV and V. Whether this stupendous event is *fundamentally* modifying the Socialist position, first on questions connected with war, and then generally, or whether it is leaving both Socialist "principles" and Socialist "tactics" essentially as they were before, as Kautsky claims, is a question we must leave to the reader to decide after we have supplied him with ample evidence—on both sides of the question.

CHAPTER III

WAR AND ITS CAUSES

THE anti-war resolution of the International Socialist Congress held at Stuttgart in 1907, is perhaps the most important document in Socialist history, in view of the present war. It was the result of a compromise and was consciously designed to cover up some of the Socialist differences connected with war, as its framers stated before the Congress. It is a very carefully constructed compromise, however, and a correct reflection of the *consensus* of Socialist opinion, so that it deserves the closest attention. It describes that relatively restricted area of *common* ground on which nearly *all* Socialists stand. However, the development of Socialist opinion, as the discussion at the Congress shows, had already advanced, in many cases, considerably beyond this point. For two widely different opinions had developed by 1907, both of them maintained by very large factions. And the division was mainly along national lines; the majority of the French on one side and all the Germans on the other. Both the leading causes and the remedies for war were very thoroughly discussed. The causes named in the resolution finally adopted were: imperialism, militarism, nationalist agitation, the desire of governments to turn the attention of the masses away from difficult domestic problems, and the fear of the rising international power of the working classes.

While the *economic* cause of war was mentioned first,

other related causes also receive full recognition. No complete remedy was held to be possible at the present stage of capitalist society. But two possibilities of the future was offered. The decay of the power of capitalism will itself gradually bring about the weakening of militarism, or if a war is actually started, a democratic revolution will result. Especially remarkable again was the position that a great hope not only for the abolition of wars, but for the introduction of Socialism, lies in the very development of militarism, which may result in such a reaction against it which will sweep away not only militarism, but the whole social system along with it.

Three resolutions are to be considered besides the final compromise resolution finally adopted: the resolution offered by the French majority favoring an international general strike in case of war, the resolution of the French minority, supported by Bebel and the Germans, opposing such action, and an amendment of the Russians adopting the main principle of the German resolution, and so rejecting the general strike, but advocating an effort to turn any future war into a social revolution, after it had once broken out and as soon as a favorable moment offered itself. At the present time this last proposition, which was incorporated as part of the final compromise, is certainly as interesting as any. For even if we hold that the establishment of a Socialist or even a semi-Socialist society is improbable as a direct or indirect outcome of the war, a merely political and democratic revolution in several of the warring countries, a revolution in which the Socialists took a leading part, pushing it always in the direction of Socialism, would be a world event altogether eclipsing the French Revolution.

RESOLUTION OF FRENCH MAJORITY

Two formulations had strong support at Stuttgart, each being upheld by approximately half of the Congress. The majority of the French delegates (including Jaurès) proposed the following:

Militarism is to be viewed *exclusively* as the arming of the state in order to *keep the working classes in political and economic subjection to the capitalist class*. The working class of all countries must remember that a government cannot threaten the independence of a foreign nation without committing a crime against this nation, against its working class, and against the international working class. The threatened nation, and its working class, accordingly have the duty of defending their independence against attack, and they have a right to the support of the working classes of the whole world. The policy of defense, as well as the anti-militarism of the Socialist Party, demands the disarmament of the bourgeoisie, and the arming of the working classes, through the introduction of general military service of the people (militia). In view of the Russian revolution, of the extreme danger to the Czarism, and the neighboring empires which would like to follow it, in view of the ceaseless capitalistic and colonial enterprises and plundering, the International Bureau and International Parliamentary Conference are called upon to form the necessary institutions in order to be able to take suitable action in case of the menace of an international conflict to prevent war. The prevention of war is to be brought about by national and international Socialist action of the working class by all means, from parliamentary intervention to public agitation and *the general strike and insurrection*. (Our italics.)

Here, then, is an immediate remedy; it is not necessary to wait for Socialism. And the cause of war is not so much the search for new markets and fields of investment, as the capitalist desire to use the army against the working class at home.

MINORITY FRENCH RESOLUTION

The minority of the French delegation at Stuttgart, including Guesde, proposed a resolution of the very opposite tendency, and it was supported by Bebel and the Germans.

Whereas militarism, as all conflicts have shown, is a natural and inevitable result of capitalist society, based upon class oppositions, and, whereas this militarism cannot be abolished until its cause, capitalist society, is abolished, and whereas by the concentration of all efforts of the working class (in the Socialist movement) the question of militarism secures its due share of attention, and whereas the proposed means of anti-militarism, from desertion and the military strike to revolution, make propaganda and conversion to Socialism more difficult, and so postpone the moment when the proletariat will be sufficiently organized and strong enough to put an end to capitalist society, and with it to all wars, the Congress declares that the best means against militarism and to preserve peace, must consist in organizing the workers of all the world socialistically, and in the meantime avoiding military service, refusing all money for the army, navy, and colonies, and making propaganda for the armament of the people.

In this resolution we are told curtly that capitalism is the cause of war, and that, therefore, Socialism is the only effective remedy. And the one important immediate anti-war measure, according to this German view, is for Socialist members of parliament to refuse to vote any money for the army, navy, and colonies. Yet, the Germans themselves were the first of all the Socialist parties of the Continent of Europe to desert this principle—in 1913, a year before the outbreak of the present war. (See Chapter V.)

Of the speeches at the Congress, the most important were the opening and closing speeches, both by August Bebel, the speech of Jaurès for France, and the speech of Vandervelde for Belgium. The speeches of Bebel

have a double significance. They bring out the position of a large number of Socialists of all countries, but especially they throw light upon the state of mind of the Socialist Reichstag members who voted for the war loans after the outbreak of the present war, for this and other documents leave little doubt that Bebel would have stood with this majority.

BEBEL IN SUPPORT OF FRENCH MINORITY RESOLUTION

According to my view, we have so often discussed the military and war question, that it would be enough to reaffirm the resolutions we have formerly passed. But after the French comrades, chiefly through the so-called anti-military agitation of Hervé, desired to bring the question before the Congress, we could not refuse to discuss it again. What Hervé says in his book, *Their Country*, on militarism and patriotism, is not new. Domela Nieuwenhuis said that all to us at previous Congresses, and the Congresses have always refused to follow him by large majorities. Hervé says: "The Fatherland is the Fatherland of the ruling classes. It does not concern the proletariat."

A similar thought is expressed in the *Communist Manifesto* where it says, "the proletariat has no Fatherland." But in the first place, the disciples of Marx and Engels have declared that they no longer share the views of the Manifesto, and in the second place, they have taken, throughout the decades, a very clear and by no means negative position towards European and German national questions. What we fight against is not the Fatherland itself, which belongs to the proletariat far more than to the ruling classes, but the conditions which are present in the Fatherland in the interest of the ruling classes. Parliaments also are a ruling class insurance for the maintenance of their class rule, and yet we go into parliaments, not only to fight class rule, but also to better conditions. We do not limit ourselves to negation, we also carry on positive work everywhere. The civilized life and the development of the civilization of a people can only be developed upon the basis of full freedom and independence, by means of the mother-tongue. Therefore the effort everywhere among peoples who are under foreign rule is to gain freedom

and independence. We see this, for example, in Austria. We see it in the struggle of the Poles for the reconstruction of their nation. In Russia, too, as soon as it is a modern state, the nationality question will arise. Every people which is under foreign rule fights, first of all, for its independence. If Alsace-Lorraine fought against separation from France, that is because it had shared its cultural development for a century, enjoyed the achievements of the great Revolution as an equal, and so culturally had grown up intimately with France, without any damage to its people. *Hervé's thought, that it is all the same for the proletariat whether France belongs to Germany, or Germany belongs to France, is absurd.* If Hervé tried to persuade his countrymen of this, in a crisis, I fear that his own comrades would tread him under foot. What national excitement means in time of war we saw in 1870, when the masses saw in Napoleon III a disturber of the peace, although it was not he, but Bismarck, who provoked the declaration of war by his later discovered falsification of the Ems dispatch, and the excitement turned against us, because at that time we abstained from the vote of the war loan, believing that both governments were responsible for the war, since at that time the Ems dispatch was unknown to us.

I deny the statement [which had been made by Kautsky as well as Hervé—see Part IV] that it would be difficult to say, when the case arises, what is an aggressive and what a defensive war. Affairs are no longer in such shape to-day that the threads of a war catastrophe are hidden to educated and observing students of politics. Closet diplomacy has ceased to be.

But let us also test Hervé's anti-militarism practically. I fear that if Hervé's method is tried in France in times of war, namely, the mass strike, desertion of reservists, and open insurrection, some very serious experience will be gained. I must declare firmly that these means with us are impossible, and beyond discussion. How things are in Germany, we see in the case of Karl Liebknecht, who is under trial for high treason, although in his writing he only quoted Hervé and declared his tactics as impossible. I also do not know whether the anti-military agitation, as carried on by Hervé, is not regrettable from his own standpoint. In the circles of the German military and the General Staff, his agitation is very

closely followed, and the War Party, which to be sure is small with us and has no adherents in governmental circles, welcomes a phenomenon which weakens a principal enemy. *In the ruling classes of Germany nobody wants war, partly out of regard for the existence of the Socialist Movement. Prince Buelow himself conceded to me that the governments know what great dangers for government and society lay in a European war, and therefore would avoid it if possible.* [Bebel here refers to the probability that revolution would follow war.]

On these grounds we cannot vote for the Jaurès-Vaillant resolution, which makes regrettable concessions to Hervéism in its last paragraph. Besides, it is not necessary to speak of such things. As to the matter itself, the fight against militarism and war, we are agreed. Nobody has been more consistent in this struggle than we Germans. On the contrary, Jaurès has often been held up to us as a patron of patriotism." Jaurès here interrupted with the remark: "Just as you are held up in France." Whereupon Bebel answered: "I have also been held up in your country as a great patriot, who would be for every war, even if it were not a war of defense. With us a different language is used. During the Morocco affair we used every effort to avoid war. If, even as Social Democrats, we cannot get along entirely without military armament as long as the relations of the various countries to one another have not undergone a fundamental change, this is only for defense, and upon the democratic principles which prevent a misuse of military force. In Germany we struggle against the existing militarism on land and water in every possible form, and with all our strength, but we cannot be pushed beyond into *methods of struggle which might endanger the party activities, and even the very existence of the party.*" (Our italics.)

Most significant are Bebel's statements, (1) that it would not be difficult for the Socialists of the world to say which government was the aggressor and which was on the defensive in case of war, (2) that there was absolutely no war party in Germany, and (3) that the German Party could not take up a more radical

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anti-war position for fear of making it unpopular and inviting governmental persecutions.

Jaurès, on the contrary, was very radical and uncompromising in his opposition to war—though, like the non-Socialist pacifists, he makes no suggestion as to the means of removing its underlying causes. He spoke in part as follows:

JAURÈS IN SUPPORT OF FRENCH MAJORITY RESOLUTION

Hervéism, which had a certain support fourteen months ago at the Limoges Congress, is on the wane, and is dying out. Hervé wishes to destroy the Fatherland. We wish to socialize the Fatherland for the benefit of the proletariat, by the transformation of the means of production into the property of all. For the nation is a treasure house of human genius and progress. And it would be a bad service to the proletariat to destroy this treasure of human culture. Our resolution has nothing to do with Hervéism. It is not the chance spectre of the brain of a dreamer, but has grown up as a necessity out of the great Fashoda and Morocco crises. Then the proletariat had to ask itself: Shall we suffer this great crime against humanity, which is planned by a few capitalists? Shall we not fight it by means of the great alliance of the powerful masses of organized labor? Is that a dream? Is that a utopia? At one time national prejudices may have made war inevitable, as when Italy was under the foreign domination of Austria, or when Germany became united through blood and iron. But now these national pretexts are vanished. And so in the Morocco crisis, the idea came to the French and German workers to unite. Even after Fashoda, the English trade unionists came to a mighty peace demonstration in Paris, though only after the danger of war was over. Shall we be surprised again in the future? No! We must be for settlement. We must bind the proletariat firmly together in an unconquerable army. *We are told [by the Socialists of the other side] that the struggle against war is in vain, that capitalism necessarily creates wars.* We are not relaxing in the struggle against capitalism. But if we struggle against clericalism, which delivers the brains of the workers over to exploiting capitalism, we must also

fight militarism and war, which hurls the body of the proletariat against one another in Chauvinism, hatred, and anger. It will be asked if we can say no more than Bebel, that we know of no sure means to stop the stirring up of the people against one another, and their mutual murder. It will be asked if the greatly increased force of the German working class, of the International proletariat, could do no more. In no questions are we any longer content with parliamentary action alone. The proletariat wishes to step upon the stage as a player of its own fortune. The prevention of war must also be given by the proletariat all the powerful force that it has in its great masses. Bebel has declared for a general strike in case the right of suffrage is taken away, and the Party Congress at Jena reached such a revolutionary decision in that case that Bebel already saw himself wading up to his knees in blood.

Kautsky, in *Die Neue Zeit*, has declared for direct action in case the German troops should interfere in favor of the Czar. Bebel repeated this sentence before the Reichstag. If you can say that, you can also say it in the case of all national conflicts. Certainly the military intervention of Germany in favor of the Czar, against the Russian Social Democracy, will be the most extreme, the sharpest imaginable form of class struggle. But if a government does not go into the field directly against Social Democracy, but, frightened by the growth of Socialism, seeks to make a diversion abroad, *if a war arises in this way between France and Germany, would it be allowable in that case that the French and German working class should murder one another for the benefit of the capitalists, and at their demand, without making the most extreme use of its strength?* If we did not try to do this, we should be dishonored.

Bebel has pictured for us the dangers of an anti-military agitation in Germany. We certainly do not wish to risk the destruction of the strongest branch of International Socialism. But I think you exaggerate. You went through the days at the time of the anti-Socialist law, when the hand of a man pressed upon you, which was ten times stronger than that of any other Prussian minister. The hand of the law can make itself felt upon a few, but it is not easy to break the power of three millions.

Liebkecht is called before the military court, not because

he called the proletariat to arms, not for an uncertain and mis-named danger of war, but *the complaint expressly declares a war between Germany and France as likely*, and accuses him of high treason in case of such a war. *You must also bring this possibility into the scope of your thought, just as much as the possibility of the invasion of Germany by Russia, and make your preparation for it.* (Our italics.)

In his reply, Bebel did not take up the challenge of Jaurès. He still refused to say what the German Socialists would do in case of war with France. We give all the essential parts of his answer:

BEBEL ON THE COMING WAR

Hervé says that upon the threatened invasion of Russia by German troops, we did not do our duty to the International. In October, 1905, when the Russian Revolution had reached the climax, and even pessimists believed in an immediate and fundamental transformation of the Russian state, the Prussian Government feared that the revolution might pass over into Prussian Poland, and therefore strengthened the frontier guards in the east. But only for this purpose, and only in the east. Even the German Government did not think of an invasion of Russia, for the experience of 1792 showed what a storm of anger that would unchain. Also the moment the first Prussian battalion stepped over the frontier, the danger of a world war would immediately be at hand. Finally, even the Czar, who was to be rescued, would in this war be extremely compromised with his own people. Under all these conditions we had no grounds for special measures at that time.

Hervé has also recalled my expressions at Amsterdam (1904). It never occurred to me to say that it is a matter of indifference to us whether we have a republic or a monarchy. I said literally: "The republic is not so good as you represent it, and the monarchy is not so bad as you make it appear. If I had the choice between the French republic and the English monarchy, I do not know which I would choose. But if I had the choice of the German monarchy and a republic like the French, I would not be in doubt for a

moment." I said in Amsterdam that we would not risk our heads for the bourgeois republic.

In the debate it seemed for a while as if the chief differences between us arise from the fact that Germany refused to take up the struggle against militarism, and to carry its national responsibilities. Comrades, that never occurred to any of us. Not a single German comrade even thought of such a thing. At the previous International Congresses in the discussion of militarism we always found ourselves with the great majority, and have not changed our standpoint. On the contrary, our French comrades have changed their standpoint by coming nearer to Hervé, and in this way calling forth a split. *We know better than you Frenchmen how the conclusion of the Nancy resolution [that of the French majority] would be regarded in our country.* For the sake of nothing at all, for something that we do not know would even be carried out in a crisis, we are not willing to prepare trouble for ourselves and to seriously cripple our movement. Yesterday morning Adler well pictured the dialectical development of militarism. Unless all signs fail, I say, going further than he did, *militarism has reached a point in its development where we can see that the first time it is put in practice, militarism will break its own neck.* Our resolutions would not harm a hair on the head of militarism, if the evolution which it has taken in the last forty years did not necessarily undermine its own existence. We are not here perpetually to repeat, as we do in our agitation, the horrors of war and the disgusting character of militarism. I point at Germany, the first of military powers and the chief promoter of this whole development. . . .

Four million families will be in the greatest need—that is worse than a general strike. Think of this situation, of the feelings of these masses. We get a great part of our food from abroad. From the day of the declaration of war this importation will cease. [Bebel, we note, must have foreseen that England would be in the war.] We shall have no products of industry to sell any longer, because a great part of production has become impossible through the impossibility of exportation. This means further unemployment and suffering. Necessities increase in price. Perhaps actual famine breaks out. In the mass battles of the present, a German general has declared we shall not know where to take the

wounded or where to bury the dead. And in such a situation shall we give ourselves over to the plan of a general strike? Upon our first appeal we should be laughed down. *What will happen I do not know. But I know that this war will probably be the last, and that it brings the whole of bourgeois society into danger. So we can do nothing but educate and bring light into people's hearts. Agitate and organize.*

From a certain standpoint one can say, as a Social Democrat, that a great European war would further our cause more than ten years of agitation, and so we can only desire it. *But I would not conjure up such a frightful means of gaining our goal.* If, however, those who are most interested in maintaining bourgeois society do not understand that with such a war they are tearing up the roots of their existence, we cannot be disturbed at this, for I say, work away, we are your heirs, *if the ruling classes did not know that, we would long ago have had a European war. Only the fear of the Social Democracy has stopped it.* But if such a situation ever occurs, then it will no longer be a question of such a trifle as insurrection or a general strike. The civilized world will change its whole aspect from one end to the other, and knowing this, we do not need to worry over the means which may be used in such a moment. The German resolution says plainly and clearly that we must struggle against militarism with all means which, according to our judgment, we consider effective. We can neither view our tactics differently nor force them upon the enemy. But world-shaking events may change our minority into a majority. For, since civilization has existed, there has never been a movement which has seized the masses so deeply as Socialism. There has never been a movement which has given the masses such a deep insight into the spirit and nature of our civilization. There have never been so many men who know what they want of state and society. Let us keep our eyes open and our hearts clear. Then the right moment will find the right men ready.

VANDERVELDE ON MILITARISM

According to Vandervelde, Bebel's position amounted to a refusal of the German Socialists to take up the struggle against militarism. He said:

Hervé has said that as a small nation, Belgium is not much interested. Such an expression is very strange in the mouth of an anti-militarist, since the little nations would be the very ones to become victims of a war, and Belgium, moreover, would likely be the battlefield of the war. We are for Hervé's goal, but not for his means. . . .

My heart leans toward the Vaillant resolution. It is true that Leopold will not declare war, so that it would be very easy for us to declare for insurrection in case of war. We know the difficulties in which the other countries are, but we believe nevertheless that a solution is possible. If an agreement were not reached, if the French declare that they will proclaim a general strike, and the Germans that they will not do it, then that is an impossible situation for an International Congress. The Germans should think of this. As a friend of the Germans, who has been a comrade for twenty years, who has learnt much from them, who owes so much to them, I ask if now they do not wish to learn something from the practices of other countries. *The majority of the Congress finds it would be an evil thing if the French plunge into an anti-military agitation, while the Germans oppose it as much as they possibly can.* We want no resolution which clothes nothingness in resounding words. But we want all countries to take up the struggle against militarism. We must labor to win the brains of the soldiers. If we regard the transactions in The Hague with distrust and contempt, we must avoid giving the same picture of weakness here.

The resolution finally adopted was framed for the purpose of covering up these differences. The part referring to the proposed international general strike against war we discuss in the following chapter, especially devoted to this subject. The reasoning upon which it rests is given in the following paragraphs dealing with the causes of war, which follow the lines of the German as against the French resolution.

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ANTI-WAR RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS AT STUTT GART (1907)

The Congress reasserts the resolution adopted by former International Congresses against militarism and imperialism, and declares afresh that the war against militarism must proceed hand in hand with the general class war. Wars between nations are, as a rule, the consequences of their competition in the world market, for each state seeks not only to secure its existing markets, but also to conquer new ones. This means the subjugation of nations and lands, and, therefore, spells war. But wars result furthermore from the continual attempts of all lands to outstrip their neighbors in military armaments—one of the chief supports of the capitalist class supremacy, and therefore of the economic and political oppression of the proletariat. Wars are also favored by national prejudices which the ruling classes fan into a flame for their own interests, and in order to turn the attention of the proletariat away from the interests of their class and from the international consolidation of those interests. Wars, therefore, are part and parcel of the nature of capitalism; they will cease only when the capitalist system declines, or when the sacrifices in men and money have become so great as a result of the increased magnitude of armaments that the people will rise in revolt against them and sweep capitalism out of existence. The working classes, who contribute most of the soldiers and make the greatest material sacrifices, are, therefore, the natural opponents of war. Besides which, war is opposed to their highest aims—the creation of an economic order on a Socialist basis, which shall express the solidarity of all nations.

In a word, wars are here regarded as being caused by—capitalism. And the only remedy is held to be—Socialism. The working classes, moreover, are the “natural” enemies of war.

RESOLUTION OF RUSSIAN AND POLISH DELEGATES

An additional formulation proposed by the Russian and Polish delegates, Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin, and Martoff, was in part as follows:

In case a war should, nevertheless, break out, the Socialists shall take measures to bring about its early termination and strive with all their power to use the economic and political crises created by the war to arouse the masses politically and hasten the overthrow of capitalist class rule.

This threat and prediction of a revolution to follow the war was finally incorporated in the Stuttgart resolution (see Chapter IV), and was adopted unanimously by the Congress of Basel in 1912. (See Chapter VII.) Naturally the time has not yet come for its discussion in connection with the present war—though evidently it has already been abandoned by the ultra-nationalist Socialists.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS AT COPENHAGEN (1910)

The Stuttgart resolution insists that the working classes are the sole opponents of war who can be relied upon. The following Congress at Copenhagen, in 1910, distinctly moderates this position, claiming only that the working classes have *greater* interests against war than any other class; though it still asserts that the organized workers alone have enough *power* to guarantee peace. The resolution contains an indirect recognition that there are other important forces besides the Socialists opposed to war in that it limits itself to the statement that wars will not “completely” cease before the end of capitalism, thereby suggesting that they may greatly diminish in frequency and intensity. Its most important sentences are the following:

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The workers of all countries have no quarrels or difference which could lead to war. Modern wars are the result of capitalism, and particularly of rivalries of the capitalist classes of the different countries for the world market, and of the spirit of militarism, which is one of the main instruments of capitalist class rule and of the economic and political subjugation of the working class. Wars will cease completely only with the disappearance of the capitalistic mode of production. The working class, which bears the main burdens of war and suffers most from its effects, has the greatest interest in the prevention of wars. The organized Socialist workers of all countries are therefore the only reliable guaranty of universal peace.

This resolution shows very strongly the existing tendency of the Socialists to modify some of their most fundamental tenets with regard to the causes of war.

WEAKENING OF THE OPPOSITION TO IMPERIALISM

Before passing to the proposed Socialist action to prevent war, it should be noted that there have been signs in recent years of the weakening of the opposition of a part of the Socialists to that economic and political policy which nearly all of them regard as the chief cause of war, that is, Imperialism. Imperialism, as we have seen, is the effort of the capitalists of a nation to secure control over markets or fields of investment to the exclusion, or disadvantage, of other capitalists. And it chiefly takes the form of colonies or "spheres of influence." (See Chapter II.)

The historic attitude of Socialists to this ownership and exploitation of colonies was briefly expressed at the Congress of London, in 1896, in a resolution declaring that "whatever may be the pretext of colonial politics, whether it be religion, or for the purpose of advancing civilization, it is in reality nothing but the extension of the field of capitalist exploitation in the ex-

clusive interest of the capitalist class." And this is still the position of the International Movement to-day, having been reaffirmed at Stuttgart in 1907. It is noteworthy, however, that *most of the Socialists of nations possessing colonies* voted at that Congress to modify this policy, including a majority of the British and a large part of the French and Germans.

The Germans were nearly equally divided—Kautsky and Ledebour speaking against colonies, and Bernstein and David in favor of them, the labor union leaders being with the latter faction. Naturally all those now most strongly in favor of the present war were then in favor of compromise with governmental colonialism and *vice versa*.

It is useless to reproduce the arguments of those who favored colonialism, as all disclaimed any intention to compromise with imperialism. Nevertheless, the connection, even if indirect, is undeniable, and it can be no mere coincidence that these are the same persons who are now adopting so many other governmental arguments in support of the present war.

CHAPTER IV

PROPOSED METHODS OF PREVENTING WAR: THE INTERNATIONAL GENERAL STRIKE

THAT means of preventing war which has been longest discussed at Socialist Congresses, and more vigorously than ever in recent years, is the proposed *international general strike*. This project has attracted general public attention on account of its spectacular character, and it has been especially popular among the working people because, if it could succeed against war, it could probably succeed also in other less difficult situations, and might prove a sovereign means of securing all the demands of labor, including even the establishment of a new social order.

In the discussion of Socialist Congresses this double aspect of the general strike must be held in mind. It has been most frequently discussed as a remedy against war rather than a means to advance or to obtain Socialism, because war is recognized as the specific evil of our present society, and because extreme measures against war would secure a wider support than extreme measures used for any other purpose. At the same time, all Socialists, all labor unionists, and most of the working people are even more interested in the economic advance of their class than they are in the abolition of war. So that, in all Socialist discussions there are two conflicts, that between those who favor the general strike as against those who oppose it as a means of advancing the cause of labor or of accomplishing social

revolution and that between those who favor and those who oppose it as a means of preventing war.

So, when the general strike was first brought up at the Congresses of Brussels and Zurich, in 1891 and 1893, it was rejected by an overwhelming majority, whereas at the Congress of Stuttgart, in 1907, it had the support of practically half of the Congress, and would have had some prospect of being carried at the proposed International Congress at Vienna in 1914, but for the fact that it was feared that the Germans and Austrians would refuse to accept it, and so its adoption would have created a dangerous split in the International Movement between those very groups where the split was to be most avoided (the Germans and Austrians being against, and the French and British in favor of, the measure). It was for this reason that Jaurès publicly declared, a few days before his death, that he did not intend to force the issue at Vienna—as we show in the last document quoted in this chapter (the discussion of the proposed international strike at the special Congress of the French Party in the middle of July, 1914).

The question had also been brought up before the British labor unions and they discussed action along these general strike lines at the time of the Morocco affair, 1911, as shown in another quotation in this chapter. On the other hand, the Germans, while denouncing the militarist party at the time of the Morocco crisis, proposed no radical remedy.

THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS OF BRUSSELS (1891)

The discussion in 1891 and 1893 shows that in twenty years the international has passed through nothing less than a revolution in its attitude towards the possible use of the general strike. It will be seen that the So-

cialist opposition to war was at least as strong at this early period as it is now. Indeed there can be very little doubt that it was stronger. Nationalistic sentiments, which have become somewhat common within certain Socialist groups since that time, were unheard of in 1891 and 1893. On the other hand, this very radical *practical* measure, an international general strike as a preventive of war, which has almost been adopted recently, was violently and almost unanimously rejected twenty years ago—not as being too radically anti-national, but as being anarchistic in character.

The following account of the discussion at the Brussels Congress (1891) is taken from the very authoritative summary of Jean Longuet, grandson of Karl Marx, and one of the Secretaries of the French Party, in the volume of the *Encyclopédie Socialiste* entitled “Le Mouvement Socialiste Internationale”:

The Congress at Brussels was confronted by a proposition of Domela Nieuwenhuis, then the leader of the Dutch Socialists. He has since evolved more and more towards anti-parliamentarianism. Nieuwenhuis proposed the following resolution:

“The Congress declares that the Socialists of all countries will reply to the proposition of a war by an appeal to the people to declare a general strike.”

A similar proposition was moved by an English delegate, Giles. The general strike, the mass strike as the Germans called it, was still quite new in the internationalist Socialist and Labor movement, and was somewhat compromised by the patronage that the anarchists had given it, so the proposition of Nieuwenhuis was received very coldly.

While proclaiming the internationalism of the proletariat which brings it about that “the enemy of the German worker is not the French worker, but the German bourgeois,” Wilhelm Liebknecht took a strong position against a proposal, “the authors of which run no risk, because, belonging to little neutral countries, they are not subjected to the crushing weight of militarism,”

Finally, the following resolution, presented by Wilhelm Liebknecht and Édouard Vaillant, and voted by fifteen nations against one (Holland), which abstained from voting, declared:

The militarism which burdens Europe at this moment is the fatal consequence of the permanent state of latent or open war imposed on society by the régime of the exploitation of man by man and the class struggle which results from it; only the creation of a Socialist society putting an end to the exploitation of man will put an end to militarism and insure permanent peace; as a consequence the duty and interest of those who wish to put an end to war is to enter into the International Socialist Party, which is the only true party of peace.

Accordingly the Congress appealed to all the workers "to protest by ceaseless agitation against all the archaisms of war, and alliances which favor it, and to hasten the triumph of Socialism by the development of the international organization of the proletariat."

THE CONGRESS OF ZURICH (1893)

The question of the attitude to be taken towards war was again brought up by Domela Nieuwenhuis at the Congress of Zurich (1893). To the idea of "the general strike" brought before the preceding Congress he added the proposition of "the military strike." Georges Plechanoff, the sole delegate of Russia at the Congress, had been appointed to report officially for the Congress on the subject. He rejected the Dutch proposition on the ground it would deliver the most Socialistic country (which would strike) in a defenseless condition into the hands of the most backward country (which would not strike). And the Cossack would reign over Europe.

To the bitter criticisms of Nieuwenhuis, who had reproached the German Party "for making concessions

to militarism," the veteran of the German Social Democracy, Wilhelm Liebknecht, replied with the following stirring speech:

To say that the German Socialist Democracy has passed over to militarism and chauvinism is to speak a falsehood which we have refuted in advance by our words and actions! In our fight against militarism we have not retreated by a hair's breadth!

The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine? We condemned it as an error. We denounced it as a crime. (Enthusiastic applause.) I said this in the Reichstag, before militaristic Germany, I repeated it before the people. I confirm it solemnly here, before the assembled proletariat of the world. We have paid for that opinion, I and my comrades, by bitter years of prison, the total number of which, if it was reckoned, would be more than a thousand. Not a man, not a penny, this is our programme. Since it came into existence, our party has not given to the German army a single man or a single penny! (Enthusiastic cheers of the German delegation.)

If the Dutch proposition were practical we would vote for it with both hands. It is only a pious wish. It is not practical. Such a proposition might arise in neutral Holland. It could not take root in military Germany. You say that our proposition is a farce. I fear that is the case with yours.

No, you cannot struggle against the Moloch of militarism by winning over a few isolated individuals, by provoking puerile, barrack insurrections. You would merely deliver to the Moloch a few unfortunate persons. You would merely give it a few victims more! What is necessary is indefatigable propaganda. Our spirit must be implanted in the army. When the masses are Socialists, militarism will have seen its last day! (Prolonged applause.)

It is to this end that we Germans have worked, are working, and shall work ceaselessly. Here, before the representatives of the international proletariat, I make a solemn pledge to this effect. (Enthusiastic applause.)

By a unanimous vote against two nations only (France and Holland) the Dutch resolution was re-

jected, and the German motion was accepted. It was to the same effect as the resolution voted at Brussels two years before.

So for fourteen years, from 1893 to 1907, the International Congresses appeared to be satisfied that the general strike was not an available preventive of war, but that the best Socialists could do was to adopt the other remedy, of continuing to refuse to vote a single soldier or a single penny for military purposes, until they were in control of parliaments and could bring about universal disarmament.

But in the meanwhile the British Labor Party, which habitually supports governments that increase armaments, was admitted to the International Congress. Neither this body nor its Socialist wing, the Independent Labor Party, has ever contemplated any fundamental change in this policy. Yet both the Independent Labor Party and the Labor Party are, and always have been, strongly opposed to war. It is therefore not surprising to see these organizations seeking an alternative remedy, and settling upon the general strike.

At the same time the general strike sentiment, already dominant among the French delegates at the International Congress of 1893 (as just noted), continued to develop. The revolutionary labor-union Socialists, the strongest anti-militarists and advocates of the general strike, had been expelled from the International at the Congress of London in 1896, but within a few years they had founded the Syndicalist Movement in France. While in conflict with the French Socialist Party at many points, the Syndicalists first persuaded the unions to adopt Socialism as their goal and then persuaded the party, at the French Congress of 1907 (at Nancy), to recognize in the French Federation of Labor Unions a body as Socialistic as the party itself, though fighting

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for Socialism by labor-union action. At the same time the idea of a general strike and insurrection against war was adopted by the Congress, securing the support of the moderates, Jaurès and Vaillant, though not of the orthodox, led by Guesde.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS OF STUTTGART (1907)

The International Socialist Congress held at Stuttgart in the same year, was not ready, however, definitely to demand that the Socialists of each nation menaced by war should join in an international general strike. The opposition, as we have shown in the previous chapter, came chiefly from the Germans, the Austrians, and their supporters—and the grounds of this opposition have already been made clear.

The Stuttgart Congress did indorse the general strike as a *possible* weapon against war—in case, when war was threatened, the International Socialist Bureau recommended its use. But out of regard for the wishes of the Germans direct indorsement of the general strike was avoided, as the language of the resolution shows:

The International is unable to prescribe one set mode of action to the working classes; it must of necessity be different in different lands, varying in time and place. But it is clearly its duty to encourage the working classes everywhere in their opposition to militarism. As a matter of fact, since the last International Congress at Brussels the working classes have adopted various ways of fighting militarism, by refusing grants for military and naval armaments, and by striving to organize armies on democratic lines. They have been successful in preventing outbreaks of war, or in putting an end to existing wars, and they have utilized the uncertain state of society which war, or the rumor of war, produces, to do something for the liberation of the working classes. We may mention the agreement entered into between the English and

French trade unions, after the Fashoda incident, for the purpose of maintaining peace and for re-establishing friendly relations between England and France; the policy of the Social Democratic parties in the French and German parliaments during the Morocco crisis, and the peaceful declarations which the Socialists in both countries sent each other; the common action of the Austrian and Italian Socialists, gathered at Trieste, with a view to avoiding a conflict between the two powers; the great efforts made by the Socialists of Sweden to prevent an attack on Norway; and lastly, the heroic sacrifices made by the Socialist workers and peasants of Russia and Poland in the struggle against the war-demon let loose by the Czar, in their efforts to put an end to its ravages, and at the same time to utilize the crisis for the liberation of the country and its workers. All these efforts bear testimony to the growing power of the proletariat and to its absolute determination to do all it can in order to maintain peace. The action of the working classes in this direction will be even more successful when public opinion is influenced to a greater degree than at present, and when the Labor parties in different lands are directed and instructed by the International.

If war ever threatens to break out, the working classes and their representatives in parliament in the countries affected should, with the assistance of the International Bureau, strive to take every step possible in order to avoid the occurrence of war. They must use every effort which, in their view, according to the political situation and the opposing class interests, will best contribute to the maintenance of peace.

If, however, despite all efforts, war breaks out, then it becomes their primary duty to bring about its conclusion as quickly as possible, and thereafter to make the most of the opportunities offered by the economic and political crises which are sure to follow the war, in stirring up public opinion and hastening forward the abolition of capitalist class rule.

By the time of the next Congress at Copenhagen in 1910, the general strike sentiment was still more in evidence, being now strongly supported by the British. J. R. MacDonald, speaking for the British Labor Party, rebuked the German Socialists for their unwillingness to indorse the international general strike. Ledebour,

speaking for the German Party, rebuked the British Laborites for keeping in office by their votes governments that increase expenditures for army and navy. The general strike amendment proposed by the British and French was finally postponed until the next Congress (the Congress of 1914, which never took place) as the following brief report of the American delegates will show.

THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS AT COPENHAGEN

The amendment, proposed by Vaillant, of France, and Keir Hardie, of England, was as follows:

Among the means to be used in order to prevent and hinder war, the Congress considers as particularly efficacious the general strike, especially in the industries that supply war with its implements (arms and ammunition, transport, etc.), as well as the propaganda and popular action in their most active forms.

Ledebour of Germany spoke at considerable length in favor of the resolution presented by the committee and against the Hardie-Vaillant amendment. Keir Hardie, who had been instrumental in drawing up the amendment, said in part:

The great question before us is that of hindering war and furthering disarmament. On this question the English Labor Party takes a clear position. We are not only against war, but also against militarism. We maintain that the army and navy are the brutal means used by the modern state to maintain the possessing class in the enjoyment of privileges. By no means do we wish to subscribe to the use of the general strike against the danger of war at all times in all nations. We only desire to say to the working class of all lands that if it unites its economic strength, the power of the working class is sufficient to make war impossible.

Vandervelde, of Belgium, introduced an amendment providing that the Congress send the amendment of

Keir Hardie and Vaillant to the International Bureau for study of the subject, and that at the next International Congress a report be presented on the investigations made. Both Keir Hardie and Vaillant agreed to this and the Vandervelde amendment was accepted by the Congress.

LETTER OF THE BRITISH SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

The arguments in favor of the proposed general strike were well summed up in a letter addressed in August, 1912, to the labor unions of Great Britain by Keir Hardie and Arthur Henderson, the two delegates representing these organizations, together with the Labor and Socialist Parties in the International Socialist Bureau:

Everyone will recognize the gravity and importance of the matter. War with all its horrors is always inimical to the interests of the working class, and is always in these days undertaken for the benefit of the financial and propertied classes. The recent South African War is a typical illustration of this truth, which is further exemplified by the present war between Italy and Turkey over Tripoli. The workers of the world have no interest in fighting each other, but have every interest in coming together for their mutual advantage. The International Conferences, which are now so frequently held by the trade-unionists of different countries, such as the Miners, the Metal Workers, the Textile Workers, the Printers, and many others, are tending to create a feeling of solidarity and to break down racial prejudices mainly founded upon misunderstanding, which only the ruling classes have an interest in perpetuating. Those who support an anti-war strike do not do so as an alternative to political action, but as supplemental to that action, and only to be used as a last resort where political action is not yet sufficiently developed to prevent it.

Take by way of illustration the case of Germany and this country. The German Reichstag has 397 members all told, of

whom 110 members are Social Democrats, representing 4,250,000 electors. These could undoubtedly put up a formidable fight against war on the floor of the Reichstag. A like remark applies to the Labor Party in our own country, numbering 41 in a House of Commons containing 670 members. A tremendous backing would undoubtedly be given to this fierce struggle for peace by the parliamentary representatives were it known that in both cases the trade unions had a firmly grounded understanding, mutually arranged, to cease work, if need be, rather than tamely to sit still and allow their masters and rulers, backed by the powerful influence of the capitalist press, to force war upon them. Besides, it should be remembered that the House of Commons has no voice in declaring war.

Since the Copenhagen Congress the Socialist attitude towards the general strike has not only been the subject of wide discussion; it had a somewhat more practical test, for at the time of the Morocco crisis, in 1911, it seemed the time had arrived when it might be put into effect.

It will be noted that the Germans did not suggest the general strike or any action approaching it as being even a remote possibility. It must here be pointed out, however, that some of the more revolutionary German Socialists feel that, although the most extreme and violent measures are justified to prevent war, against a highly organized military system like that of Germany a general strike *at the outbreak* of war would be a useless waste of human life, even if equally extreme measures might promise results at later stages of the war, or at its close.

SOCIALIST ACTION AT THE TIME OF THE MOROCCO AFFAIR (1911)

Vorwaerts, on July 4th, as soon as the Morocco affair broke out, urged the members of the Socialist Party "to protest against the methods of jingoes who wish the citizens' blood

for the capitalistic interests in Morocco, and against imperialism, which is the cause of the military dangers hovering over the German nation."

On July 7th, the French Socialist, Jean Jaurès, wrote to *Vorwaerts*, suggesting calmness and demanding energetic action on the part of the European proletariat. A few days later his paper, *L'Humanité*, published a resolution of the Executive Committee of the French Socialist Party to the effect that the French section of the International was ready to carry out the resolution of the last International Congress. [That of Stuttgart—see above.] The German *Vorwaerts* upon the receipt of this resolution responded, with the approval of the Executive Committee of the German Social Democratic Party, saying that the German Party accepted the initiative of the French comrades with the warmest sympathy and satisfaction, and adding: "Morocco is worth the bones of neither the French nor German workmen."

On August 17th an international peace demonstration, attended by several thousand workingmen, took place in London, arranged in co-operation between the Executive Committee of the Labor Party, the Federation of Trade Unions, and Trade Union Congresses. The meeting was addressed by Keir Hardie, J. R. MacDonald, and H. M. Hyndman. French guests participated as speakers. Keir Hardie demanded that the English workers must hold themselves prepared so that if the order for war and the murder of brothers went out, not a soldier or a cannon should be transported by steamer or railway. A resolution was passed calling attention to the danger to world peace, of the exploitation of home and foreign markets, and promising solemnly to prevent the breaking out of war.

J. R. MacDonald, chairman of the Labor Party, made the following remarks in the English Parliament:

"The House knows the forces, the organization, and the movement in Europe with which we, English Socialists are connected; that so long as there is a general federation of labor or a labor party they will all work for peace. The International Miners' Congress has just passed a resolution, that if peace should be interrupted at the present moment, we will nevertheless stand by it. We appreciate the deep seriousness of the situation. We also know that it is very useful for the ruling classes to learn the story of an organiza-

tion which will energetically support peace in evil as well as in good times."

When Lloyd-George delivered his belligerent speech in Mansion Hall, Bebel, German delegate to the International Socialist Bureau, urged a conference of the Bureau. The German Socialist Party arranged demonstrations all throughout Germany. In Berlin itself, ten mass meetings were held September 3d, the anniversary of "patriotic" Sedan. These were attended by one-half million organized workingmen. The following resolution was unanimously adopted:

"The meeting protests with the utmost energy against the latest course of the imperialistic policy of Germany. It is against permanent settlement in Morocco, as well as against the increase of the German colonial possessions through unworthy bargaining. The meeting is convinced that neither the German working class nor German commerce and industry would be profited by new colonial acquisitions; that, on the contrary, the burden of the people would be increased and an unforeseen war-danger created.

"The meeting turns with utmost indignation against capitalistic circles which, induced by selfish purposes, utilize the country's diplomacy to engage Germany in useless war.

"The meeting declares in the name of the working men that they would oppose all the criminal attempts which are directed towards bringing on a war, bloodshed, and destruction of the common welfare among the nations, *with all the means at their disposal.*"

While this resolution carefully avoids all suggestion of radical measures like the general strike, it clearly implies opposition—such as the refusal to vote military supplies.

THE SPECIAL FRENCH CONGRESS OF 1914

The French Socialists continued to discuss the general strike, particularly at a special Congress held for the purpose of instructing their delegates to the proposed International Congress at Vienna on August 23d (1914). This Congress is especially important because the French Socialists there once more advocated this

revolutionary anti-war measure of an international strike—on July 15th-17th, *only two weeks before the outbreak of the present war.*

The question of the proposed international general strike in case of war came before the French Congress as a resolution from the Seine Federation. It was supported by Vaillant himself, by Jean Jaurès, and by Sembat. Against it were arrayed Compère-Morel and Jules Guesde, who fought it energetically. The resolution in amended form was passed by a vote of 1690 to 1174. Among those not voting it was Guesde.

The resolution, as finally passed, read as follows:

The French Party considers the spontaneous general strike of the workers of all countries, combined with anti-war propaganda among the masses, as the most workable of all means in the hands of the workers to prevent war and to force international arbitration of the dispute.

Jaurès spoke in support of this resolution as follows:

It seems impossible to me that working people, who are most threatened by this storm, who are the ones to be hurled against one another, should not become conscious of their own strength. We Socialists show the crimes of governments in the press and in meetings. We make attacks on parliaments, but when the moment comes when the people are in danger, they must declare their position themselves. Notwithstanding all theoretical differences of opinion, there can be no differences whatever at the decisive moment. And if the systematic general strike is used in all countries for the purpose of fighting economic dangers, shall we not use it to fight against the danger of war? It is impossible that we should fail to do this. We have seen the spontaneous uprising of the Spanish workers, and that of the Russians—in spite of all old theories. But it is not a question of deciding whether the general strike will break out in case of war, but whether this movement shall break forth in confusion and anarchy, first here and then there, and too late, after war is already begun, or whether it shall be accomplished through

a voluntary and international understanding—as a general strike before the war, for the purpose of preventing it.

The problem is especially difficult and serious for two peoples: France and Germany. England is an island, and its fleet can bring supplies at all times. Russia, as in the time of Napoleon, is protected by its boundless size. But France is exposed to danger of being overwhelmed by pan-Germanism, Germany to the danger of pan-Slavism. Nobody suspects the German workers of having forgotten the help given by Russia to the counter-revolution of 1848, or of ignoring pan-Slavism; nobody will convince the French workers that they ought to overlook pan-Germanism. Therefore, an agreement is necessary.

It would be the crime of crimes to hurl the French and German workers against one another (prolonged applause), as the jingoists desire. But for this very reason we must appeal to the International to direct both peoples. Action is possible—but not after the outbreak of war. For then the world is surrendered to all the powers of Hell. And, as Shakespeare said, nobody can call the Leviathan back to the shore—though the justice of the nature of things waits for the guilty in the shape of the hungry masses, forced to fight for a cause that is not their own. But in the period for preparation of war, the period of press agitation, the general strike may break out in both of the contending countries, and the International may declare: “We shall allow the strike to end first in that country which offers arbitration to the other.”

We are told not to use big words. Certainly we shall not. We know that at the present time, in Europe, no national section of the working class can give a guarantee to that of other countries, that it will join in the common action. And I confess that we French especially, who have not been able up to the present to create a great economic organization of the proletariat, must not use big words. We do not demand that a pledge should be given [to strike]. But we have seen explosions in Russia, and recently in Italy. We must make the proletariat conscious of what the world expects from it, and if we fill it with the idea that its mission is to give peace to the world, we shall make it capable of accomplishing this ideal. (Thunderous applause.)

The majority of the committee has considered it best not

to offer an amendment to the Copenhagen resolution, but to make an addition to it as follows: "Among the means of avoiding and preventing war and of forcing governments to arbitrate, the Party Congress considers as particularly effective the simultaneous general strike of the organized workingmen, as well as popular agitation and other action in an efficient form."

Simultaneous action is necessary when the danger appears.

It goes without saying that our revolutionary anxiety for peace is closely connected with our anxiety for the independence of all peoples. And there is no more noble principle than that which proclaims it as a duty of the proletariat of all countries to protect the independence of all nations.

If we have left out the special mention of certain industries [as in the original Vaillant-Keir Hardie resolution at Copenhagen—see above], we have done it to emphasize the fact that the whole working class must be set in movement. In doing this we do not deny that the action of certain sections is of special importance.

When we try to force an appeal to arbitration we do this to gain the help of all thinking men. And in order not to give our enemies an excuse for attack, we have emphasized the fact that the strike must be simultaneous [*i.e.*, international]. (Stormy applause.)

Jaurès was ably supported in the Congress by Vaillant and Sembat. Vaillant said:

We cannot decide this matter in committees such as these, but must spread the idea among the masses so as to enable them to arrest action on both sides of the boundaries. The general strike has been tried and has withstood the test. In Russia, where, it is true, conditions are unique; in Sweden, and in Belgium. Prussia discussed it. But even the partial crippling of certain industries would have resulted in preventing mobilization. As, for instance, the French railroad strike which paralyzed two systems, and the transport workers' strike in England, evidence of the success of which Ramsay MacDonald had from high sources. We in France have always been in sympathy with the Confederation of Labor on this proposition. We have always approved of the general strike as a weapon. Why do we hesitate to indorse

it as the means which should be employed now? . . . It is impossible now to change our former decisions. In Copenhagen we emphasized the Stuttgart resolution. Can we, after our tremendous increases of power, and particularly after the Balkan War, stay idle? Who, among those who lived through the terrible days of 1870, will not say with me, "It must not happen again"?

Sembat approved of the contention of Jaurès that action before the beginning of hostilities is essential, but Guesde interrupted him with the remark: "That's why Germany will defeat the resolution." Sembat then continued: "I do not want to exaggerate, but I am convinced that if the differences between France and Germany become acute, the strike will break out of itself." (Stormy applause stopped the speaker.)

Guesde here interrupted again: "As long ago as 1891 Liebknecht declared: 'We will accept no formulation which delivers the more Socialistic country to the less Socialistic.' That would be to deliver Germany to Czarism. The Social Democracy will never consent to that."

Sembat answered: "I believe that too. There is not a single workingman who would undertake to disarm his country for the advantage of the invader. I declare, in agreement with Jaurès and Vaillant, that we will accept the general strike only if it is also accepted in Germany."

The chief opponents of the general strike were Guesde and Compère-Morel, leaders of the orthodox Marxists. The latter argued as follows:

Would we, in the event of an invasion, declare a general strike? For what purpose, then, do we favor the institution of a militia? Would not a general strike of soldiers be identical with insurrection? We in France were not even able to do in France at the time of the Morocco expedition what the Italians did at the time of Tripoli. Why decide on something we are not able to put through? Now

suppose that the proposition carried in Vienna. Not all sections of the International have equally developed organizations. The most developed country, therefore, would suffer most. The present condition of the proletariat of the world does not permit of such methods. And what does our decision mean? The ruling classes would simply draft the workingmen of the industries in question into the army. Why do we not bring our force to bear on preventing and avoiding war instead? When war is once declared, resistance is made difficult. . . .

The amplifications of Vaillant and Jaurès have completely changed the Keir Hardie-Vaillant formulation. They have limited it to a preventive action, and this falls into the category of "all means," which the Stuttgart resolution recommends. What is the purpose, then, of a formulation which injures our propaganda and—which *one will not dare to defend before the voters?* And did not the representatives of the arsenal workers of Bourges declare at the Labor Union Congress that they would not undertake the responsibility of an insurrection? But the general strike and insurrection are inseparable [Vaillant calls out: Belgium—referring to the general strike of 1913]. One cannot make that comparison, even if we suppose that all nations go into the general strike. For shall we all carry it out with the same intensity? We must declare that we will use all means to prevent a war of aggression and also that we will use all means for the defense of our country. In this way we will strengthen our propaganda, and at the same time, our power for maintaining peace.

Compère-Morel proposed a resolution which repeated the Stuttgart and Copenhagen declarations. He concluded:

The amendment of Keir Hardie and Vaillant can only serve as a pretext for exceptional laws against the working people. Yes, in the unlikely case that the proposal is accepted and carried out, it could only assure the defeat of the best organized proletariat and that which was truest to the decisions of the International.

Guesde (now Minister) reached the same conclusions:

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The general strike would be a real danger for the Socialism of the more progressive countries. And how could the International Bureau make the strike simultaneous? And even if it could, would not the difference in the strength of the various labor organizations remain? The more strongly organized country would be crushed. And that is high treason against Socialism.

CHAPTER V

PROPOSED METHODS OF PREVENTING WAR:

THE REFUSAL OF MONEY FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES

THE historic rôle of parliaments, from the democratic standpoint, as well as from the standpoint of Socialists, is to control governments through control of the governmental purse strings. Socialists have everywhere and always opposed war and preparation for war, unless on the most limited scale, and for the most obviously defensive purposes. And until 1913 there had never been any disagreement among Socialists that it is the duty of their representatives in parliaments to refuse to non-Socialist governments, which are all more or less aggressive as to foreign policy, all money for military purposes.

Unlike the case with the proposed general strike, as to the use of which there has been a great change of Socialist opinion (as we have shown), there has been very little change as to this remedy. If the German Socialist Party voted money for military purposes in 1913, it did so with the claim that it was not voting money for military purposes, but that the money had already been voted, and that it was deciding merely as to the form of taxation by which this money should be raised. Before the present war, with this possible exception, there was no considerable Socialist support anywhere for the proposition that Socialist legislators might vote money for military objects.

Only in Great Britain, where the non-Socialist Labor Party dominates, has the opposite course been followed, that is, before the present war. Now, of course, the war itself has brought a number of changes in the Socialist position as to war credits, especially in Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and other countries where the governments are supported because, in the present crisis, they are not suspected of desiring to wage aggressive war. It is hardly necessary to say that this refusal to vote military supplies on the part of the Socialist parliamentary minorities was not offered as an immediate preventive of war, as long as existing political conditions continue. It was realized that the Socialist vote in parliaments, even when added to the vote of anti-militarist bourgeois democrats and radicals, was hardly sufficient to prevent the further growth of militarism and the danger of war. But with the steady development of Socialism and of bourgeois pacificism it was hoped that this plan of financial opposition might, before many years, check the growth of armaments, then lead to their reduction, and finally hasten the tendency toward permanent international peace.

The question is now whether this policy will be continued or abandoned after the present war. But equally important is the question whether this position had already been abandoned by the German Socialist before the present war. The voting of increased taxes for military purposes by the German Socialist majority in 1913 is scarcely less momentous than their vote of the war loan on August 4, 1914, and the two actions are clearly connected.

It is scarcely necessary, however, for us to comment here upon this second question, as our documents are so complete as to throw light upon it from every side. Moreover, it is undoubtedly a more scientific and non-

partisan method to allow the situation to be developed on both sides by the German Socialists themselves, since the German minority, as our documents show, made an able and thorough criticism of the majority.

Let us first state briefly the position of the International. In the anti-war resolution of the International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart, in 1907, already referred to, there occurs the following passage *definitely prohibiting Socialists, in parliaments, from voting military supplies under any circumstances*—a resolution all the more binding because it was passed unanimously.

THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS AT STUTTGART (1907)

The Congress regards it as a duty to impress on the working classes, and especially on their representatives in all parliaments, the absolute necessity of opposing all naval and military armaments and of refusing funds for their upkeep. They must remember the nature of modern society: that these armaments only help to continue the opposition of nations to each other. The proletariat must make it their business also to educate the children of the working classes in the spirit of international brotherhood and Socialism, and to strengthen their class consciousness.

The anti-war resolution at the next International Socialist Congress (the last held, that of Copenhagen, in 1910) was equally explicit. This was also passed unanimously:

THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS OF COPENHAGEN (1910)

The Congress, reiterating the oft-repeated duty of Socialist representatives in the parliaments to combat militarism with all means at their command and *to refuse the means for armaments*, requires from its representatives:

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(a) The constant reiteration of the demand that international arbitration be made compulsory in all international disputes.

(b) Persistent and repeated proposals in the direction of ultimate complete disarmament; and, above all, as a first step, the conclusion of a general treaty limiting naval armaments and abrogating the right of privateering.

(c) The demand for the abolition of secret diplomacy and the publication of all existing and future agreements between the governments.

(d) The guaranty of the independence of all nations *and their protection from military attacks* and violent suppression. (Our italics.)

We can now turn to the treatment of the military budget by the Socialists in the German Reichstag in the spring of 1913, and the discussion of their action by the annual Congress of the German Party held at the close of the summer of that year. Hermann Wendel, a Socialist member of the Reichstag and of the majority faction, which was responsible for the action taken, wrote a summary in *The New Review* (September, 1913), from which we take the following paragraphs, as explaining sufficiently the *conditions* under which the action was taken:

THE FIRST VOTE OF THE GERMAN SOCIALIST PARTY IN FAVOR OF INCREASED TAXES FOR MILITARY PURPOSES (1913)

1. THE SOCIALIST ACTION STATED AND DEFENDED BY HERMANN WENDEL, SOCIALIST MEMBER OF THE REICHSTAG ("THE NEW REVIEW")

When at the beginning of this year the German people was astounded by the most monstrous military bill that a government had ever dared to offer to a country—it demanded an increase in the army of not less than 136,000 men—the Social Democratic Party, faithful to its traditions, assumed a distinctly hostile attitude toward this most recent extravagance

of militarism. In the interest of the world's peace, of popular liberty, and of popular welfare, it fought to the bitter end militarism in general and the new military bill in particular, and won a number of brilliant moral victories. For by courageous criticism and by exposure of all the foul characteristics of the present military system it has aroused the masses and has dealt a telling blow to the authority of the militaristic idols. But the struggle of the Social Democratic Party inside as well as outside of the parliament was unable to prevent the passage of the military bill, for the Socialist Party stood entirely alone, hence in the minority. There have been times when even bourgeois parties, such as the Clerical and Liberal, made strong resistance to new military demands and persisted so stubbornly in their refusal that the result was, as in 1893, a dissolution of the Reichstag. But of these times we may say: It was long, long ago. All bourgeois parties, from the Right to the Left, have now surrendered themselves, body and soul, to imperialistic world-politics, and hence are saturated to the bones with the militarist spirit. . . .

But if the fight of the Social Democratic Party against the strengthening of the army was a battle in which from the very beginning it was impossible to hope for victory, it was otherwise with the struggle over the bill providing the necessary funds. The ruling class, nobility and bourgeoisie, have hitherto, by means of indirect taxation, saddled upon the propertyless masses the cost of its expensive naval and military policy. Indirect taxation was Bismarck's ideal ["because the individual does not suspect that he is paying taxes"], and by indirect taxes and assessments all the expenses of the military, naval, and colonial policies have been met in the glorious era of Wilhelm II. Thereby all the food articles and the absolute necessities of the great mass have been gradually raised in price to the extreme limits of the endurable. The burden of the German people through indirect taxation amounts to-day to twenty-five marks (six dollars) per person. That is to say, a working-class family of four persons (father, mother, two children) having an income of 1000 marks pays out 100 marks, or 10 per cent. of its income, in indirect taxes!

The Social Democratic Party has always opposed vigorously all attempts at new indirect taxation and has several

times sought, though without success against the bourgeois majority, to carry through its taxation programme providing for direct and progressive income, property, and inheritance taxes throughout the empire. Thus far the direct taxes have been reserved for the federal states, where they are under the jurisdiction of reactionary parliaments—witness Prussia!—and hence can be assessed according to the will and desire of the possessing classes. The bourgeois parties, chiefly the representatives of the great land-owners and of mobile capital, have feared, as the devil fears holy water, to hand over by an imperial income and property tax “the pocketbook of the possessors” to the Reichstag, elected by universal and equal suffrage.

If the great land-owners and the owners of mobile capital had had their way, the immense cost of the monstrous military increase would now also have been saddled by means of indirect taxes upon the propertyless masses of the people. But meanwhile the wind had changed. The people, embittered by the taxation robbery of 1909, had cast four and a quarter million of Socialist votes in the Reichstag elections of 1912, and in the parliament were seated 110 Socialists, who could not be utterly ignored. Hence the first great result of the Social Democratic victory of 1912 was this, that the government proposed to raise the gigantic costs of the military increase mainly by taxation of the rich—these costs should amount to a lump expenditure of 1000 millions of marks and a permanent annual expenditure of 200 million marks. Without the four and a quarter million Social Democratic votes and without the 110 Socialists in the Reichstag the government would never have thought of such a thing. . . .

The Social Democratic representatives, after mature reflection, also voted in favor of the [special] military assessment, although it would have passed even had they voted against it. This affirmative vote arose from the circumstance that the [special] military assessment represents the first step toward a taxing system corresponding in principle to the demands of the Social Democracy.

The essential point is that the government itself proposed graduated direct taxes as the means for paying

for its new military bill—thus following along the lines of a number of other governments, including that of Great Britain. The policy, then, was in no sense Socialist.

With these selections from Wendel's article as an introduction, the reader is in a position to understand the whole question as presented to the Party Congress of 1913 by the Executive Committee, the Reichstag Group, and the leading speakers on both sides. (We quote from the report of the Socialist Party Congress of 1913.)

2. "THE MOST MONSTROUS MILITARY BILL"

(The Governmental Bill as Reported by the Reichstag Group to the Socialist Party Congress)

In round numbers the following increase of military equipment was called for by the new armament bill:

4,000 officers.
15,000 petty officers.
117,000 privates.
27,000 horses.

The German army in times of peace was to be increased by this bill from 544,221 privates and regulars to 661,176.

This exorbitant demand was accompanied by a declaration which stood qualitatively and quantitatively in an inverse ratio to the gigantic proportions of the armament bill. In scarcely 20 lines—not pages—the arguments were presented: the Balkan War, the long, extended boundary lines of Germany, and the necessity of universal armament. The arguments which the Prime Minister and the Minister of War added verbally were, as far as the subject-matter was concerned, on a level with the laboriously collected platitudes of the written explanation.

The appropriation bill that was to provide the funds necessary to cover the outlay caused by the new increases, was no better. The government realized, it is true, that this terrible sum *could not* again be raised through indirect taxes from the great mass of the people, certainly not in the great anni-

versary year of 1813. It proposed, therefore, in order to raise this "extremely high sum," as the government itself expressed it, to call for a single extraordinary contribution from the very wealthy.

3. THE SOCIALISTS AGAINST THE INCREASE OF ARMAMENT

(From the Reichstag Group Report to the Party Congress)

Our first speaker at the first reading of the armament bills in the open session of the Reichstag, Comrade Haase [chairman of the Reichstag delegation], called attention at once, emphatically and sharply, to the unbelievable weakness of the [governmental] argument. The generalities of the Prime Minister and the Minister of War might just as well have been used to justify a requisition for 10,000 instead of 100,000. Foreign political conditions do not warrant the expenditure. Our relations with England are good. The Balkan states, far from being dangerous to us, will soon fall into dissension and strife with one another. *The Prime Minister's reference to the threatening Slavic peril is but a theoretical fantasy. The French chauvinist is not one iota worse than our own German "patriot."* The people on either side of the boundary line demand peace. The mutual manifesto drawn up by the French and German Socialists on the 15th of March proves that this is so. Russia is busy with her own internal troubles and with the maintenance of her power in the Far East.

All of these reasons are but a cloak for the real reason. "You want elbow room in order to carry out your imperialistic policies. . . . Armaments must be increased to the extreme that we may add weight to our demands, when the time comes for the division of Turkish spoils among the great European nations. Not for the protection of our border—no, the intimidation of other nations is our aim,—those nations, who, like our own imperialists, urge on to war and conquest." Haase then proceeded to demonstrate the correctness of his assumption. Step by step he traced back the history of the armament bill, showing conclusively that the Prime Minister and Minister of War had succumbed to the machinations of the "Wehrverein" and the imperialistic influences which stand behind it.

4. THE SOCIALIST MAJORITY FORCES THE REICHSTAG TO VOTE
ON MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND MILITARY TAXES
SEPARATELY

(From Same Report)

The Budget Commission decided upon two readings of both the military expenditure and the military taxation bills. The Conservatives and the Center demanded that the first reading of the armament or military expenditure bill and that of the military taxation bill be taken together. According to this plan, the matter was to be discussed as a whole. They hoped in this way to prevent a possible union of the radical elements with the Social Democracy.

At the beginning the order of procedure was left undecided. But when the first reading of the military expenditure bill was ended, a discussion on the order of business arose, which involved the conflicting interests of the different groups on the question of military taxation. The Conservatives and the Center demanded the immediate disposition of both bills, the National Liberals and the Progressives, while with them in spirit, insisted upon the complete disposition of the military expenditure bill first, so as to permit independent voting on each of the two questions. They hoped thus to be free to form a majority with some other party or group of parties when voting on the military taxation law [which was to decide how the money for the military expenditures was to be provided]. The Social Democratic group held the deciding vote.

The great majority of the Socialist group decided to force a second reading of the military expenditure bill as soon as the first reading was ended, instead of first taking up the armament taxation bill, which would have resulted in coupling the two together.

5 THE MAJORITY OF THE SOCIALISTIC GROUP DECIDES TO VOTE
IN FAVOR OF TAXES FOR MILITARY PURPOSES

(From Same Report)

After the armament and the military taxation bills had gone through two readings, the Socialist group faced its most difficult problem. How was it to vote at the final, decisive, third reading? The members were fully conscious of the importance of the question in the present political crisis. After serious consideration of the whole matter in two caucus ses-

sions, one of which lasted more than six hours, in a long and objective, though frequently heated, discussion, the position of the Socialist delegation was determined.

The attitude toward the army bill itself [the armament or military expenditure bill] was a question which needed no discussion. It was a matter of course that Socialist speakers, from the first reading of the bill through all stages of its parliamentary deliberation, should attack the bill as a whole and in all its parts in the most decisive terms. It was thoroughly understood that they should vote against this unnecessary and dangerous military expenditure. In taking this stand the Socialist members of parliament do not deny the necessity of a people's army. On the contrary, we are trying to enforce this method of public defense. We merely refuse to support the present standing army because it is an instrument of capitalist class rule.

The real discussion began only when the question of voting for or against the proposed military tax was brought before the body. Opinions here differed widely.

A number of our representatives defended the opinion that the Socialist group must vote in favor of the military and the property taxes included in the army taxation bill.

The military tax is practically a direct income and property tax levied for a period of three years, a tax, therefore, which in spirit is in harmony with the immediate demands of our platform, though unsatisfactory in many details. The same may be said of the property tax bill. It is true, the progressive property tax as here presented is likewise insufficient, but in spite of this, the property tax law represents a step forward on the road toward a national income, property, and inheritance tax law. In our programme we demand the adoption of such a law. On the other hand, our programme does not state that the purpose for which the income from such taxes is to be used, shall determine whether we are to support the tax itself. Our constituents would not understand why the Social Democratic Party should oppose a national direct tax when it was for the first time in a position to force the adoption of such a tax by the votes of its representatives. A vote against this property tax would be sure to make our agitation more difficult, inasmuch as, in fighting indirect taxation, we have always demanded the introduction of a system of direct taxes.

The existing situation in the Reichstag, furthermore, forces us to vote in favor of these laws. Granted that the temporary military tax would pass even without our vote. That this would be the case with the property tax law is doubtful. In fact, it is very probable that the Conservatives, the Polish members, and a number of the Center would vote against the property tax, which would mean its defeat. That would leave two possibilities. *The Reichstag might be dissolved*, or the whole question of taxation might be laid over until the fall session. *Personally every one of us would welcome the opportunity for agitation presented by the election of a new Reichstag. But we should go into the campaign under unfavorable conditions. The people would accuse us of having defeated a national direct property tax bill, although we had always demanded direct taxes. It is likely that we would return to parliament a decreased representation, an eventuality we could not risk in view of the coming revision of the tariff.* The weakening of the Socialist representation under these circumstances would be detrimental to the interests of the German working class, while in some measure it would offer righteous satisfaction to the high tariff supporters. . . .

The use to which the income derived from these taxes is to be put is a consideration entirely foreign to the matter at hand. When we go to a vote on the armament taxation bill the fate of the armament bill itself will have been decided. We could not hinder the passage of the armament appropriation bill by refusing to vote for the proposed military tax.

When, therefore, the armament bill will have passed its third reading, in spite of our attacks and against our votes, it is our duty to keep the burden of this new military expenditure from falling upon the shoulders of the working class. This we can do only by voting in favor of the proposed military and property tax laws. In doing this the German Social Democracy does not act contrary to the spirit of international solidarity, but fulfills the provisions of the mutual manifesto of the Socialists in the French Chamber of Deputies and in the German Reichstag, issued March 1, 1913, according to which the financial burden caused by military expenditures which are authorized in spite of the opposition of the Socialist group, shall be borne by the wealthy class of the nation.

These views were opposed by a second group of Socialist

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representatives, who maintained that we must vote against both bills.

A part of them based their argument on the old axiom of the party: "For this system not one man, not one penny!" The purpose of a tax measure is its chief consideration. Though the armament bill, theoretically, will be discharged before a final vote on the tax question is taken, an inner connection between the bills undeniably exists. If we grant the government the means for carrying out the armament appropriation bill by voting for both tax laws, our direct approval of military expenditures would arouse the antagonism of the whole country. The masses have appreciated and understood these views; our increase in votes showed this plainly. New tactics must cause confusion. Our programme, in demanding direct taxes, does not direct us to support such taxes in all cases, irrespective of the purpose for which they are being levied. We may vote in favor of direct taxes where they do away with the indirect tax, but here this is not the case. In fact, the direct taxes proposed by the government will be passed even though we vote against them. The actions of the capitalist parties must not influence our judgment. They are striving for momentary victories, we must consider every question in the light of its effect upon the masses and upon social development. We need not fear the dissolution of the Reichstag. Our supporters will understand why, again, we have given "not a man, not a cent." *Even if we should lose seats, we certainly would not lose votes.* In our agitation we would use the fact that the government was forced, by our strength, to propose direct taxes, and our hearers will agree with our position, will support us because a strengthening of our forces will mean that we shall not only hinder the passage of new indirect taxes, but shall be strong enough to force better taxation laws than those now in force.

The common manifesto [of the French and German Socialists] of March 1st does not pledge us to vote for the new military tax laws. It calls only for a vigorous struggle for property taxes. Bitter discussion will be caused in the party by our vote in favor of these laws. The welfare of the party should stand far above a momentary benefit to be derived from a favorable political constellation.

The Socialist parliamentary group voted—52 against 37—in favor of the position taken by the first group, 7 members

refrained from voting. In the session of the parliamentary caucus on the following day the minority demanded a reconsideration of the question, and, if necessary, another vote. The majority voted this down after a lively debate, and thus ratified its vote of the preceding day.

The caucus was unanimously of the opinion that the minority must be ruled by the decision of the majority, that is, the Socialist group must vote unanimously at the final reading, and that all members must be present.

By a unanimous vote it was decided to precede the vote of our party by a declaration of the motives which led to the vote. The latter was drawn up by a committee, to which members representing all viewpoints were elected.

6. OFFICIAL DECLARATION OF THE SOCIALIST REICHSTAG GROUP

When the military bill was put to a final vote [in the Reichstag], Comrade Haase presented the following [public] declaration for the Social Democratic group:

"A majority of this house has voted a new, a terrible, and a totally unnecessary army increase. We have proved to you that this is not the way to protect our country from the danger of war, to insure peace among civilized nations. We have emphatically warned you, and we repeat our warning in this hour: this continual military rivalry between nations fosters mutual distrust, disrupts international relations, and, despite all our assurances of peaceful intentions, will evoke the spirit of world-wide war against the will and against the interests of the workers of all nations.

"At the same time militarism as an instrument of class rule is a constant menace to internal freedom. You have defeated the motions through which we sought to abolish grave abuses in the present system. You have refused to consider our recommendation to replace the standing army by popular armament. The military bill has become a law. Now we are faced by the question: 'Who shall pay the cost?' We have always insisted that military expenses should not be piled upon the shoulders of the poor; we stand on the platform of the International Social Democracy. We are in accord with our comrades in the French Chamber of Deputies. Together with them we declared to the world on the 1st of March of the current year in a mutual manifesto: 'If in spite of our

determined opposition, our opponents insist upon burdening the people with new militaristic expenditures, the Social Democratic Parties of both countries will do all in their power to place the burden of the increase upon the shoulders of the well-to-do and wealthy citizens of our country.' In accordance with this principle we shall vote against the law which provides for a change of our national finance system, though by voting in its favor several benefits might be gained. But these are wiped out by the fact that this law increases the war fund, an institution that is politically and economically a menace to our nation; because, furthermore, the reduction of the sugar tax, which has so often been promised to the people, is once more disregarded.

"We vote also against the stamp act because it throws an unjustifiable burden upon the middle class.

"The laws providing for a single, extraordinary military tax and for a property tax have many deficiencies we have tried in vain to correct. Nevertheless they are the beginning of a form of taxation we have demanded upon all occasions: direct taxation in the form of national income, property, and inheritance taxes.

"To our great satisfaction the plan to turn over the duty of collecting the necessary military tax to the legislatures of the individual states, to bodies which are elected under reactionary election laws, was defeated. This proposal gave to the states the power to burden the propertyless classes with new, indirect taxes.

"We shall vote for the proposed tax laws because we hope thereby to prevent the passage of other tax bills which would throw the whole burden upon the poor of the country. We are convinced, moreover, that the taxing of the upper classes, in order to support new armament measures, may be an effective means of dampening the enthusiasm for increased military forces which obtains in these circles and thus indirectly of gaining a new weapon in our struggle against militarism."

7. THE PARTY CONGRESS OF 1913

The whole question was once more carefully reviewed at the Party Congress at the end of the summer, when the speeches made clear the motives that governed the

two factions. The leading speakers for the majority were Suedekum, Richard Fischer, one of the five Socialist Reichstag members from Berlin, and Philip Scheidemann, Vice-President of the Reichstag for a time in 1912, who spoke officially for the Executive Committee of the Party. Fischer's chief point was as follows:

(a) *Richard Fischer, of Berlin, for the Majority*

A number of comrades have argued that we should have forced a dissolution of the Reichstag. *They believe we would have gone from victory to victory in a campaign based on anti-militaristic propaganda. I am of a different opinion.* The election does not involve a struggle between Socialists on one side and the capitalist parties on the other. We must consider the second ballots, in which two parties may join hands to defeat the third candidate. Do you believe for one moment that we could win the votes of the constituents of any opposing parties at the second ballot, after we have gone on record as having voted down direct taxes? (Hear! Hear!) In the last election we secured only 74 seats, about two-thirds of our final representation, in the first election. The last third we won in the by-elections. [Katzenstein: "We wouldn't have won 40 seats in this election."] I agree with you. We went into the last campaign protesting against an outrageous financial bill, agitating against indirect taxes, against the robbery of the masses. Then came this situation in the Reichstag. We held the balance of power. The form of the new taxes lay in our hands. The Center was eager to regain its old position. This was equally true of the Conservatives. Upon a dissolution of the Reichstag, caused by our refusal to support direct taxes, *we should not have received one National Liberal, one Progressive vote at the second balloting.* (Our italics.)

(b) *Scheidemann, Speaking for the Executive Committee and the Majority*

We were at the height of a gigantic popular movement that made our hearts beat high with joy and pride, when the new military bill was brought before the Reichstag. The imperial-

istic politicians thought to mold the iron while it was hot, while the Balkan villages were burning, human blood was flowing. The military bill came, and a new cry of indignation swept upward from the ranks of the German proletariat. Just as we had protested and fought against imperialism in general, so did we once more rally all of our forces to a storm against the new military bill. We spoke to the masses through our meetings. The movement took another great stride forward—and then suddenly the whole agitation seemed to die down, to dwindle. Why? Had the Party Executive failed to do its duty? No, it died because in the four months of the protest movement the masses had learned that the passage of the bill was an absolute certainty, as the representatives of all the capitalist parties had pledged themselves to vote in its favor. (Hear! Hear!) It died down because everyone knew that the government had not dared to demand new taxes on the necessities of life, but was proposing taxes that must be paid by the property-owning class. That this is a Socialist victory cannot be denied. The government demanded a tax that would not, in the first place, affect the masses of the population, but which called upon the property owners to pay the piper. (Hear! Hear!)

And still we must hear our wise party tacticians say: "Oh, that isn't so." I have never been able to understand why our comrades so vehemently deny that the Social Democracy has accomplished anything. (Laughter and cries of "very good.") You say the government would not have dared to levy a tax on necessary articles of consumption even if the Social Democratic Party were not as strong as it is.

But I do not understand why you should insist on denying our movement the honor of self-evident victory.

Many criticisms have been aimed at our actions. One comrade, for instance, in an article in the *Neue Zeit*, tried to find the reasons for the decline of the anti-militaristic movement and found, among other things, that our party press had not done its duty. I do not agree with this opinion in its entirety, but it is not altogether wrong. (Hear! Hear!)

The Party Executive did its duty as we understood it. You may be sure that we were not pleased to see the whole movement die out. We tried everything to keep it at its height. In vain! Then in a meeting of the National Committee of June 9th we met especially to discuss the question: shall we

arouse another popular protest during, or after, the second reading of the military bill? In this meeting all those who took part in the discussion were of the same opinion—from the most radical to those we call the most conservative—all agreed: Don't do it. *You cannot organize such a movement artificially.* (Hear! Hear!)

The people have been in a turmoil of protest for many months; the "cost of living" meetings, the Balkan War meetings, the military bill protests, etc. "And," so our speakers closed, "since it is absolutely certain that the military bill will pass, since it is our duty to see to it that the cost of this new bill will not fall on the backs of the laboring class, it is *impossible to bring back the movement to its original force.* In fact, the people have been mainly interested in the tax question, we are sorry to admit. And many of them heaved a sigh of relief because they did not need to fear new tax burdens with a strong Socialist group in the Reichstag."

The National Committee was unanimously of the opinion that *a new general movement against the armament bill was impossible.* Should the situation change, the Executive was free to act as it saw fit. You see that we did everything that could be done, that *nothing more was possible.*

I have referred to the foolishness of declaring that the tax situation is no concession to the Socialist movement. The proof of the interest among the people in the tax question lies in the dying out of the movement when the so-called property tax seemed assured. They felt that the worst was over. This feeling on the part of the masses was reflected in the action of the Executive. There the comrades know and live with the people. *A certain weariness had taken hold of the whole population.* (Our italics.)

The radical anti-military view was presented in a resolution proposed and supported by Geyer of Saxony, and secured almost one-third of the votes of the Congress. We give this resolution and selections from the speeches of Geyer, Stadthagen, and Ledebour, the latter another Socialist Reichstag member from Berlin.

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(c) *Defeated Amendment Against Voting the Military Budget (Offered by Geyer and Others)*

That militarism is the most powerful weapon in the hands of the ruling class, and should be attacked relentlessly.

Wherefore, our representatives shall vote "no" on all bills presented to the Reichstag for the purpose of the strengthening of militarism, including also tax provisions that are levied to cover the cost of militarism, whether they be direct or indirect.

The position to be taken by the Socialist group toward all other tax bills is covered by Section 10 of the *Party Programme*: existing indirect taxes shall be replaced by direct taxes.

(d) *From the Speech of Geyer*

To come to the gist of the matter—are we justified in voting for taxes to raise a military fund? Wurm [who reported to the Congress on the tax question] was careful to push the tax question into the foreground. He barely mentioned its political aspect; he avoided it by declaring that the whole matter is a tactical, not a theoretical, problem. But I maintain that these two aspects of a problem cannot be so completely separated. We may act as we please, in one way or another, but our tactics must always be adapted to the principles of the party. Finally tactics can endanger the fundamental aims of the whole movement. Wurm says in support of his viewpoint: "When the military bill is accepted, the purpose of the tax bill is no longer under consideration. We are concerned only with the character of the tax itself." Comrades, that is not the question. Look at the matter as you will, you must admit that the tax bill was passed in this session for the express purpose of raising funds for military expenditures. You can't get away from it. It all comes down to this: "Has the parliamentary group the right to vote in favor of military taxes?" *The moment we give to the government the funds to cover military expenditures, our whole struggle against militarism becomes a farce.* (Cries of dissent and of approval.)

I agree with your contention that the party must use its power, when it becomes a political factor, mainly in the direction of relieving the laboring class of some of its burdens.

But we must not increase the power of the ruling class as we are doing when we give to it the means for a greater military outlay. We desire to save the party from the reproach that our struggle against militarism is not in earnest. The question is being raised on all sides, Why all this agitation against war if you then appropriate the means to carry it on? No high-sounding words, not even your vote against the military bill as such, will alter the fact that you have strengthened it by voting the means to carry it into effect. Some, indeed, have gone so far as to say that our whole agitation against militarism will vanish into thin air, if we grant the means for its support. You argue that a proposal of direct taxes by the government is a great victory for the party. Do not overestimate the strength of the party. Our vaunted greatness was not sufficient to prevent the presentation of this outrageous military bill to this Reichstag with its 110 Socialist members.

Wurm uttered a glaring contradiction when he attempted to separate theory from tactics. He said: "We do not grant the funds for militarism!" Further on he says: "When the military bill is once passed the purpose of the tax is no longer under consideration." That is an obvious contradiction. By giving to the government the means for increased armament, we encourage it to come again to the Reichstag with new demands. (Hear! Hear!) It will not be difficult in the future to secure military appropriations. We may assume that the government, if it is true that it holds the strength of our party in such great respect, will in the future ask for direct taxes, will in the future try to suit its military requisitions to the views of the Social Democracy. Whenever we give new support to the growth of militarism, even in the form of direct taxes, we are encouraging new burdens for the workers, we are inviting new armament bills. Of this I am convinced. (Hear! Hear!) The government would be foolish not to take advantage of the situation created by the adoption of Wurm's resolution. In the future, armament bills and the military appropriation bills will not be presented as one whole. Why should our opponents be so foolish, when they know that the Social Democratic representation, though it will vote down the armament bill, will consider the appropriation bill as an independent question, as a mere problem of taxation?

Wurm tries to defend his standpoint by maintaining that our refusal to indorse the direct taxes would have brought indirect taxes in their place. That is a mere presumption. (Hear! Hear!) I maintain that the government would not have thought of such a thing. (Vehement opposition and exclamation: "That is an unfounded statement.")

(e) *From the Speech of Stadthagen*

I do not think very highly of Bethmann-Hollweg's intelligence, but I believe he would be perfectly willing to ask the two comrades who spoke on the military appropriation bill to enter the ministry, for they have presented splendid arguments, I am sorry to say, for every military bill, arguments against the opposition of the masses toward such measures. (Laughter.) They gave him a good prescription when they declared: "Every military bill is sure to be passed by the other parties; we must therefore vote in favor of all direct taxes for these military bills." The government would be foolish if it did not remember the arguments of these comrades and act accordingly.

How does our position in this matter differ from that of the Liberals? This question should have been discussed, but all of our speakers, even Suedekum [the second reporter on the tax question], passed it by.

Wherever a conflict arises between our struggle against militarism and our struggle for direct taxes, the former must always be conclusive. We must oppose everything that will support militarism, whether it be direct or indirect taxation. This conception must determine our attitude toward taxes.

The fight against the terrible strengthening of our military forces, not the question of the tax bill, should have claimed our attention. (Hear! Hear!) We should have insisted: no expenditures without the necessary provision of funds; we should have joined forces with one of the other parties for the adoption of such a policy. If, then, the taxation bill had not received the vote necessary to pass it, a dissolution of the Reichstag would have followed. This should have been our aim. *But some of the comrades feared an electoral campaign, because they believe we should be unsuccessful in our fight against the patriotic arguments of the other parties. It*

shows an extraordinary lack of faith in our principles and demands to wish to avoid a campaign for such reasons.

(f) *From the Speech of Ledebour*

I insist that the occasion of a tax, as in this case, the armament bill must, without exception, determine our vote. For this reason, in order to simplify the whole matter, I have proposed to the parliamentary group that we insist, in the future, *upon a more organic union of armament appropriation and taxation bills, so that the final vote may include both.* If this were done, our attitude in the future would be clear. For this reason I voted in favor of motion 114 [the Geyer amendment] because it forces us, in the future, to insist upon merging of the two bills. We will then always have a clear field in our struggle against militarism. If we were strong enough to defeat the military bill together with its taxation bill, and could so force a dissolution of the Reichstag, we should have an entirely different outlook. We could take up the struggle against militarism in its whole significance, could carry it on with uncompromising vigor, without running the risk of such misunderstandings as were suggested by Richard Fischer and David, without fearing that somewhere among the people someone would misunderstand the issue at stake. We should have won countless new sympathizers and supporters. *The loss of a few seats in the Reichstag is but a secondary consideration. Our aim must always be to win new supporters.* If that is not the case, we must change our present method of agitation. (Our italics.)

CHAPTER VI

ANTI-MILITARY AGITATION IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE WAR

UNDOUBTEDLY the proposed remedies by which Socialists hope finally to put an end to war, are more important than the action they have already been able to take against militarism. But the recent activities of the Socialists have undoubtedly had a very great effect on public opinion, and a considerable effect on governments. The documents we give in this section are of a very wide variety. Referring to Germany and being sufficiently related to one another to make a more or less connected whole, they scarcely need comment. Karl Liebknecht's exposures, the Zabern affair, the trial of Rosa Luxemburg, have all been discussed telegraphically by the world's press. Therefore the thoughtful newspaper reader is prepared also for the very effective criticism of the German militarist government conducted by the Socialist members of the Reichstag, though he is probably unfamiliar with the exact character of this criticism, of which we give several examples. It may be pointed out that all these documents refer to German Socialist action *after* their voting of taxes for the war budget of 1913. (See Chapter V.) So we see that the anti-military agitation continued on a large scale in spite of that seemingly militaristic action. The radical minority of the party, Liebknecht, Luxemburg, and others, were more active than ever before, and were supported in their activity by the party as a whole, and

especially by *Vorwaerts*, the party's daily organ, though a very considerable minority was opposed to much of their work. We shall begin with the Socialist exploitation of the celebrated Zabern affair. (Our quotations are from the report issued by the Socialist Reichstag Group to the party in July, 1914.)

THE ZABERN AFFAIR

(SESSIONS OF THE REICHSTAG OF NOVEMBER 28, AND DECEMBER 3 AND 4, 1913, AND OF JANUARY 23 AND 24, 1914)

The Zabern affair of 1913 had a double importance. It showed the mutual hostility of the military authorities and the people of Lorraine; and, both the civil authorities and the Reichstag having taken up the side of the people of Lorraine without being able to secure any justice for them, it showed the predominance of the military over the civil authorities throughout the nation. The following report of the Socialist members of the Reichstag (from their annual report to the party) explains the whole affair, its importance and its sequels.

The effects of the well-known events that took place in the small garrison of Zabern in November, 1913, have reached out far beyond the scene of their occurrence. There were disclosures of unwarranted interference on the part of military persons with civil life. Furthermore, the tremendous power wielded by militarism over the civil authorities was so drastically shown up that these conditions, their defense by the one side and their condemnation by the other, practically usurped the parliamentary activity of the whole session. To recapitulate: Lieutenant von Forstner had the effrontery to tell his recruits in his instructions that they should knock down any "Wackes" who should dare to attack them. [This does not, of course, refer to a physical attack.] He promised to pay out for every feat of this kind a premium of 10 marks. A non-commissioned officer declared his willingness to add three marks to this sum. This word "Wackes," though its

use had been forbidden by regimental orders, was used by this same officer on several occasions in an insulting manner. Besides this, he uttered a vilification of the French flag. When the people of Zabern, excited by these incidents, expressed their indignation, the soldiers, led by officers, undertook the persecution and arrest of civil persons.

On the occasion of the clearing of the Schlossplatz about thirty persons, among them many bystanders, state attorneys, judges, etc., were placed under military arrest. The colonel, von Reuter, who had entirely usurped the rights of the civil authorities, ordered preparations in the garrisons that looked surprisingly like siege. Complaints against these conditions were in vain. Neither Lieutenant von Forstner nor the colonel was removed from his regiment. The rights of the civil authorities were shattered, the garrison removed from Zabern. Finally all of these occurrences led to a change in the government of Alsace-Lorraine. The appointment of the Prussian Police Minister, von Dallwitz, confirmed the triumph of military supremacy over the [already] limited rights of civil government. When only the first "deeds" of the Lieutenant von Forstner were known, the Alsace-Lorraine Reichstag group directed a short inquiry to the government, asking what it intended to do "to protect the soldiers of Alsace-Lorraine from such insult and the population from such provocations." The government, in person of the Minister of War, answered that the incident was neither an insult nor a provocation; that the lieutenant in question could not have known that his words would become public, that, finally, an investigation only could shed light upon the matter. At the time when this declaration was made, Zabern had already become the scene of new developments. Our Reichstag group had meanwhile presented the following interpellation; the Radicals (Freisinnige) and the Alsace-Lorraine group presented similar interpellations:

"What will the Chancellor do concerning the actions of the lieutenant in the garrison Zabern, who has grievously insulted the population of Alsace-Lorraine, who further uttered sentiments that are likely to impair our relations with France?"

At the discussion of the interpellation, Comrade Peirottes was intrusted with the task of showing, after a detailed description of the events in the Zabern case, the lesson that

should be drawn from the whole difficulty in our treatment of Alsace-Lorraine. Furthermore, he was instructed to call attention to the supremacy of rule by military force. He did this ably, knowing as he does the land in question and its conditions. He criticised the apologetic speech of the War Minister in answer to the first inquiry, and denounced this military régime of the sword as a flagrant violation of the law. He showed clearly the effect that this dictatorship of the sword must produce by quoting the words of the former Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe: "They desire to drive the population of Alsace-Lorraine to desperation, they try to provoke uprisings, in order to drown them in blood." *"We used to speak in our country," said Peirottes, "of a second or military government. To-day we cannot speak of a second or military government, to-day the military authorities are the government."*

Among the answers that followed from the government, the speech of the Chancellor was full of humble resignation to an unalterable fate. This fate means even for the highest officer of the business of the state, the still more exalted power of militarism. In this sense, too, he closed his speech with the ambiguous remark: "The authority of public force and the authority of the law must be equally protected. The representative of military force [the Minister of War], whose backbone had been visibly strengthened in Donaueschingen [*i.e.*, by the Kaiser], was less diplomatic, *i.e.*, more inconsiderate in his attitude. According to his argument, the demands for legal protection had been voiced only by noisy disturbers and incendiary press organs." Further: "We have here an avowed attempt to exert an illegal influence upon the authorities in question by press agitation, by mobs, by systematic vilification of military persons, yes, by hindering the latter in the observance of their regular duties." The War Minister went so far as to condone the unjust arrests with the remark: that these were better than the possibility that "an officer might, in his terrible excitement, run his sword through the body of a man who has called out an invective to him."

The Chancellor declared in a second speech that he was "in full accord with the War Minister." Accordingly he, too, neglected to protect the civil authorities against the interference of the soldiers.

Our party and the radicals presented motions, both of which

stated that "the position of the Chancellor, in the matter which is the subject of this interpellation, is not in accord with the views of the Reichstag."

Our second speaker, Comrade Dr. Weill [now a volunteer in the French army], uttered a striking characterization of the "harmony" between the army and the people, so emphasized by the Chancellor, saying that it meant the abdication of the Chancellor and the civil authorities in favor of military dictatorship. The Chancellor's latest speech was evidence of his retreat before the military cabinet. The latter and Herr von Deimling are the victors. Our speaker termed the aggressive utterances of the Minister of War against the press and the people as an attempt to shake off responsibility, where responsibility is due. The same was true of the actions of the national government, in simply sacrificing the government of Alsace-Lorraine and of the civil authorities. The Chancellor spoke of the proposed vote of dissent of the Reichstag with the same contempt that the army shows toward the civilian population of Zabern. Besides, the answer to the inquiry was delayed until after the hunting sports in Donaueschingen were ended. From these things we can well understand why Alsace-Lorraine demands *absolute autonomy* in government. Aside from establishing more friendly relations with France, this step, and only this step, can free Alsace-Lorraine from Berlin domination. We Socialists see in this arrogance of the military powers a new declaration of war. For us it is not only a question of the authority of the army, and the assumed military supremacy; it is our task in the Reichstag to keep the authority of parliament intact, to preserve the self-respect of the people.

Of the capitalist parties, only the Conservative speakers came to the assistance of the government. Accordingly, the above vote of dissent was passed by a roll call with 293 against 54 votes, 4 not voting.

Soon afterward the various trials were held before military courts, and the occurrences we have related ended with the acquittal of Lieutenants von Forstner and Schad and Colonel von Reuter. The acquitted officers were congratulated upon their acquittal by the judge, while Colonel von Reuter received a decoration. The president of the court-martial, a general, had notified Conservative Party men, the Berlin President of Police, now Minister, von Jagow, and another

Conservative deputy of the sentence by wire. The telegram of the Crown Prince, "Bravo, give it to them!" had also become known. Above all, Colonel von Reuter defended his actions in the trial by referring to the Cabinet Order of October 17, 1820, that gave to him and to all others the right to assume civil authority under similar circumstances. Finally the junkers of the Prussian Landtag gave their blessing to this open infringement of the law, and directed the vilest attacks against the Reichstag.

These facts decided us to bring in the following interpellation:

"What does the Chancellor propose to do to protect the constitution and rights against illegal encroachments of military powers, such as have occurred in the trials before military courts in connection with the Zabern disturbances, with the approval of both houses of the Prussian Landtag?"

The Radicals (Freisinnige) presented a similar interpellation, which was discussed together with ours in the session on January 27, 1914. Comrade Dr. Frank, who spoke for our interpellation, showed that we were not interested in the fate, in the punishment, or rewarding of a few officers. [Dr. Frank volunteered at the beginning of the present war and was killed.] For us the question is a political one, he continued, *i.e.*, whether we are to go forward toward law and constitutionality or to return to the rule of police and military force. In the first place, the actions of the Chancellor were reprehensible. In the trials he allowed the supreme judge to ignore all pleas for appeal and revision. This was his bow to the Right. As a concession to the wavering figures in the Center, he stated that he would have the disputed regulations concerning the use of weapons by the soldiers investigated. The verdicts of the Strassburg trials in the eyes of the largest part of the people signify nothing in connection with the guilt or innocence of the officers or of the civil government. They simply prove the impossibility of military justice. We demand, therefore, the abolition of military courts of justice, for otherwise similar convictions will occur again and again. Our speaker pictured the judicial development of the regulations concerning the use of weapons by military persons. The application of these regulations that we have just witnessed is in contradiction to the constitution. But no minister of war, no emperor can set aside the provisions

of the constitution. Finally Dr. Frank criticised sharply the occurrences after the verdict, namely, the telegram and the attacks of the Prussian reactionaries.

The purpose of our interpellation was the protection of constitutional rights. We expect no revolutionary deeds from the capitalist parties, but only that they shall have the courage with us to use the rights that we already possess.

The Chancellor declared in his reply that we were using the Zabern incidents simply for the purpose of furthering our plans. In this connection, in order to influence certain circles, he accused us of demanding the "abolition of the Kaiser's rights as Commander-in-Chief"—which played an important part in the numerous Conservative and Kriegerverein speeches that followed.

Comrade Ledebour answered the speeches of the Chancellor and of the bourgeois speakers, and to begin with, showed the fallacy of the conception that we live under a government based upon the constitutional rights, which has merely for the time being experienced a travesty of justice. That is not the case. Rather is it a matter of fact that the decisions of a military court are influenced by the spirit of comradeship just as in civil courts, when they are dealing with complaints against striking workers, the decisions are colored by the friendship with the employing class.

The speaker then gave an explanation of our endeavors toward a people's army, that the preceding debate had made necessary; he showed that we demanded equal rights for officers and the men in the ranks. In case of war there must be a chief command—that we do not deny. But that which at present is termed the law of the chief command of the Kaiser, is, in fact, the free and unhindered use of the army against the people, like von Oldenburg's dream of the lieutenant and his ten men [who, he said, would enter the Reichstag and dissolve it on the Emperor's order]. Then Ledebour interpreted the speeches of the capitalist parties, and maintained that they were already beginning to regret the vote of dissent they had given the Chancellor, that the majority was unwilling to take up and carry out a serious fight against militarism.

The government did not say one word to indicate what was to be done with the demand of the Center, Radicals (Freisinnige), and National Liberals for definitely fixing the

powers of military and civil authorities. Nor did the government think it necessary, on the following day, when motions to this effect were discussed, to suggest a practical solution.

Before the house were our motion "to request the Chancellor to present a bill abolishing military courts and placing the military members of the army and navy and all other persons who are included in Article I of the Military Penal Code for the German Empire under the jurisdiction of the civil courts; furthermore, one motion each from the Center, the Radicals, and the Alsace-Lorraine group, demanding that the rights of the army in civil affairs be fixed by law; and finally, the motion from the National Liberals demanding an investigation to determine the regulations of 1899 concerning the use of arms by military persons.

Comrade Haase in supporting our motion referred to the statements that had been made by our speakers in reference to the whole Zabern affair as sufficient to present our side. We have on hand so much more material in support of our motion that we desire a commission, before which our motion and the motions of the other parties may be discussed. Haase finally protested against the insulting absenteeism of the government representatives, and at the same time reminded the other parties that in this case only a determined struggle would bring the matter to a satisfactory outcome. The motion of the Center and that of the National Liberals were immediately passed, the remaining motions were turned over to a special commission of 21 members, the so-called Zabern Commission. The absence of the government from these proceedings led the Reichstag to stop all further discussion of the subject for that day, thus sending home the representatives of the government, who were waiting in the ante-room.

The Zabern Commission was treated with the same disregard by the government. The latter took no part in the discussions, but simply gave judicial information. *The War Ministry was not represented at all.* The hearings were, therefore, suspended after a few sessions. (Our italics.)

But long before the discussion of the Zabern affair had completely died down, other military abuses came

up for public discussion, and the Socialist agitation continued.

SOCIALIST ANTI-MILITARISM IN THE REICHSTAG OF 1914

In spite of its vote in favor of the military budget and of the war credits in the early summer of 1913, the Socialist Party kept up a lively anti-military agitation right up to the beginning of the present war. We refer not to the big anti-war demonstrations in the German cities, not to the agitation of *Vorwaerts*, nor to the preceding revolutionary agitation of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, but to the official action of the party in the Reichstag from last December right up to the closing session in May, *when, as a republican demonstration, the Socialists remained seated and silent during the cheers for the Kaiser that closed the session.* It is true that a large minority (the vote was 51 to 47) opposed this action, but, nevertheless, it was carried out—for the first time in the party's history.

On December 2, 1913, in the debate on foreign affairs, David spoke in the Reichstag for a more friendly policy towards England, laid emphasis upon the English movement for the restriction of armaments, and deplored the fact that "the English discussion in regard to restriction of warlike preparations found no echo in Germany."

For the purpose of remedying the mistreatment of the soldiery, the Socialist spokesman, Stücklen, demanded that instead of arguing aimlessly, something really definite be enacted; in short, that those men be removed from the army whose influence was found to be at all deleterious. The high *suicide* rate stands directly in opposition to the mere palliation of these evils, for the number of suicides has risen to the height of 10,439 during the interval extending from 1870 to

1911. *Vorwaerts* on July 11th cited, from the *Militärische Wochenblatt*, statistics showing that in Germany suicides in the army were twice as numerous as among the civil population, while in France they were only one-third more numerous.

Hofrichter, speaking on military justice, severely condemned the state now existing in the army as regards the large number of *desertions*, which has become especially marked in the 16th division. The actual number of these desertions must be regarded as considerably higher than that indicated purely on the basis of statistics, since only those cases were recorded in which the fugitives had either been apprehended or had surrendered themselves of their own accord. A particularly large number was reported from the garrison of Trier. Desertion of a purely wanton nature seems to have been of comparatively rare occurrence; almost in every case the act had been committed in desperation. Hofrichter traced the trouble primarily to maltreatment, and adduced considerable evidence in support of his assertion. Cases were repeatedly reported from the Trier garrison, even from among courts. Particularly in need of further reform are the conditions of a most sensational and not of a merely painful and disagreeable nature. But very little information as to the judicial proceedings comes to light, a direct result of deliberate extensive news-gagging. Mere decrees against the symptoms of the evil are, of course, most insufficient; these sores are inherent in the system. In order to facilitate the fight for reform, immediate steps should be taken to insure the soldiers a means of self-defense and free access to justice, as in Bavaria up to 1872.

A representative of the Ministry of War here replied that the cases of mistreatment of soldiers had already materially decreased in number.

Kühnert was able to demonstrate this answer as insufficient on the basis of a long series of new facts. To alter the military penal code can only prove of temporary relief. We should strive, therefore, towards the attainment of complete self-defense for the men and the abolition of all military

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courts. Particularly in need of further reform are the conditions prevailing in connection with the proceedings of the courts of honor and the administration of punishments.

Next we may quote the well-known debate on the Army in which Liebknecht continued in May, 1914, his celebrated Krupp revelations of 1913. As no authoritative statement has reached the American Socialist public and the reported summary of Liebknecht's speech is very condensed, we reproduce several of its chief paragraphs:

Liebknecht, in supplementing the occurrences of the past year and by way of more complete elucidation, presented a detailed picture of conditions prevailing in regard to the international armament market. He showed in its entirety the magnitude of the coalition between the corporations dealing in materials necessary for war purposes, their grouping, and the means employed by them in common for the purpose of exploiting as many nations as possible for their own interests. This industry in Germany operates on the basis of a capital nominally set at 270 millions, though, in truth, its shares are worth half a billion. Neither in trade nor in corruption does Krupp limit himself to Germany merely—he is the matador of international war traffic and of the firms allied with him.

The whole Krupp process has been demonstrated not only at the periphery of the government, as in the recent police scandal, but also in the rotting center of military and naval administration. If the abuses of the Krupp system now *seem* (our italics) to be done away with, there yet remain behind its relations to the press, its purchased journals, etc.

When our spokesman mentioned by way of supplementing all this, that the late General von Lindeman had carried on a profitable trade in titles, with the Kaiser's permission, it caused the most theatrical excitement among the bourgeois and government representatives. In conclusion, the speaker affirmed by way of reply to militaristic "friends of labor" that the struggle against militarism and the prevailing corruption was being waged by the working classes in England and France as well.

An even greater sensation was created in Germany by Wendel's celebrated speech in which he referred to the Zabern affair, and closed with the cry of "Vive la France." This was as late as May 14 and 15.

The State Secretary of the Foreign Office, von Jagow, had presented a brief review of the present foreign situation and of the present policy maintained by Germany in connection with this situation.

Wendel was able to criticise this statement on the basis that it contained nothing more than what every newspaper reader was already familiar with. By brief reference to the Zabern affair he was able to demonstrate that the foreign reputation of Germany had been secured in greater measure through civil freedom than through bayonets, cannon, and battleships. In contrast to the State Secretary, Wendel gave a plain and unvarnished report on foreign policy. *In the matter of the Balkans he affirmed that Germany had acted merely as Austria's train-bearer throughout, had contributed blindly to her interests, had made herself just as culpable, and finally had been for months in danger of becoming involved in a world war.* For Albania there were two Powers eagerly expectant—Austria and Italy. In having acted as godfather for such an Albania we must reckon our foreign policy as having erred most seriously; for those backward tribes, naturally, only a feudal lord from a Prussian barrack-yard could serve as a suitable head. In no way whatsoever may this private venture of the Prince of Wied, even if it fail, be made a matter of national concern for Germany. The dispatching of a military mission to Turkey has prejudiced our relationship with Russia and with England as well. What Turkey needs is internal reform. We welcome the improvement in the relations between Germany and England, especially between the laboring classes of both countries, whose mutual understanding is the best guarantee for peace. In spite of all that the war-agitation of retired generals may do to the contrary they are to be given the chief credit for having brought this improvement about. The vile enmity toward France is also of great service to that wild seeking for war. But the French people have a resolute wish for peace and understanding with Germany and have demonstrated both at the recent election to

the Chamber of Deputies. There are no longer the Vosges to separate the peoples; at the most there are only a few mile posts. Our spokesman concluded his remarks with the following words, which were subsequently sadly distorted by the chauvinistic press and misused for its own purposes:

"In this sense, in the sense of the holy alliance of peoples, of which Heinrich Heine dreamt, I owe it to the France of the laboring masses, to the France that loves peace, to the France that desires an understanding, to the France from which the cry rings out to us, 'Long live Germany,' to close my speech with the cry, 'Long live France.'"

Interest is added to this speech by the fact that, since the killing of Frank, Wendel, Suedekum, and Goehre are the only Socialist members of the Reichstag who are serving as volunteers in the army.

Wendel's speech was indorsed in the Reichstag by Bernstein on behalf of the party. We quote once more from the German Party report:

Bernstein declared in our name that we were not at all willing to have Wendel's statement discounted, at least the following portion of it: "To peace-loving France, to the France of the working classes, to the France who maintains the ideals of freedom, of freedom for all nations, to this France we extend as formerly our full sympathy."

THE PROSECUTION OF ROSA LUXEMBURG

Conditions in the Army are also discussed in the report of the Executive Committee of the party with reference to the prosecution of Rosa Luxemburg. (Rosa Luxemburg was finally sentenced to serve one year in prison on this charge, beginning in March, 1915—all appeals having been lost.)

The Frankfurt prosecution of Comrade Rosa Luxemburg was the forerunner of a whole series of prosecutions following certain alleged libels of officers' corps and the Crown Prince. The accused were convicted and very severely sen-

tenced, while the officers were acquitted. The success which militarism won through this judgment against Social Democratic speakers and editors made the War Minister arrogant. Because of the following words occurring in a speech delivered by Comrade Luxemburg at Freiburg in regard to the mistreatment of the soldiery, the Minister of War filed immediately a demand for punishment:

"As to what is transpiring at Metz, one thing, at any rate, is clear—it is, beyond doubt, one of those dramas which take place day in and day out in the German barracks, from which the groans of the victims only occasionally reach our ears."

The Social Democracy was quite ready to thrash out this matter with the Minister and with the fullest publicity; 1,013 witnesses at once reported themselves as ready to testify before the court on the basis of their own bitter experiences, gained during their own military service, and daily this number grew [32,000 written cases were collected]. On the motion of the prosecuting attorney the proceeding was adjourned, but is to be reconsidered soon after the close of the present court recess, the outlook, in the meantime, being quite hopeful. The party has never before had such an opportunity of bringing into the very brightest publicity such facts as it has now gathered in regard to this worst abuse of our military system. It seems, however, that the administration does not relish the prospect of further proceedings partaking of the character; at least, so much might be inferred from the fact that the action against Meyer, the *Vorwaerts* editor, has already been dismissed [July, 1914].



PART II

**THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY BE-
FORE THE WAR—EVENTS CON-
NECTED WITH THE PRESENT
CONFLICT**

The present war took its origin in the Balkans and is nearly connected in many ways with the previous Balkan Wars. We therefore give at some length the resolution of the special International Socialist Congress at the time of the first Balkan War, and also the action of the Servian and Bulgarian Parties at that time. In the same connection we reproduce articles bearing on the internal situation in Bulgaria after the Balkan Wars, and the phenomenal Socialist successes at the elections. And while dealing with Servia we reproduce two documents having to do with the present war, or rather with the Servian-Austrian war, out of which, after a week's interval, the present war developed. The Servian and Bulgarian documents indicate that there is a very strong anti-war party among the people of both countries, and that these two parties are in no way hostile to one another. We also give a message of the Russian to the Austrian Socialists during the Balkan Wars.

CHAPTER VII

THE BALKAN WARS AND THEIR SEQUELS

THE SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS AT BASEL (1912)

AFTER the Stuttgart Congress of 1907, the special Congress of Basel, held in 1912, during the First Balkan War (November 24th and 25th), is perhaps the most important international meeting of Socialists. For the various parties of the Continent were all menaced at that time by a grave and immediate danger and were compelled to confine their resolution to realities. As at Stuttgart, the resolution was passed unanimously, and it unquestionably represents the point reached, as well as the limit reached, by the overwhelming majority of Socialists at the outbreak of the present war, as to the *general* issues it involves.

The resolution begins by the reiteration of the two most *important* passages of the resolutions of the Stuttgart and Copenhagen Congresses. It will be noted that it emphasizes, as a preventive of war, the threat of revolution.

At its Congresses in Stuttgart (1907) and Copenhagen (1910), the International Bureau laid down the following principles for the war against war:

"In the case of war being imminent, the working classes and their parliamentary representatives in the countries concerned shall be bound to do all they can, assisted by the International Bureau, to prevent the war breaking out, using for this purpose the means which appear to them the most efficacious but which must naturally vary according to the

acuteness of the class war and of the general political conditions.

"Should war nevertheless break out, it would be their first duty to intervene in order to bring it to a speedy termination and to employ all their power to utilize the economic and political crisis created by the war in order to rouse the masses of the people and thereby to hasten the downfall of capitalistic class domination."

The Balkan crisis which is already responsible for so many calamities, if allowed to spread, would become the most frightful danger to civilization and the workers. It would likewise be one of the most scandalous events which has ever taken place in history, because of the disproportion between the immensity of the catastrophe and the triviality of the interests invoked in justification of it.

For this reason the Congress rejoices that all Socialist Parties and labor unions of all countries are unanimous in their desire to make war upon war. By simultaneously rising in revolt against *imperialism*, and every section of the international movement offering resistance to its government, the workers of all countries are bringing public opinion to bear against all warlike desire. Thus a splendid co-operation of the workers has been brought about which has already contributed much to maintain the threatened peace of the world. *The fear of the ruling classes that a revolution of the workers would follow the declaration of a European war has proved an essential guarantee of peace.* The Congress therefore asks all Socialist Parties to continue their efforts with all means that appear to them efficacious. Each Socialist organization will be asked to do its own part in furthering common action.

The Balkan Socialists

The Socialist Parties in the Balkan peninsula have a difficult task. The Powers of Europe, by systematically postponing all reforms in Turkey, have contributed to the growth of intolerable economic, national, and political conditions, which necessarily led to unrest and to war. The Balkan Socialists with great courage have fought against the use of these conditions as an excuse for war in the interests of the dynasties and the middle-class capitalists, and *have demanded the establishment of a democratic federation of the Balkan states.*

The Congress urges them to persevere in their admirable

endeavors, believing that the Socialists of the Balkans will leave no stone unturned after the war to prevent these states being robbed of what they have gained at such heavy cost by the dynasties, the militarists, and capitalists of the Balkans, ever thirsting for expansion. The Congress above all calls on the Balkan Socialists to oppose everything likely to lead to a renewal of the old animosities between Servians, Bulgarians, Roumanians, and Greeks, as well as to all violence against those Balkan peoples whom they are at the present moment fighting—the Turks and Albanians. The Socialists in the Balkans should also strongly oppose any depriving of rights of these peoples and proclaim the fraternity of all Balkan peoples, including Turks, Albanians, and Roumanians as against any national jingoism that may have been let loose.

Austria and Italy

The Socialists of Austria-Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina must continue with all their strength their successful efforts to prevent any attack of the Austrian monarchy upon Serbia. They must *continue to resist in the future as they have done in the past any attempt to take by force from Serbia the fruits of war or to transform that country into an Austrian province*, and thereby to embroil the peoples of Austria-Hungary and other nations of Europe in conflict in the interests of the ruling dynasty. The Social Democratic Parties of Austria-Hungary will also have to struggle in the future to secure democratic autonomy for all the southern Slav nations within the frontiers of Austria-Hungary and at present governed by the Hapsburg dynasty. The Socialists of both Austria-Hungary and of Italy will have to give special attention to the Albanian question. The Congress admits the right of the Albanians to autonomy, but recognizes the danger that, under the guise of autonomy, Albania might become the victim of Austro-Hungarian and Italian ambitions. This would not only constitute a danger for Albania herself, but might in the near future threaten the peace between Austria-Hungary and Italy. *Albania can only become really independent as an autonomous unit in a democratic federation of the Balkan states.* Therefore, the Congress calls upon the Austro-Hungarian and Italian Socialists to combat any action of their respective governments

which aims at drawing Albania within the sphere of their influence and to persevere in their efforts to consolidate the peaceful relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy.

Russia

The Congress heartily congratulates the Russian workers who organized protest strikes, as proving that the Russian and Polish workers are beginning to recover from the blows received during the Czar's counter-revolution. The Congress recognizes these strikes as a guarantee against the criminal intrigues of Czarism, which, after having shed the blood of the Russian people and after having so often betrayed and delivered the Balkan nations to their enemies, is now wavering between dread of the consequences that a war would mean for itself and the fear of a renewed national uprising which it has itself created. *If Czarism is once more pretending to play the part of liberator of the Balkan nations, it is in order to reconquer by means of this pretext Russian predominance in the Balkans.* The Congress expects that the town and country workers of Russia, Poland, and Finland, now recovering their strength, will tear asunder this fabric of lies, *will oppose all bellicose Czarist undertakings, and resist every Czarist attack, whether upon Armenia or Constantinople, by concentrating all their energy towards a renewal of their revolutionary fight for freedom against Czarism.* As Czarism is the hope of all reactionary forces in Europe, so it is also the most inexorable enemy of democracy and of the peoples under its rule, and *to bring about its downfall is one of the first duties of the international movement.*

Germany, France, and Great Britain

The most important task of the international movement falls to the lot of the workers of Germany, France, and Great Britain—to demand from their governments at the present moment an undertaking to refuse all support to either Austria-Hungary or Russia and to abstain from all intervention in the Balkan trouble, and in every respect to observe an unconditional neutrality. A war between the three leading civilized nations over the question of an outlet to the sea, concerning which Austria and Serbia are in dispute, would be

criminal folly. The workers of Germany and France do not recognize that any secret treaties make it necessary for them to interfere in the Balkan conflict.

Remedies

If, however, as a consequence of the military defeat of Turkey, the downfall of the Osman dominion in Asia Minor became inevitable, it would be the duty of British, French, and German Socialists to oppose with all their might a policy of conquest in Asia Minor, since the result would lead straight to a European war. The Congress is of opinion that *the greatest danger to European peace is the artificially-fostered animosity between Great Britain and Germany*. It therefore welcomes the workers of both countries on their efforts to improve the situation. It believes that the best means of removing friction would be an understanding between Germany and Great Britain concerning *the arrest in the increase of their respective navies and the abolition of the right of capture of private property at sea*. The Congress invites the Socialists of Great Britain and Germany to continue their agitation for such an understanding.

To overcome all outstanding differences between Germany on the one side and France and Great Britain on the other, would be to remove the greatest danger to international peace. It would weaken the powerful position of Czardom, now profiting by these differences, it would render impossible an attack on Serbia by Austria-Hungary, and it would finally secure the peace of the world. To this end, above all, the efforts of the international movement must be directed.

The Congress notes with satisfaction that Socialists of all nations are agreed as to these main lines of foreign policy. It calls upon the workers of all countries to pit against the might of capitalism and imperialism the solidarity of the international labor movement. It warns the ruling classes in all countries to put an end to the economic misery produced by the capitalistic system and not to increase it by warlike action. It insists on its demand for peace. *Governments must not forget that, in the present frame of mind of the workers, war will not be without disaster for themselves. They must remember that the Franco-German War resulted in the revolutionary movement of the Commune; that the Russo-Japanese War put into motion the revolutionary move-*

ment in Russia, and that the competition in armaments in England and on the Continent has increased class conflicts and led to great strikes. It would be madness if the governments did not comprehend that the mere notion of a European war will call forth resentment and fierce protest from the workers who consider it a crime to shoot each other down in the interest, and for the profit of capitalism, or for the sake of dynastic ambition and of secret diplomatic treaties.

If government interrupt the possibility of normal development of the peoples and thereby provoke them to take desperate steps, they will have to take the whole responsibility. (Our italics.)

The most remarkable features of this resolution, besides its clear résumé of the general situation, are (1) that it repeats three times and very explicitly the threat that revolutions, supported if not initiated by Socialists, were sure to follow a general European war, (2) its demand for a revolution in Russia in any event, and (3) its advocacy of a Balkan Federation.

SERVIA

Before the First Balkan War had started the Socialists in the Servian parliament had advocated a Balkan Federation and voted against the military expenditures intended for the war (July 2, 1912).

All the heads of the bourgeois parties approved the attitude of the government and promised their support. The leader of the Socialist Party, Laptchevitch, declared, in the name of his partisans, against the war with Turkey and in favor of a democratic federation of the Balkan states, which should serve as a basis for a Balkan tariff union.

The action taken by the Servian Socialists at the time of the Second Balkan War was still more courageous and explicit.

At the elections of April 3, 1912, the Socialists had secured two seats in the parliament and 25,000 out of a

little over 300,000 votes. They had candidates in only six constituencies and claimed that they might have had 50,000 votes if they had nominated more candidates.

On October 12th, Laptchevitch, who had been elected from Belgrade, made the following prophetic speech in the parliament:

We are opposed to war between the people of the Balkans not only because that war will be bloody and horrible, not only because it will ruin the Balkans, but because of the indirect effects it will have, the prospect of which appears terrible, even if the Powers have not already reached an agreement about dividing up the Balkans.

Even if that has not been definitely decided upon, war will not fail to bring about some intervention of the great capitalist states interested, and that intervention may mean a general conflagration in Europe, colossal bloodshed, and the disappearance of economic and political gains due to the efforts of previous generations working for centuries to realize them.

The Servian Prime Minister Paschitsch, in a speech before the Skupschtina (May, 1913), made an attack upon Bulgaria that aroused a storm of comment. Servian Socialists, thereupon, published the following constructive proposal of a Balkan Confederation:

The Social Democratic Party again demands, as it has often done in the past, immediate cessation of hostilities and the recall of all troops, that they may return to useful work and to civilization.

The Social Democratic Party of Servia emphatically denounces the quarrels, conflicts, and enmities which can only result in increased bitterness among the nations of the Balkans, and must finally lead to a catastrophe. We desire full national freedom and national autonomy, and hereby protest against any attempt to rob the Balkan nations of their right to self-government, to force them under a national control.

The Social Democratic Party is of the opinion that the Balkan peninsula is made up of a mixture of nationalities

which cannot be divided along geographical lines according to their respective national affiliations. A territorial division into states will not bring about the desired unity. On the contrary, each of these states would inevitably become the oppressor of a large mass of foreign inhabitants. We denounce openly, therefore, any attempt to so divide the Balkan peninsula. We offer our unqualified support to a union of the Balkan people, we are convinced that only the formation of a Balkan federation will give to each nation national autonomy, will assure to each nation industrial and cultural progress. Moreover, we consider that such a federation constitutes the only effective means of self-defense against the imperialistic—or colonial—desires of European Powers.

The Social Democratic Party of Serbia looks with horror upon the prospect of a fratricidal war between Serbia and Bulgaria, two countries that speak related dialects of the same mother-tongue, two nations whose customs and inclinations are identical, two nations whose culture, whose industrial life, whose interests are similar. The Social Democratic Parties of Serbia and Bulgaria raise their voices in emphatic protest against the artificial hatred that is being stirred up by the ruling class, that can lead to but one result, armed conflicts, and the destruction of the Balkan peoples.

Against the dangerous organized opposition of our rulers, the capitalist cliques, the military leaders, and the unscrupulous bourgeoisie, the Socialist Parties of Bulgaria, Roumania, Turkey, Greece, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slavonia, as well as the Social Democratic and progressive people of Montenegro and Albania, are pledged to work for a union of all Balkan nations in the interests of their own industrial and cultural development, a union of the Balkan nations in the Federation of Balkan Republics.

In May, 1914, the Congress of the Servian Social Democratic Party met at Belgrade, for the first time after the Second Balkan War. One hundred and twenty-eight delegates took part, among them three delegates from the newly-acquired provinces of Serbia.

Professor Kachanitch, of the University, presided. He gave the floor to the foreign delegates, especially to

those from the Austrian, Hungarian, Czech, Croatian, and Bulgarian Socialist Parties.

The Congress received Sakasoff, the delegate from the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party and editor of its central organ, with enthusiastic applause. He said:

"Our soldiers and yours lived together for many years like brothers, but the intrigues of diplomats, the imperialism, and despotism of our dynasties have pitted them against each other in a fratricidal war."

Continuing his speech, he gave a sketch of the political situation of the Balkan peoples. At no time had conditions been so favorable for the constitution of a republic in the Balkan states as at the present moment. Bulgaria had lost 100,000 men in her wars and incurred a public debt of a thousand million francs. Everywhere poverty and ruin reigned, and an intense discontent on the part of the people with the régime established after the war had shown itself by the election of 37 Socialist deputies to the Bulgarian Parliament at the last elections.

The Congress adopted resolutions demanding the introduction of self-government in the provinces conquered by Servia; equality of all residents of these provinces, irrespective of race, religion, and nationality; and the abolition of the feudal system still powerful in these provinces; the land should belong to its workers.

It also published an appeal to the Servian proletariat, similar to that issued among all the other Balkan peoples, urging them to establish a very close bond between all the Balkan peoples in order to bring about a federated republic of all the Balkan nations.

An imposing demonstration took place after the Congress in favor of a union between Bulgaria and Servia.

On August 1, 1914, after the outbreak of the war with Austria, the Socialists in the Servian parliament (the Skupschtina) had the courage to refuse their support to the government.

Representative Laptchevitch (Socialist) maintained that the government had not done everything possible to avoid

war, because it had made of Servia a bridge between Russia and France, and is being used by these countries to serve their own interests and not those of Servia. The government was to blame for tolerating the conspiracies of such secret organizations as the Black Hand of the Narodna Obrana, which has driven the country into this war.

The Premier Paschitch thanked the Skupschtina for its willingness to support the government and attacked representative Laptchevitch for deserting the government at a critical moment. He maintained that underhand methods rather belong to the arsenal of the Socialists.

Representative Laptchevitch protested vehemently against the views expressed by the Minister President, causing a noisy scene.

The address was then accepted by the votes of all against those of the Socialist representatives Laptchevitch and Kazlerovitch.

BULGARIA

The Bulgarian Socialists had obtained in 1911 only 25,000 out of nearly half a million votes, and not one out of 211 seats in the parliament (Sobranje). In a special bye-election in the Sofia, however, Sakasoff, the leader of the "broad" faction, was elected and to good purpose, as will be seen.

On October 11th the Bulgarian Sobranje (Assembly) ratified by acclamation the mobilization decree and other measures relating to preparation for war. There was only one dissenting vote, that of the sole Socialist deputy, Sakasoff. He said: "We do not want a Balkan confederation instituted in view of the war. What we want, what we are preparing is a confederation uniting in fact all the Balkan nations, including Turkey, for a work of peace, of labor, of production, and exchange, a work of liberty and of progress."

Sakasoff was attacked in the open street by a band of

students with revolvers and sticks. He took shelter in the house of Professor Kalew, all the windows of which the students smashed. The deputy was only able to get home under a strong escort of police.

After a half year's experience with war against Turkey and later against the Balkan Allies a large part of the working people and peasants of the country came to share Sakasoff's view and, in the election of the summer of 1913, increased the Socialist vote from 25,000 to 107,000.

The general elections, held on December 7, 1913, resulted in a great victory for the Socialist Party, or, we should say, parties, as there are two, the more Opportunist section and the Radical section, reported London *Justice*.

The former had 21 members returned, the latter 16, a total of 37 out of a parliament of 211 members.

In the last parliament there was only one Socialist, Comrade Sakasoff, belonging to the Opportunist section.

The programme of the Peasants' League, according to *Vorwaerts*, demanded that the famine and fearful suffering of the country be met by the most rigid economies, including *the dismissal of all ambassadors and higher army officers*. The Socialists demanded in addition *a democratic republic and a federation of the Balkan states*, and improvement of the condition of the Macedonian Bulgarians by peaceful means.

Vorwaerts reported:

The opposition parties have put a programme of 15 points before the government. In case their demands are not granted they threaten to bring into the new parliament a law abolishing the monarchy and establishing a republic. Since such a law might easily secure a majority in the present parliament, the day of its opening [which depends upon the consent of the King] is extremely uncertain.

The government, however, called a new election for March 8, 1914, and by the use of police violence finally succeeded in defeating the Socialist and Peasant Parties. Sakasoff gives us a good account of the result of this election in *Vorwaerts*:

The Sobranje parliamentary elections of March 8, 1914, resulted as follows: The government gained in old Bulgaria 95 (formerly 94) seats, the Peasants 50 (formerly 47), the Democrats 20 (formerly 14), the Socialists 20 (formerly 37), the Populists 8 (formerly 5), the Radicals 5 (formerly 5), the Progressives 4 (formerly 1). In the new territories the government won 32, the Democrats 8 seats. The government has 127 seats, while the opposition has 118 seats. Two seats have still to be filled.

The first question that arises is, Will the government, with such a small majority, be able to hold its own? In fact, it was believed that the government would resign, especially as 13 *Young Turks, elected in new Bulgaria, had to be counted in with the Government Party*. It can be said without mistake that the majority is not the majority of King Ferdinand, but also the majority of the Turkish Sultan, for it stands to reason that the Young Turkish deputies will listen more readily to Enver Pasha than follow President Radaslawoff. Anyway, the government decided to remain, and it is not uninteresting to see that this conclusion was reached *after the Prime Minister had a conference with the Austrian, Roumanian, and Turkish Ambassadors*.

The second result of the election is the maintenance of the democratic character of the opposition, though the loss of seats by the Socialist Party naturally points to a shifting toward the right inside the opposition. Agrarians and Democrats have increased their seats. The increase comes partly from the newly conquered territories, which nevertheless proves that they have not fallen a prey to reaction. The Socialists of both wings have more than 1500 votes in the new territories. This is another good and promising sign.

The loss in seats by the Socialists has, besides those mentioned, other causes. The power of the proletarian movement in Bulgaria has not been large enough to maintain the gain in the last election of the 37 seats and 107,000 votes—a fifth of the entire vote. Several thousand indifferent voters, who voted for us while under the impression of the war, have not done so at this election. Another part was dissatisfied with our work in the house and many voters were frightened away by persecutions of the government.

Our losses were heaviest in the towns. The united Socialists had at the last elections 54,369 votes, at present 47,107;

the other faction formerly had 52,777, at present 38,382; the entire loss amounts to about 21,000 votes, about a fourth of our former votes. That the party, under these conditions, made a showing of 85,000 votes does credit to our party and voters.

The Socialists thus managed to retain 80 per cent. of their enormous vote of 1913 in spite of their republicanism and extreme hostility to war.

The rise of Socialism in Bulgaria, then, gives the most solid support to those Socialists who believe that an anti-war stand may, in case of defeat, greatly hasten the growth of their movement.

LETTER OF SOCIALIST MEMBERS OF THE RUSSIAN DUMA
TO SOCIALIST MEMBERS OF THE AUSTRIAN
REICHSRATH

At the time of the Balkan Wars, the Russian and Austrian Socialists also worked to maintain the peace of Europe.

On May 8, 1913, the Social Democratic Deputies in the 4th Duma sent a letter to the Austrian and Hungarian Social Democrats, in which the whole situation is briefly reviewed. It proceeds:

We, the few Social Democratic deputies in the fourth Imperial Duma, in contrast to the pro-Slavic patriotic demonstrations, as a sign of brotherly solidarity and Social Democratic greeting, stretch out our hands, over the heads of the reactionary and bureaucratic clique and Liberal and chauvinistic opposition, to you, the representatives of the laboring masses of Austria and Hungary.

Under the cover of the desire of Serbia to get out on the Adriatic, and of the autonomy of Albania, there is in progress a passionate struggle between Russia and Austria-Hungary for the hegemony on the Balkans. In the struggle between Roumania and Bulgaria we again find that Austria-Hungarian and Russian diplomats have made it their profession

to excite an appetite among the small countries in order that they may use their disunion to advance their own imperialistic intrigues.

And every one of these secondary questions, in which the responsible and irresponsible diplomats want us to see natural forces at work, may be the beginning of a new chapter of bloody shame in European history.

If every desire to lead one nation against another is, according to the Basel International Socialist Congress, "an attempt against humanity and reason," then *a war between Russia and Austria-Hungary would be an actual act of insanity; it would result in a savage attack of one nation upon another. The people of Russia do not know of one single cause which could offer a shadow of reason for such a crime.*

The peasant masses of Russia have nothing to look for on the Balkans. They are at present in need of important agrarian and tax reforms in Russia proper. The poor and starving Russian peasants are not promoters of imperialism. They are the victims of it. The same holds true in regard to the masses of the small bourgeoisie, also suffering from the oppression of militarism. The Russian proletariat cannot support this adventurous imperialism, being a class especially suffering on account of the existing régime of political injustice, police oppression, and nationalistic prejudice.

Just as you are warning the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy not to meddle, in the interest of the feudal and capitalistic cliques, with the affairs of the Balkan nations, so we declare: The St. Petersburg diplomacy has no business in the Balkans, just as the Balkan nations have nothing to hope for from St. Petersburg diplomatic bureaus.

The peoples of the Near East, through their own initiative, must establish on their territories a democratic federation, independent of Russia and Austria-Hungary. This point of view binds us to one another as well as to our fraternal parties in the Balkans. We ask you to believe, dear comrades, that the Russian proletariat, having already freed itself of the effects of the counter-revolution, realizes its own significance and mission, and will be able at the deciding moment to force the Powers to pay heed. In our struggle for peace, as in all our activities, we feel and realize that we are united to you by the indestructible bond of ideals and purpose. This unobscured Socialist solidarity strengthens our

beliefs, notwithstanding the spread of chauvinistic passions. We sweep aside with contempt the Germano- and Austrophobe agitation of Russian Liberalism, which is trying to cover the savage attack of Russia against the Germans and everything that is German with the color of progressivism. We are proud to declare ourselves devoted adepts of German Socialism.

The underlying points of difference between the Austrian and Russian governments were the same in July, 1914, as they were in May, 1913. Then, as now, Balkan questions were the chief issues. This letter, then, gives in brief the attitude of the Russian Socialists towards the issues that were the *immediate* cause of the present war.

CHAPTER VIII

REVOLUTIONARY GENERAL STRIKES, 1914

RUSSIA: THE GENERAL STRIKE OF JULY 17TH-27TH

OUR chief Russian documents of this period are an account of the revolutionary, though spontaneous, general strike movement, which came to an end only in the very days when the Russian army was being mobilized. We show an aspect of this strike that is not generally known, namely, that it was directed in part against the Russian militarist party.

The inception of the strike was not political. A labor-union strike for higher wages had been declared ended by the leaders, when a riot occurred and blood was shed by the Cossacks and police.

THE STRIKE IN ST. PETERSBURG

(From the New York *Volkszeitung*)

At the beginning of the movement, the workers, incited by the bloodshed at the Putiloff works, in which fifty were injured and four killed, entered upon a three-day protest strike at the call of the active organizations. But the masses were so bitterly provoked by the actions of the police and Cossacks that the decision of the executive councils of the leading parties to end the strike on the evening of July 20th—which, however, was kept from the general mass as a result of the confiscation of the two Social Democratic papers—secured no hearing. Until this time, the streets of St. Petersburg had been thronged with peacefully demonstrating workers who, when President Poincaré passed by, cried, "Long live the republic! Amnesty! Down with autocracy! Long live lib-

erty!" Then, inflamed to the greatest fury by the attacks of the police and Cossacks, the strikers erected barricades on July 21st in various public places. For the first time since its founding, the Russian capital saw huge barricades spring up, behind which the workmen, armed with stones, sought shelter from the assaulting Cossacks.

The fiercest conflicts occurred on the nights and days of July 22d and 23d. Several thousand workmen took part in these fights. From most of the barricades—consisting for the most part of telephone and telegraph poles, overturned carts and stone piles—red flags were seen fluttering. Women and children helped with the building of the barricades. Broken up by the police, the masses of men reassembled at different points in order to take up the fight anew. The police and military volleyed fiercely upon the crowds until, after a time, it became impossible to count the dead and wounded.

During the week, according to the report of the factory inspection committee (which falls somewhat short of the true number), over 200,000 workmen took part in the strike in St. Petersburg alone. Even such concerns as the Neva yarn mills, the Neva cotton mills, and the Thornton factory, which had never stopped work since 1904, discontinued operations as soon as the street fights began in the capital in connection with the general strike—a sign of how deeply inflamed even the less eager sections of the proletariat in St. Petersburg became as a result of recent occurrences. Even a portion of the street railway men and of the shop employees of several railroads ceased work. Only the presence of numerous troops and gendarmes prevented the most important roads from taking part in the strike. The extent and strength of the movement may be shown further by the fact that the marine barracks were watched by armed soldiers to prevent the sailors housed in them from going over to the strikers.

A leading feature of all the demonstrations after July 20th, according to this and all other reports, was that the workers tore down all decorations in celebration of the Franco-Russian alliance—French capitalism being generally known as the underlying cause of the failure of the last revolution and of all the misery and horrors of the last ten years.

A dispatch to *The Daily Citizen* of July 24th shows that Russia was then on the very verge of revolution:

The city to-day has the appearance of an armed camp, and is, in fact, in the throes of a civil war. Barricades have been built by the strikers in the Samson Prospect, and are held, despite assaults from police and military, by strong forces of armed men. The tramway traffic has been brought to a complete standstill. Tramway men declare that they are afraid to venture out with the cars. There is no doubt, however, that they are sympathetic to the strike.

At the moment there seems every probability that St. Petersburg may be cut off from the outside world, so far as railway traffic is concerned, for to-day the strikers, turning up suddenly and in great force, tore up the rails just outside the city. Women as well as men took part in these operations.

The object of those who are directing the strike is both to cut off supplies and to prevent the transport of troops into the capital. On the other hand, the tactics of the government are to draw cordons of police and military across the city and divide it into districts, so that the strikers in one may not be able to communicate with those in another. The evident plan is, by isolating each, to crush the uprising in district after district.

That the government are thoroughly alarmed was proved by the extraordinary meeting of the cabinet summoned to-day to consider what measures ought to be taken in the emergency. The government, however, seem to have lost their heads, for the orders to the police are given by the Minister of the Interior and countermanded several times a day, with the result of general bewilderment.

The situation is the more serious because during last night the police tried by a series of sudden descents to effect the arrest of supposed strike leaders. They met with resolute and armed resistance, and had to retire beaten.

All factories are now guarded by strong detachments of troops. A feeling of uncertainty prevails everywhere. The stock exchange is very depressed owing to the news of the heavy fall of Russian securities in Berlin. The position, in short, is exactly like that which prevailed before the great strike in 1905, and the whole question is, Will the railway men join? I am told there is a strike of post and telegraph employees in preparation.

News from Moscow and other towns is scarce, since the

telephone line was many times interrupted to-day, and then largely used by the government. It is feared that Moscow will witness the repetition of the scenes of 1905, and troops are being hastily rushed to that capital.

On July 26th, the day after the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, St. Petersburg was put under martial law and the strike was finally terminated. But even then it was only the most extreme measures of repression that succeeded in putting the strikers down. The city working classes of Russia, organized under Socialist leadership, were certainly in no loyal or militaristic mood at the outbreak of the present war.

ITALY: THE GENERAL STRIKE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT (JUNE, 1914)

There was another domestic political situation which had an equally important bearing on the war. We give documents showing the threat of general strike and insurrection on the part of the Italian Socialists in case Italy went to war as a part of the Triple-Alliance, that is, against France. This threat is widely held in Italy and elsewhere to have had a great deal of influence with the government. But it would have amounted to little or nothing, but for the successful general strike of the previous month (June, 1914), which resulted as a protest against governmental repression. This strike is recorded to have involved two million workingmen, and though it failed to satisfy the revolutionary aims of many of its participants, it undoubtedly served the purpose of the Socialist Party and the Federation of Labor, and it showed that they were able to call a general strike. We also give an account of the governmental reprisals, but they were not sufficient to take the heart out of the working people, as they have always accompanied Italian general-strike movements. In spite of reprisals the last move-

ment was the most menacing Italy has ever witnessed.

The Russian and Italian strikes suggest the possibility of revolutionary action in these and other countries in connection with the war, either in the case of the bad defeat of any of the Powers or long continuance of the war—or as a result of the economic and political crises likely to follow it. It will be recalled that the International Manifesto at the time of the Balkan War (the first document of this section), in seeking for methods of preventing the war, emphasizes neither the general strike nor the refusal to vote military supplies, but the danger to the ruling classes of revolutions resulting from the war.

THE STRIKE DESCRIBED BY MUSSOLINI

The general strike which occurred in Italy in June, less than two months before the outbreak in the war, was one of the most complete the world has ever seen. It has been estimated that there were nearly two million strikers. While not all of the railroad workers struck, a very large part did, so that the system was crippled in many parts of the country. After the strike was ended, hundreds of railway employees were punished by losing their rank in the government service, so that the Railway Union met and decided, at the proper time, to declare another strike. This was late in July. Besides, nearly 6,000 other workers are to be tried by the courts. It will be recalled that in many of the smaller towns of the Romagna the government was entirely overthrown, and that the republican agitation was immensely strengthened throughout Italy.

The following account of the revolutionary disturbances is from the pen of Mussolini, then editor of the Socialist daily, *Avanti*. We take it from the Belgian Socialist daily, *Le Peuple*:

"The first Sunday in June, in Italy, is the celebration of the granting of the constitution. A military review and other dynastic celebrations take place. The militant Italians—Socialists, Syndicalists, Anarchists—have chosen this day to hold meetings of protest against the military discipline companies. The government promulgated a decree prohibiting these meetings. This was, as can be seen, a gross violation of freedom of speech and assemblage.

"The seriousness of the movement arises also from the plundering of gunsmiths' shops, from the barricades that have been erected in several cities, from the arming of an entire population that believed the government had been overthrown. Churches were burnt, railroad stations, town halls and headquarters of monarchists were sacked, requisitions were sent out for food, which was divided among the poor. In short, evidences pointed towards the eve of the social revolution.

"For a week the two provinces of Torti and Ravenna that make up Romagna were separated from the rest of Italy. Railroad bridges were torn up, the red flag of the republic was hoisted in cities and villages, the military and political authorities shut themselves up in their palaces and barracks. An enormous mob of armed peasants traversed cities and country proclaiming the new régime.

"For two days no paper appeared in Italy, with the exception of the official *Popolo Romano*. . . .

"The proletarians who had obeyed the order of the Socialist Party in the matter of the general strike were calculated at two million. . . .

"The figures of the dead and wounded give an idea of the movement:

"At Turin, 3 dead.

"At Milan, 1 dead.

"At Parma, 2 dead.

"At Florence, 3 dead.

"At Naples, 4 dead.

"At Ancona, 3 dead.

"At Fabriano, 1 dead.

"At Bari, 3 dead."

Mussolini gives as the real cause of the uprising—the Tripoli War.

"Tripoli War has cost us two thousand millions. For

a nation like Italy, whose economic constitution is very weak, such a sum represents a deadly bleeding. As a result we have unemployment, discontent, and general uneasiness."

Writing to *Le Peuple* on June 23d, before there was any menace of another and greater war, Mussolini still predicts the approach of revolution:

"The truth is, that as a result of the war [in Africa], Italy has entered a critical and revolutionary situation. The hour of great responsibilities for the Socialists draws near."

SUBSEQUENT MILITARY DISTURBANCES

As soon as the first menace of the present war appeared, about the middle of July, the agitation was everywhere redoubled. The *Avanti* called upon the workers to declare a general strike and to inaugurate a revolution, if Italy declared war. And it was supported in this position both by the Confederation of Labor and the Socialist Party.

When the reserves began to be called out, the situation became critical, as a despatch to the Berlin *Vorwaerts* clearly indicates.

On the night of the 18th of July, the reservists of Forli, Cestna, and Rimini (in the Romagna) mutinied.

The report had spread among the reservists of Forli that they were to be sent to Albania. In the night of the 19th they were awakened and ordered to make themselves ready for travel, without any explanation being given them: they were to go not to Albania but to Padua. The reservists refused, however, to get ready for the voyage and cried out that they wanted to say farewell to their families first. When officers appeared to find out the cause of the alarm, they were received with the cry, "Down with the war. Long live the republic!" As the officers tried to force obedience, the reservists began to throw bread and other remnants of food at them, so that the officers were forced to retreat. The reservists even tried to seize the weapons, but were prevented by the fact that the door of the armory was locked. They

obeyed orders only when they learned that they were not to go to war. As the train left the station the cry was heard, "Down with the war! Hurrah for the revolution!"

THE THREAT OF REVOLUTION IN CASE OF A DECLARATION
OF WAR AGAINST FRANCE

A few days later appeared the revolutionary article of the *Avanti* already referred to:

And Italy?

If a European conflagration should occur, what will be her attitude? With Austria against France?

We do not know what are the secret "pacts" of this Triple Alliance, which was so suddenly renewed by the monarchs against the will of the people; but we know that we boldly declare that the Italian proletariat will break the pacts of the alliance if it is forced to spill a single drop of blood for a cause which is not its own.

Even in the case of a European conflagration Italy, if it does not wish to precipitate its ruin, has but one attitude to take: absolute neutrality.

Because of the general strike of June and the revolutionary state of mind of the working classes afterward many competent observers believe that it was this attitude of the Socialists and labor unionists, more than anything else, that prevented Italy from entering the war as a member of the Triple Alliance.

PART III

AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR THE PERIOD IN WHICH THE SOCIALIST PARTIES DEFINED THEIR POSITION TOWARD THE CONFLICT

In Parts I and II our quotations have been carefully selected from a large number bearing more or less directly on the subject. From this point the action of the leading Socialist Parties becomes of momentous historic importance, and practically *all* the principal documents are reproduced in whole or in part, there being very little question as to those that are most essential.

The period covered begins with the Austrian Ultimatum to Servia, issued on July 23d. The end differs in the various countries. One of the first questions brought up by the war was whether the Socialist members of various parliaments were to vote for or against the war appropriations demanded by all the governments involved. Until their attitude towards this practical question was decided the position of the Socialists was not wholly determined. We therefore include in this Part all documents bearing on this question.

In some countries, notably Belgium and France, Socialists were invited to participate in the government. We include in this Part the Socialist statements as to their reasons for this action.

And finally the invasion of Belgium forced a number of small neutral countries to discuss the possibility that they might be forced into the war. So we include in this section documents showing the position of the Socialists of these smaller countries, Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Portugal, even when that position was defined only several weeks or months after the outbreak of the war. It was a question of a possible extension of the war to these countries. And in this same connection, naturally, we show also the attitude of the Italian Socialists towards the question of neutrality.

CHAPTER IX

THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

ON July 29th, the International Socialist Bureau, representing all the world's Socialist Parties, was in session at Brussels. It gave its attention wholly to the danger of war. We reproduce the resolution passed, as well as the speeches made by Haase for the Germans and Jaurès for the French, at the public meeting held in Brussels on the following day. It is scarcely necessary to say that both use the very strongest terms in opposition to war. The speech of Jaurès gains an added importance by the fact that he was assassinated on the following day, while Haase, speaking in the Reichstag, less than a week later, made the official declaration of the German Party indorsing the war, and giving the Socialist support to the war loan.

The resolution unanimously passed by the Bureau was as follows:

In assembly of July 29th the International Socialist Bureau has heard declarations from representatives of all nations threatened by a world war, describing the political situation in their respective countries.

By a unanimous vote, the Bureau considers it an obligation for the workers of all nations concerned not only to continue but even to strengthen their demonstrations against war in favor of peace and of a settlement of the Austro-Servian conflict by arbitration.

The German and French workers will bring to bear on their governments the most vigorous pressure in order that Germany may secure in Austria a moderating action, and in order that France may obtain from Russia an undertaking that she

will not engage in the conflict. On their side the workers of Great Britain and Italy shall sustain these efforts with all the power at their command.

It was further resolved that "the International Socialist Bureau congratulates the Russian workers on their revolutionary attitude, and invites them to continue their heroic efforts against Czardom as being one of the most effective guarantees against the threatened world war."

The International Bureau held no further meetings. This is important, since it had been intrusted by the International Congresses, whenever a war was threatened, with doing everything in its power to prevent it (see Chapter III). The discussion at the Congresses also showed that the Socialists were fully aware of the difficulty of concerted action at such a moment, but in spite of this realization deliberately staked their hopes entirely on the Bureau. The Socialist parties of the great nations, however, made no special effort to make use of the Bureau, as they did not intrust their representatives in Brussels with any special powers, and did not even instruct them to remain in session.

In Brussels on July 30th the International Bureau participated in a monster demonstration against the war. The speech of Haase is final evidence that, *even after the Russian mobilization*, the German Socialists were against the war, and the speech of Jaurès shows strongly the French Socialist feeling against war—before the invasion of Belgium.

Haase, representing Germany, said:

The Austrian ultimatum was then, in reality, an actual provocation for a war both longed for and awaited. Servia's answer was, it is known, drawn up in a spirit so moderate that, if good faith were admissible on the part of the Austrians, peace would be assured. *Austria wanted war*. But what is so dreadful, is the fact that this criminal madness can cover all Europe with blood.

Austria apparently desires to count upon Germany. But the German Socialists declare that secret treaties do not pledge the proletariat. *The German proletariat contends that Germany ought not to intervene even if Russia should intervene.*

Let our enemies take care. It is possible that the different peoples, tired out by such manifold misery and oppression, will finally wake up and establish a Socialistic society. (Our italics.)

Jaurès, representing France, spoke as follows:

And Germany? If she knew all along the tenor of the Austrian note, she can in no way be excused for having permitted such a step. And if official Germany did not know, in what lies all her much-vaunted governmental wisdom? What! A contract binds you and drags you to war, and you do not know what the contract is? I want to know what people ever afforded such an example of anarchy.

As for us French Socialists, our duty is simple; we have but to impose upon our government a policy of peace. Our government practices peace. For myself, who have never hesitated to take upon my shoulders the hatred of our jingoes through my obstinate desire—which will never fail—for Franco-German conciliation, *I have a right to say that at the present moment the French Government desires peace and is working for the maintenance of peace.*

The French Government has taken the initiative in conciliation. And she gives Russia counsels of prudence and patience.

As for ourselves, it is our duty to insist that the government speak forcibly enough to Russia to make her keep hands off. *But if Russia, unfortunately, should not take notice, our duty is to say: "We know but one treaty, the treaty, that which binds us to the human race!"*

Such is our duty, and on voicing it we found that we shared the opinion of our comrades in Germany, who are asking their government to make Austria moderate her acts.

But for the absolute masters, the ground is undermined. If in the mechanical seduction and intoxication of first struggles they succeed in luring the masses, just as typhoid will finish the work of the shells and as death and misery will aid in striking down men, so the masses, sobered down and come

to their senses, will turn towards the directing Germans, French, Russians, Italians, and will ask what reasons they can give for all these corpses. And then revolution, freed from its chains, will say to them: "Away and seek pardon from God and man!"

The proletariat has already imbibed the feeling of its strength, and once it has acquired a little pride, millions and millions of proletarians, through the organ of their delegates, will come to Paris to affirm their desire for justice and peace.

The entire audience stood up, waved their hats and handkerchiefs, and applauded the speaker for more than five minutes. "It was a most stirring demonstration and one never to be forgotten," we read in the press report.

CHAPTER X

GERMANY

THE German Socialist Party has over 1,100,000 members and secured 4,239,000 votes, one-third of the total number cast, at the last Reichstag election in 1912. Its vote increased nearly one million during the five years from 1907 to 1912, and it now has 113 of the 397 votes of the Reichstag, constituting the most numerous party in that body, and more numerous also than either the combined Liberal or the combined Conservative groups. The party has the support of three-fourths of Germany's labor unionists. It owns 86 daily papers and controls many thousands of subsidiary organizations of various kinds. The actual or potential influence of such a party upon public opinion, if not directly upon the government, is evident.

While the declarations of the Austrian Socialists were first in point of time, those of the German Party are first in point of importance. Its position was clearly defined by its anti-war proclamations of July 25th and 31st, by the editorials of *Vorwaerts* and *Die Neue Zeit*, the official party organs, and by the resolutions of the Berlin mass meetings of July 29th, and the revolutionary resolutions of the Wurtemberg Socialist Convention, then in session. In all of these documents it will be noted that there is the strongest possible opposition to the war and that every conceivable argument is used against it.

Even the most opportunistic Socialist newspapers,

now very warlike, offered no exceptions. We close this chapter with the official declaration of the party in the Reichstag, on August 4th, in favor of supporting the war. This is, of course, one of the most important documents in the whole volume.

Many of the declarations, articles, and speeches in Part IV, either attack or defend this official statement of the German Socialist position. Only one note needs to be made at this point, namely, that the party refused all responsibility for the declaration of war, and supported the war only on the ground that it was already being fought. It is probable, therefore, that the Socialists are not to be blamed, directly or indirectly, for the actual declaration of war. Those Socialists who attack the party's action in supporting the war on August 4th, claim only that this action may so seriously strengthen the government as to enable it to prolong the war, and so greatly increase the destruction of life and property it entails, and that this action may postpone or make more difficult that democratic revolution against the military party now in control of Germany, which might otherwise have been expected at the close of the war. The Socialists who defend the German Party on the other hand do so chiefly on the ground that its support of the German Government helped to prevent a Russian victory.

It will be noted that none of the later statements of Socialists outside of Germany, and only a few of those of the Germans, regard English or French defeat by Germany as desirable from the Socialist standpoint, while almost none desire to see Germany defeated by Russia. The chief difference of opinion, then, is solely on the question as to whether *predominance* of defeat or victory for the German Government is more to be wished for from the International Socialist point of

view. The main question is: Is it or is it not to the advantage of International Socialism that the German Government should be able to strengthen itself by results obtained from the war?

The official proclamations of the Party Executive before the war were as radically anti-governmental as the editorials of the party press. Many of the latter threatened revolution or defeat. We shall begin with the official proclamations.

PROCLAMATION OF GERMAN SOCIALIST PARTY (JULY 25TH)

The fields in the Balkans are not yet dry from the blood of those who have been massacred by thousands; the ruins of the devastated towns are still smoking; unemployed, hungry men, widowed women, and orphaned children are still wandering about the country. Yet once more the war fury, unchained by Austrian imperialism, is setting out to bring death and destruction over the whole of Europe.

Though we also condemn the behavior of the Greater Serbia Nationalists, the frivolous war-provocation of the Austro-Hungarian Government calls for the sharpest protest. For the demands of that government are more brutal than have ever been put to an independent state in the world's history, and *can only be intended deliberately to provoke war.*

In the name of humanity and civilization the class-conscious proletariat of Germany raises a flaming protest against this criminal behavior of the war provokers. It imperiously demands of the German Government that it use its influence with the Austrian Government for the preservation of peace, and, if the shameful war cannot be prevented, to abstain from any armed interference. *Not one drop of a German soldier's blood shall be sacrificed to the lust of power of the Austrian rulers and to the imperialistic profit-interests.*

Comrades, we appeal to you to express at mass meetings without delay the German proletariat's firm determination to maintain peace. A solemn hour has come, more serious than any during the last few decades. Danger is approaching! The world-war is threatening! The ruling classes who in time of peace gag you, despise you and exploit you, would misuse you as food for cannon. Everywhere there must sound in the

ears of those in power: "We will have no war! Down with war! Long live the international brotherhood of the peoples!" (Our italics.)

THE LAST MESSAGE OF THE PARTY EXECUTIVE (JULY 31ST)

The second manifesto, issued immediately after the mobilization order, differed in no essential way from the first—as its leading passages, which follow, demonstrate:

Comrades, martial law has been declared! The next hour may bring with it the outbreak of the world-war. And with it bitter trials will be forced upon the people, upon our whole Continent.

Up to this last moment the international proletariat has done its duty. Beyond the German border everything is being done to keep peace, to make war impossible. Our earnest protests, our repeated attempts to avert this catastrophe have been useless. The conditions under which we are living have once more been stronger than our will and the will of our working-class brothers. So we must look at that which lies before us firmly, unflinchingly.

The terrible butchery of the European nations is a horrible verification of the warnings we have given in vain to our ruling classes for more than a generation. . . .

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

MASS MEETINGS IN BERLIN (JULY 28TH)

On the 29th of July, twenty-eight Social Democratic mass meetings were called in Berlin, the text being "War against War." A resolution was passed which ended as follows: "The German workers, just as the French, are now confronted by the problem of so dealing with their respective governments as to prevent the sacrificing of these peoples to the desperado tactics of Austria and Russia. Down with the cry for war! Long live the international brotherhood of man!" *

* *Vorwaerts*, July 29th.

At these twenty-eight meetings—one alone of which had 70,000 persons in attendance—the Marseillaise was, as usual, sung—and also on the streets.

Similar meetings were held in nearly all the other large cities. In many places they were dispersed by the police, and nationalistic or “patriotic” counter-demonstrations were also held—though the Socialist meetings are reported to have been the larger in most cases.

The Socialists of Wurtemberg, especially Stuttgart, seemed to take a position even more revolutionary than those of Berlin. Here the clear threat of a general strike was heard.

RESOLUTION OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY CONGRESS OF
WURTEMBERG (JULY 25TH, 26TH)

(*Vorwaerts*, July 27th)

On the 25th and 26th of July the National Congress of Wurtemberg Social Democrats convened at Esslingen. The following resolution, proposed by the well-known Clara Zetkin, a member of the national executive of the German Party, was passed:

“The representatives of the Wurtemberg Social Democracy promise the masses to assemble and train them, on the ground of the revolutionary class struggle, so that they may be prepared with self-sacrifice to put forth their full economic and political power for the maintenance of peace. They send greetings to the brave proletariat of Russia, which has again entered the lists in a strike of the masses for economic and political rights. They greet it also as a strong shield for peace in these dire times. The fact that the Russian proletariat has been able to cripple Russian Czarism indicates the great power that may be wielded by a daring and unselfish working-class organization in the battle for freedom and peace.”

THE POSITION OF “VORWAERTS”

We next give selections showing the position of *Vorwaerts*, the official party organ, from July 25th to Au-

gust 3d. The important passages we have placed in italics. All these quotations are from editorials covering large parts of the first page.

(Vorwaerts, July 25, 1914)

They want war, the conscienceless elements which influence and control the Vienna Court. They want war—the wild cries of the sensational press have proved it for weeks. They want war—the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia makes it clear and public to all the world. . . .

For this ultimatum both in its manner and in its demands is so shameless that a Servian government which, humbled by this note, should draw back, would have to reckon with the possibility that it would be driven out by the masses of the people between dinner and dessert. . . .

It was an act of criminal frivolity on the part of the German press to urge on its dear allied comrades to the last extremities in their lust for war. *But in Berlin there is being played just as dangerous a game as in Vienna.* For in a policy of adventure, one can only know how it begins, but not how it is to end, and if it comes to a great European conflict, *then highly undesired things might go to pieces in Germany, things which in Germany are reckoned among the most sacred institutions.* (Our italics.)

The next day the threat of revolution contained in the last lines was repeated.

(Vorwaerts, July 26th)

Into what complications Germany has fallen because of Austria's scandalous surprise! For the fact that the Austrian ultimatum was issued upon its own responsibility and without consultation with the German Government is now admitted by the German officials themselves.

The German Government denies through the official press bureau that it has been consulted as to the conditions of the Austrian ultimatum. *That these conditions mean the most frightful humiliation, the very abdication of Serbia as an independent state, is confessed even by the pro-war newspapers of Germany.* (Our italics.) If now the German Government

had no knowledge of the final formulation of the ultimatum, this "pretext for war," as the *Rheinische-Westfaelische Zeitung* calls it, then it must at least have been informed of the intentions of the Austrian Government in general outline. *That thereupon the German Government did not from the first take steps against the Austrian intention, which meant nothing less than the beginning of a predetermined declaration of war, this is a fearfully serious accusation which must be brought against it.* (Our italics.) A "scandal" is what the *Rheinische-Westfaelische Zeitung* calls it—a newspaper whose patriotism leaves nothing to be desired.

WE DESIRE NOTHING BUT A FREE ROAD FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT. EVERY WAR IS THE DEADLY ENEMY OF THIS DEVELOPMENT. THEREFORE THE WORKING CLASS IS THE SWORN ENEMY OF WARLIKE POLITICS.

(*Vorwaerts* uses large letters for the above expression.)

Austria has not yet reached a final decision. Its regiments are not yet on the march. Let the Austrian authorities and their open and secret helpers remember that every failure of their gambler's policy may unchain an unexpected popular movement which may put a final end to every kind of desperado and gambler's imperialistic policy.

As significant as the revolutionary note in these last lines is the accusation that Germany was behind Austria—which *Vorwaerts* had already accused of every political crime; also the statement that *every* war is the deadly enemy of political, economic, and cultural development.

The threat of revolution was repeated for a third time, and at greater length, on the following day.

(*Vorwaerts*, July 27th)

The chance of a victory can nowhere be taken for granted—what is certain in all countries is only *unspeakable bloodshed, economic ruin, and an inner Jena* [that is, overthrow of the government].

Influential Italian voices have already declared that Italy does not dream of allowing itself to be entangled in a war, as a third Power of the Triple Alliance, through the Austrian

adventure in Servia. And yet is Germany, in foolhardy Niebelungen loyalty, supposed to jump into the breach alone, for the sake of Austria's insane desperado politics, and at the risk of a world war?

Russia and France are in the same situation. The Little Father and his advisers certainly know out of their own experience what dangers may be conjured up at home by actions abroad. And France, too, knows very well, that its always temperamental, and in the meanwhile always better and better organized and disciplined proletariat would take advantage of every weakness of the bourgeois state in the most positive way, for accomplishing its own goal. So all the war countries are endangered by any frightful, bloody war and economic crisis, and on top of that *a general smash-up*.

The Austrian Party, threatened by martial law, has in the last few hours placed all the responsibility on the ruling powers. The Russian working people have already shown such ready energy in recent weeks, that the Czar's government has already got a long foretaste of future events. That the French proletariat will do its duty in the preventing of chauvinistic acts nobody will doubt. And it is a matter of course that the German Social Democracy also will stand together to the last man in these difficult struggles.

The first page of *Vorwaerts* on the following day again repeated the menace of revolution. But it now also undertook to absolve Russia from the accusation that it was the Power mainly responsible for the danger of war. No, not Russia but Austria was the chief creator of the whole disturbance.

(*Vorwaerts*, July 28th)

Fortunately England has taken the initiative for the maintenance of peace, and for the prevention of the threatening and destructive conflict. The four neutral powers, England, France, Germany, and Italy, should, according to the proposal of England, take over the function of a mediation and arbitration court. That is a reasonable proposal from all sides. Every *justifiable* complaint of Austria could reckon upon satisfaction under these conditions. It could safely reckon upon this with the co-operation of Germany and Italy. So

that if Austria does not want *war at any price*, but only its *rights and guarantees for the future*, it cannot possibly refuse mediation.

Our Russian comrades have given the Czar to understand their views in a sufficiently drastic manner. And they would prepare a sufficiently warm treatment if he is mad enough to try to plunge the country into a still worse warlike adventure than that of eastern Asia. But if, trusting solely to revolutionary action, we go so far as to stir up the power of pan-Slavism and Czarism, which is nevertheless very great, by encouraging Austria to rush forward into the wildest provocation, not the Czarism is the greatest danger at this moment, but the ill-advised Austria, which has brought to life the mad illusion that it only needs to give the signal and all Europe will march and offer up the blood of its youth as sin offerings for the murder of the heir to its throne.

No, never! The peoples of Europe hesitate to allow themselves to be led to the slaughter-house like a helpless flock of sheep.

They demand from their governments *the most energetic intervention against this political madness*.

They demand unambiguous representations in Vienna, in Berlin, and in St. Petersburg.

(Vorwaerts, July 29th)

On the next day Vorwaerts again placed the blame on Austria for having taken the initiative towards war, and again put the responsibility on the German Government if it rejected the British mediation plans. By an assumed confidence in the Kaiser the Socialist organ put the whole burden on his shoulders, which is to go as far as the laws of lèse majesté allowed. To violate these laws at this time would certainly have meant the confiscation of the whole article. We give several paragraphs:

And suppose the Czarism sees in this wanton destruction of its Servian protégé an attack upon its own prestige; suppose it sees its whole Balkan policy destroyed, and so advances its army corps, which have long since been mobilized, against Austria?

As a matter of course the International Social Democracy as a whole, and the Russian Social Democracy in particular, would consider Russian intervention unjustifiable, would oppose it with all its might. But whether it could effectively hinder Russian warlike measures is another question. Should the Russian troops advance, however, the German troops, too, would at once be sent to the front. This was declared some time ago by the German Government. Then France, too, would act—terrible world-war, with its horrors worse than the imaginings of a most satanic brain, will be upon us.

Not as a voluntary outcome of devilish desires on the part of European governments! Heaven forbid! They all want peace, and we believe their protestations. It is the diabolical logic of unmerciful facts, of events that are beyond their control.

Every conscientious politician, every feeling human being, every honest friend of civilization faces the question, What shall we do to prevent this shameful blot upon our civilization, how can we avoid this terrible outcome?

England and Russia have proposed temporary cessation of the Austrian hostilities. Austria has declined because it desires to speak first with the language of force. Germany is said to have declined to support this first important step toward settling the question of a world-war. *We can hardly believe this attitude on the part of the German Government, for as we have shown above, it places upon it the most awful responsibility—before its own people, before the foreign nations, before the forum of the world's history. (Our italics.)*

Already voices in France, where the desire to maintain peace is as ardent as anywhere in the world, are declaring that henceforth no one can hold Russia responsible, that Austria and its ally, Germany, alone will be regarded as the incendiaries who started this world-wide holocaust, that they alone are the trouble makers. (Vorwaerts here uses heavy type.)

And in England, too, the impression is quite general that the German Kaiser bears the blame, that it lay in his power, as ally and adviser of Austria, to shake war or peace out of the folds of his toga. And England is right. In the present situation, William II holds the outcome in his hands. (Our italics.)

We have always been, and always will be, opponents of

monarchical rule. We have frequently attacked most bitterly the temperamental occupant of the throne. But we here openly admit, and it is not the first time, that the attitude of William II in the years past has been that of a friend of peace. If human power and good will could control the destinies of many millions in the light of humanity and common sense, our fears in the present crisis would be small. But even the most resolute of men are not impervious to outside influence. *And we regret to say that the indications prove beyond doubt that the camarilla of war lords is working with absolutely unscrupulous means to circumvent all plans of the government, to carry out their fearful designs, to precipitate an international war, to start a world-wide fire, to devastate Europe.* (Our italics.)

[A controversy arose later as to the meaning of this paragraph. *Vorwaerts* made it clear that it was *not* meant as an approval of the Kaiser or his policy.]

The next day mobilization was ordered, and it is especially important to search the *Vorwaerts* editorial to see if it was finally swept along in the nationalistic current. On the contrary, we find it more strongly than ever insisting on the responsibility of Austria and of Germany.

(*Vorwaerts*, July 31st)

Let us consider only the situation as it stands to-day, the need of the hour. Let us examine for a moment Austria's assurance that the conflict will be localized.

This localization is a hobby with the Austrian and the German governments. They assure us that there is no danger of a world war. It is simply a question that must be settled between Austria and Servia, which concerns nobody but the parties involved. But should Russia insist upon assisting Servia, it would mean German interference—in short, *the world war*.

Russia, like all nations concerned, dreads the world war. But the German and Austrian governments must realize that the Czar's Russia, from his point of view, cannot permit the unconditional sacrifice of its protégé Servia.

Russia's internal political troubles as well as the influence

of the pacific French Government, will cause Russia to practice the greatest possible self-control, to make the most liberal concessions. But it seems practically out of the question that it should turn Serbia over for better or worse into the hands of the Austrians.

Austria has given the most sacred assurances that this shall be no war for new territory. Russia, however, demands likewise the positive guarantee that the political freedom of Serbia be not disturbed. That, as a matter of fact, is the real question at issue.

Will Austria demand from Serbia concessions that will strike its name from the list of independent nations? Or will it be satisfied to insure itself against new Servian conspiracies and assassinations?

Is it possible that Austria can be so utterly without conscience, that it remains deaf to all warnings? Is it possible that Germany is determined to go through thick and thin with such an ally?

On the morning of the day when war was declared the official daily organ of the German Party once more reaffirmed its position: Not merely was the war an affair of the German Government rather than the German people, but the governments of Austria and Germany were to blame above all the rest. *Russian mobilization was shown to be an insufficient pretext for war, and German victory was declared to be improbable—in as strong language as the conditions would allow (if the paper was to reach the public).*

(Vorwaerts, August 1st: Europe's Fateful Hour)

But Russia's mobilization does not need to make Germany nervous, because Russia—because of the organization of its army, and the wide extent of its territory—certainly needs a far longer time for mobilization than does Germany.

So there is still time for negotiations which might protect the civilized mankind of Europe from the great calamity, and especially Germany, since it is certainly true, to use the words of William II himself, that it will have to make enor-

mous sacrifices in blood and property if this fate is truly unavoidable.

And we cannot even now regard it as unavoidable, because *no* country, *no* group of Powers can calculate with certainty upon victory, laurels, and political successes. . . . (Our italics.)

Nor did *Vorwaerts* change its policy after the outbreak of the war. And it has not changed it up to the present day, except in so far as certain matters are not permitted to be discussed by the military censors. Even these forbidden topics, as our later quotations show, are indirectly discussed; or else *Vorwaerts* demonstratively asserts that it is forced to be silent as to this, that, or the other question—often a sufficient indication of its opinion.

(*Vorwaerts*, August 3d)

On Monday, August 3d, the very day when the Social Democratic group in the Reichstag decided to vote in favor of the war budget, the *Vorwaerts* printed an article condemning German "patriotism" and the "patriots" who suddenly became warriors for "freedom against Czarism."

The article, which is entitled "War Against Czarism," exposes the fallacy of German patriotic jingoists who have for years been trying to plunge the country into a war by crying that it is being menaced by the enemy.

It also ridicules the position of the government which for years has sided with Russian barbarism and the Czar and persecuted Socialists for "insulting" Nicholas, but which suddenly changed its front and adopted the stand of Marx, Engels, and Bebel, who always spoke of the necessity of smashing the Czar's rule:

The article continues:

Since the above-named leaders of the Social Democracy expressed their opinion that it was necessary to wage a democratic war against Russian despotism, conditions have changed considerably.

Russia to-day is no longer a stronghold of reaction, but it is a land of revolution. The overthrow of the monarchy and Czarism is now the aim of the Russian people in general and the Russian workers in particular.

The article then goes on to state that shortly before war was declared Russia was in the midst of a revolutionary blaze that was sweeping the country. Czarism has not been weakened by the declaration of war, but, on the contrary, it has been considerably strengthened. The war has given the despotic government a chance to distract the hatred of vast numbers of Russian people against the monarchy and Czarism, and gain the confidence of the people by its incitation against the Germans. By its agitation, the German Socialist Democracy had shown the Russian people that their enemy is not across the border, but right in their own home.

Nothing was more unpleasant to the Russian reactionaries, the "real Russian" jingoes, than to hear of the great peace demonstrations of the German Socialists, continues the editorial. Oh, how glad they would have been to come out to the revolutionary working class in Russia and say, "Why, the German Socialists call upon the people to war against the Russian people."

The "Little Father" at St. Petersburg would have felt as though a great burden had been removed from him. He would have exclaimed: "That's just what I need! Now, that the German Socialists call upon the people to war on Russia, my worst enemy, the revolutionary movement, has broken its backbone. The international solidarity of the working class is now smashed, and I can get a chance to call out a yell of patriotic nationalism. Oh, I am saved!"

Vorwaerts here definitely rejects one of the chief arguments by which the Reichstag Socialist majority—on the next day—justified their support of the war.

The Socialist world, which had read the editorials of *Vorwaerts*, was thunderstruck in the early days of August to learn that the Germans Socialists had voted

in favor of the war credits in the Reichstag—an action, on the face of it at least, in contradiction to the position of the party press before the war and to the famous precedent established by Bebel and Liebknecht, known to every Socialist, when they abstained from such a vote in 1870.

The official party explanation of this action, read by Haase, Chairman of the Reichstag Delegation at the session of August 4th, was as follows:

THE SOCIALIST PARTY DECLARATION ON VOTING FOR THE
WAR LOAN (AUGUST 4TH)

A most serious hour is upon us, an hour in which a matter of life and death confronts us. The results of the imperialistic policy which furnishes cause for the entire world to take up arms and permits the horrors of war to engulf us, the results of this policy, I say, have broken forth like a storm flood.

The responsibility for this calamity falls upon supporters of this policy. We, ourselves, are not responsible. (Applause.)

The Social Democratic Party has always combated this policy to the utmost, and even to this hour we have agitated for the maintenance of peace by great demonstrations in all countries, and, above all, by our co-operation with our French brothers. Our exertions have been in vain. And now we are only too surely confronted by the fact that war is upon us and that we are menaced by the terror of foreign invasion. The problem before us now is not the relative advisability of war or peace, but a consideration of just what steps must be taken for the protection of our country. At this moment let us think of the millions of our compatriot comrades who, through no fault of their own, will be involved in this calamity; it is they who will suffer most acutely from the devastation that war inevitably brings in its train.

Our best wishes accompany those of our brothers who have been summoned to arms, no matter what their party. (Applause from all parties.) We think also of the mothers who must be separated from their sons, and of the wives and

children who are being robbed of their bread-winners and who in consequence dwell in constant torment and fear as to the fate of their loved ones, threatened themselves, meanwhile, by the terrible sword of hunger.

Tens of thousands will be wounded or will return as invalids.

Let us regard it as our duty to assist these unfortunates, to mitigate their sufferings, and to minister to their indescribable need. But as far as concerns our people and its independence, much, if not everything, would be endangered by a triumph of Russian despotism, already weltering in the blood of her own noblest sons.

It devolves upon us, therefore, to avert this danger, to shelter the civilization and independence of our native land. Therefore, we must to-day justify what we have always said. In its hour of danger Germany may ever rely upon us.

We take our stand upon the doctrine basic to the international labor movement, which at all times has recognized the right of every people to national independence and national defense, and at the same time we condemn all war for conquest.

We hope that as soon as our opponents are ready for negotiations, an end will be made to the war and a state of peace induced which will make possible friendly relations with our neighbors.

We do not regard this in the light of a contradiction to our duty in connection with international solidarity to which we are just as firmly bound as to Germany itself. We hope that this fatal strife will prove a lesson to the millions who will come after us, a lesson which will fill them with lasting abhorrence for all warfare. May they be converted by this to the ideal of Social Democracy and international peace. And now, bearing these thoughts in mind, we give our sanction to the voting of those moneys demanded! (Applause from all parties.)

THE VOTE FOR THE WAR LOAN—MINORITY STATEMENT

Those Reichstag Socialists who were present at the session, in obedience to the decision of the party caucus, voted unanimously in favor of the war loan, but the

custom of the party allows the minority to be absent if they do not leave the Reichstag in a demonstrative manner. (See Chapter XIX.) Some took advantage of this custom. Others voted with the party but only after the most strenuous opposition in the caucus. The strength of this opposition was variously estimated. It can be more accurately measured by those who voted against the second war loan on December 2d, when 15 of about 100 members in Berlin refused to vote with the party, to say nothing of other members who so voted after uttering their protest in the caucus.

Karl Liebknecht sent to the Bremen *Bürgerzeitung*, the local Socialist organ, a communication in which he explained:

I understand that several members of the Social Democratic Party have written all sorts of things in the press with regard to the deliberations of the Social Democratic Party in the Reichstag on August 3d and 4th.

According to these reports, there were no serious differences of opinion in our party in regard to the political situation and our own position, and the decision to assent to the war credit is alleged to have been arrived at unanimously.

In order to prevent the origination of an inadmissible legend, I feel it my duty to put on record that the issues involved gave rise to diametrically opposite views within our parliamentary party, and that these opposing views found expression with a violence hitherto unknown in our deliberations. It is therefore entirely untrue to say that the assent to the war credits was given unanimously.

CHAPTER XI

AUSTRO-HUNGARY

THE Austrian Socialist Party, like that of Germany, is the largest in the country, with 1,081,000 votes in 1914, and 88 out of 516 members of the Reichsrath. Its influence is considerable, because most of the other parties are nationalistic, German, Bohemian, Polish, etc., while the Socialists of the various nationalities are comparatively united. It includes the majority of the working people of the cities and towns.

The German deputies of the Austrian Social Democratic Party issued a long manifesto at the beginning of the war with Servia, from which the following is taken:

We Social Democrats, the representatives of the working people, do not shut our eyes to the great injury which the Servian rulers have done to Austria. As we, true to our principles which repudiate vain deeds of force, condemn the assassination at Serajevo, so also do we condemn those who bear a share in the responsibility for it. We recognize that Austria-Hungary is within its rights in asking from the Servian Government the prosecution of the participants in that crime; we understand that Austria-Hungary demands that the underground agitation against the security and peace of the Austrian Federation of States shall be stopped, that the Servian rulers shall put an end to the encouraging toleration with which they have hitherto regarded this secessionist movement. But we are convinced that the Servian Government would not have been able to offer any opposition to these demands of Austria-Hungary, which are sanctioned by international law, and would, in fact, have offered none. We are convinced that all that Austria-Hungary asks could have been

obtained, and can still be obtained, by peaceful methods, and that no necessities of state, no consideration for its prestige, compels the great Power to depart from the paths of peaceful agreement. Therefore we declare, in the name of the working class, as the representatives of the German workers in Austria, that *we cannot take the responsibility for this war*, that we lay the responsibility for it, and for all the frightfully serious results that may follow, at the door of *those who thought out, supported, and encouraged the fatal step* which has brought us face to face with war. (Our italics.)

A considerable part of the above manifesto, however, was censored; and there can be no doubt that this censored part contained an even more radical attack on the war and the government than the part we have quoted. But we have quoted enough to show that the Austrian Socialists blame their own government for the war with Servia.

We are able to reproduce only a few valuable Austrian quotations because of the rigidity of the censorship. However, we give enough to prove that the Socialist parties of both Austria and Hungary regard the present war as being defensive. Of the Great Powers, they face the reactionary government of Russia alone, their armies being nowhere in conflict with those of semi-democratic England or France. Their position is, therefore, much simpler than that of the Germans, and their support of their government, whether defensible or not, is less frequently criticised by Socialists.

Even in its most bitter attack against the censorship the official party organ, the Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung*, assumes an ultra-patriotic attitude:

If the press is to perform the task which in the present organization of society belongs to it, if it is to spur on the nation *to risk its last man in the defense of its liberty and independence*, mere clouds of words and artificial pathos will not suffice. Least of all, will it do to conceal in silence the

awful seriousness of war, and to gloss over its changing fortunes. (Our italics.)

The *Arbeiter Zeitung* further declared that all Austrian Socialists were unanimous in condemning Czarism and *had no criticism to make of Germany's conduct in this war.*

This organ had a special article in its number of August 23d, the day that was to have marked the opening of the International Socialist Congress, which clearly shows the attitude of the Austrian Party. We give its chief statements:

In all countries we Socialists, German, French, English, Belgian, Austrian, Servian, have done our duty as internationalists, as long as it was possible; we warned against the war, and with every drop of our blood have sought to hinder it; and we tried to make use of every possible chance of maintaining peace up to the very last minute.

But since fate has overtaken us and overcome us, the proletariat in all countries, which formerly did its international duty, now does its duty as sons of its people, who risk everything in order that the people shall not be conquered, in order that its soil will not be delivered to the horrors of a defeat. We all suffer wrong; we all do right to protect ourselves against it. . . . But even in this tragic moment we do not forget that we are International Social Democrats. Our heart bleeds because of the frightful necessity of this conflict, but we give to our people and to the state what belongs to the people and the state.

This article, it will be noticed, justifies the Socialists of all Continental countries in supporting their governments during the present war. It does not justify one nation over the other, but it does justify all.

The Hungarian government has no democratically elected parliament, even of the narrowly restricted kind that prevails in Austria. The government being more despotic than that of Austria, the Hungarian Socialists

are correspondingly more revolutionary; but they are also nearer to the still more dangerous Russian despotism. Doubtless this is why their position in the war seems to be so similar to that of the Austrians. We quote from an article against censorship in their official daily organ, *Nepzava*:

In other countries it is understood that in these extraordinarily serious times everything must be laid aside which tends to keep men apart. Since the whole nation is engaged in a life and death struggle, the state cannot afford to call the attention of citizens to the fact that there are fighting classes within the framework of the nation. Everything must be avoided which might make difficult a victory of our arms. All must fight together when the common enemy of civilization endangers all.

And while we stir up the Hungarian workingmen from day to day, and point out where the danger for them lies in the Russian attack, we confront continuously, in the midst of the strongest cannon fire, political trials inside of the country. This week again *Nepzava* had more of these trials.

But the workers fighting on the field of battle not only have prosecutions heaped up against them, but our officials demand the prompt payment of fines. . . . The conduct of the prosecuting officials and justices cannot change our point of view. We shall still say that it is the duty of the working class to defend the country. We shall still say that Czarism is a danger for the civilization of western Europe. We shall still declare that Russia is the land of slavery, and that it will also continue to be our conviction that in such troubled times what is needed is the co-operation and the solidarity of all the citizens of the state, and not the severity of justice nor new legal prosecutions. We shall also continue to smile at those who even now will not believe that in times of threatening danger the best weapon of protection is to be found in a strong, popular army, and not in the royal Hungarian Courts.

CHAPTER XII

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

THE Socialists of Great Britain have only seven Members of Parliament. But the Labor Party, of which these seven are also members, has forty Members of Parliament (out of 607) and over half a million votes. This vote has risen by about 150,000 since 1910. The Independent Labor Party is the leading Socialist organization, which—as a party—is a part of the Labor Party. Six of the forty Labor Party members belong also to this organization. The British Socialist Party has one Member of Parliament, who is likewise a member of the Labor Party. But *as an organization* this latter party is at present not a part of the Labor Party.

The selection of British documents is complicated by the fact that it is always necessary to give the position of these several organizations, the Labor Party, its Socialistic wing (The Independent Labor Party), and the British Socialist Party, as well as the more or less independent Fabian Society. The position of these various organizations may be stated in a word. All opposed the declaration of war, but the British Socialist Party and the Labor Party, immediately after the invasion of Belgium, came to favor it. The Fabian Socialists turned, more gradually, to the same opinion. The Independent Labor Party opposed the war for some weeks, and finally came officially to take a middle ground—permitting its members to support the war without itself justifying it—though it continued to oppose participation in the recruiting campaign.

The general situation among these various groups—up to the invasion of Belgium and British participation in the war—is well described by the *Socialist Review* (London), which organ, as may be seen, favors the radical anti-war stand of the Independent Labor Party.

How has the British Socialist and labor section of the International conducted itself in the crisis? We gather that a good deal of confusion exists in the minds of Socialists abroad concerning the position taken up by the movement in this country. This is hardly to be wondered at, considering how sharp and deep has become the division of opinion in the movement itself since the war broke out. The division is an unequal one, however—the Independent Labor Party (the I. L. P.) standing almost alone in its unfaltering adhesion to the principles of international Socialism and peace.

Up to the moment when the government declared war, the Socialist and labor movement in this country, as in France, Germany, and other lands, was united and solid in opposing militarism and war, and in agitating against the government entering into the present struggle. Also, as in France, Germany, and the other belligerent countries, as soon as its own government spoke the word of war, the whole movement with the exception of the I. L. P. and a few individuals and branches belonging to other groups of the movement, at once turned round about, abandoned pacifist principles, declared the war was unavoidable, approved the policy of the government in taking part in it, and appealed to the workers to take up arms in "defense of their country."

How sudden and complete was the change in the attitude of the movement at the beat of the war drum at its own country's doors will be realized when we recall the circumstance under which the movement had pledged itself against war even at the last hour. As late as Friday, July 31st, the day on which news reached this country that Russia had ordered a general mobilization of her troops, and war between France and Germany was regarded as a foregone conclusion, at a meeting of the British committee of the International Bureau, representative of all sections of the British movement, a manifesto was adopted (drafted by Mr. Hyndman), declaring resolutely for peace, urging the British Government to re-

main neutral in the event of war, and warning the British, not against German militarism, but against Russian aggression and Russian despotism. On the following Saturday and Sunday (August 1st and 2d) huge "Stop the War" meetings, under the auspices of the bureau and the Labor Party, were held in London and other cities. At the London Trafalgar Square meeting every shade of Socialist and labor opinion was represented. Among the speakers were J. Keir Hardie, M. P.; Arthur Henderson, M. P.; Will Thorne, M. P.; George Lansbury, Ben Tillet, and Cunninghame-Graham. Mr. Henderson, who referred to the news published in the morning when war had broken out between Russia and France and Germany, said that "unless we are on our guard we may be reduced to the same position as Germany, Russia, and France. We are here to protest against the war in the name of international brotherhood," Mr. Thorne declared that the whole country was waiting for Mr. Asquith to make a declaration of neutrality. "What do we," he exclaimed, "the workers, know of this unholy Triple Alliance that bids one nation to assist another in wholesale slaughter? If under the terms of this alliance we are called upon to back up Russia and France, the government should be called upon to resign." Tillet averred that "the workers had the right to say they would not be embroiled." Cunninghame-Graham described as a "damnable lie the statement that war was 'inevitable.' It is not inevitable so far as England is concerned. Great Britain still has the casting vote, and had she given Russia and France to understand she would have nothing to do with this terrible war, Russia would have ceased her bluffing and Germany would never have had an opportunity to impel war." In none of the speeches was reference made to Germany as the aggressor, or German military autocracy as the chief menace to European peace.

JOINT RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT TRAFALGAR SQUARE
(AUGUST 2D)

The resolution adopted at the last-mentioned meeting was as follows:

This demonstration, representing the organized workers and citizens of London, views with serious alarm the prospects of

a European war, into which every European Power will be dragged owing to secret alliances and understandings, which in their origin were never sanctioned by the nations nor are even now communicated to them; we stand by the efforts of the international working class movement to unite the workers of the nation concerned in their efforts to prevent their governments from entering upon war, as expressed in the resolution passed by the International Socialist Bureau; we protest against any steps being taken by the government of this country to support Russia, either directly or in consequence of any understanding with France, as being not only offensive to the political traditions of the country, but disastrous to Europe, and declare that as we have no interest, direct or indirect, in the threatened quarrels which might result from the action of Austria in Servia, the government of Great Britain should rigidly decline to engage in war, but should confine itself to efforts to bring about peace as speedily as possible.

MANIFESTO OF THE BRITISH SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU (AUGUST 3D)

On the next day, August 3d, the representatives of the British Labor Party and the British Socialists to the International Socialist Bureau, Arthur Henderson, M.P., and Keir Hardie, M.P., issued a similar statement, of which the following is the most significant paragraph:

Whatever may be the rights and wrongs of the sudden crushing attack made by the militarist Empire of Austria upon Servia, it is certain that the workers of all countries likely to be drawn into the conflict must strain every nerve to prevent their governments from committing them to war. Everywhere Socialists and the organized forces of labor are taking this course. Everywhere vehement protests are made against the greed and intrigues of militarists and armament mongers. We call upon you to do the same here in Great Britain upon an even more impressive scale. Hold vast demonstrations against war in every industrial center. Compel those of the governing class and their press who are eager

to commit you to co-operate with Russian despotism to keep silence and respect the decision of the overwhelming majority of the people, who will have neither part nor lot in such infamy. The success of Russia at the present day would be a curse to the world. There is no time to lose. Already, by secret agreements and understandings, of which the democracies of the civilized world know only by rumor, steps are being taken which may fling us all into the fray. Workers, stand together therefore for peace. Combine and conquer the militarist enemy and the self-seeking imperialists to-day, once and for all.

THE INDEPENDENT LABOR PARTY MANIFESTO

The resolution of the Independent Labor Party (issued about the same time) took up a still more radical position against the war:

Instead of striving to unite Europe in a federation of states, banded together for peace, diplomacy has deliberately aimed at dividing Europe into two armed, antagonistic camps, the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance.

For the present Sir Edward Grey issues his *White Paper* to prove Germany the aggressor, just as Germany issues a *White Paper* to prove Russia the aggressor, and Russia to prove Austria the aggressor. Even if every word in the British *White Paper* be admitted, the wider indictment remains. *Let it be acknowledged that in the days immediately preceding the war, Sir Edward Grey worked for peace. It was too late. Over a number of years, together with other diplomats, he had himself dug the abyss, and wise statesmanship would have foreseen, and avoided, the certain result.*

It was not the Servian question or the Belgian question that pulled this country into the deadly struggle. Great Britain is not at war because of oppressed nationalities or Belgian neutrality. Even had Belgian neutrality not been wrongfully infringed by Germany we should still have been drawn in. If France in defiance of treaty rights had invaded Belgium to get at Germany, who believes we should have begun hostilities against France? Behind the back of parliament and people, the British Foreign Office gave secret un-

derstandings to France, denying their existence when challenged. That is why this country is now face to face with the red ruin and impoverishment of war. Treaties and agreements have dragged republican France at the heels of despotic Russia, Britain at the heels of France. At the proper time all this will be made plain, and the men responsible called to account.

We desire neither the aggrandizement of German militarism nor Russian militarism, but the danger is that this war will promote one or the other. Britain has placed herself behind Russia, the most reactionary, corrupt, and oppressive power in Europe. If Russia is permitted to gratify her territorial ambitions and extend her Cossack rule, civilization and democracy will be gravely imperiled. Is it for this that Britain has drawn the sword? . . .

The recruiting campaign on the part of the government forced all the parties—the Independent Labor Party, the British Socialist Party—to restate their position during the month of September. The declaration of the I. L. P. showed that it had not altered in any essential way its opposition to the war, as may be seen from the following paragraph of its manifesto against the recruiting campaign:

To the Branches of the I. L. P.: At a specially summoned meeting your National Council considered the matter, and, for the following reasons, recommends branches to take no part in the proposed [recruiting] campaign. If advice has to be given to the workers, we hold it should come from our own platforms, preserving the character and traditions of our movement, and we refuse to take our stand by militarists and enemies of labor with whose outlook and aim we are in sharpest conflict, and who will assuredly seize this opportunity to justify the policy leading up to war. Now that the country has been drawn into a deadly and desperate war, which may involve, in the end, our existence as a nation, it is not a matter for speech-making, least of all from those who will not themselves be called upon to face the horrors of the trenches.

A REPLY TO SIR EDWARD GREY

By J. R. MACDONALD, in the *Labor Leader*, August 13th

At the session of Parliament on August 4th, when Sir Edward Grey made his celebrated statement of the British case, laying special emphasis on Belgium, J. R. MacDonald made for the Labor Party a brief speech deploring war under any circumstances. This statement was elaborated ten days later and we reproduce it at length. This "Reply to Sir Edward Grey" by the man who was then Chairman of the Labor Party, (published in the *Labor Leader* of August 13th) is perhaps the most important Socialist document emanating from Great Britain since the outbreak of the war. We, therefore, give it at some length. There can be no doubt that his view, fixing the entire responsibility for the war on a relatively small group of the governing class, is the view both of the *Independent* Labor Party, of which he is a leading member, and of a considerable number of Socialists and Laborites outside of that body.

The most remarkable feature of this extremely important statement is that MacDonald excuses Germany's declaration of war against Russia and France, puts upon England the chief responsibility for the war between England and Germany, and that he takes a view of the invasion of Belgium which, if it does not actually take the German view, comes very near to it. We quote the leading paragraphs:

The *White Paper* begins with a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and the German Ambassador on the 20th of July regarding the Austrian threat to punish Servia, and finishes with the delivery of our ultimatum to Germany on the 4th of August. From it certain conclusions appear to be justified, the following in particular:

1. Sir Edward Grey strove to the last to prevent a European war.

2. Germany did next to nothing for peace, but it is not clear whether she actually encouraged Austria to pursue her Servian policy. The mobilization of Russia drove Germany to war.

3. Russia and France strove both by open pressure and by wiles to get us to commit ourselves to support them in the event of war.

4. Though Sir Edward Grey would not give them a pledge, he made the German Ambassador understand that we might not keep out of the conflict.

5. During the negotiations, Germany tried to meet our wishes on certain points so as to secure our neutrality. Sometimes her proposals were brusque, but no attempt was made by us to negotiate diplomatically to improve them. They were all summarily rejected by Sir Edward Grey. Finally, so anxious was Germany to confine the limits of the war, the German Ambassador asked Sir Edward Grey to propose his own conditions of neutrality, and Sir Edward Grey declined to discuss the matter. This fact was suppressed by Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith in their speeches in parliament.

6. When Sir Edward Grey failed to secure peace between Germany and Russia, he worked deliberately to involve us in the war, using Belgium as his chief excuse.

That is the gist of the *White Paper*.

That Sir Edward Grey should have striven for European peace, and then when he failed, that he should have striven with equal determination to embroil Great Britain, seems contradictory. But it is not; and the explanation of why it is not is the justification of those of us *who for the last eight years have regarded Sir Edward Grey as a menace to the peace of Europe and his policy as a misfortune to our country*. What is the explanation? (Our italics.)

The justifications offered are nothing but the excuses which ministers can always produce for mistakes. Let me take the case of Belgium. It has been known for years that, in the event of a war between Russia and France on the one hand and Germany on the other, the only possible military tactics for Germany to pursue were to attack France hot foot through Belgium, and then return to meet the Russians. The plans were in our War Office. They were discussed quite openly during the Agadir trouble, and were the subject of

some magazine articles, particularly one by Mr. Belloc. Mr. Gladstone made it clear in 1870 that in a general conflict formal neutrality might be violated. He said in the House of Commons in August, 1870:

"I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this house what plainly amounts to an assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises."

Germany's guarantees to Belgium would have been accepted by Mr. Gladstone. If France had decided to attack Germany through Belgium Sir Edward Grey would not have objected, but would have justified himself by Mr. Gladstone's opinions.

We knew Germany's military plans. We obtained them through the usual channels of spies and secret service. We knew that the road through Belgium was an essential part of them. That was our opportunity to find a "distinterested" motive apart from the obligation of the entente. It is well known that a nation will not fight except for a cause in which idealism is mingled. The *Daily Mail* supplied the idealism for the South African War by telling lies about the flogging of British women and children; our government supplied the idealism for this war by telling us that the independence of Belgium had to be vindicated by us. Before it addressed its inquiries to France and Germany upon this point, knowing the military exigencies of both countries, it knew that France could reply suitably whilst Germany *could not* do so. It was a pretty little game in hypocrisy which the magnificent valor of the Belgians will enable the government to hide up for the time being. (Our italics.)

The country had been so helplessly committed to fight for France and Russia that Sir Edward Grey had to refuse pointblank every overture made by Germany to keep us out of the conflict. That is why, when reporting the negotiations to the House of Commons, he found it impossible to tell the whole truth and to put impartially what he chose to tell us. He scoffed at the German guarantee to Belgium on the ground that it only secured the "integrity" of the country but not its independence; when the actual documents appeared it was found that its independence was secured as

well. And that is not the worst. The *White Paper* contains several offers which were made to us by Germany, aimed at securing our neutrality. None were quite satisfactory in their form, and Sir Edward Grey left the impression that these unsatisfactory proposals were all that Germany made. Later on the Prime Minister did the same. Both withheld the full truth from us. The German Ambassador saw Sir Edward Grey, according to the *White Paper*, on the 1st of August, and this is our Foreign Minister's note of the conversation:

"The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions upon which we could remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed." (MacDonald's italics.)

Sir Edward Grey declined to consider neutrality on any conditions, and refrained from reporting this conversation to the house. Why? It was the most important proposal that Germany made. Had this been told to us by Sir Edward Grey, his speech could not have worked up a war sentiment. The hard, immovable fact was that Sir Edward Grey had so pledged the country's honor without the country's knowledge to fight for France and Russia that he was not in a position to discuss neutrality.

Now the apparent contradiction that the man who had worked for European peace was at the same time the leader of the war party in the Cabinet can be explained. Sir Edward Grey strove to undo the result of his policy, and keep Europe at peace, but, when he failed, he found himself committed to dragging his country into war.

Without this wide survey of policy it is impossible to estimate either Sir Edward Grey's culpability or Germany's share of blame.

Germany's share is a heavy one. Taking a narrow view, she, with Russia, is mainly responsible for the war; taking a longer view, we are equally responsible. (Our italics.) The conflict between the Entente and the Alliance had to come, and only two things determined the time of its coming. The first was the relative capacity of the countries to bear the burdens of an armed peace. That was reaching its limit in most countries. The second was the question of how the changes which time was bringing were affecting adversely the military power of the respective opponents. The Alliance was

to receive a great blow on the death of the Austrian Emperor; Russia was building a system of strategic railways up to the German frontier, and this was to be finished in 1916, by which time her army was to be greatly increased. The Entente, therefore, was forcing Germany to fight within two years. We can understand the military mind of Germany faced with these threatening changes if we remember how scared we were when we were told of German threats against ourselves. The stubbornness of Germany shown on every page of the *White Paper* was not merely military offensiveness, but the stand of a country being put into difficulties by time tipping the balance of power against it. The breaking point had been reached. Foreign ministers and ambassadors had to give place to the war lords.

So I come back to the statement which I think I have clearly proven, that the European War is the result of the existence of the Entente and the Alliance, and that we are in it in consequence of Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy.

RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE LABOR PARTY (AUGUST 5TH AND 6TH)

On August 5th and 6th the Labor Party Members of Parliament held two highly important meetings to determine their position toward the war. The result was the following carefully worded resolution:

That the conflict between the nations of Europe in which this country is involved is owing to foreign ministers pursuing diplomatic policies for the purpose of maintaining a balance of power; that our own national policy of understandings with France and Russia only, was bound to increase the power of Russia both in Europe and Asia, and to endanger good relations with Germany.

That Sir Edward Grey, as proved by the facts which he gave to the House of Commons, committed, without the knowledge of our people, the honor of the country to supporting France in the event of any war in which she was seriously involved, and gave definite assurances of support before the House of Commons had any chance of considering the matter.

That the labor movement reiterates the fact that it has

opposed the policy which has produced the war, and that its duty is now to secure peace at the earliest possible moment on such conditions as will provide the best opportunities for the re-establishment of amicable feelings between the workers of Europe.

THE CHANGE IN FRONT OF THE LABOR PARTY

But soon after the invasion of Belgium on August 4th, and the British declaration of war on August 5th, a rapid change of front took place in the Labor Party and in the Socialist Party, though not in the Independent Labor Party.

We shall proceed with the story once more in the words of the *Socialist Review*. It begins by a reference to the Labor Party resolution just quoted:

(From the *Socialist Review*, of London)

This resolution [just quoted] was, and at the time of writing remains, the formal declaration of Labor Party policy on the war. How completely the Labor M. P.'s and the generality of the leaders of the movement with the exception of those of the I. L. P. have since departed from the terms and spirit of that statement is known to our readers. The defection began early and soon became a stampede. On the very night of the adoption of the resolution by the Executive the majority of the Labor Members of Parliament opposed the proposal of their chairman, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, that he should read its terms in his speech that evening to the house. In consequence of their retraction from the position and policy which until then the party had unanimously adopted, Mr. MacDonald resigned from the chairmanship of the parliamentary group, and Mr. Arthur Henderson, who was then in full accord with Mr. MacDonald, accepted the office temporarily.

A few days later, on the invitation of the Prime Minister, the Labor members agreed to co-operate with the Liberal and Tory Parties in promoting a joint recruiting campaign, the purpose of which was also, as Mr. Asquith afterwards explained, to justify the war policy of the government. In

response to a similar request, the National Executive of the Labor Party decided to place the electoral machinery of the party at the disposal of the joint committee for recruiting purposes. Since then the whole of the Labor Members of Parliament, with the exception of four of the six I. L. P. members, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Mr. Keir Hardie, Mr. F. W. Jowett, and Mr. Tom Richardson, have, in a greater or less degree, identified themselves with the war policy of the government and the so-called "non-political" recruiting campaign.

But while the Labor Party, as a whole, did not rescind the resolution of August 6th, and did not adopt a substitute, an entirely new ground was taken by a majority of the very Labor Members of Parliament who had passed the resolution and also by the Federation of Trades Unions representing over a million unionists, largely unskilled, and the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, which represents nearly all of the labor unions of Great Britain. Taken together these statements give very thorough expression to the position of the overwhelming majority of the members of the British trade unions and of the Labor Party. We give selections from all three documents in their historical order—beginning with a quotation from the manifesto of the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress:

A factor to be remembered in this crisis of our nation's history, and most important of all so far as trade unionists and labor in general are concerned, is the fact that upon the result of the struggle in which this country is now engaged rest the preservation and maintenance of free and unfettered democratic government, which in its international relationships has in the past been recognized as, and must unquestionably in the future prove to be, the best guarantee for the preservation of the peace of the world.

The mere contemplation of the overbearing and brutal methods to which people have to submit under a government

controlled by a military autocracy—living, as it were, continuously under the threat and shadow of war—should be sufficient to arouse the enthusiasm of the nation in resisting any attempt to impose similar conditions upon countries at present free from military despotism.

It will be observed that this declaration of the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress (dated September 3d) takes an international standpoint. Its chief argument for supporting the recruiting campaign is that a German victory would lead to the spread of military despotism and to further wars.

The position of the Management Committee of the Federation of Trades Unions on the other hand is more nationalistic and is very similar to that of the government itself—as the following paragraphs will show:

In Germany and in Austria, and also in the neutral states of Europe and America, persistent attempts are being made to misrepresent the attitude of the British labor movement towards the government, and towards the crisis through which Europe is passing. Extracts from speeches and cuttings from newspapers are collated, and conclusions drawn which cannot be justified by facts, and which do not represent the real opinion of the British working-class movement.

Under such circumstances, an organization like the General Federation of Trade Unions, which represents, and is to a great extent interested in the financial stability of 1,006,904 trade unionists, must remove all doubt concerning its own position and intention.

It cannot better begin this task than by stating that it is, and always has been, on the side of international as well as industrial peace.

In the opinion of millions of trade unionists, the responsibility for the war does not rest upon the policy or conduct of Great Britain.

This opinion is supported from our own side by documentary evidence, and by the fact of our own unpreparedness, and from the opposing side by the utterances of their soldiers, their statesmen, and their teachers, and by their terrible and

immediate capacity for striking effective and terrorizing blows.

It is obvious that the immediate participation of Britain in the war was neither desired nor expected; her day would gladly have been postponed. Loyalty to herself, to her best traditions, and to her treaty obligations made abstention from the conflict impossible, and to-day her people, especially her workpeople, are determined to support not only the neutrality of heroic Belgium, but the honor of nations and the inviolability of treaties.

Once involved in such a war, the duty of the movement stood out clearly. It became necessary, apart from all personal considerations of friendship, to offer the fiercest resistance to the aggressor, and to make any sacrifice necessary to bring the war to a definite and honorable conclusion.

The declaration of the Labor leaders, which bears the date of October 14th, is the most weighty of the three documents. It contains the signatures of an overwhelming majority of the best known leaders, including a large number—if not a majority—of the most radical, such as the Socialist Members of Parliament, Barnes and O'Grady (of the Independent Labor Party), and Will Thorne of the British Socialist Party, Ben Tillet, Vernon Hartshorn, and other so-called "syndicalist" leaders—also W. S. Sanders, Secretary of the Fabian Society. The larger number of persons consulted resulted in a somewhat more moderate and a considerably more explicit statement than those previously quoted. The following are its leading paragraphs:

The British labor movement has always stood for peace.

But this hope has been destroyed, at least for a time, by the deliberate act of the ruler of the military Empire of Germany. The refusal of Germany to the proposal made by England that a conference of the European Powers should deal with the dispute between Austria and Servia, the peremptory domineering ultimatum to Russia, and the rapid preparations to invade France, all indicate that the German military caste were determined on war if the rest of Europe could

not be cowed into submission by other means. The wanton violation of the neutrality of Belgium was proof that nothing, not even national honor and good faith, was to stand between Germany and the realization of its ambitions to become the dominant military power of Europe, with the Kaiser the dictator over all.

The Labor Party in the House of Commons, face to face with this situation, recognized that Great Britain, having exhausted the resources of peaceful diplomacy, was bound in honor, as well as by treaty, to resist by arms the aggression of Germany. The party realized that if England had not kept her pledges to Belgium, and had stood aside, the victory of the German army would have been probable, and the victory of Germany would mean the death of democracy in Europe.

Working-class aspirations for greater political and economic power would be checked, thwarted, and crushed, as they have been in the German Empire. Democratic ideas cannot thrive in a state where militarism is dominant; and the military state with a subservient and powerless working class is the avowed political ideal of the German ruling caste.

The Labor Party, therefore, as representing the most democratic elements in the British nation, has given its support in Parliament to the measures necessary to enable this country to carry on the struggle effectively. It has joined in the task of raising an army large enough to meet the national need by taking active part in the recruiting campaign organized by the various parliamentary parties. Members of the party have addressed numerous meetings throughout the country for this purpose, and the central machinery of the party has been placed at the service of the recruiting campaign. This action has been heartily indorsed by the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress, which represents the overwhelming majority of the trade unionists of the country.

The policy of the British labor movement has been dictated by a fervent desire to save Great Britain and Europe from the evils that would follow the triumph of military despotism. Until the Power which has pillaged and outraged Belgium and the Belgians, and plunged nearly the whole of Europe into the awful misery, suffering, and horror of war, is beaten, there can be no peace. While the conflict lasts England must be sustained both without and within; combatants and non-

combatants must be supported to the utmost. The labor movement has done and is doing its part in this paramount national duty, confident that the brutal doctrine and methods of German militarism will fail. When the time comes to discuss the terms of peace the labor movement will stand, as it has always stood, for an international agreement among all civilized nations that disputes and misunderstandings in the future shall be settled not by machine guns but by arbitration.

This declaration might be called anti-German. It must be pointed out, however, that its characterization of the German Government is a scrupulously exact statement of the views expressed daily in the German Socialist press, and held by the overwhelming majority of the German Party members, before the war, and still held by a very large section at the present time. (See Chapters VI and XIX, pp. 263-65.)

THE BRITISH SOCIALIST PARTY MANIFESTOES

It was only a few days after the beginning of the war when the British Socialist Party issued a manifesto disclaiming Socialist and labor responsibility for the outbreak of war, but at the same time giving the government a qualified support. We quote its leading paragraphs:

This awful catastrophe, which will turn the greater part of Europe into a vast shambles, and send thousands to their death at sea, is the result of the alliances, ententes, and understandings entered into and "assurances" given by the governments and chancelleries of Europe without any reference whatsoever to the peoples themselves. It is not a war of the peoples. Be sure of that. The workers of Germany declared vehemently against war. No one knows to-day how many German Social Democrats and trade unionists have been shot down or imprisoned for their opinions since martial law was proclaimed. *At this moment of natural hatred of German aggression we appeal to you to distinguish soberly between the mass of the German people and the Prussian military caste which dominates the German Empire.*

From the very first, and all through, the International Socialist Party has declared for peace, whilst always maintaining the right of nations to defend their national existence by force of arms. It is the working class in all lands who are called upon to bear the heaviest burden in this fratricidal conflict. Wives will lose their husbands and mothers their sons in tens of thousands before the power of Prussian militarism is broken and the German people themselves are freed from a crushing imperialism. (Our italics.)

The manifesto of the British Socialist Party on recruiting, issued on September 15th, shows that the position of that organization had become even more favorable to the war than this earlier manifesto:

The government has invited all political parties to join in a united campaign to secure recruits for service in the European War.

The British Socialist Party, whilst working consistently in the interests of peace, has always maintained the right of nations to defend their national existence by force of arms. Recognizing that the national freedom and independence of this country are threatened by Prussian militarism, the party naturally desires to see the prosecution of the war to a speedy and successful issue.

But it declares that the government must cease to rely upon methods of cajolery and starvation to secure recruits. The workers are called upon to enlist, but no adequate provision is made for their wives or dependents. Neither are recruits offered proper rates of pay, guarantees of employment, or insurance against disablement if and when they return from the war.

The British Socialist Party once more declares that the workers of Europe have no quarrel with one another. The terrible struggle we are now witnessing, *into which this country has been drawn by the invasion of Belgium*, is largely the outcome of the rivalry between the capitalists of all countries for the domination of the world market. This competition has resulted in the building up of huge armaments, and has led to treaties and alliances—entered into without any consultation with the peoples themselves—between groups of Powers for the protection of mutual commercial interests.

THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY AND THE WAR

The first stand of the Australian Party, which, in the elections of September 5th, gained control of the government of that country, was made towards the end of August. It is not only thoroughly nationalistic, but is even militarist, since it claims credit for the adequate preparations it had made for war. Indeed, the party seems to have won the elections largely on this issue and the greater part of its electoral manifesto was devoted to its position on war and armaments. We quote the following passages from that document:

As regards the attitude of labor towards war, that is easily stated. We deplore war! We believe war to be a crime against civilization and against humanity. But to deplore and to denounce war is not to abolish it. War is one of the greatest realities of life, and it must be faced. Our interests and our very existence are bound up with those of the empire. In time of war, half measures are worse than none. If returned with a majority we shall pursue with the utmost vigor and determination every course necessary for the defense of the commonwealth and the empire in any and every contingency. Regarding as we do such a policy as the first duty of government at this juncture, the electors may give their support to the Labor Party with the utmost confidence. And this we say further, that whatever be the verdict of the people [in the approaching elections], we shall not waver from the position taken up by Mr. Fisher on behalf of our party, *viz.*, "That in this hour of peril there are no parties so far as defense of the commonwealth and empire are concerned, and that the opposition will co-operate with the government and stand behind them as one man." The position, then, is that if the electors give us a majority we shall expect Mr. Cook and his supporters to stand behind us. On the other hand, if Mr. Cook has a majority, we shall stand behind him in all things necessary for the defense of the commonwealth and the empire.

That is the position, and our attitude towards it. It remains for the electors to choose between the two parties.

This being so, we desire to direct the electors' attention to

some facts of first importance, and directly bearing upon the present position of the commonwealth and the war.

To-day the empire, from its heart to the most distant outpost, is in arms! War is upon us! War which many declared impossible; but which, had it found us unprepared, would inevitably have destroyed us. But it had been foreseen and its outbreak finds us calm. It had been prepared for, and we face its consequences with confidence and courage.

To whom is due the fact that Australia at this great crisis is able not only to protect its sea-borne commerce and great cities from the depredations of the enemy's ships of war, and to defend the commonwealth generally, but to dispatch, in record time, an expeditionary force of 20,000 men, properly armed and equipped, to fight the battle of the empire oversea, and by relieving the British navy—upon which our very existence rests—from the task of defending these shores, to enable that navy the more effectively to protect the heart of the empire?

To whom is due the fact that to-day Australia has a "fleet in being"—the most powerful, the most effective in the Pacific, excluding only Japan?

To the Labor Party alone these things are due.

That Australia is able to face and deal with this crisis in its present spirit of calmness and confidence is due to the policy of the Labor Party. Let us prove it.

In 1910, when the Labor Government assumed office, there was neither navy, army, nor wireless system.

During its term of office, Labor built a navy, created that organization without which ships of war are mere useless scrap iron; made provision for the training of its officers and men; established dockyards, naval bases, and depots. In short, it created a "fleet in being." It established an effective military force where before there was none. It made an army fit to take the field and defend the country. It armed and equipped this army with up-to-date weapons. In short, it created the great and complex organizations necessary for a thoroughly modern and efficient system of defense, and it developed that organization in every necessary detail. It established training colleges for officers, instructional corps for non-commissioned officers; small arms, ammunition, cordite, and accoutrement factories. Above all, in the face of much opposition, with inflexible resolution and purpose, Labor

effected a veritable evolution by engrafting the system of universal military training upon the civic life of the commonwealth so that to-day Australia presents the spectacle of a nation in arms arrayed for her own defense.

The naval and land defense forces of Australia to-day are the work of the Labor Party, and that party alone.

THE POSITION OF THE AUSTRALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY ON CONSCRIPTION AND THE ELECTIONS

The Socialists, largely because of the success of the Labor Party, are not very strong in Australia. Nevertheless they have flourishing organizations in the two leading cities, Sydney and Melbourne, as well as in certain mining and industrial centers, especially Broken Hill. Their criticism of the military policy of the Labor Party, and their opposition to the war—both before and after its outbreak—are, therefore, of some moment—as indicating, at least, the probable line of future attack on the Laborites. We quote from the *Melbourne Socialist* of July 24th:

QUESTIONS TO BE PUT TO POLITICAL CANDIDATES

Australia and New Zealand alone among civilized countries compel voteless boys to undergo military training. Will you vote for the removal of this blot on the statute book?

There are between 30,000 and 40,000 persons liable for non-registration under the defense act, while 27,000 prosecutions have taken place in three years, equaling one prosecution for every five trainees. What amendment of the act are you prepared to support?

In the eleven months to May 31, 1914, there was one defense prosecution for every ten trainees, and in the first quarter of 1914 1,278 lads were sent to fortresses, barracks, etc. Seeing that, after three years' trial, compulsory military training is still so unpopular, are you in favor of a referendum as to its continuation?

Do you consider danger from invasion so imminent as to render necessary a compulsory military system which has

driven many boys from their homes and necessitated the prosecution of conscientious objectors?

Australia pays more per head for defense purposes than any other country except Great Britain and France, and the expenditure is rapidly increasing. Do you not think there is grave danger of crippling national development? If so, what action do you suggest should be taken?

SPECIAL QUESTIONS FOR LABOR CANDIDATES

The Labor Party in England, U. S. A., New Zealand, and elsewhere is strongly against any form of compulsory military training, and labor organizations are endeavoring to abolish it wherever it is in force. Can you explain why the Australian Labor Party is an exception?

The Australian defense scheme is largely modeled after the Swiss. Seeing that the Swiss soldiery has been used against strikers on thirteen occasions in recent years, how can you, as a workingman's representative, support such a system?

Are you in favor of amending the defense act so as to prevent the permanent militia and volunteer forces being called out to shoot down strikers?

Are you in favor of the repeal of Clause 98, so as to prevent the possibility of Australian workers being sentenced to death for mutiny, by court-martial, consequent upon their refusal to shoot their fellow Australian citizens?

THE CANADIAN SOCIALISTS AGAINST THE WAR

The Socialists of Canada are somewhat more numerous than those of Australia, though not so strong as the newly organized Social Democratic Party of New Zealand (organized in opposition to the New Zealand Labor Party). All three organizations were opposed to the war, and after it was declared, to the participation of these Colonies. A paragraph from the manifesto of the Social Democratic Party of Canada follows:

The rude god of war gallops across the world in a saddle of steel and sneers and laughs in savage glee. He wades in blood. His own sweet music is the rattle of rifles and a million sobs and groans from broken hearts. Brute force

reigns supreme, and to the roar of Christian cannon thrusts brotherhood off the stage. Morally, capitalist civilization stands bankrupt and ragged before the world, mockingly murmurs a prayer for help, and grinds its sword for the throat of labor.

Let the Socialists everywhere hold street meetings and hall meetings. Unfold to the workers the true meaning of war. Let those who make war go to war.

The other Socialist Party (The Socialist Party of Canada) took a similar position.

Notwithstanding its opposition to the war, the Social Democratic Party of New Zealand succeeded, in combination with the labor unions, in electing eight members to the Parliament of that country in the elections of December, 1914—which demonstrates that anti-militarism is not altogether unpopular in New Zealand.

CHAPTER XIII

FRANCE

THE French Socialists now have 102 out of 584 members of the Chamber of Deputies and 1,400,000 votes, the vote having increased by 300,000 in four years. It either has a majority or is very near to having a majority in the larger part of the cities and large towns of the country.

It will be noted that the declarations of the Party on July 28th, like that of Jaurès in Brussels on July 30th (see Chapter IX), insist that the French Government was doing everything to avoid war. It will be noted also that Austria and Germany are regarded as the aggressors. Nevertheless, until the invasion of their country, the Party, as will be seen, was opposed to the participation of France in the war. The opening paragraphs of the party declaration are as follows:

Citizens: The fundamental anarchy of our social system, the competitions of capitalist groups, colonial ambitions, the intrigues and brutalities of imperialism—the policy of rapine of some, the policy of pride and prestige of others—have created a permanent tension in Europe for the last ten years, a constant and growing risk of war.

The peril has been suddenly increased by the aggressive proceedings of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy. Whatever may be the grievances of Austria-Hungary, whatever may be the excesses of nationalist pan-Serbism, as has been declared by our Austrian comrades, Austria could have obtained all necessary guarantees without recourse to *the threatening and brutal note which suddenly gives rise to the menace of the most revolting and frightful of wars.*

Against this policy of violence and the brutal methods

which may now let loose upon Europe a catastrophe without precedent, the proletariat of all countries must raise their protest. They must express their horror of war and their intention to prevent it. The Socialists, the workers of France, make an appeal to the whole country to use all efforts for the maintenance of peace. *They know that in the present crisis the French Government is most sincerely anxious to avert or to diminish the risks of conflict.* It is asked to apply itself to securing a policy of conciliation and mediation rendered all the easier by the readiness of Servia to accede to the major portion of the Austrian demands. It is asked to influence its ally, Russia, in order that she shall not seek a pretext for aggressive operations under cover of defending the interests of the Slavs. Their efforts thus correspond with those of the German Social Democrats in demanding that Germany shall exercise a moderating influence on her ally, Austria. Both at their posts of action have the same work and the same end. (Our italics.)

On July 27th, according to the *Daily Citizen*, the Federation of the Trade Unions of the Seine held a demonstration against the war. Some 8,000 to 10,000 persons took part, among them being many Socialists. A rally took place in front of the offices of the *Matin*, where the "Internationale" was sung, after which the crowd shouted, "Down with the war!"

The police appeared on the scene and charged the demonstrators in an attempt to disperse them. Many arrests were made, among them being that of M. Bon, a Socialist deputy.

Under the date of July 29th, we read:

Violent scenes were witnessed on the Paris boulevards last night.

The Socialists were out in force to protest against the war, but they were met by hundreds cheering the declaration of hostilities.

Frequent collisions occurred between the two parties, and many arrests were made. Five or six thousand people collected outside the offices of the *Matin*, and traffic was entirely held up.

Undoubtedly the most weighty document issued by French or Belgian Socialists was their joint manifesto which was spread by aëroplanes in the territory held by the Germans. It came into special prominence because it was signed by the members of Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau, who stated this fact after their signatures. This aroused the bitter criticism of the German and Austrian Socialist Parties, who took occasion also to repudiate its arguments, although without entering into any discussion. The French and Belgians, therefore, republished the document with a statement of its origin, as follows:

The document which follows was written since the first fortnight of the war by agreement between the Belgian and French Socialist sections [of the international movement] for the purpose of showing to the other sections the reasons for the position assumed by the Socialists of the two countries. [The original document here follows.]

With regard to the French section we need not go back to the period preceding the war when the general excitement about the colonial policy and armaments was growing, when we were opposing the Moroccan policy and the three-year military service law, *the result and consequence of the German military law providing for increase of the standing army* [which was supported by the German Socialists—see Chapter V].

It is of the crisis that brought about the war that we want to speak. This crisis burst like a plot upon Austria's ultimatum to Serbia, and, what is more, when Austria had rejected Serbia's pacific and conciliatory answer, there was no doubt that imperialistic Germany inspired Austria and wanted war.

During those critical hours, and in order to obey the mandates of the international movement, we kept in touch with the French Government, which we above all urged to second with all possible energy the English mediation, the best chance there was for peace, and to bring its influence to bear upon the Russian Government in favor of this peace.

And we ascertained that the French Government sincerely wanted peace and put forth, as we asked, its best efforts to maintain it.

On the afternoon of the very day of the breach of the negotiations the delegation of the Socialist group of the Chamber of Deputies called on the president of the Cabinet, M. Viviani.

M. Viviani did not conceal from us the fact that, notwithstanding his efforts, the aggressiveness of imperialist Germany every minute rendered improbable the maintenance of peace, but he asserted that the French Government till the very last moment would do everything possible to make the most of whatever possibilities of peace remained; that, notwithstanding the raids of German troops on French soil, the French troops remained eight kilometers on this side of the frontier, and that nothing would be done, on the French side, that might hurt the continuation of negotiations for peace which was so much desired and was possible so long as the German Ambassador, M. de Schoen, remained in Paris.

We insisted and strongly demanded that a new and demonstrative manifestation of their willingness to retain France's peace be made immediately, that a specific demand of new intervention and mediation be addressed to England with formal declaration of complete and energetic support from France.

M. Viviani seemed to us decidedly in favor of it and promised to submit the proposition to a meeting of the Cabinet that very evening. But we had been gone hardly an hour when M. de Schoen called on him at the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and asked for his passports.

The German Socialists of the Lese Club, living in Paris, daily witnesses of the occurrences and of our efforts, have fully approved our attitude and shared our hopes.

We have reason to believe, however, that the German working class, deceived by official news, has not exact knowledge of the facts and *we submit to them for consideration the great fact, the full meaning of which proves on which side was aggressiveness shown: the violation of Belgian territory.*

After having falsely stated, before the declaration of war, that French aviators had dropped bombs on Nuremberg, *the imperial German Government asserted, without any more foundation, that the French troops had invaded or prepared*

to invade Belgium, while at that very time France was renewing to England the formal agreement, already made regarding Belgium, to respect its neutrality.

Under this pretext, Germany itself ordered Belgium to give free passage to its army, and upon Belgium's refusal it declared war against it, besieged Liège and invaded its territory.

These facts, which we submit to the judgment of the international proletariat, suffice to establish from which side aggression came, from which side war was sought. If in this hour of crisis we have found ourselves united, in parliament and in the whole country, with all the other parties of the nation, it is because we were conscious of fighting for the principles which we have so often affirmed in common.

It was not with the idea of aggression, it was not even because it had sentiments of ill will and hostility that our government resolved to go to war.

We have every certainty of defending the independence and autonomy of our nation against German imperialism.

We do not fight against the German people, whose autonomy and independence we equally respect.

It is with the certainty of supporting the principle of liberty, the right of the people to dispose of themselves, that the French and Belgian Socialists suffer the hard necessity of war.

They are certain that once the truth shall be established their action will be approved and they will be joined by the Socialists of Germany.

For the French Socialist Party: The delegates to the International Socialist Bureau: Jules Guesde, Jean Longuet, Marcel Sembat, Édouard Vaillant.

For the Belgian Labor Party: The delegates to the International Socialist Bureau: Édouard Anseele, Louis Bertrand, Camille Huysmans, Émile Vandervelde.

One distinction made in this statement must be carefully noted. Most Socialists attach little importance to treaties, even to treaties of neutrality, which they favor. The French and Belgian Socialists do not accuse Germany of violating its own solemn promise. They accuse Germany of violating Belgian territory. For if

there is one principle upon which Socialists have been unanimous, it is their respect for the sovereignty and independence of each nation, as is proven by documents already quoted in Part I.

Scarcely less important is the official statement of the French Party, issued on August 28th, when it sent two representatives into an anti-Socialist Ministry. We give selections from this exceptionally important document also at some length:

Comrades: It is after due deliberation and mature thought that the Socialist Party has authorized two of its members, our friends, Jules Guesde and Marcel Sembat, to enter the new government, and that it has constituted them its delegates for the national defense. All the representatives of the Socialist parliamentary group, the Permanent Administrative Commission, and the Administrative Council of *L'Humanité* have agreed to assume with them the grave responsibilities that they have consented to undertake.

If it were but a ministerial rearrangement, if it were only a question of adding certain new forces to the old government—some of those fresh forces in which our party is so rich—still more, if it were merely one of ordinary participation in a bourgeois government, neither the consent of our friends nor of ourselves would have been obtained.

It is the future of the nation, it is the life of France, that are in the balance to-day. The party, therefore, has not hesitated.

The truth, foreshadowed, announced by us has burst forth. Without being broken through or in any way affected, our armies find themselves, momentarily, falling back before superior numbers. One of the richest and most industrial districts of our country is menaced.

The national unity which at the beginning of the war once more revealed itself and comforted our hearts must display all its power.

The entire nation must rise for the defense of its soil and its liberty in one of those outbursts of heroism which always repeat themselves in similar hours of our history.

The Chief of the government felt that in order to win over

the nation, to organize it, to support it in a struggle which will be and which must be relentless, he had need of the help of all, and most particularly, perhaps, of those who feared for the emancipation of the proletariat and humanity, and dreaded the formidable oppression of despotism. *He knew that in all grave hours, in 1793 as in 1870, it was in these men, these Socialists, these revolutionists, that the nation placed its confidence.*

Spontaneously, without waiting any other demonstration of the popular will, he has appealed to our party. Our party has replied, "Here!"

Above all, comrades, the presence of our friends in the government will furnish for all the guarantee that republican democracy is ready to struggle to the end.

How many times has our great Jaurès, foreseeing even a preliminary French reversal under an attack of superior numbers, insisted upon the necessity of this struggle? He would have wished for France to be prepared in every detail. But no matter what this stubborn resistance costs, it is our duty to organize it, and, further, upon it depends the common success of our allies. Our friends will urge forward the nation to this resistance.

To-day, as yesterday, after the first tests, as in the enthusiasm of mobilization, we know we are struggling not only for the existence of the country, not only for the greatness of France, but for liberty, for the republic, for civilization.

We are struggling that the world, freed from the stifling oppression of imperialism and from the atrocities of war, may finally enjoy peace in respecting the rights of all. (Our italics.)

Particularly remarkable was the acceptance of one of these Cabinet positions by Jules Guesde, one of the world's leading Marxists and an ardent opponent of all coalition with non-Socialist Ministries—in times of peace. Yet his statement at this time was even stronger than that of the party. He said:

I go into the Cabinet as an envoy of my party, not to govern, but to fight. If I were younger I would have shouldered a gun. But as my age does not permit me to do this,

I will nevertheless face the enemy and defend the cause of humanity.

I am confident of final victory, and without hesitation as to its subsequent rôle in France, the party will never deviate from the line of conduct laid out.

France has been attacked, and she will have no more ardent defenders than the workmen's party.

The solidarity of workmen does not shut out the right to defend themselves against traitor workmen. Nor does international solidarity exclude the right of one nation to defend itself against a government which is traitor to the peace of Europe.

We have the evidence of Joseph Steiner, writing in the official weekly of the German Party (*Die Neue Zeit*), that the entrance of Guesde and Sembat into the Cabinet met the approval of practically all the Socialists and labor unionists of France.

It is generally known that the government after the defeats in Belgium and northern France, reconstituted itself as a government of national defense, and that the Socialist Party of France delegated two of its members to enter into this government, Comrades Sembat and Guesde. It should be emphasized at this point that this delegation from the party was never conceived of as a political coalition, but from the first was limited to the object which the government had given as the basis of its existence, the defense of the country. Nowhere has any opposition worth mentioning arisen against this participation either within the party or among the unions. Jouhaux, the Secretary of the Confederation of Labor, even went so far as to offer his services to the government for the projected tour of propaganda, for the strengthening of the resistance against the invading enemy.

We may add to this statement that not only did all the Socialist and labor union leaders rally to the support of the war, but the same was true also of all the famous intellectual leaders among the French Socialists, such as Anatole France, who went so far as to write a letter offering his services to the Minister of War.

CHAPTER XIV

BELGIUM

THE Belgian Socialists cast half a million votes though under the unequal suffrage laws they secure only 40 of the 186 deputies of the Belgian parliament. Ten years ago their vote was only a little over 300,000.

On August 3d the Council of the Socialist organization, the Belgian Labor Party, decided to abandon the anti-war demonstrations above referred to (see Chapter IX) and resolved to issue a manifesto to Socialist workmen, in which it was declared that by exercising the legitimate right of self-defense they were fighting against barbarism and for political liberty and democracy.

The Council also decided that the Socialist Party in the Chamber should vote the necessary war credits.

The following is the manifesto:

To the People: The European War is declared.

In a few days, a few hours perhaps, millions of men who ask only to live in peace will be dragged without their consent into the most appalling of butcheries by treaties to which they have not agreed, by a decision with which they had nothing to do.

The Social Democracy bears no responsibility in this disaster.

It shrank from nothing to warn the people, to prevent the folly of armaments, to drive back the catastrophe which will strike all European communities.

But to-day the harm is done, and by the fatality of events one thought dominates us: that soon, perhaps, we shall have to direct our efforts to stopping the invasion of our territory.

We do so with all the more ardent hearts in that *in de-*

fending the neutrality and even the existence of our country against militarist barbarism we shall be conscious of serving the cause of democracy and of political liberty in Europe.

Our comrades who are called to the colors will show how Socialist workers can conduct themselves in the face of danger. But whatever the circumstances in which they find themselves, we ask them never to forget, among the horrors they will see perpetrated, that they belong to the Workers' International, and that they must be fraternal and humane as far as is compatible with their legitimate individual defense and that of the country.

Our readers will notice from the documents in Part IV that this action of the Belgian Socialists has received very little adverse criticism anywhere. What criticism has arisen has been confined to individuals, even in Germany. Indeed, approval has been generally expressed or implied, including that of the majority of German Socialists, and with only one important exception, that of the Socialists of Russia.

The position taken by the Belgian Socialists was further defined by their acceptance of a place in the Ministry a few days after the declaration of war. After a few weeks the new Minister, Émile Vandervelde, went on a mission to Great Britain and America, where he made several brief statements to the Socialists and the general public. On account of the official and diplomatic character of his mission these statements vary considerably, so we are forced to give several of them in whole or in part. As they discuss the war in a general way they are closely related to the documents in Part IV, but they are still more valuable in aiding in the understanding of the original position of the Belgian Socialists. Isolated these statements might give a false impression of Vandervelde's attitude; taken all together it is probable that they give a correct impression of his position and that of the majority of Belgian Socialists.

Vandervelde has an exceptionally high rank among the world's Socialists, as he is Chairman of the International Socialist Bureau.

We give brief citations from five statements, each dealing with a new point and helping to define his attitude as a whole:

IS IT A WAR AGAINST MILITARISM?

(Interview in *Justice*, London)

I consider the war, on the Allies' side, is a great fight against militarism. We did not wish for war; it was forced upon us by the violation of our neutrality. That was why I joined the Belgian Ministry, now a ministry for national defense, and that is the reason why Sembat and Guesde have entered the new French Cabinet. It will interest our English comrades to know that the French Government is distributing from aeroplanes the manifesto of the French and Belgian Socialists to the German people (see Chapter XIII); and that the Russian Embassy has conveyed a message from me to the Socialist members of the Russian Duma (see Chapter XXV). The spirit of the Belgian soldiers, who are Socialists, was strikingly manifested in the defense of Liège. They greeted the oncoming of the German attack by singing the "International." In the fighting line I have been warmly greeted by our comrades. That which is particularly odious in the violation of Belgian territory by the armies of the Kaiser is not so much the violation itself as the policy of terrorism and brutality which has been pursued throughout, and which seems to have no other object than that of vengeance on the Belgians because they have defended the territory and barred the way against the invading hosts.

SOCIALISM IS AT STAKE

(*The Nation*, London)

In Belgium, as in France, the entire democracy, without exception and without reserve, have rallied round the government with the firm conviction that in the present struggle the whole future of Liberalism and Socialism in Europe is at stake. Until the very last moment we, along with our friends

in Britain and Germany, did all that was humanly possible to secure the maintenance of peace. Our efforts were vain. Austria's brutal ultimatum, and the violation of Belgian neutrality by one of the nations which had guaranteed it, unloosed war. Nothing was left for us to do but to defend ourselves. We have done so with all our energy. We shall continue to do so, whatever happens, as long as we can. And in *this fight for freedom, in this struggle for civilization*, we appeal to all those who can help us by succoring our wounded, by relieving the wretched victims of the atrocities caused by the German invasion, and by securing the final victory of those peoples who are fighting for their independence over those who meant to subdue and enslave them. (Our italics.)

DEFEAT WOULD BENEFIT GERMANY

(Interview by HARRY LAIDLER, Secretary of the Intercollegiate Society)*

What will be the effect of the war on the Socialist movement in the various countries and on the International? I asked that question of Émile Vandervelde, on his arrival in America.

"That will depend," he answered, "upon the result of the war. If Germany should win—of which I see no possibility—militarism would be entrenched in Germany and the Socialist movement there would feel its oppression even more than now. Belgium, Holland, Servia, Alsace-Lorraine, Prussian Poland, would be dominated by this autocracy. The republican institutions of other countries would be placed in jeopardy and each nation would be compelled to arm even more extensively than at present.

"On the other hand, should the Allies win, *especially should they be victorious largely through the efforts of England and France, a great impulse would be given to all democratic movements, especially to Socialism.* The independence of Belgium would be secure, and she would be in a position to give her attention to internal problems. We in Belgium have been fighting for many years for universal suffrage, for the policy of one vote one man, instead of the present one, two, and three-vote system. The Labor Party even entered upon a general strike to attain this end, and a governmental commit-

*The *Intercollegiate Socialist*, October-November.

tee is taking the matter up. It is believed on all sides that universal suffrage will be granted immediately after the war.

"The Socialist parties of Belgium and France have greater prestige than ever before. The governments were compelled to turn to the Socialists when their countries were in danger. Sembat and Guesde were called to the Cabinet in France, while a Socialist was made a minister of state in Belgium.

"We believe that the Socialist movement in Germany will be greatly strengthened if Prussian militarism is overthrown and that it is therefore to the interest even of the German Social Democrats that Germany be defeated. Prussian Poland would secure greater freedom than at present; Alsace-Lorraine would, in all probability, be freed from German domination; Servia would be far more independent than at present and would probably have possession of Herzegovina, while the Italian population of Trieste would perhaps be freed from the complete control of Austria.

"I believe also that a victory for the Allies would mean greater democracy for Russia. That is the opinion as well of many Russians whom I have met.

"The only way to stop war is to abolish the rule of the militarists and of the autocracies," said the chairman of the International. "When the Social Democrats become the majority party, then we shall have peace." (Our italics.)

THE GERMAN SOCIALISTS DEFENDED

(Statement to the Socialist Press of America)

In all international conflicts of later years, the International Socialist movement has found itself united. It was still so on the eve of the present conflict. War had already been declared by Austria on Servia when the International Socialist Bureau, convened with special urgency at Brussels, took the stand that Germany should prevail upon Austria, France upon Russia, to assure the entire world of the localization of the conflict. And with our whole hearts we render this testimony to our German comrades, that in their efforts for the maintenance of peace they did their duty, their whole duty, and more than their duty.

But this effort has been in vain. The war has become generalized. All direct communications have been rendered im-

possible between the Socialists of Germany and those of other countries.

On both sides millions of proletarians find themselves confronting one another as enemies.

What gives our situation a particularly tragic character is the fact that on both sides the Socialists appear equally convinced that it is a question of a war of defense. Similarly, with the French and Belgian Socialists, who are firmly fixed on the idea that it is a case of legitimate defense, the German Social Democrats have voted the credits for the war.

We will naturally be careful not to address any reproaches to them in this matter. *We take cognizance of the difficulties of the situation. If they had refused to vote for credits for the war they would have given over their country to Cossack invasion. In voting them they have furnished to the Kaiser arms against republican France, and against the democracies of western Europe.*

Between the two evils they chose the one they considered the lesser. Again, I repeat, we do not blame them. But we, who are defending our independence, are inflexibly resolved to defend it to the end. And since—in respect to Belgium—Germany has not limited herself to opening a passage by arms, and has prosecuted against us a war of conquest and vengeance, since she has committed against us acts of violence which are not only contrary to humanity, but constitute formal infractions of international law, a ruling of The Hague on war, we dare to hope that on the day that our German comrades are exactly informed in regard to the horrors that have been committed in Belgium, they will join us in denouncing and scourging them.

I limit myself to expressing the hope that the entire Socialist International will stand beside us to affirm its sympathies for our people in using their right of legitimate defense against Prussian militarism.

SOCIALISM TO GAIN FROM THE WAR; REVOLUTION PROBABLE

(Interview by the Secretary of the American Socialist Party)

There can be no truce in the European War. It must go on until a basis of permanent peace can be established. The effect of the war, Vandervelde believes, will result in an advantage to the Socialist movement. He pointed out that

Russia had a revolution after the Chinese War; Italy had revolutionary demonstrations after the war in Tripoli; England doubled and trebled the Socialist representation in Parliament after the Boer War. When this war is over similar things will happen. *Even if Germany is defeated, it will be to her advantage, as the people always rise against any government that leads them into disasters.* (Our italics.)

CHAPTER XV

RUSSIA

IF we include the peasants' party or Labor Group as being more or less Socialistic, the vote cast by the Russian Socialists at the last election at which a semi-democratic suffrage prevailed, that of 1907, was reckoned at about 10,000,000. The Social Democratic and Socialist Revolutionary parties probably obtained from the working people and lower-middle classes of the towns several million votes. Exact figures are not obtainable.

In the second Duma (1907) these Socialist and semi-Socialist parties had secured, in spite of undemocratic suffrage restrictions and extraordinary police repression, almost half of the total membership of the Duma.

Recent elections show that the population of all the large cities is more radical than ever, though the new electoral laws permitted only a handful of Socialists (14) and a similar number of Laborites (11) to be elected.

The following quotation from the anti-war manifesto of the Socialist Revolutionary Party puts in a few words the position of most Russian Socialists:

There is no doubt that Austrian imperialism is responsible for the war with Servia. But is it not equally criminal on the part of Serbs to refuse autonomy to Macedonia and to oppress smaller and weaker nations?

It is the protection of this state that our government considers its "sacred duty." What hypocrisy! Imagine the intervention of the Czar on behalf of poor Servia, whilst he martyrizs Poland, Finland, and the Jews, and behaves like a brigand towards Persia.

Whatever may be the course of events, the Russian workers

and peasants will continue their heroic fight to obtain for Russia a place among civilized nations.

One of the most momentous of all Socialist actions during the whole war was that of the fourteen Social Democrats in the Duma, when it met on August 8th for the purpose of voting money for the war. The Socialists abstained from voting, but their declaration against the war gave this abstention the full force of a negative vote.

Valentin Khaustoff, speaking in the name of the two Socialist groups in the Duma, read the following statement:

A terrible and unprecedented calamity has broken upon the people of the entire world. Millions of workers have been torn away from their labor, ruined, and swept away by a bloody torrent. Millions of families have been delivered over to famine.

War has already begun. While the governments of Europe were preparing for it, the proletariat of the entire world, with the German workers at the head, unanimously protested.

The hearts of the Russian workers are with the European proletariat. This war is provoked by the policy of expansion for which the ruling classes of all countries are responsible.

The proletariat will defend the civilization of the world against this attack.

The conscious proletariat of the belligerent countries has not been sufficiently powerful to prevent this war and the resulting return of barbarism.

But we are convinced that the working class will find in the international solidarity of the workers the means to force the conclusions of peace at an early date. The terms of that peace will be dictated by the peoples themselves and not by the diplomats.

We are convinced that this war will finally open the eyes of the great masses of Europe, and show them the real causes of all the oppression and violence that they endure, and that therefore this new explosion of barbarism will be the last.

After reading this declaration the Social Democrats left the Duma. They were followed by the members of the Labor Party. Neither of these parties shared in the vote of military credits nor the vote of confidence in the government.

Our documents in Part IV show that the Social Democrats still continue their agitation against the war and the government, including an effort to bring about a revolution. That the Russian Government realizes this thoroughly is shown by its semi-official statement at the time of its arrest of five of the Socialist Duma members on November 17.

The semi-official statement says:

At the beginning of the war most of the Russian people were conscious of the necessity of defending the dignity and integrity of the fatherland and were unanimous in assisting the authorities in the accomplishment of the tasks incurred by the operations of war. An altogether different attitude was observed by some members of the Social Democratic Association, who continued an activity aiming at the downfall of Russia's military power by means of an anti-war agitation, the distributing of secret proclamations and the conducting of propaganda by word of mouth.

The government on October last learned of a scheme to convoke a secret conference of delegates of the Social Democratic organization to discuss measures aiming at the ruin of the Russian state and the speedy realization of revolutionary designs.

On November 17th the police discovered that a meeting of the said conference was to be held in a house in Viborg road, eight miles from Petrograd. A detachment of police arrived on the scene and found there eleven persons, including the following members of the Duma: Messrs. Petrovsky, Badaveff, Mouranoff, Samoeloff, and Chagoff.

There being no doubt as to the anti-government object of the conference, the members of the meeting were arrested after a search, with the exception of the members of the Duma, who were released. An examining magistrate was intrusted with the inquiry and immediately opened an investigation. Having

examined the documents seized in the raid, the magistrate drafted an indictment against all the members of the conference, under Article No. 102 of the Penal Code, and issued warrants for their arrest.

In the trial, which occurred several months later, the government asserted that arrangements were made at this meeting for circulating manifestoes throughout Russia of the following import:

After the declaration that "from the point of view of the working class and of the laboring masses of all the nations of Russia, the defeat of the monarchy of the Czar and of its armies, would be of extremely little consequence," the absolute necessity was urged of *carrying on on all sides the propaganda of the social revolution among the army and at the theater of war, and that weapons should be directed not against their brothers, the hired slaves of other countries, but against the reactionary bourgeois governments*, the undoubted urgency for the organization of such a propaganda in all languages by groups in the armies of all nations, and the necessity for the propaganda, as one of their first watchwords, of the republics of Germany, Poland, Russia, etc., on an equal footing with the conversion of all the separate governments of Europe into a republican united states.

The Duma members were accordingly sentenced to exile and imprisonment. The *New Statesman* points out that there is no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of the above governmental accusations, as they accord entirely with the avowed revolutionary principles and purposes of the Social Democrats.

The Labor Group also took a stand against the war at the Duma meeting of August 8th, but nevertheless it supported the government on the plea of the danger of invasion—a plea emphasized also by the German Socialists in voting the war loans of August 4th and December 2d, and elaborated by Kautsky in his articles

(see Part IV). The leader, Kerensky, made the following statement in the name of the Group.

"A terrible affliction has befallen the fatherland and great suffering is spreading over the whole land. Thousands upon thousands of young lives are forced into inhuman suffering. Poverty and starvation are going to destroy the well-being of the laboring masses of the people. We believe firmly that the great flower of Russian democracy together with all the other forces will throw back the aggressive enemy, and will defend their native land."

The labor groups, according to Kerensky's declaration, supported the war "in defense of the land of our birth and of our *civilization created by the blood of our race.*" "We believe," he said, "that through the agony of the battlefield the brotherhood of the Russian people will be strengthened and a common desire created to free the land from its terrible internal troubles." He would take no responsibility for this "suicidal war" into which "the governments of Europe had plunged their peoples." "The Socialists of England, Belgium, France, and Germany," he said, "have tried to protest against rushing into war. We Russian democrats were not able at the last to raise our voice freely against war. But deeply convinced of the brotherhood of the workers of all lands, we send our brotherly greetings to all who protested against the preparations for this fratricidal conflict of peoples. Remember that Russian citizens have no enemies among the working classes of the belligerents! Protect your country to the end against aggression by the states whose governments are hostile to us, but remember that there would not have been this terrible war had the great ideals of democracy, freedom, equality, and brotherhood been directing the activities of those who control the destinies of Russia and other lands! As it is, our authorities, even in this terrible moment, show no desire to forget internal strife, grant no amnesty to those who have fought for freedom and the country's happiness, show no desire for reconciliation with the non-Russian peoples of the empire.

"And, instead of relieving the condition of the laboring classes of the people, the government puts on them especially the heaviest load of the war expenses, by tightening the yoke of indirect taxes.

"Peasants and workers, all who want the happiness and well-being of Russia in these great trials, harden your spirit! Gather all your strength, and, having defended your land, free it; and to you, our brothers, who are shedding blood for the fatherland, a profound bow and fraternal greetings."

The speech was received with great applause by all of the Duma except the extreme reactionaries.

CHAPTER XVI

POLAND

THE Polish Socialists are divided into several parties. There can be no question that those of Germany did all in their power, as individuals or in small groups, against Germany—though they could take no organized action. The Polish Socialists of Russia are divided into three factions. Two of them are connected with the Russian Socialists and aim at bringing about a Russian revolution, with autonomy for Poland as an incident. A third Russian party is closely connected with the Polish Socialists of Austria. The anti-Russian attitude of the last-named goes to the length of active support of Austria. Joseph Pilsudski, a leader of this party, commands a volunteer corps composed of this and other Polish nationalist parties with the purpose, first, of aiding Austria and, second, of setting up a Polish nation, as the following proclamations show:

The first is dated Warsaw, August 3d, and pretends to set up a Polish government.

DECLARATIONS OF THE POLISH SOCIALIST PARTY (THE P.P.S.)

Warsaw, August 3, 1914.

The hour has come.

Poland is no longer a slave, and will henceforth shape its own destinies, will throw its own armed force upon the scales of European events. The corps of the Polish army have entered the Kingdom of Poland and have taken possession of it in the name of its rightful, its only possessors, the Polish

people, who have built and enriched their fatherland with their life blood. They have taken possession in the name of the highest authorities of the national government.

We have loosed the nation's chains, we have given to its people the possibility of normal development.

Beginning with this day the whole nation shall be united under the direction of the national government. Only traitors will withhold their allegiance, and with such we shall deal without mercy.

(Signed) **COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE POLISH ARMY,**
JOSEPH PILSUDSKI.

The second proclamation, dated Cracow, August 10th, is of a purely military character. It is as follows:

Polish soldiers have entered Polish land, belonging to Russia, the land of slavery and merciless brutality. Our marksmen took Miechow and the surrounding villages, and marched by way of Jendrzyow-Kielce toward Warsaw, with the consent of the Austrian army.

With enthusiasm the people greeted the Polish eagle. The farmers and workmen of the kingdom joined the marksmen in hordes, joyous over the opportunity to fight against Russia.

Foodstuffs and other necessities are being gladly supplied. The commandment of the Polish army is creating civil authorities and has called upon the most prominent residents of the various communities to take over the control of local affairs in all its phases. It is organizing a militia. The walls of the cities and villages are covered with proclamations from the national government and commander-in-chief.

Brothers, the soul of the nation has shaken off the old doubt as to its own strength. With the brave march of our soldiers into the Polish Kingdom the existence of Poland has again begun.

The undying desire for independence has become a fact, a reality. The soldiers marching to Warsaw have turned over a new leaf in the history of Poland. Never before have conditions been so favorable for the struggle against Russia.

We are the allies of Austria in the present situation, we gain wherever the Austrian army takes possession of Polish territory.

Austria, in defending its own national interests, is also helping the cause of Poland.

The future of the nation depends upon us, upon our readiness to sacrifice, upon our organization, upon our determination to win.

In view of our independence we must forget about social and political struggles: there is but one question—are we capable of fulfilling our duties as a nation? No sacrifice of life and property can daunt us. Let us support with the whole strength of the nation our brothers who are fighting for Poland.

The Commission of the Confederated Independent Parties to-day has assumed the powers of the national government in Warsaw, and it will become the agency between the national government and Galicia, will report all developments, and will conduct the necessary relief measures in the war against Russia.

Certainly, after this, there can be no question of the position, the activity, or the efficiency of the Polish Socialists of the P.P.S.

CHAPTER XVII

ITALY

THE Italian Socialists secured, in the election of 1913, 1,160,000 votes, about 25 per cent. of the total number cast. Sixty-three deputies were elected by the radical Socialists, besides a considerable number by the reform Socialists. The Socialists have either a majority or very nearly a majority in most of the large cities and towns. There are two Socialist parties in Italy. But the second, the Socialist Reform Party, founded by members expelled from the Socialist Party because of their support of the Tripoli war and of other military measures, is considerably smaller, though it has sixteen members of parliament. The larger and more radical party has from first to last favored the strictest neutrality for Italy—with the exception of a few leading members. During the first month of the war, however, when there still seemed to be a danger that Italy would fight with Germany and Austria, its agitation for neutrality was directed in part against those governments.

Its first manifesto, in view of the success of the general strike of June, assumed the character of an ultimatum (see Part II). Here are some of its most menacing sentences:

FROM THE ULTIMATUM ADDRESSED TO THE PREMIER BY THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY

It is not a question of ourselves, but of Italy.

We can assure you that if Italy mobilizes her army and commands it to march to the *direct or indirect support* of the

Germans against France, that very day there will be no need of any effort on our part to make the Italian people revolt.

The insurrection would be unanimous and terrible.

M. Salandra, do you doubt it?

It is not possible that you do.

During a whole week the most prominent supporters of the present order have come to us and have said: If Italy is forced to go with the Triple Alliance, that is the hour for the revolution. It would be a patriotic revolution if it stopped Italy from giving her support to Germany and Austria.

The party's position at this time is also shown by an interview with the moderate leader Turati, on July 26th. He said:

I believe that the group will be unanimous on the proposition of neutrality for the present as well as for the future, not only because of its fundamental opposition to war, but also in consideration of *the principle of nationality, basely reviled and menaced by the aggressiveness of what is in appearance only Austria-Hungary, but in reality of Austria and Germany, and more of Germany than of Austria.*

It is possible that ours will not be the voice in the wilderness this time. It may be because the painful experience in Tripoli will be of help. It may be that, if it was possible to make the fools among us gulp down the delusion that we could transport our emigrants and civilization to Tripoli, it ought to be less easy to make even the most trusting and gullible in our midst bolt down the infamous proposal now before us. *For it is inconceivable that a country like ours, that has attained to independence as a nation, in the very teeth of this same Austria, could ever, without going down in history as an everlasting disgrace and—what will count as more effective persuasion in certain quarters—without risking a radical upset at home—it is inconceivable, I say, that this country can play the halter in Austria's game of stringing up another nationality. And there is no honest party, I repeat, that, at least in this thing, can afford not to give us its aid.* (Our italics.)

After such anti-Austrian declarations, it was difficult for the party to sustain its attitude of neutrality when

the tide turned, and the middle classes, together with a large part of the ruling class, clamored for war against Austria. This difficulty is illustrated by the resignation of the editor of the official party daily, the *Avanti*, who was one of the party's best known leaders.

The Executive Committee of the Socialist Party in its meeting of October 20th discussed the international situation. The director of the *Avanti*, Mussolini, proposed a resolution in which it was declared that the formula of absolute neutrality which had formerly been the party's position, was too rigid and dogmatic in view of the international situation which was becoming more complicated and more subject to unexpected events. The party should therefore refrain from deciding future tactics of the party in case of war, until the events themselves gave the basis upon which to act. This resolution of Mussolini was supported by no other member of the Party Executive, which reaffirmed its former decisions, and in a manifesto to the working people declared its opposition to war and its determination to maintain its advocacy of neutrality. After the rejection of his motion, Mussolini resigned from the editorship of the *Avanti*.*

A few weeks later a mass meeting was held in Milan to discuss this question. Mussolini had a large number of adherents, but was still in a minority. He then founded an independent newspaper advocating war against Germany and Austria, and, shortly before the end of the year, was expelled from the party.

The difficulties of the party were increased by the anti-Austrian attitude of other Socialists, notably Battisti, formerly a leader of the Italian Socialists in Austria and member of the Austrian parliament, and Raimondo, a member of the Italian parliament but recently expelled from the Socialist Party on the doubtful ground of his free-masonry.

But most of the Socialist anti-Austrian sentiment

* *Vorwaerts*, October 21st.

came from the Socialist Reform Party, which includes such well-known personalities as Bissolati, member of parliament from Rome, one of Italy's leading orators, and Podrecca, editor of *L'Asino*.

In the very first days of the war it recorded its opinion that the victory of the Triple Entente, Great Britain, France, and Russia, would not only aid universal disarmament, but at the same time open the way to an exchange of national opinions and help the proletariat both socially and economically.

It declared also the victory of the Entente Powers would assure Italy's predominance over Austro-Hungary in Balkan questions.

Gradually this party developed a propaganda for actual participation in the war against Austria.

By the end of September the Socialist Party felt obliged to assume a more aggressive position in its neutrality, and to take a stand against the pressure of the Allies as it had previously done against Germany and Austria. This new neutrality was developed in the following proclamation:

NEUTRALITY PROCLAMATION OF ITALIAN PARTY

Socialist Comrades, Italian Workers: More than two months have now gone by since the day on which accursed war threw the nations of civilized Europe against one another. While the terrible massacre continues, the bourgeois governments, by the notes and polemics of their agencies, by the speeches of their Ministers, seek to throw upon their respective enemies the initial responsibility for the tremendous conflict. All this is false and artificial. They are responsible in common, and in common they must answer for it before history. Leaving out of the question pacific and heroic Belgium, which has had to endure the vandalism of the invasion of the German armies, the settlement of the exact responsibility for the events is of minor interest. The primary and fundamental responsibility for the war is to be traced back to the

present capitalistic system, based on the rivalry of the states.

Italy alone of all the greater countries has been able to keep out of the gigantic conflict and to declare itself neutral. In bringing about this decision of the government the resolute attitude assumed by the Socialist Party and the proletariat ever since the commencement of the crisis has not been without effect. As a matter of fact, the Triple Alliance treaty is dead, though it still has a sterile existence in the diplomatic protocol. The declaration of neutrality received the unanimous approval of public opinion. But since a few weeks ago parties without a large following and other currents are agitating to push the government toward intervention in the European conflagration. We see arising a "state of mind" very similar to that which preceded the enterprise in Libya. The urgent necessity of a great ministry of national concentration is pointed out. War against the ally of yesterday, and, therefore, also against Germany, is demanded.

The Socialist Party makes this appeal to you and trusts it is not in vain. *The Socialist deputies will not vote the military credits for a war of aggression*, resulting from a grotesque and contradictory foreign policy made up of expedients and devoid of ideals, for which the Italian governing classes and the dynasty are responsible.

In the middle of February the Socialists and labor unionists held a conference at Milan. Turati had proposed a resolution for the conference, in which he affirmed that the Italian Socialists repudiated with equal strength and at the same time, as aberrations from a sane Socialist conception, both the ideas of Hervéism, which denied country and nationality, and the facile "interventionism" of the nationalists and friends of war.

Opposed to that resolution was one advocated by Malatesta (the anarchist), which was taken to mean the proclamation of a general strike in case of war, though that pacifist weapon was not specifically mentioned. It read: "The Socialist group, convinced of the necessity of converting into positive practical and resolute action

the opposition manifested by the Italian Socialist proletariat against the military intervention of Italy in the European conflict, confides to the Party Executive, in accordance with the directive organizations of the proletariat, the task of carefully preparing a simultaneous action from which no means whatever is to be excluded a priori." That resolution was adopted by 182 votes, against 125 votes cast for the resolution drafted by Turati.

Here is an implied indorsement of the use of the general strike in case of war; but its opponents, as may be seen, are almost as numerous as its advocates—even among the *organized* working people.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE OTHER NEUTRAL NATIONS

At first the invasion of Belgium and the voting of the war loan by the German Socialists seemed to incline the Socialists of the smaller neutral nations, especially the immediate neighbors of Germany, against that country. But gradually the need of maintaining their own neutrality and the heavy military burdens forced upon them by the war led to the position that the victory of one or the other of fighting groups was of less importance than to prevent the spread of the war. The danger arising from the rapid growth of nationalism, the enemy of Socialism, within these countries was also a contributing cause, as well as the difficulty of successful Socialist agitation under the prevailing conditions. In a word the Socialists of these little nations seemed more and more overwhelmed by their own troubles and less and less inclined to go deeply into the causes of the war, which might lead them to take sides with the Socialists of one or another of the warring nations. This change will be noted by comparing the documents here quoted with those referred to in Part IV, where we discuss Socialist *opinions* about the war.

HOLLAND

In the election of 1913 the Dutch Socialists increased their delegation in Parliament from 7 to 19. Their vote had risen (in three years) more than 50 per cent. They

were thereupon invited to form a coalition ministry, but—after prolonged discussion—they refused.

During the session of August 1, 1914, in the Dutch Chamber of Deputies, Troelstra declared in the name of the Social Democrats, that they would vote for mobilization funds, since Holland must observe its neutrality, guaranteed by all powers, against all those tending to disregard this right. On the other hand, they desired it clearly understood that the Social Democrats as such would resist, strenuously, any aggressive participation in the war.

On the 26th of August Troelstra made another declaration for the party, the chief point of which was the very natural wish that the peace terms should "recognize the independence of the various peoples." However, the party does not seem to feel that any peace can make this the last war, since it expresses the pessimistic view, "that only by the formation of an International of Labor of the free people of Europe can all capitalistic struggles for power and profit cease, and so all wars be made impossible."

SWITZERLAND

The Swiss Socialists have only 17 out of the 189 members of the federal parliament. But their vote has increased from 64,000 in 1904 to 105,000 in 1914, and they form large and influential minorities in all the large cities, Zurich, Basel, Geneva, and Bern.

At Zurich on July 29th, they held a great demonstration against war, at which Greulich, the veteran leader, and Sigg made the chief speeches.

Greulich spoke in part as follows:

More than forty years ago Servia freed itself from Turkey and since then its people have developed amazingly, in spite

of much bad government. Out of the oppressed Servians there has sprung up a free peasant people. This is the principal stumbling block to the designs of Austria, for the peasants in Herzegovina and Bosnia are smarting under the same feudal rule under which the Servians smarted in the days of the Turkish régime.

And if these oppressed people are longing for that freedom which in Servia they already possess, that feeling would be in no way incomprehensible. To be sure, this situation entails danger for Austria, but Austria has only herself to blame. *Let these peasants be given their freedom, which they would have as subjects of Servia; this done, the problem will be solved.*

Sigg predicted that the German Socialists would inaugurate a revolution in case their government declared war:

The direct cause of the war is the assassination of the Crown Prince and Princess of Austria. This, however, can be regarded as but little else than a pretext. The true cause of the war lies much deeper; its basis was laid when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. From that time dates the troubled state of the dual monarchy, induced by the Serb agitation against the government, and already vast sums have been spent to defray the cost of mobilizations and of other procedures which were found necessary for the control of this disturbance. Let Austria bear the blame for this development. She has done nothing to assimilate the Slavs whom she has taken over to herself. She has done nothing to arouse thoughts loyal to Austria among her Serb subjects, nothing to awaken an attachment for the Austrian Empire in their hearts. On the contrary, Austria has neglected every opportunity for such action; indeed, she has taken frequent occasion to make the Servians unhappy and to advance her design of eventually absorbing that country.

The demands which Austria is now making of the Servians are, without doubt, the most unheard-of in the history of civilization, and yet they have practically submitted to them. Only in one respect did they object, and even in this they were willing to submit to the decree of an arbitration tribunal. In spite of all this, however, Austria declared herself unsatis-

fied. The Austrian Government will not be content with its rights, and the punishment of the murderer. *No, it demands war!*

If, then, the unheard-of event should occur, if it should still happen that the war develops into a general massacre of European peoples, and *if the German rulers confront their people with the question: "Are you ready?" then we will answer them: "Yes, we are indeed ready. We are ready, we will endure you no longer; we are ready to wage the fight for freedom."* (Our italics.)

At the Conference of the Swiss and Italian Socialists, held in Lugano on September 27th, an entirely different tone was adopted. Its declaration was as follows:

The present catastrophe is the result of the imperialist policy of the Great Powers, which in absolute monarchies are identical with dynastic interests.

The European War is not a struggle for higher culture, for the freedom of the people. It is at once a struggle of the capitalist classes for new markets in foreign lands, and a criminal attempt to break down the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the Social Democracy at home.

The German and Austrian bourgeois have no right to defend the war with references to Czarism and the freedom of national culture. For not only have the Prussian Junkertum, with William II at its head, and the powerful capitalists of Germany always befriended this damnable reign of the Russian Czar, but the governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary have also suppressed the national culture of their people, have cast into chains those who struggled for liberty of the working class.

Nor have the French and English bourgeois the right to uphold their own countries by denouncing German imperialism, by declaiming about the freedom of the nations of Europe. Their aim is not the liberation of the people from capitalist and military oppression, their alliance with the Russia of the Czar has increased this oppression and has hindered the progress of a higher civilization.

The real causes and the true character of this war have been purposely hidden by the ruling classes of the European nations in a frenzy of chauvinism, and parts of the working

class have been swept into this chauvinistic whirlpool. They believe that by taking up arms they can free the proletariat of other countries from the bloody oppression of their rulers. But no war can accomplish this. The oppressed cannot win their freedom in a fight for their oppressors against the oppressed classes of other countries.

More than ever it is to-day the duty of Socialists who live in those countries that have been spared the dreadful ravages of war to uphold the old principles of the International of the proletariat. The undersigned representatives of the Socialist parties of Italy and Switzerland thus believe it to be their task to fight to the last breath against the extension of this war into other nations, and to denounce every attempt to drive new nations into this chaos as a crime against the laboring population, as a blot upon civilization.

In this sense the representatives of the Italian and Swiss Social Democracy call upon the Socialist parties of the other nations.

We are creating a foundation upon which the people of those nations which, though not engaged in war, are yet suffering from its effects, may unite against the continuance of this horrible butchery. At the same time we call upon the Socialist parties of the neutral countries to demand that their governments shall immediately take up diplomatic negotiations with the governments of the nations engaged in this war, with a view toward a speedy close of this mass murder of the European people.

The chief features of the resolution passed by the Swiss Socialist Congress held on November 1st, were its uncompromising internationalism and its demand for immediate peace—apparently at any price, since, although Belgium is mentioned and indemnities were discussed at the Congress, the resolution avoids making any distinction between the character of the various governments or the relative advantage to Socialism of their defeat in the war. (See "Switzerland" in Parts IV and V.)

The resolution concerning the International read as follows:

The war, both in its immediate and in its ultimate character, is a crime of unheard-of magnitude. Its unspeakable horror appears especially in the outrageous violation of Belgium and the waste of that country. The ruling classes through their politics and lust for dominion and longing for profits are leading to menace and attack. Behind lying phrases about the defense of national freedom and civilization there hides in every country the capitalistic interests of big business, which wanted the war in order to assure itself by this means of markets and new possibilities of exploitation. . . .

The ruling classes in the present war not only wished to strike their competitors as hard a blow as possible, but also wished to create a mutual recrimination between the proletariat of the various countries and to intensify national conflicts.

Since the maintenance of a lasting peace without danger of war is only possible in a collectivist form of society, peace can only be prepared for by the uncompromising class struggle of the proletariat on an international basis, and by its refusal to take any responsibility for the politics of the ruling classes, and the results of this politics.

Therefore the Party Conference of the Swiss Social Democracy, as a member of the International, greets the resumption of international relations by means of the conference called at Lugano between the Italian and Swiss parties, and supports all efforts which are directed to bringing the present war to the earliest possible conclusion.

The Socialists of French Switzerland declared that they regarded the resolution only as partially satisfactory.

DENMARK

In the elections of 1913, the Danish Socialists secured 32 out of 114 deputies, increased their vote to 30 per cent. of the total, and were invited to form a coalition government, which—after mature deliberation—they refused.

The leading thought of the neutrality proclamation

of the Danish Party, issued at the beginning of the war, is the same, that permanent peace can be attained with Socialism and only then.

A later proclamation, issued in common with the labor unions, emphasizes a similar thought, that after the war the people may identify the cause of peace with that of Socialism.

SWEDEN

With 87 out of 230 members of Parliament—won as a result of the elections of September, 1914—the Swedish Socialist Party is the strongest numerically in that country. At a special Party Congress held on December 2d, it was decided, for the first time in the history of any Socialist Party, not only to form an alliance with the Liberals, but to be prepared to take part in a possible coalition government with them—after the war. The situation, however, is very similar in Denmark and in Holland.

In Sweden the governing class and the nationalists are strongly anti-Russian and pro-German. This is one of the reasons why the Swedish Socialists, even as late as September, took a strong anti-German stand.

The Swedish Social Democracy dissolved its Ninth Annual Congress after two days, as a great number of the delegates were obliged to respond to mobilization orders. Before the Congress adjourned a long manifesto was unanimously adopted emphatically demanding absolute Swedish neutrality. According to the party organ of Stockholm, the *Social Demokrat*, the manifesto was in part as follows:

The Social Democratic Labor Party of Sweden in this fatal hour, when all Europe stands in flames, unites with its brothers in arms all over the world in a passionate protest. The catastrophe has burst upon us, it has developed out of

the desire for profits of our ruling classes. It was hastened by the constantly growing military burdens that oppressed the people of all nations, it was precipitated by reckless nationalistic voices, *by a flagrant disregard of international law*, both in the past and in the present. It reached its present extent because of the unscrupulous and brutal imperial policies of *a few powerful rulers*.

Heavy, fearfully heavy, will be the responsibility these powerful men must bear, who did not stand aghast before this unspeakable crime, who, in cold blood, turn loose the furies of war upon people who deserve only to live in peace. (Our italics.)

ROUMANIA

Roumania is, perhaps, more predominantly agricultural than any country of Europe. For this and other reasons the Socialist movement has, as yet, developed no considerable strength except in the one large town, the capital—Bucharest. Nevertheless, it has obtained a footing in other towns and has a membership of about 3,000, largely concentrated in Bucharest, which gives it a certain influence with the population of that city—and enabled it to conduct large demonstrations against Roumania's participation in the war, some of which resulted in serious riots.

The Social Democratic Executive, some two months after the outbreak of the war, published the following appeal:

It is our duty to direct attention to the danger for our country that lies in the Russian propaganda. The so-called independent organs are carrying on a shameless propaganda to assist the spies of the Czar by creating a pro-Russian sentiment, with the excuse that they are for France and French democracy and civilization. We have ground to affirm that this propaganda, which may decide our fate, is not without interested motives. It is leading us directly to war. We direct the attention of the working classes and of the whole people to this sinister and systematic campaign. An alliance

with the Czar means the conquering of democracy, the crushing of popular freedom, and reaction. We must turn against this tendency, against the rolling ruble [Russian bribery]. The Roumanian people must know this: *The Russian danger always has been, and still is, the greatest.*

BULGARIA

In the sitting of the Sobranje (Parliament) on November 24th, according to a telegram of the Leipzig *Volkszeitung*, the Social Democratic group of the "narrow" Socialists (orthodox) brought forward a motion that the Sobranje should immediately call upon all the parliaments of the Balkan countries for a common understanding upon the basis of defense against all foreign conquest, the formation of a Balkan Federation upon the ground of common political and economic interests, and a national union of the Balkan people.

The same group further moved: "That the Sobranje demand that the government should immediately come to an understanding with the governments of the neutral countries for a common intervention with the warring Powers, in order to bring about the earliest possible end to the bloodshed."

Only the eleven members of the "narrow" group voted for the two motions. The "broad" group (opportunists), which, as a part of the loyal opposition, favors a more nationalistic policy, did not vote for it. The "broad" leader, Sakasoff, welcomed the governmental policy and promised the support of his group.

PORTUGAL

The Socialists of Portugal have developed their strength chiefly in the two leading cities, Lisbon and Oporto. In the former they have a daily newspaper, and from Oporto they sent a member to the parliament

at the first elections after the revolution that established the Republic.

Portugal's position, as an ally of Great Britain, has a certain importance. While we do not have the proclamation of the Portuguese Socialists, the Lisbon papers published on October 6th a common manifesto of the Radical and Socialist members of the Cortes demanding the strictest neutrality of Portugal in the war.

THE UNITED STATES

The Socialists of the United States cast 931,000 out of fifteen million votes at the election of 1912, an increase of nearly 400,000 in four years. They failed to re-elect their one member of Congress, however, and succeeded in returning only one member at the succeeding elections of 1914. Proportional representation would entitle them to ten or fifteen.

The first proclamation of the American Socialist Party was issued early in August, and its plan of mediation by the President of the United States was the first Socialist peace proposal. (See Part V.)

The essential paragraphs of the former proclamation are the following:

The Socialist Party of the United States, *in conformity with the declarations of the international Socialist movement, hereby reiterates its opposition to this and all other wars, waged upon any pretext whatsoever; war being a crude, savage, and unsatisfactory method of settling real or imaginary differences between nations, and destructive of the ideals of brotherhood and humanity to which the international Socialist movement is dedicated.*

The Socialist Party of the United States hereby expresses its condemnation of the ruling classes of Europe, and points out to the world that by their action in this crisis they have conclusively proven that they are unfit to administer the affairs of nations in such a manner that the lives and happiness of the people may be safeguarded.

The Socialist Party of the United States hereby pledges its loyal support to the Socialist parties of Europe in any measures they might think it necessary to undertake to advance the cause of peace and of good-will among men.

The Socialist Party of the United States hereby calls upon the national administration to prove the genuineness of its policy of peace by opening immediate negotiations for mediation and extending every effort to bring about the speedy termination of this disastrous conflict.

PART IV
SOCIALIST ACTION AND OPINION
DURING THE WAR

We shall now review the very varied Socialist *opinion* concerning the war—leaving for the following (and final) section, Part V, the discussion of the Socialist principles, plans, and efforts as to peace. In the documents quoted in Part III it became evident that the difference between the two leading groups of Socialists, those fundamentally opposed to nationalism, and those ready to compromise with it, is very radical. Whether this difference is insuperable and will lead to the splitting up of the Socialist organizations into two or more parties, or to the reorganization of the present international movement on some new basis, remains to be seen. What seems certain is that the tremendous and intense discussion now going on among the Socialists of all countries cannot fail to have a profound effect on the future of this great popular movement, is bound to have a considerable effect on public opinion generally, and may exert no small influence on the peace negotiations.

CHAPTER XIX

GERMANY

BEGINNING again with Germany we find that the majority of the Party Executive, as well as the new leaders of the Party, Scheidemann, Richard Fischer, and Suedekum, either take the same position as they did in the Reichstag session of August 4th, or have become still stronger adherents of the cause of the government. Still more radically nationalistic are some of the newspapers of the right wing, and especially its monthly, the *Socialistische Monatshefte*. On the other hand, a powerful radical minority has shown itself. We find that this minority is well represented among the Reichstag members and within the Socialist caucus opposed the voting of the war loan, while Liebknecht, Mehring, Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin (the two leading women members of the party) have expressedly declared that the statements of Scheidemann and Suedekum do not represent the party as a whole.

At the voting of the Prussian war loan on October 22d, we find a division of the party into two equal factions. The conduct of the group during the session shows a very radical difference of opinion, which was brought out by the conflicting statements of Hirsch and Liebknecht after the session. And again, at the voting of the third war loan and the annual budget by the Reichstag on March 10th, we see that almost a third of the Socialist members—including Haase and Bernstein—abstained from the vote, while Liebknecht and Ruehle voted in the negative.

We also give a number of articles from all sections

of the Socialist Party press and some editorials from the daily organ of the German Socialists of the United States, the New York *Volkszeitung*, which agrees with the German minority, while under the head of other countries we reproduce several similar opinions from Socialist leaders in close touch with the German Socialists. Equally interesting and important are our quotations from the articles of Karl Kautsky (in *Die Neue Zeit*) and from *Vorwaerts*, the party's official daily organ, especially during the months of August and September, when it had a larger measure of freedom. The *Vorwaerts* material indicates a radical difference of its editors with the party majority, and an almost complete agreement with the revolutionary minority. The Kautsky articles also show an entirely different opinion from that expressed by Scheidemann, Fischer, and Suedekum, though, perhaps, in accord with the official party declaration of August 4th. Kautsky was opposed to that action and repudiates the arguments used to support it. But he does say in an interview that this action can be reconciled with Socialist principles, and he attempts this reconciliation in two highly important articles (which we quote at some length).

KARL KAUTSKY

As editor of *Die Neue Zeit*, the official weekly of the German Party, Kautsky holds one of the most important positions in the organization and is its leading spokesman. In the present war he defends the action of the party majority. But he makes important amendments as to the grounds of this action, and he wishes the party to maintain its freedom fundamentally to alter its policy according to the changing character of the struggle. Kautsky, the leading "orthodox" writer of the party, and his opponent, Bernstein, the leading "re-

visionist'' writer, in some respects hold similar views with regard to the war—forming a middle group, the policy of which is to continue to support the government on the whole, while opposing it in important particulars. The principal purpose of this group is to prepare the party for complete opposition in case the governmental policy becomes more reactionary; for example, if it goes in for persecution of the Socialists at home—or if it works for a separate peace with Russia. For this would mean that an alliance with that reactionary government would take the place of the present war against it, a reversal of Germany's foreign policy which all Socialists agree would result in the most terrible reaction, not only in Germany but throughout all Europe. For it would mean practically a renewal of the "Holy Alliance" of the three Emperors of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, which was responsible for the brutal despotism which terrorized not only those countries but the whole Continent for a quarter century after 1849.

Kautsky had important articles in *Die Neue Zeit* nearly every week during the first months of the war. We have quoted one of these in Part I. Space allows selections from only four of the most significant at this point, and from two others dealing with peace in Part V.

In his first article written after the war began, Kautsky continues the thought of his last article before the war, that war has its natural economic limits, which have nearly been reached, and that they will be reached all the more rapidly because of the present struggle.

There was a very careful though brief statement of Kautsky in *Die Neue Zeit* of August 16th as to the probable results of the war, of which the following are the chief points:

The real objects of the war will be known only when the relative strength of the various Powers is settled. Then the

victors will suddenly have the courage for all sorts of demands.

However, some results of the war already appear as highly probable, especially in reference to the nations not directly involved. The United States, for example, is sure to get very great benefits. Moreover, this will have the result that *American industries will develop to such a degree that Europe will be absolutely unable to continue her vast armaments and still compete effectively with us.*

Next, Japan, China, India, Persia, Turkey, etc., will be in large measure relieved from the oppression of the European Powers. This will not only strengthen them, but *will lead to a second result of world-wide benefit. For the stronger these outlying states become, the less practicable the continuation of the present imperialistic politics of the Great Powers.*

Kautsky is also absolutely confident that there will be a great shifting of the balance of political power within each nation, and that this shifting will be in favor of the democracy, though he does not hazard any calculation as to how far it will go. In fact, he says at the beginning of his article that his mouth is closed by the censor as to the most important phases of the situation.

But in spite of his despair of getting around the censor, Kautsky does find an indirect way of saying that the war must bring either democracy or revolution.

In an article in the September *Neue Zeit*, Kautsky first warns the German Social Democrats of the effect of the war, in arousing Russian patriotism, and then goes on to predict its later and more beneficent results. Here is his warning:

No doubt the expectation, which made the war popular among many party comrades, that it would be a sovereign means of overturning the Czarism, may easily prove mistaken. In Russia, too, the war may become a popular war and the fight against the invading Germans may appear more important to the Russian proletariat than the fight against the Czar.

But he goes on to say:

"The war can scarcely be waged for any long period without concessions by the Czar, grants of greater liberty which are perhaps not very earnestly intended, but which neverthe-

less cannot be taken back after the war, unless it becomes a glorious and brilliant victory [for Russia], which does not seem probable at the present time.

"We must reckon with the possibility that a Russia will issue from the war which, even if not a republic but only a constitutional monarchy, will nevertheless show greater freedom than its neighbors. It only needs freedom to develop its great natural resources, and the advantage to the inner market of an empire of more than one hundred and sixty million inhabitants—assuming of course that increased armaments do not hold it back."

Thus not only does Kautsky anticipate a great improvement in Russia, but he believes that Russia will develop greater freedom than Germany and Austria. And his hope for these two latter countries is that "they could not long withdraw themselves from the influence of Russian progress."

Kautsky's views of the later effects of the war on Russia are still more optimistic. While Germany, being an industrial country, may suffer losses not easy to repair, Russia as an agricultural country may actually gain from the era of high agricultural prices which will rule after the war. Russian defeats then will only stir the country to greater efforts:

"In this agrarian empire the danger to industry by the war may be compensated for by the gains to agriculture. If it is defeated at present, this is due to its lack of communications, the ignorance of its people, the corruption of its administration, the lack of freedom of initiative and organization of the masses. Far more than the Russo-Japanese War, the present war must force the Russian colossus to modernize itself. Whether this takes place through the overthrow of the Czarism, or through voluntary liberal concessions, has nothing to do with the economic effects. It is enough that a free era is possible for Russia, which may overcome its deficiencies with gigantic strides. With this the Russian danger would cease for the *democracy* of Europe. But the Russian danger would then for the first time become a really burning one for *military* powers. Give one hundred and sixty million men freedom, well-being, and knowledge, and their numbers will soon make them dominant."

Thus Kautsky completely negatives the idea fostered

by the German Government and its Socialist supporters that the Kaiser is fighting the Czar as a means of bringing liberty to the Russian people. On the contrary, the coming Russian revolution, or democratization, is to bring democracy to Germany.

The next article quoted, the most important Kautsky has written, deals primarily with the position of the German Socialists during the present war. He rejects the propositions of the declaration made by the party on its voting of the War Loan on August 4th, namely, that this vote was justified because the war was defensive, and because it was directed against Russian despotism. Kautsky approves solely the other justification contained in that declaration, that the country was in danger of actual invasion, and that from a Socialist standpoint invasion should be prevented—a defense which would justify *all the Socialists of Europe in supporting their governments by all means in their power, including even those of Russia*. At the same time he definitely abandons the principle of internationalism held by the overwhelming majority of Socialists and, as he reminds us, advocated by himself up to the present war, namely, that Socialists should determine their position in time of war according to the interests of the working people of all countries.

This defense of the German Party is as follows: *

At the outbreak of the war not only did both parties appeal to the same God for the protection of their great cause, but the populations of both sides, in a similar way, consider themselves attacked.

This experience caused me in Essen [1907] to oppose the Bebel point of view—one of the few cases in which we differed from one another.

Bebel said at that time:

"I have been asked, and Kautsky, too, has harped on this same string, what is a war of offense? Well, it would be right

* *Die Neue Zeit*, October 2d.

sad if to-day, when large circles of the people interest themselves in politics more and more day by day, we still could not judge in particular cases whether we were confronting a war of offense or not."

Now experience shows that there are cases in which the greatest political schooling is not sufficient to say forthwith at the outbreak of a war, and without possibility of disagreement, who is the aggressor.

This time the decision was especially difficult on account of the suddenness with which events broke over our heads and on account of the complications of the policy of alliances which increase from day to day.

Through these complications even that guide which I offered against Bebel's "aggressive war" criterion in Essen, lost its value. I said at that time:

"The German Government may one day inform the German proletarians that it is attacked, the French Government may do the same for the French proletarians, and we would then have a war in which the German and French proletarians would follow their governments with equal enthusiasm and mutually murder one another and cut one another's throats. That must be avoided, and can be avoided if we do not adopt the criterion of aggressive war but that of proletarian interests."

The reader will feel the need of a slightly fuller statement of the famous debate between Kautsky and Bebel in 1907, in view of Bebel's reference to the possibility of war against Russia and Kautsky's insistence (1) that such a war would involve other nations also and (2) that the proletarian view must be not only proletarian but also international—an opinion abandoned, as we have seen, in the article just quoted.

In 1900 August Bebel had said in the Reichstag:

"You will find that in case of war with Russia, the Social Democratic element, which you designate as unpatriotic and hostile to the Fatherland, will perform its duty fully. Indeed, if we were attacked by Russia, whom we regard as an arch-enemy to all Europe and to Germany especially, since it is upon Russia that the German reaction rests, I myself, old as

I am, would be only too willing to shoulder a gun against her."

At the Essen Congress of the German Socialist Party, 1907, this speech was brought into the discussion, and Bebel made the following explanation:

"Did the comrades not fail to note that I only spoke of the defense of the Fatherland? I expressly added at the time, if we ever should really be called upon to defend the Fatherland we will defend it because it is our fatherland, the ground upon which we live, whose speech we speak, whose customs are ours, because we wish to make this fatherland into a country which for perfection and beauty should have its equal nowhere. We defend this country not for you, but against you. And so we must defend it also if it is attacked. In connection with this, it has been said to me, and Comrade Kautsky, too, has harped upon this string, 'What is an aggressive war?' Well, it would be sad if to-day, when larger and larger circles of people are interested in politics from day to day, we could still not judge in each particular case whether it was an aggressive war or not. A deception in such a matter might have been possible in the seventies, but is no longer possible to-day."

Kautsky, who was apparently supported by the majority of the party, defined his views as follows:

"I ask whether the Social Democracy of every country has the duty to talk class in every war of attack. If, for example, Japan had attacked Russia, were the Russian Socialists obliged to defend their nationality, to support the government? Certainly not! We are not to be guided by the criterion as to whether it is a war of attack or a war of defense, but whether it is a danger for proletarian and democratic interests. Indeed, in case of a war, it is not a national question for us, but an international question. For a war between great Powers will become a world war, will affect all Europe, and not only two countries. The German Government might some day inform the German proletariat that it was attacked. The French Government might inform the French to the same effect, and then we would have a war in which French and German proletariat would follow their governments with the same enthusiasm, and murder one another and cut one another's throats. That must be avoided, and it will

be avoided if we adopt, not the criterion of defensive war, but of proletariat interests, which at the same time are international interests.

"Fortunately it is a misunderstanding to suppose that the German Social Democracy, in the case of war, would judge by national and not by international standards, that it would feel itself first as a German and then as a proletarian party. The German proletariat are united with the French proletariat, and not with the German capitalists and aristocrats."

It is the international proletarian criterion of the last paragraph that Kautsky now avowedly abandons. He continues his article of October 2d as follows:

This criterion, too, was considered at the outbreak of the present war on both sides, but, just as with the criterion of aggressive war, it led Germans and French to an opposite standpoint.

Our French comrades issued a manifesto together with the Belgians, in which they declared they must stand behind their government because on the German side the attack had been willed and because they were defending freedom and justice against German monarchism. . . .

They therefore felt themselves obligated to fight as republicans against the empire, but the German Social Democrats for the most part felt the same obligation to fight, for the war appeared to them as a war of a realm with universal and equal suffrage, the right of organization, and freedom of the press against the despotism of the Czarism. The Germans fought simultaneously against the Czar and the republic. The French simultaneously against German monarchism and for Russian absolutism. Where does the proletarian and democratic interest lie?

But each time we find that the difference between German and French Socialists does not lie in the criterion used or in the fundamental point of view, but in varying conceptions of the conditions, which in turn result from the difference of geographical situation. So that this conflict can scarcely be overcome as long as the war continues. There is no difference of principle.

Naturally, the prevailing view of the German Social Democ-

racy is not to be confused with that simple popular view, still strong in Germany, which sees in all Russia nothing but Cossacks, Bashkirs, and Kalmucks, servile tools of the Czarism. The colossal transformation through which the Russian people has passed in the last generation is well understood and appreciated in our party, since it made a powerful impression in the Revolution of 1905. We know that democracy is on the march in Russia and that it created a strong movement among the proletarian masses and also in the bourgeoisie before the war. We no longer take the point of view that war against Russia is necessary in order to break the power of the Czar or to protect that of the democracy of western Europe. On the contrary, the war between Germany and Russia to-day may—though this result will not necessarily follow—create obstacles for the democracy of both realms, whoever conquers. The view that the war against Russia is just as great a misfortune as any other war, however, does not contradict the conviction that after the war has once broken out the victory of the Czar would be the greatest misfortune of all the misfortunes it might bring.

However, if neither the criterion of aggressive war nor that of the proletarian interest produces in the present situation an equally clear and binding point of view for the comrades of all countries, there nevertheless remains a third criterion. One may dispute who is the attacker and who is the attacked, or which threatens Europe more—a victory of Germany over France or a victory of Russia over Germany; one thing is clear: every people, and the proletariat of every people, has a pressing interest in this: to prevent the enemy of the country from coming over the frontier, as it is this way that the terror and devastation of war reach their most frightful form: that of a hostile invasion. And in every national state the proletariat, too, must use all its energy to see that the independence and integrity of the national territory is maintained. That is an essential part of democracy, and democracy is a necessary basis for the struggle and the victory of the proletariat. . . .

But from this follows also the further duty of the Social Democracy of every country to regard the war exclusively as a defensive war, to set up as its goal only protection from the enemy, not his "punishment" or diminishment. Since this view speaks the cause of war, not in the personal badness or the

inferiority of the enemy, but in objective relations, it will regard the assurance which peace is to bring not to be the discouragement or maiming of the enemy, which would only furnish a new cause of war for the future, but the abolition of conditions which brought about the war. At the present time, that is, imperialistic antagonisms and world armament. . . .

Whether the war is *conducted* defensively or offensively is a purely military question which has nothing to do with the question whether it is *undertaken* as a defensive war or as an aggressive war. And every defensive campaign must finally turn into an offensive campaign if it is effectively conducted.

At the same time, although the military and political aggressive are to be sharply separated, the military aggressive, as soon as it is carried on with great success, is not without a reaction on foreign politics, and easily colors the latter with its own aggressive character. Thus the character of the War of 1870 was changed. At the beginning it was on the whole an aggressive war of Napoleon, but during its course it took on more and more the character of a defensive war of the French, not only in a military, but also in a political sense. Through such a transformation during the war, the attitude of the Social Democracy of the country may also change.

The mere fact that two groups of people—for example, the French and German Socialists—hold the same theory, though they *necessarily* apply it in such a way as to reach the opposite conclusions, is thus held by Kautsky to show that they are fundamentally in accord. The intelligent, well-informed leaders of the French and German Socialists are urging their followers to kill one another; still, we are reminded, they agree *in theory*. Kautsky's closing paragraphs, however, are of a more practical nature; they convey to the millions that listen to his voice the idea that the time may come for them to withdraw their support of the war.

On November 27th, appeared the most important article Kautsky has written during the war. As it is

long we give several quotations in order to give a general idea of the whole. Its object is to explain and defend, not only the German Party, but also the fundamental differences of the Socialists of the various countries concerning the war, and it reaches the conclusion that the International Socialist Movement cannot be expected to maintain its internationalism in times of international conflict, being an organization exclusively adapted to peace.

Kautsky writes:

It is asserted that he who was against the outbreak of war on international grounds ought not to have taken part for either side after its outbreak, that this would mean a recognition of war, a violation of internationality, which sets the same high value on all peoples and condemns all hostility of one against the other.

If that is true, then the International would indeed have been killed by the war; for there is certainly scarcely a single party member who could still boast of standing on the ground of the International, for if there is any event to which one cannot remain indifferent, which forces one to take sides and to take sides in a partisan and definite way, it is war. Even in the neutral countries most of the comrades have decided for one or other of the belligerents. Neutrality requires only the refusal to take sides by practical actions, but it never requires that no side should be taken in opinions and in wishes.

There is no doubt there can be a partisanship in war which is incompatible with internationality. But fortunately that is not true of all kinds of partisanship. The decisive thing is the motive upon which one takes sides.

He who lets himself be led by the principle, "My country, right or wrong," puts himself forthwith outside of the International, if he ever had any right to stand within it.

The case is different if one takes sides, not according to the interest of one's country, but according to that of the whole proletariat, and if one asks oneself whose victory gives better prospects for the progress of our cause, not only in the home country but in the whole world. Whatever the answer may be it will never violate the fundamental principles of

the International, which are based on the proposition that the interests of the proletariat of one country are the same as those of the proletariat of the other countries; that no lasting progress can be won in one country if it makes other countries go backward.

However, the principle of international solidarity by no means says that the answer must everywhere be the same. On the contrary, a unanimous opinion of the Social Democracy in the case of war has been very seldom obtained.

He who does not reflect that war reverses so many things sees in such behavior [the support of one's own government] a violation of our former practice. Some complain of this as of a miserable betrayal, others see in it the beginning of new tactics and a new concession that was never made before. The one view is as mistaken as the other.

If we formerly refused to grant to the existing system a single man or a single penny [for armies], we did this in order to replace the existing government by another, subjected to the will of the people. In war this is not the question. The question is whether or not the government of the country is to be subjected to the will of a foreign government. . . .

If we underestimate these difficulties and live in the expectation that the International will be fully united in war as in peace and continue to function without the least split, then this is partly due to the failure to discriminate between the attitude towards [entering into] war and the taking of sides during a war. Because we were all united in the condemnation of the war and because we all knew that at the bottom a European war represented only imperialistic tendencies, it was easy to suppose that the International had herewith reached a complete unity as to all the problems of war. . . .

The small states at war, and not less those great states composed of many nationalities, are struggling for nothing less than their existence. The situation is different with the great solidly-based national countries. *Their independence is certainly not threatened, but apparently their integrity is not threatened either.* Democracy, the participation of the people in politics, is too strongly developed in them; so that the tearing out of a piece from one of them and its forcible annexation to another foreign country would always be a perpetual source of weakness and complication to that country. More-

over, the demand for the alienation of a piece of another nation would stir up the wildest resistance, would considerably prolong the war, greatly increase its sacrifices and causes, and all for a purpose which would bring harm rather than benefit to the conqueror.

Violation of the integrity and independence of a great national state is scarcely to be expected, but the conquered country must reckon with the possibility that *the present material basis of its existence will be considerably narrowed* and the country forced to build upon a new and completely changed foundation.

Under certain conditions this might prove a beneficial force and compel the country to new and higher forms of production. But the devastation of war and the necessities of the conquered will be so great that even the boldest Socialist innovator will regard it as a hard task to make a new social life grow on such desperate ruins. And so not only the possessing classes, but also the proletarians everywhere, feel *their existence threatened* and feel compelled to *do everything possible to avoid defeat*.

Therefore a quiet and passionless consideration of the prospects which a victory of one or the other side promises for international progress was never so rare as now.

Under these conditions what obtrudes itself not only on the masses but on many of the leading comrades is the most primitive way of deciding one's attitude to the war, namely, that motive which everywhere has been the first one and has everywhere decided the attitude of the masses in previous wars, the fear of hostile invasion, *the pressing need of keeping the enemy out of the country, whatever may be the cause, the object, or the result of the war. . . .*

Unquestionably there is a great danger for the International in taking sides according to nationalistic standpoints. Of course, the taking sides in war for protection against hostile invasion is altogether compatible with our principles. The decision according to this criterion, however, does not stand so high theoretically as decision *according to the criterion of the proletarian interests of the world*. But in the first place, *the latter criterion is almost completely lacking in the present war*, and then, though it is certainly important for individual theorists and leaders of the party who cannot allow themselves to be swept along by the current, *it has hitherto had*

little historical effect. Certainly it has never decisively influenced the masses. For them the most tangible, the nearest, and the most compelling consideration was the defense of their lives and their livelihoods. It would be a bad case for the internationalism of the modern proletariat if it were incompatible with this defense.

That is by no means the case. It rather sanctions it. But that does not mean that this consideration may not at the same time endanger the International standpoint. It brings proletarians in hostile conflict with proletarians and temporarily forces the social conflicts in one's own country into the background. *In their activities it is difficult to distinguish between international patriotism and nationalist chauvinist patriotism. . . .*

So the present war shows the limits of the power of the International. We deceived ourselves if we expected that it might assure a harmonious attitude of the whole Socialist proletariat of the world during the world war. Such a position was possible only in a few specially simple cases. The world war split the Socialists into various camps, and especially into various national camps. The International is unable to prevent that.

That is to say, it is no effective tool in war. It is essentially an instrument of peace. (Our italics.)

The most important part of this article is the statement that, although neither the independence nor even the territorial "integrity" of the Great Powers is menaced, nevertheless, the working classes feel their *existence* to be threatened, since the "material basis" upon which a nation is founded may be "considerably narrowed" as the result of a defeat in war. For this is the position of Bauer (see Chapter III), namely, that in the existing form of society, under which the world is divided into economically competing nations, not only do the economic interests of the possessing classes conflict, but also the *immediate* economic interests of wage-earners.

But there is an enormous difference between the conclusions of these two authorities from this same premise,

Bauer concludes that the division of the world into competing and hostile economic units, the cause of all nationalism, must be done away with. Kautsky concludes only that this same fact persuades the working people of the various countries to support their governments when they are waging war against one another.

The above articles of October 2d and November 27th, and an interview with Troelstra, gave rise to a controversy as to Kautsky's position as to the stand taken by the German Party on the war. Especial emphasis was placed by the pro-Government and the pro-War majority of the party on his statement of October 2d:

If, in spite of all the efforts of Social Democracy, war occurs, every nation must defend itself as well as it can. From this it follows that the Socialists of every nation have the same right to take part in this defense, and that none of the others have a right to criticise them on this account.

In *Die Neue Zeit*, of February 15th, however, Kautsky himself corrects this impression. He denies the statement that he had completely and wholly justified the conduct of the international proletariat at the outbreak of the war and develops his position as follows:

If I explained a course of action by the circumstances, that is by no means the same as justifying it or saying it was right. Everything in the world must be explained, error as well as truth. A course of action can also arise from motives which are reconcilable with our principles and yet may be mistaken if, for example, this action arises from a false evaluation of the situation or from the impression that it will make. It may arise from right motives but from erroneous information.

For an exhaustive public discussion of the question whether we acted rightly, it appeared to me the time had not arrived, that the material was not sufficient, and that there was no possibility that all points of view and arguments should be allowed sufficient freedom of expression; in a word, the situation of the party did not appear suitable for a polemical discussion [because of the censorship].

Kautsky proceeds to a statement which indicates once more that he does not justify, or altogether justify, the action taken by the party.

It is true that I saw since the 4th of August that a number of members of the party were continuously evolving more and more in the direction of imperialism, but I believed these were only exceptions and took an optimistic view. I did this in order to give the comrades confidence and to work against pessimism. And it was equally important to urge the comrades to tolerance, following the example of Liebknecht in 1870.

It clearly appears from this that Kautsky will not permit himself to be classified with those who were actively supporting the war at the time of this writing, in the middle of February—whatever may have been his position in November.

Shortly after this, Kautsky explained, *for the first time in public*, that he had even *opposed* the voting of the war loan on the fourth of August:

My view, from the very beginning of the war, was not the same as that either of the majority or the minority. I believed that the difficulties of the situation were best avoided or lessened by abstaining from the vote. Since neither the majority nor the minority agreed to this method, I thought we ought to consider making our decision dependent upon the grant by the government of guarantees as to the aims according to which the war was to be conducted.

EDWARD BERNSTEIN

Edward Bernstein is the world's best known Socialist opponent of the orthodox Socialist view, as expressed by Kautsky. Among the German Socialists his influence is largely limited to the right or moderate wing of the party—from which he has now separated on questions connected with the war. His influence in Germany, out-

side the Socialist Party, however, and his influence among Socialists generally, outside of Germany, is very great. In his criticism of the "civil peace" as well as his opposition to a war directed mainly against England, it will be seen that he is in accord with Liebknecht and Kautsky.

Bernstein takes the position of the party declaration of August 4th. His views do not seem to have been affected by the invasion of Belgium on that same day. As remarked in the *Volkszeitung* editorial below (in this chapter), he even defended that action on the ground of military necessity. But when war began with England on the following day, August 5th, and in proportion as the war was directed by the German government mainly against England rather than against Russia, the views of Bernstein—as our quotations show—became more and more oppositional and critical of the war. In *Vorwaerts* of January 2, 1915, he wrote as follows:

He who takes the trouble to look through the resolutions of the Congresses of the German Social Democracy and the International Socialist Congresses with regard to the questions relating to the war, will come upon strong opposition to war in every one of them, but will nowhere find a single sentence which unconditionally rejects every war, no matter of what kind it may be. In these resolutions, motives which to-day lead to armament and to war are pointed out and condemned. Measures are proposed or insisted upon which appear suited to prevent or to shorten wars. But there is not one single resolution which unconditionally forbids all support of every kind of war. And if one seeks information in the literature of Socialism, one will find in the writings and letters of its great theorists places enough where they, on the contrary, speak in favor of certain wars—one could even say, agitate for them.

How is this lack in fundamental principles for judging wars to be judged, what consequences are to be drawn from

it? It would be bad if we have to conclude from this fact that the Social Democracy is lacking in any criterion whatever to guide its decisions in questions relating to war, if this question, like that notorious resolution regarding another matter, is decided "from case to case." In view of previous events, we have found out only too well where this abandonment of the effort to find positive criterions in questions of importance to the Social Democracy, leads.

So the question must be answered whether there are Social Democratic criteria as to war which will give Social Democracy rules upon which to base its attitude or whether this is to be left entirely to more or less arbitrary, emotional, and opportunistic considerations. Many people will be inclined to deny the possibility of any criterion when they recall the sad fate of the apparently simple criterion of offensive and defensive war. For a long time it had been believed that in this had been found a guide which would show the Socialists at the outbreak of any war the right road for them to follow. How right those were who pointed to the difficulties that the appeal to this criterion would meet in practice the present war has taught us. None of the Powers admits having been the aggressor. On both sides it was, and still is, asserted that it is a defensive war. At the time when the decision had to be made the Social Democracy was in fact not in a situation to decide with certainty into which of these two categories, as far as its country was concerned, the war fell.

However, if in the criterion of offensive or defensive war one has at least a formal hold of affairs, even this completely disappears when [we pass to another criterion] and the question is raised as to the guilt or excuse in war. This question is still more difficult to determine at the time when the Social Democracy has to reach its decision, that is, at the beginning of war. As to this question, there are still differences of opinion as to past wars which took place a whole generation ago. This does not mean the question can be passed over as insignificant, and that one can limit oneself to damning all wars of present-day governments without distinction, as outgrowths from the capitalist order of society, or that one can in a similarly indiscriminating way act according to the principle, "My country, right or wrong." A statesman, a government, a party, can no more regard itself as irresponsible, and forthwith put off the responsibility for its acts and fail-

ures to act upon circumstances, than a man can do this in his private life. The feeling of high responsibility must never leave us in such momentous events. Nevertheless we cannot deceive ourselves as to the fact that to-day, at the moment when people have to decide the question of war and peace, the question of guilt or innocence is almost never ripe for discussion.

So those very two criteria forsake us, which, according to the feeling of the ordinary man, are most important in order to reach a decision.

Bernstein's abandonment of the effort to determine which of the Powers had the better excuse for war and which is to blame, will strike many readers as equivalent to an abandonment of all effort to judge the conduct of governments in entering into the war.

In *Die Neue Zeit* of January 7th, however, Bernstein has an article in defense of the French Socialists which very strongly suggests that, *as between France and Germany*, he rather justifies France than his own country. We quote several of the leading paragraphs.

How does it come that the Republic has allowed itself to be drawn into the present war? That, notwithstanding its democratic development, France holds fast to its alliance with the Russian Czarism, and now the French Socialists also hold to this alliance?

The first ground for the support of the present war by the French Socialists of all shades which must be considered is to be sought in the immediate causes that brought it about. With many of us this eventful time has put out of our memory the events which preceded the outbreak of the war, and with most of us these events have completely extinguished all memory of the feelings which then inspired the Social Democracy of all countries. The flaming protests which in the last weeks of the past July were published both in the organs of the Social Democracy of other countries and in those of the German Social Democracy against the politics of Austria and its support by the German Government would strike them as if coming out of a time long gone by. One

of the sharpest of these protests was the appeal published by the Party Executive on the 25th of July in a special edition of *Vorwaerts*, calling the party comrades to mass meetings against the danger of war. (See above, Chapter X.) The German Government was imperiously called upon in this document, in case Austria's conduct should bring about war, under no circumstances to allow itself to be driven into participation in it. The wish of the German Social Democracy that peace should be preserved was, in this document, as in many articles of the party press, expressed in the warmest terms.

It happened otherwise. Under the influence of the events leading up to the war and of the after effects of our vote on the 4th of August, the opinions of that time have vanished out of the minds of the majority of the leading members of the German Social Democracy, together with the atmosphere of that time. One can understand this, even if one judged things otherwise at that time and to-day still judges things otherwise than the majority of our comrades; but one can also understand that people for whom no event has intervened which might change their judgment of that time—and the majority of French Social Radicals and French Socialists are in this situation—still preserve, unchanged or even strengthened, the same feelings the Social Democrats of Germany also felt at that time.

At the present moment I know the *Yellow Book* of the French Government on the war only from extracts telegraphically published. But one does not need it in order to understand the conceptions and the conduct of the Socialists of France. If they hold the view that the French Government did not want the war, they can rely, among other things, upon the testimony of Jean Jaurès, who in Brussels on the 29th of July, at the session of the International Socialist Bureau and also at the great demonstration in the Royal Circus [on the 30th], gave his word that the French Government was working for peace. With emphasis he declared:

“The French Government is the best peace ally of that admirable government of England, which took the initiative towards mediation. And it is influencing Russia by its counsels of wisdom and patience.”

At that time, and also in the last conversation which he—on the 31st of July—held with the representatives of the gov-

ernment, Jaurès urged energetically that France denounce its duty as an ally of Russia if Russia did not enter into the mediation plans or if it declared war. But, as things appeared to the French, Russia did the first thing and did not do the second—entered into all mediation proposals, and finally Russia did not declare war. The war declared by Germany against Russia and France, moreover, came at a moment when Russia represented the cause of a people in danger of being overpowered by a stronger neighbor and when the enemy of France and Russia proposed to another people that it should lend its hand against its own will for an attempt against the former [France]. If one recalls the fact that in those days there was not *one* single country, the workingmen's democracy of which did not take a stronger stand against Germany and Austria than against Russia, then one will understand that it was all the more impossible for the proletarian democracy of France to turn its back on Russia. If it did not want altogether to renounce the defense of its own country it was forced to allow the fact of the alliance with Russia to pass as a temporary necessity.

But that the Republic had not previously given up the alliance of its own accord is the result of the circumstance that democratic and capitalistic interests have long worked together to justify this alliance in the eyes of the French.

The capitalistic interests concerned are obvious. Against a Germany always becoming stronger, France could assure its power in Europe only by an alliance with another Great Power. And it was Russia that offered itself for this purpose, since, as early as 1870 and 1871, it had already raised its voice against a too great weakening of France, and in 1875 had given its powerful veto when Bismarck made a move to prevent France from rebuilding its defensive power by the threat of a new war. The attempt made by Bismarck and his followers to divert France from the idea of reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine to a preoccupation with colonial forces could take root at the best only with a part of the bourgeoisie. Among the great masses of the people it was doomed to failure, because in their eyes the idea of the *Revanche* included a thought of democratic justice, because the reconquest of those provinces for a long time meant for them the emancipation of their oppressed fellow-citizens. As long as Alsace-Lorraine remained under dictatorship, it remained to

the French as oppressed just as Schleswig-Holstein once was for the Germans, and therefore it was very difficult to separate the demagogic chauvinism of professional politicians from the democratic thought of the restoration of a just condition in a part of the country which was under a dictatorship. The line,

“Vous rendez nous l’Alsace et la Lorraine,”

was based therefore on the same idea of justice as our [poem] of a former time:

“Schleswig-Holstein, meerumschlungen,
Deutscher Sitten hohe Wacht,
Wahre treu, was schwer errungen,
Bis ein schön’rer Morgen tagt.”

PHILIP SCHEIDEMANN, SOCIALIST VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE
REICHSTAG IN 1912

It is the right or moderate wing of the party that is most extreme in its support of the war and of the government at the present time. Bernstein, as we have pointed out, is an exception. But all the other well-known revisionists are strongly for the war: Frank, who volunteered and was killed; Suedekum, Richard Fischer, Kolb, David, Heine, and all the leading labor unionists, Legien, Hue, Robert Schmidt, etc. But with the revisionists are also to be found a number of leaders who were formerly of the middle group, then represented by Bebel and Kautsky. The best known of these is Scheidemann, who was given the nomination for Vice-President of the Reichstag that would have fallen to Bebel, and therefore may be considered as a possible successor to Bebel in party leadership.

On August 21st Scheidemann wrote a long letter to the New York *Volkszeitung*, which was published on September 10th.

He says that *nobody* wanted the war in Germany, and underlines the word “nobody.”

He puts the chief blame for the present war upon Russia,

and takes the Russian mobilization as a sufficient cause for the war:

"The chief guilt for the present war rests upon Russia. At the very time when the Czar was exchanging dispatches with the German Kaiser, apparently working for peace, he allowed the mobilization to go on secretly, not only against Austria, but also against Germany.

"When France, republican France, has allied with the Russian absolutism for the purpose of murder and destruction, it is a difficult fact to conceive that England, parliamentary England, democratic England, is fighting side by side for 'freedom and culture.' That is truly a gigantic, shameless piece of hypocrisy."

The sole motive of England is "envy of the economic development" of Germany. He continues:

"We in Germany have the duty to protect ourselves. We have the task of protecting the country of the most developed Social Democracy against servitude to Russia. . . . Russia, France, Belgium, England, Serbia, Montenegro, and Japan in the struggle for freedom and culture against Germanism, which has given to the world Goethe, Kant, and Karl Marx! This would be a joke if the situation were not so desperately serious.

"We Social Democrats have not ceased to be Germans because we have joined the Socialist International!

"And if we granted the war credits unanimously in the Reichstag we only did what was often announced we would do by our best tribunes in the Reichstag. Bebel said: 'The working classes are at least as much interested in maintaining the independence of Germany as those regarding themselves as the appointed leaders and rulers of the people, and the working people is not disposed to bend its neck under any foreign rule. If it should ever be a question of protecting its skin, the working class of Germany will be ready to offer their last man.'"

Scheidemann defends the invasion of Belgium and approves the German Chancellor's defense of this action, namely, that it was "necessary."

Scheidemann, in the closing part of his letter, expresses the hope that Germany will conquer France at the earliest possible moment and force peace on that country. He makes the claim

that Germany in the early part of the war had everywhere been victorious, that all contrary statements were lies, that German victory was absolutely certain, and quotes Bebel's statement to the government in the Reichstag in 1904: "Gentlemen, you cannot carry on any victorious wars henceforth without our aid."

This is practically the position of most of the "revisionists." It will be seen closely to resemble the defenses of the position of the German Government in the present war written by non-Socialists, or anti-Socialists.

Scheidemann did not moderate his views with the progress of the war, as may be seen from an article in the *Hamburg Echo* published in January. After reviewing the attitude toward the war of the various European Parties, the former Vice-President of the Reichstag concludes as follows:

Now we know why the French Socialists have said nothing in the Chamber of Deputies; they did not want to destroy the unity of the nation; they wanted to offer themselves for the service of their government; they wish to struggle to the end that Alsace and Lorraine should come back to France; they wish to fight out this "frightful war" until Europe is ruled—not by a deceptive armed peace, but by the freed peoples of Europe—which means, according to the present conditions, struggle until the enemy is annihilated.

We must not indulge in any illusions; under present conditions the annihilation of German militarism means nothing less than the annihilation of the German army. A fight without mercy; that is to say, the annihilation of our brothers in uniform. In order that this goal shall be reached, Vaillant calls for the help of Japan, while Guesde, like the Englishman, Hyndman, calls upon Italy to give up its neutrality.

A telegram of the 17th of January from Lyons tells us that a conference of the Socialist members of the Chamber of Deputies was held on January 15th. The conference was attended by the French Ministers, Comrades Sembat and Guesde, as well as Comrade Vandervelde.

Vandervelde is reported to have declared that the French and British Socialists were in favor of holding a conference

of the Socialists of the allied countries, but advocated the continuation of the war until the Allies are completely victorious. [This resolution was passed by the Conference called at London a few weeks later—see below.] The German Social Democrat can take note of all this only with great pain, but in these terrible times facts alone must be considered. And so, unfortunately, we must say still more to our German comrades, who have hitherto learned little or nothing of all this: All the steps which have been taken by the comrades of neutral countries, on their own initiative, to move the International Bureau, or to organize international conferences and congresses, have been suspected as manipulations of the German Social Democracy, who are said to be acting "under an understanding with the German Government."

The talk about the absolute necessity of the coercion or destruction of the German barbarians is supported by the reports in the foreign press of the frightful conditions prevailing in Germany. These illusions on the other side of the border might have as a result a material prolongation of the war, and many of our brothers, sons, and comrades, who are now in the fighting, would be forced to give up their lives on this account, but nobody among us desires that, so there is one way and one way alone left open to us: "We must hold out."

This phrase goes against the grain of many people and by many is misinterpreted. "To hold out" with us does not mean the same thing as we hear from hostile countries: "Struggle until the enemy is destroyed." What we mean by it is: to hold out until the goal of the safety of the Fatherland has been reached and our enemies are ready for peace.

In none of the statements of non-German Socialists quoted by Scheidemann is there a direct or remote suggestion that Germany is to be annihilated in order to accomplish their aims. Apparently Scheidemann draws this conclusion from the fact that the French have decided to emancipate Alsace and Lorraine and to allow those provinces to determine their own form of government and the nation to which they are to belong, if to any. If this appeals to Scheidemann as an annihilation

of Germany, that in itself is a highly significant commentary on his own attitude.

VON VOLLMAR

Von Vollmar is not only the best known political leader of the Socialists of South Germany, but he is also the political leader of the revisionists—Bernstein being their leading thinker. In a January number of the Copenhagen newspaper, *National Tidende*, he thus briefly describes his conception of the attitude of the German Socialists as to the war:

The goal which is aimed at by the political and economic representatives of the working classes and of the Socialist Democracy is well known, also the great struggles they have carried on for many years against their governments and warring classes. But now, when Germany is threatened from without, these inner struggles must go into the background and be postponed until a more favorable time. At the present time the whole German people is prompted by a single unconquerable will, namely, to protect the Fatherland, its independence, and its cultural organization against the enemies that surround it, and not to rest until the latter are conquered. There is not one German who is not ready to make any kind of a sacrifice that is asked of him to reach this goal. If people in other countries have any doubt about this they will experience a great disillusionment.

Von Vollmar, it will be recalled, was formerly an army officer, and perhaps speaks in a somewhat more militaristic manner than would some of his revisionist associates or followers.

His statement, however, that Germany's independence and cultural organization are at stake is evidently deliberate, and this belief is widely shared by the other revisionists, as our other quotations show.

INTERVIEW WITH HAASE, CHAIRMAN OF THE SOCIALIST
GROUP IN THE REICHSTAG

(By TROELSTRA, of Holland, in November, Published in
Vorwaerts)

Haase was indicated by Bebel as his choice for his successor as Chairman of the Socialist Group in the Reichstag. In this capacity, he read the two declarations of the Reichstag Socialists on August 4th and December 2d. His personal opinions may differ from these declarations, however. They are indicated by his expressions in an interview with Troelstra, the leader of the Dutch Socialists:

The discussion turned to the attitude of the German Party with respect to Belgium. I was assured that our party in the committee of the Reichstag had always insisted on respecting the neutrality of the smaller countries. How now did it come about that it did not protest against the violation of Belgian neutrality on August 4th? I asked this question of the Chairman of the Reichstag group, our Comrade Haase, and his answer was as follows: "The declaration of our party had been previously decided upon by our group, and given to the President of the Reichstag before the group knew of the violation of Belgian neutrality. The group, every time it has been given the opportunity, has always declared decidedly for the observation of treaties of neutrality."

Troelstra continues as follows:

"In looking through the German papers it has occurred to me that it was only after the 4th of August that the ultimatum to Belgium and the following events were related in the press."

Bethmann-Hollweg's confession of the violation of Belgium, however, was noted in these same papers, and concerning this Troelstra says:

"Information of the Chancellor that Belgium was probably already invaded was tied up with the declaration that any wrong that had been done would be made right."

Socialists do not usually accept governmental promises, but according to Troelstra, they were justified in accepting the governmental excuse and promise at this time.

Troelstra also asked Haase what the Social Democracy would think of a possible annexation of all Belgium. His answer was:

"The German Social Democracy is the enemy of all annexation, both on Democratic grounds, and in the interest of Germany itself. In its declaration of August 4th, the Reichstag group took this standpoint, and since that time the party press has also frequently repeated it."

Another question asked by Troelstra of Haase was whether Germany would favor a non-partisan investigation of the cruelties in Belgium. Haase's answer was as follows:

"Each of the warring Powers accused the other party of conducting the war in an inhuman way and of violating the laws of war. I regard it as necessary, after the end of the war, to have an expert investigation by a non-partisan tribunal, for the discovery of the facts in the interests of historic truth; so that those may be declared innocent who are wrongly accused, and so that the guilty may be discovered."

One important point in the Haase interview is the plea that the Socialists, in granting the war loan of August 4th, did not know in time of the invasion of Belgium. This defense does not apply, however, to the subsequent voting of the second war loan on December 2d. We must conclude either that Haase did not personally approve of this second action, or that he later changed the opinion he expressed to Troelstra.

It is significant that neither Troelstra nor Haase says anything about a possible indemnity to Belgium.

THE "CIVIL PEACE"

One of the policies insisted upon by the military authorities in Germany is that of "civil peace." *Vorwaerts* was allowed to continue its publication after having been suspended on September 30th, only on a change of management, and the assurance that the class struggle would not be mentioned. The supposition was that all class attacks were to cease, though *Vorwaerts*

still constantly complained that, while such attacks were made by the ruling classes and by the employers, the Socialists were forced to be very mild in their criticisms both of employers and of the government, and to remain always on the defensive. The discussion of this enforced "civil peace" now took the first place in German Socialist newspapers and periodicals. In *Die Neue Zeit*, the historian of the party, Franz Mehring, discussed the question from the historical standpoint, and used his influence and that of *Die Neue Zeit* for a bitter criticism of the party majority which voted the war credits. Mehring's principal points were as follows:

The shattering fact that the International has broken down and that the behavior of the German Social Democracy is judged unfavorably by its sister parties, even in the neutral states, is in part explained by the fact that the German Party authorities, and especially the German Party press, has adapted itself to the so-called "civil peace," abandoned the definite expression to party principles during the war. They have done this under the iron pressure of military dictatorship, but they have done it just the same, and by this action they have created the impression among foreign comrades that the German Social Democracy has given itself over body and soul to imperialism.

This appearance is deceitful, as we know. Still a deceitful appearance may do great harm. Even if the "civil peace" is only an interim, this interim will leave its shell behind it. When the party gives in to it, it offers a sacrifice that is only justified by the most pressing and the highest interests of the nation. The ruins of the International warn us, and one does not need to be a prophet to foresee that the party may be brought to the most fateful decisions by the question of the "civil peace."

The central and fundamental nature of the subject, "Civil Peace," may not at first strike the reader. To discuss it is really but another way of discussing the war. Socialism means a kind of civil war, the class

struggle, which is the very opposite of civil peace. Moreover, Socialists have always declared that this civil struggle is international, that the interests of the workers of all nations are opposed to the interests of the capitalists of all nations, that the chief evil in wars between nations is that they serve to divide workers against themselves and force them to unite with their real enemies, the capitalists. All Socialists agree that the class struggle is held more or less in abeyance by the sheer fact of war. The question is: How far shall Socialists allow this "civil peace" to go? If it goes far enough it may postpone the class struggle, that is the struggle for Socialism, indefinitely. The question then is: How far shall Socialism, during the war, abdicate altogether in favor of nationalism, or the struggle of the nations?

On this question Bernstein agrees with Mehring. We take the following from his highly sensational attack on the ultra-patriotic Socialist organ, the Chemnitz *Volksstimme*:*

The Chemnitz *Volksstimme* [a party paper] opened a discussion on what should be the attitude of the Social Democratic press during the present war. This is certainly a very important question. No party has been put to a greater task through the war than the Social Democracy.

We cannot permit the world, and especially our own people, to have for a moment the idea and the belief that we entered the war with such slight baggage of principles and general viewpoints as that of our bourgeois parties. It is a very superficial and in addition a very deceiving conception of "love for the country" to think that during the time of war the party principles have to be in the background. For us Social Democrats just the opposite is the case.

The stronger we adhere to the principles which we represented before the war, the more decidedly we are guided by them and arrange our behavior towards the events in accord-

* See the Leipzig *Volkszeitung* of November 3d.

ance with them, the more useful should we be to the German nation, the better should we protect and guard its highest interests, which we certainly consider, and must consider, from quite different standpoints than those of all other parties. To my sorrow I must state that the Chemnitz *Volksstimme*, in its article, as also in the modus of its editorship generally for quite a time, represents and defends a far different policy. What this party paper recommends leads in its consequences just to the opposite.

The Chemnitz *Volksstimme* writes:

"The affair of our brothers in the field of war is our affair. We must not write one line even which makes their hard and bloody work harder or longer. We must deliver to them the press and the organization undamaged and as strong as possible. When they return from the battlefields they will have again to fight for bread and freedom in civil clothes. In order that we should be able to live in safety, they sacrifice themselves. The one who does not scrutinize each article and each line he writes so that he can stand before our comrades on the fields of battle, does not understand his duty during the war. From this leading principle our acceptance of the 'civil peace' directly follows. Internal strife is the hope of our enemies. We irrevocably support that which Scheidemann wrote to America: 'In the present war the whole German nation is a unit.' The party has no right to deviate from this general policy of the party as a whole."

The Chemnitz *Volksstimme* quotes the words of Scheidemann: "In this war the whole German nation is united," and adds: "The party press has no right to deviate from this general policy of the party." I do not know in what sense Comrade Scheidemann used his statements, but the interpretation given by the Chemnitz *Volksstimme* must be absolutely rejected.

So far the party in its totality has not had the opportunity to express itself on the causes, conduct, and aims of the war. A faction of the party only has done it. But the Socialist group in the Reichstag, in granting the military budget, explained its motives and expressed in the same way as I have, what unites us in this war with the bourgeois parties and what separates us from them. He who really wishes to create a clear understanding of the situation in the minds of the masses should never emphasize the one without the other.

And where it is made impossible for him to do this [by the censorship], he should at least designate his views by different expressions than those used by the other parties.

It is the duty of our press to combat those who consciously or unconsciously are working in the direction of prolonging the duration of this war by popularizing and propagating impossible demands as conditions of peace. (Our italics.)

THE WAR MAINLY AGAINST RUSSIA OR ENGLAND?

The above article of Bernstein marked his definite separation from the labor unionists and the rest of the revisionists. But this separation was more clearly emphasized in the discussion that arose in November around another question, now become the chief war issue that divides German opinion. The pro-war enthusiasm of the masses was aroused by the governmental statement that it was primarily a war against the Russian Czarism, which was the aggressor, and trying to extend its despotic sway over territory now in possession of Germany. On August 4th, the Reichstag Socialists asserted they were supporting the war because it was against Russia. Later nearly all the German newspapers, with the exception of most of the Socialist publications, took the ground that England was the chief and the worst enemy. A strong difference of opinion arose among Socialists, which culminated in Bernstein's question whether, if it was, indeed, a war directed mainly against England, the Socialists still owed it their support. We shall begin the discussion of this question with the position of *Vorwaerts*.

Vorwaerts first quotes an interview with Witting, a former governor of Posen, from which the following are the most interesting sentences:

It is a war of life and death between England and Germany, and if necessary a war to the last man. We ask no forgiveness from England and will give none. . . . For France, we feel only sympathy and regret. The hatred against

Russia is growing less, whereas hatred and contempt for England are more and more strongly expressed by high and low. Warn America not to be deceived by any peace group. We are prepared for three years, and at the conclusion it will be a war only between Germany and England. The English have firmly decided to destroy our fatherland. We have accepted the challenge and no German Government would be tolerated for a moment which would consent to a peace dictated by England.

Vorwaerts observes that this feeling is widely spread among influential circles in Germany, and continues as follows:

We would only like to remark that this programme differs somewhat from the programme with which the war was *opened* and the statement of Herr Witting that the *hatred against Russia is growing less* appears to us very worthy of notice. We also know that Herr Witting—and not he alone—is using all his strength to win the ruling circles for his programme. (The italics are those of *Vorwaerts*.)

A month later, December 15th, *Vorwaerts* quoted the following passage from an article in the *Berliner Tageblatt* against a separate peace with Russia. The *Tageblatt* had said: "There is another consideration which is very clearly understood by those in whose hands the policy of Germany lies. The German people was called to war because Russia threatened Germany. Other goals cannot be added to this first goal and this first goal cannot be changed or eliminated."

Upon this, *Vorwaerts* made the following comment:

We also share the view that a separate peace with Russia would necessarily have most fateful results for our future development, and such bad effects would not only occur in the field of foreign politics, but also in the field of domestic politics [a possible hint at revolution, necessarily indirect to avoid the censor], but we think that the *Berliner Tageblatt* underestimates the danger that comes from adding other goals to the first goal of the war. It cannot be denied that the crushing of England is to-day the first goal in very wide-

spread and most influential circles, and from this standpoint it can be understood why the wish for a separate peace with Russia has arisen.

Up to our date of publication, *Vorwaerts* was continuing as vigorously as ever to fight against this anti-English tendency. On February 21st, it said:

At the beginning of the war the watchword, "War against the Czarism," drowned out all conscientious investigations of the causes and instigators of this struggle of the nations. With undeniable suddenness a change took place, and the press of all parties put the guilt upon England. We shall be able to discuss the causes of this change of front after the war. [A reference to the censorship.]

Vorwaerts then proceeds to advocate, instead of a treaty with Russia, a treaty with England:

Fortunately the possibility of later alliances depends not upon artificially fabricated antipathies, but upon the real needs of the people. Because of the close economic relations of the two peoples in times of peace, an alliance between England and Germany is certainly to the interest of important classes of the population in both countries.

Before the war this statement would have been a mere commonplace. Issued in the face of the present wave of Anglophobia, it has the highest significance.

The position of the right-wing papers was very different. *Die Sozialistische Monatshefte* published an article by Hugo Pretzsche which contained a review of the position of the entire Socialist Party press and drew the conclusion from this review that the press considered England to be "the most dangerous enemy." The same paper also contained an article by Walter Oehme on The English Danger. Concerning this article, the *Tägliche Rundschau*, a governmental paper, declared:

"No pan-German nor nationalistic imperialist would speak otherwise on the meaning and the goal of this war."

The Leipzig *Volkszeitung*, however, pointed out that the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* is not an organ of the Social Democratic Party, that Walter Oehme has only belonged to the party a few months, and that the article by Pretzsche contains at least one serious and unaccountable error, namely, in stating the position of the Leipzig *Volkszeitung*.

There next followed an article in the Leipzig *Volkszeitung*, in which Bernstein boldly suggested that *perhaps the Socialists should not vote for the second war loan on December 2d, in view of the changed character of the war*. This article was immediately answered by the revisionist leaders, David and Heine. David wrote (in the Mainz *Volkszeitung*) :

In the early days of August, when our assent to the war loan was decided upon, England had not yet gone to war against us, and we still hoped that it would preserve a neutral attitude. Unfortunately England forthwith joined our convinced enemies; it believed that its national independence and civilization were threatened, and declared war on Germany. That is a new factor which caused a complete readjustment which Bernstein and the rest of us deeply regret. So it happened that we could not throw the masses of the army against the Russians in time, in order to be able to smash the Czarist colossus while keeping up a victorious defensive. Just as it is a matter of course for us Social Democrats to regard a cowardly separate peace with Russia as a great political calamity, so it is just as much a matter of course that we should show our teeth to the English war power, with its white and parti-colored allies. If we see ourselves once more in the necessity of granting a new war loan, we owe that in the first instance to the conduct of English politics, so that Bernstein's question is to be answered affirmatively. Yes, it is the same war, and our conduct in it will remain the same.

Heine, another Socialist member of the Reichstag, wrote as follows:

Whether we wish it or not, we must fight in the west, and can it be said that no dangers threaten us there? England has pronounced a twenty years' war against Germany, and English labor leaders have adopted this goal of a war of annihilation. French and Belgian Socialists are adopting the same view.

The Western Powers have brought the Hindoos and Negroes to the European field of war. Does Bernstein regard an invasion of these hordes into the thickly-populated, blooming Rhine country as less damaging than the overflowing of the forest country of East Prussia by the Russians—I should have thought that the loss in blood and property would be a hundred times greater in west Germany than on the eastern frontier. . . .

And what should our soldiers in France and Belgium say to this, they who have to fight a war of unexampled heroism and sacrifice? To-day, too, we are responsible for the welfare of these courageous men. Shall we leave them in the ditch because the way they are being employed does not correspond to the strategic idea of Bernstein? Shall we forcibly alienate them from the party?

What is one to think of a policy which, according to the changed conditions of war on one or the other side, is forced to change its position as to the defense of the Fatherland? We have not willed this war either against Russia or against the western countries, but the war took place and threatened the economic, cultural, and political existence of our country. We were therefore compelled to do our best for the protection of these values. The war is still in existence and we must continue to act in the same way. We must fight it through, not with the purpose of triumph or of the subjection of other peoples, but for the sake of our existence and that of our children. This is what the fight is about to-day, as it was on the first day of the war.

The *Grundstein*, the organ of the Building Trades Union, declared it as "nothing less than scandalous" that there is a little group in Germany which holds against the party as a whole and falls on the backs of brother workingmen who are on the field of battle.

To the attacks of David, Heine, and the *Grundstein*, Bernstein (writing on November 28th) replied:

The extracts of my article made by my friends and colleagues of the Reichstag group, David and Heine, might easily arouse among readers not familiar with my article false impressions as to its tendency. With me the question was whether, and how far, the political parties are forced to change during the war their fundamental views with regard to questions related to it. In this matter I held the view that in our country it is to the highest degree important that the Social Democracy should not allow those of its principles which are involved in this connection to become silenced during the war. In this connection my article, which is under attack, said:

"The consciousness that we must be ready to make every sacrifice of possessions and of blood that is necessary for the protection and independence of our country cannot serve as a reason for putting in the background even temporarily our deeply-rooted conception of the unity of peoples, our better knowledge of what makes peoples great, our distinction between treaties and power as the basis of relations between peoples."

The close connection between politics and military conduct of war, I continued, must force the Social Democracy to insist that the military conduct of the war must be subordinated throughout to politics and not be put in a position, on the contrary, to govern politics. I illustrated this by the question discussed in various circles, whether the war against the east or the war against the west should be the controlling motive in the German conduct of the war, and connected this with the declaration of Bank Director Witting in the *New York Sun* that the hate against the Russians was growing less and that the life and death struggle against England was now the controlling factor. To this I remarked:

"If pan-Slavism as a determining factor of governmental policy is a real danger for Germany, then the raising of the above-mentioned principle [that of Witting] to the position of the leading principle of the present war would greatly increase this danger [that of pan-Slavism]. The question may be asked whether pan-Slavism has not already gained more than it has lost with the war. For it cannot be questioned that up to the present it has been much less damaged than the two western powers of Europe."

At this point it may be casually remarked: before the Hindoos and Negroes reach the Rhine country there is a long

road. And in the meanwhile the Cossacks have made themselves at home in a large part of Galicia and in front of Cracow, hold a large part of the passes of the Carpathians, and once more threaten Czernowitz.

A development in this direction, my article continued, would give the war a new character, and if the Social Democracy does not care to lower itself to become the mere statistician of history, it must decide what stand it will take as to such a changed war.

How little the danger here indicated is or how great, naturally depends upon how we judge symptoms. However, he who sees the danger has a duty and a right to point it out as strongly as possible, and to determine his political behavior accordingly.

The Reichstag Socialists did not act on Bernstein's suggestion—which, after all, was probably rather a warning to the government, than a definite proposal to withdraw Socialist support by abstaining from voting for the second war loan. They voted the loan, with the exception of Karl Liebknecht, who remained seated, and of fourteen other Socialists who, we are informed by *Het Volk*, quietly absented themselves. The second declaration of the party, however, while reaffirming that of August 4th, moved considerably in the radical or anti-war direction, indicating the strong influence, if not the control over the Reichstag Socialist Group of Kautsky, Bernstein, and the center faction of the party.

THE POSITION OF "VORWAERTS," OFFICIAL DAILY ORGAN OF
THE SOCIALIST PARTY

Vorwaerts has maintained, since the outbreak of the war, the same radical standpoint it occupied before (see Part III). It has altered in no way its opposition to the government or to the war, except where it has been forced to avoid certain topics by the military censorship. A certain field, however, has been left free by

the censor, and *Vorwaerts* has apparently taken every possible advantage of its opportunities. Moreover, it has touched directly or indirectly on the prohibited subjects, and frequently during August and September practically defied the censor.

The question will be asked, how representative is *Vorwaerts* of the Socialist Party? None of the Party organs represent the Party accurately. The Reichstag Group must pay more or less attention to the wishes of the three million voters—not members of the Party—who voted for them on the first ballot and the million or more non-Socialists who voted for them on the second ballot—as well as giving heed to the million voters who are party members. The Party Executive is elected by an annual Congress of delegates from unequally apportioned districts, the voters in the industrial centers having less weight than those of the smaller districts.

With the *Vorwaerts* the latter situation is reversed. The majority of its readers are in Greater Berlin and most of the others are in industrial districts of central Germany. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that *Vorwaerts* has said no word in defense of the votes of the Socialist Reichstag Group in favor of the war loans, and that it disagrees radically also with the Executive Committee (which occupies an intermediate ground between the position of *Vorwaerts* and that of the Reichstag majority). Which more nearly represents the majority of Socialist Party members cannot be said. We may be certain, however, that *Vorwaerts* represents the majority of the Socialists of Greater Berlin, (as one of our documents shows). We can also be reasonably certain, on the other hand, that the Socialist Group in the Reichstag represents the majority of the four-and-a-quarter-million Socialist voters (including both party members and non-party members).

Vorwaerts gives us, from another large German city, a more definite indication of the division within the Party. A meeting of delegates of the Socialists of Stuttgart elected in December adopted, by a vote of 90 to 2, a resolution of sympathy with the position of Liebknecht; 42 delegates, who had retired to hold a separate meeting, passed a resolution indorsing the position of the majority of the Reichstag Socialists. The position of the party papers in Leipzig and Bremen indicates the predominance of anti-war sentiments in these cities also. On the other hand, the Socialists of several large cities, such as Munich, Breslau, and Hanover, have always taken a stand against the radicals.

Vorwaerts has touched upon nearly every phase of the war in its relation to Socialism, with the exception of the action of the Reichstag Socialists, which it has left severely alone. Nearly every number contains some item of importance. We are able to give brief selections from less than twenty numbers, but we believe they convey a fair idea of the *Vorwaerts* policy.

The New York *Call* notes two significant silences of *Vorwaerts*—silences that could be interpreted in only one way:

(1) The *Vorwaerts* did not even have a line of comment on the matter of the Socialists voting the war budgets. Had the comrades of the *Vorwaerts* felt that it was a right step on the part of the Socialist parliamentary group they would have defended their action. Of course the censor would not have prohibited the publication of an article in favor of the Socialist parliamentary group. . . .

(2) When Germany entered Belgium *Vorwaerts* was unable to say more than this:

“Now when the war god reigns supreme not only over Time, but also over the press, we cannot say about the invasion of Belgium what we would like to express about it. . . .” But the Social-Democracy undoubtedly understood.

When it became a well-established fact that Italy had decided to break with the Triple Alliance, every "patriotic" German cried out against Germany's former ally. But not the *Vorwaerts*. Instead of condemning Italy, it spoke enthusiastically in favor of its maintaining the position of neutrality. Regarding Italian neutrality, the *Vorwaerts* spoke out openly:

"Unfortunately, we also hear workers condemning the position of Italy—workers who have for years been considered as enlightened, and to whom the menace of imperialism has been preached for years. We must confess the preaching evidently was not very effective. . . ."

Vorwaerts, on August 25th, ably avoiding every possible deadlock with the military authorities, yet succeeded in suggesting that the supposed justification of the war, that it was a defense against Russia, had fallen away, and that it had become a war of aggression:

"When the war broke out, the word went round: 'War against Czarism!' That was the cry that made the war seem inevitable even to those who were against it. . . . To military experts it appeared an unavoidable necessity that France must be first overcome, in order to advance with Austria against Russia. And to this necessity even those who mourn the frightful fate which drives two civilized peoples into this murderous struggle must resign themselves. . . . From the *military* point of view the first necessity is to overcome France. On the other hand, *politically*, the most urgent necessity is the overthrow and destruction of 'Czarism.' . . . The victory over the allies of Russia is necessary because they are the allies of 'Czarism.' But it is necessary only so far as to prevent their delaying the overthrow of 'Czarism.' . . . We must therefore not adopt a policy which will perpetuate the fatal enmity with the western powers by annexations and interference with the unity and independence of other nations, thus making Russia, even after her defeat, the arbiter of Europe.

"If we should not succeed in overcoming 'Czarism,' if the strategic necessity should push the political necessity into the background, then, whatever the intentions of the rulers, the final result might lead to a return of the 'Holy Alliance' in

which 'Czarism' would once more hold the dominating influence, instead of to a union of the civilized nations. . . . Then this war would *lose its justification*. . . . [The Holy Alliance, it will be recalled, consisted of Russia, Germany, and Austria.]

"No, this war must not be directed to the conquest and building up of a new world-power in place of the English and Russian powers, but towards the liberation of the nations. Liberation from Muscovitism, freedom and independence for Poland and Finland, free development for the great Russian people itself, the severance of the unnatural alliance of two civilized nations with Czarist barbarism—that was the goal which raised the enthusiasm of the German people and made them ready for sacrifices."

When the Socialist leaders, Guesde and Sembat,—with the unanimous approval of their party,—became members of the French Cabinet, *Vorwaerts* said that this proved that the French proletariat regarded it as a people's war and that Germany would only be able to conquer against the whole proletariat of France.

The principal points of this editorial, which appeared on the 28th of August, were as follows:

Guesde and Sembat not only did rightly to enter the Cabinet, but are the finest types of Socialists. Guesde is described as "the old fighting companion of Marx and Engels, the founder and organizer of Marxian tendency in France, the most uncompromising partisan of the idea of class struggle, the sworn enemy of every kind of opportunism." As to Sembat, *Vorwaerts* cites his speech of the 2d of August, in which he defined the present war waged by France as one which aimed neither at conquests nor at the destruction of German culture. This led *Vorwaerts* to remark:

"The French nation is defending its existence, its unity, and its independence.

"Our comrades did not refuse the grave responsibility of this momentous hour. They felt that the independence and security of the nation are the first conditions of its political and social emancipation, and they did not think it was pos-

sible for them to refuse their aid to that country in its struggle for life.

"The war commenced with the motto, 'For liberty and national independence.' If we ever have the happiness to make peace with France the liberty and independence of Poland and Finland will not be forgotten."

Stadthagen, as manager of *Vorwaerts*, received the following announcement on the 31st of August:

The Ministry of War informs you that No. 3 of the War Ministry's orders, dated January 24, 1914, which forbids the possession and spreading of revolutionary or Social Democratic writings as well as the introduction of such writings into the barracks or other departments of the service, is repealed, so far as Social Democratic writings which appear after the 31st of August, 1914, are concerned. The War Ministry at the same time makes the remark that the repeal takes place in the expectation that no articles will be published which might injure the harmonious spirit of the army. If this expectation should not be fulfilled every departmental general is given permission to put the prohibition into force again.

The above is the exact wording of the German governmental order favoring the Socialist publications. It led *Vorwaerts* to publish the following notice to its readers:

Vorwaerts may be sent to those in the field by their family as a letter. Letters to the field up to 50 gms. weight [*Vorwaerts* numbers up to 12 pages] are carried free. Those in the field can also subscribe to *Vorwaerts* through the field post office. The field subscribers obtain the numbers daily directly through the post in envelopes.

It was after this order that *Vorwaerts* was twice suspended, and it was not until a month later, when the

radical Stadthagen was replaced by the conservative Fischer, that *Vorwaerts* ceased to take full advantage of this extraordinary opportunity for anti-governmental propaganda in the army.

The following quotations from September editorials, therefore, have a special importance:

The Chancellor has made bitter charges against England in his statement to the Ritzau Bureau in Copenhagen, which the *Vorwaerts* published yesterday. "Mr. Asquith wishes to create the impression that England's war against Germany is a war of freedom against force. . . ." The Chancellor proceeds to cast recriminations upon the ruling class of England and upon the government, accusing them of oppressing foreign peoples in the name of freedom, of robbing them of their independence, of spreading servitude, and of destroying national self-dependence.

But he adds to these recriminations a promise that will bind Germany irrevocably in the eyes of the international public:

"England, in unity with Russia and Japan against Germany, has betrayed the world's civilization and has turned over the task of protecting the freedom of the European peoples and nations to the German sword."

If this be the programme of the German Government, if it will strive to carry it out honestly and earnestly, we may receive it with frank appreciation. A misunderstanding of the meaning [of this passage] after what precedes it, after the reproaches against England, is hardly possible. The words but emphasize the well-known sentence: "We shall not wage a war of conquest." But they go further. They suggest, what has always been the only aim of the Social Democracy, what *might* give to this war *something like* a justification before civilization: the assurance that this mighty conflict will bring to those nations who are suffering in slavery under other, mightier nations, liberation from the yoke of servitude to foreigners. [*Vorwaerts* purposely phrases this expression so as to include Alsace-Lorraine and German Poland.]

On September 21st the publication of *Vorwaerts* was suspended for three days. The explanation given was

the forbidden publication of a soldier's letter. But expressions like those we have placed in italics in the last quotation, had caused bitter criticism not only among non-Socialist militarists and nationalists, but also among the extreme right wing of the Socialists, represented by the Chemnitz *Volksstimme* and the trade unions, as our later documents indicate. Stadthagen, manager of the paper, even accused the unions of having denounced *Vorwaerts* to governmental officials during this period, and of having brought about its second suspension, an accusation investigated and declared groundless by the party authorities, but showing the hostile relation between the two Party groups.

From September 24th to 29th, *Vorwaerts*, in spite of its first suspension, continued this work of radical agitation in the country and in the army,—as the two following editorials, the latter of which led to the *second* suspension, amply demonstrate. We have placed important passages in italics:

We all agree that it is the duty of a labor party of any country to protect the democratic rights and independence of the nation, if need be, by force of arms against a foreign enemy.

Both these demands are self-understood. It is clear that the Social Democracy, above all others, having won and defended the democratic rights of the land in which it is working in long years in a hard struggle against the ruling classes, with the greatest sacrifices, will not look quietly on when these rights are threatened, directly or indirectly, by a foreign foe. National independence and liberty, moreover, are a necessity in the struggle for freedom of the proletariat, and must, therefore, be defended at all costs. For not only do the poor suffer much more under national oppression than the rich, who can easily afford to teach their children the language of the ruling nation, who can use hired interpreters and lawyers in their dealings with courts and governmental authorities. National oppression also adulterates the class struggle, makes

it more difficult to understand the social structure of society, the social and industrial antagonisms within each nation, and so prepares the ground for nationalistic demagogues.

To be sure, party comrades in different countries will look at the question from very different angles. The German Social Democrats saw the terrible events that broke in upon us in an entirely different light from the French, the English, the Russians, the Servians. They and their Austrian friends saw an attack of the Russian autocracy upon the independence and the comparatively democratic institutions and rights of the German people. The Social Democrats of *the rest of the world* saw above all the advance of the German troops into neutral Belgium, into republican France.

All the expressions we have placed in italics are significant. Labor parties are expected to repel invasion and to protect democratic rights, a clear justification of the action of the German Socialists against Russia or of the French and Belgian Socialists against Germany, but inapplicable, and clearly not meant to be applied, as a defense of the German Socialist action against the French. Above all, the statement that the Socialists of "the rest of the world" were opposed to the German invasion of France and Belgium emphasizes this standpoint—especially as it occurs in a thoroughly international organ, in an article devoted to the cause of internationalism.

Under these circumstances, no stronger words could have been found with which to condemn German Socialist acquiescence in the invasion of Belgium, and the hurling of the bulk of the German armies against France instead of Russia.

The article of the following day, September 28th, which led to the second suspension of the paper, began by referring to Germany's efforts "to make the truth known abroad," and to the fact that these efforts have not succeeded:

"The extent of these efforts shows how difficult it is to create confidence in the German reports. . . .

"It is necessary to go back to times of peace to find the explanation. For a long time a great measure of mistrust, suspicion, and antagonism to Germany has been heaping up abroad—even in the neutral countries—and we now see the effects of this."

In part, says *Vorwaerts*, this was due to Germany's sudden rise in the economic world and to fear and suspicion on the part of the great capitalists.

"But the jingoes abroad would hardly have had such success with their propaganda if another factor had not been present.

"That land, which developed so mightily, was at the same time that land which made its workmen a present of an anti-Socialist law, and which also, after the repeal of this law, instituted a police government of chicanery and allowed the equality of all citizens to exist only on the paper of the Prussian constitution. . . .

"Thus Germany appeared to the rest of the world, and even to the working classes, in the light of a power whose rule meant militarism and political oppression. It was this that made it possible for that distrust and bitterness to arise which so greatly aided our bellicose opponents in the ruling classes, and which makes it possible for us to gain the sympathy of neutral countries only with the greatest effort.

"This explains why regrettable pronouncements have come even from the laboring classes in these lands. These are regrettable above all because *they try to fasten upon the German people as a whole the responsibility for the acts of a single class.* . . .

"The comrades abroad can be assured that the German working class disapproves to-day every piratical policy of state, just as it has always disapproved it, and that it is *disposed to resist the predatory subjugation of foreign peoples as strongly as the circumstances permit.*

"The comrades in foreign lands can be assured that, though the German workmen also are protecting their fatherland, they will nevertheless not forget that their interests are the same as those of the proletariat in other countries, who, *like themselves, have been compelled to go to war against their*

will; indeed, even against their often repeated pronouncements in favor of peace." (Our italics.)

On the evening of the day on which this article was published *Vorwaerts* was again suspended, this time indefinitely. But within three days the management of the paper was readjusted, the conservative Socialist, Richard Fischer, replacing Stadthagen, the radical, as manager.

Vorwaerts, in its issue of October 1st, contained a letter from General von Kessel, printed at his request, stating that Hugo Haase, Chairman of the Social Democratic parliamentary group in the Reichstag, together with Richard Fischer, manager of the paper, had entered into a definite agreement with the general to the effect that if the *Vorwaerts* was granted permission to continue publication no further mention should be made "to class hatred or the class struggle" during the war.

General von Kessel stated that the editorial committee of the *Vorwaerts* was prepared to agree to these terms while martial law held sway, and the general accordingly revoked the order of suspension, demanding that his letter should appear on the front page of the next issue of the journal.

The supreme control of *Vorwaerts*, however, was still vested in party organizations controlled by the radical wing, the Party Press Committee and the Socialists of Greater Berlin—as unsuccessful attacks by the Party and by the Labor Union Executives have demonstrated.

The *Central News* Lausanne correspondent published an article printed in a suppressed number of *Vorwaerts* in November, in part as follows:

Man does not display all his strength and all his weaknesses save in exceptional situations. On the day of battle certain giants fall, like rotten trees before the tempest. The

peoples, like individuals, reveal in times of crisis their hidden virtues or their unknown failings.

The present crisis is terrible. . . . It shows us that the German people is stricken with a malady which, in the end, may prove fatal; and this malady is jingoism. Thus one names a diseased nationalism which sees neither virtue nor courage in any nation but its own, and which has only insults and suspicion for others.

Unhappily this disease appears to have seized on the German people at a time when the empire was in a particularly flourishing condition, and it was in full blast even before this war broke out.

When war was decided on there was an eruption of jingoism of the most feverish sort. Violent articles appeared in the press. In the great cities inflammatory speeches were made, warlike poems were declaimed, and war songs were chanted. The conflagration was regarded as a fête. The campaign was to be a simple promenade to Paris and to St. Petersburg.

Then one heard the atrocious details of the war in Belgium. The inhabitants had fired on our soldiers. The Belgians were "assassins," savage beasts, unworthy of any consideration. They must expiate their crimes by sword and fire. No one troubled to explain the uprising of the Belgian people. Our perfervid patriots could not understand that a people must lose its calmness on seeing itself unexpectedly attacked, its fields laid waste, its towns and villages occupied, its men sacrificed in battle.

Our jingoes have yelled, a hundred thousand times since the war began, "The duty of every citizen is to defend his country to his last breath." Those poor wretches of Belgium and France—have they done anything else? Have they not defended home and fatherland? If *we* acted thus, *our* conduct would be heroic. On the part of our adversaries it is rebellion and murder.

Let us understand, then, that we are not merely Germans, French, or Russians, but that we are all men, that all the peoples are of the same blood, and that they have no right to kill one another, but that they ought to love and help one another. Such is Christian, humane conduct. Man does **not** belong to one nation only; he belongs to humanity. (*Our italics.*)

In its issue of March 7th, *Vorwaerts* quotes an interview with Lloyd George which expresses views that *Vorwaerts* adopts as its own, with certain modifications. Through this item we get, for the first time, a clear expression of *Vorwaerts'* view of the part played by the violation of the Belgian territory as a cause of the war. The expressions attributed to Lloyd George by *Pearson's Magazine* were as follows:

On Saturday, the first of August, after the war had already been declared, I contend, a vote in Great Britain would have given a majority of ninety-five per cent. against participation. Influential, financial people of the city (the financial district) with whom I had a talk on Saturday about the financial situation, at the close of the conference, expressed the hope that England would stand aside.

A vote on the following Tuesday [the 4th] would have shown ninety-nine per cent. in favor of the war. And the City interests, well aware that participation in a great European war would mean heavy losses to them and might even mean ruin, who on Saturday were unanimously opposed to the war, showed themselves, on Tuesday, equally unanimous in favor of it. . . .

To this *Vorwaerts* makes the following comment:

It is certain that he is right in the assertion that the violation of Belgian neutrality created the war spirit in England, but it is nonsense to think that the London financiers take upon themselves the heavy risk of a campaign out of mere sympathy for the weak and helpless. They were interested in Belgian neutrality only because it kept German competitors and rivals away from the coast of the English Channel.

Here is an admission that German violation of Belgium caused English participation in the war through the fear of possible German conquest of the Bel-

gian coast, one of the most important statements from German Socialist sources since the beginning of the conflict.

THE LEIPZIG "VOLKSZEITUNG"

The following quotations from two leading Socialist dailies of the left wing indicate that they are even more oppositional than *Vorwaerts*.

Let one read between the lines of the following quotation from the Leipzig *Volkszeitung*, taken from an article in defense of the conduct of the Belgians during the war. At great length the Leipzig *Volkszeitung* shows that any atrocities which may have been committed by the Belgians had nothing to do with clericalism or the Catholic Church, as had been alleged in Germany. The behavior is accounted for by other motives:

"That in such struggles as have occurred, especially in Belgium, all passions and cruelties have been especially frequent is all the more understandable because the whole country, from house to house, and from man to man, has been agitated and torn. The Belgian people believes from its standpoint, that it is acting as patriotically as *any other country* which *supposedly* or in reality is struggling for its existence." (Our italics.)

The *Volkszeitung* proceeds to state that the actions of the Belgians which are complained of by the German Government are not cases of individual resistance of the civil population, but a universal phenomenon and "a kind of people's war." It says: "The actual events prove that in the countries already conquered by Germany, the whole people believe they must struggle for their existence only because the irresponsible chauvinists and bar-room strategists, here as there, argue that Germany will annex their country." The words, "here as there," constitute another bold attack on German militarism, which is almost universally in favor of the annexation referred to. The *Volkszeitung* finally says that the discussions of the struggle as one between cultures, which are being published

by so many leading Germans, have the same effect as this bar-room talk; they tend to force the war to become a people's war.

THE BREMEN "BUERGERZEITUNG"

The Socialist daily of Bremen, the *Bürgerzeitung*, published one of the most revolutionary articles that has reached us from the German Socialist press since the beginning of the war. It declared:

"Everything that we have said right up to the present will be considered as mere chatter if we do not maintain our ideas *during* and *after* the war.

"If the German Socialists are fighting side by side with the Junkers, their enemies, it is only their blood that is mixing, but not their hearts. All the phrases of German patriotism are shattered against the granite of our Socialist convictions.

"They talk about the struggle against Czarism! But this struggle is being carried on by the Russian revolutionaries, and not by those who, like the German Government, have always protected Czarism against the heroes of the Russian revolution, and are ready to do it again.

"The German Socialists have no confidence in the promise of the German ruling classes. Our teachers, such as Karl Marx, have proved to us that it is not good intentions which decide the fate of peoples, but real forces. If the German Empire is victorious, the ruling class of Germany will become stronger and the working class of Germany just that much weaker."

The conclusion seems unavoidable that defeat is preferable to victory, which had been the prevailing Socialist opinion in Germany during many years. The *Bürgerzeitung* even indicates, though vaguely, of course, its hope that the German Socialists will play a revolutionary rôle before the war is over: "The world war is German Socialism's baptism of fire."

THE CHEMNITZ "VOLKSSTIMME"

The organs of the other faction, however, the right or revisionist wing, are, in some instances, as patriotic

as the militarists could desire. The most extreme are the Chemnitz *Volksstimme* and the Hamburg *Echo*.

Vorwaerts, December 22d, quotes from the Chemnitz organ as follows:

Upon rumors of an American offer of mediation for peace, the Chancellor has right clearly and suitably declared that Germany has no cause to seek mediation or peace; it was attacked without cause and is defending its skin with all its strength against its enemies. When one of these enemies lies on the ground and seeks for peace, then we shall see what we will do. This policy is the only correct and reasonable one, and is being practically carried out. The only political instrument *at present* is the German army. . . . The statesman, in Germany, has nothing more to say than this: "We will help to hold out until victory. Everything else is superfluous and harmless."

To this *Vorwaerts* makes the following remark, being forced of course, to moderate its feeling to avoid the censor: "That the army is at present the sole political instrument will be a surprise to all those who believe that the aim and attitude of the government and of the parties, for example, the Social Democratic Party, has also a certain importance. At any rate, we must consider that the standpoint represented by the Chemnitz *Volksstimme* fairly agrees with that of *Die Post* and *Die Deutsche Tageszeitung* [notoriously reactionary newspapers], although these do not always express themselves so strongly."

THE FRANKFORT "VOLKSSTIMME"

In another organ of the right wing, the *Frankfurter Volksstimme* of August 4th, we read:

A stroke of lightning has revealed the whole situation. Now the German Government was forced to furnish documentary proof of the viciousness, of the satanic shamelessness of these Muscovites in the *White Paper* which it laid before the Reichstag. No countryman of ours can ignore the force of this part of its arguments.

The *Frankfurter Volksstimme* of August 7th tells frankly how shamefully the government has treated

the Party in the past, how it was made homeless, how it was driven from German soil, how its members were regarded as human beings of a lower class, how Social Democrats have always been considered as entitled to fewer rights, how they have never been held worthy of holding state or communal offices, etc., etc. And then it adds:

So matters stood in the past. But in spite of it all the Social Democrats will do their duty. Without them the nation would be lost.

The capitalist parties should keep this in mind: *The political bill will have to be paid, and will have to be paid promptly.* For the Social Democrats will be after the war what they were before—the greatest party unit, a party that will not be fooled by empty words and cheap promises. It will do its duty now, but for the future it will insist upon its rights as well. (Our italics.)

In criticism of the last quotation, the Zürich correspondent of the New York *Volkszeitung* says: "We are ashamed of this, we comrades of the other countries, for it degrades the party to an ordinary give and take business proposition," the idea being that at least one of the motives of certain German Socialists—judging by the expressions of the *Frankfurter Volksstimme* and other similar organs—is that if they supported this slaughter of other peoples it would increase their chance of getting something from the government for the German people. Dr. Südekum spoke to similar effect in Berlin:

Dr. Südekum delivered a lecture in Berlin on "The War and the German Laboring Man," which was attended by prominent government officials. There was, as far as the present crisis is concerned, nothing in his remarks to which the most patriotic German could take exception, but while he said that the unselfish attitude of the Social Democratic Party was foreshadowed by Bebel and Vollmar, he more than hinted

that the future would bring about necessary changes. After the war, he said, the Social Democracy would insist upon reforms tending to give the people a larger share in the administration of public affairs. There must be such a "mobilization" in matters of law and education as well as in the constitution of the empire as will do away with ancient favoritism. The Socialists have sufficiently attested their patriotism; now let them have their rights. (From the New York *Evening Post*.)

THE NEW YORK "VOLKSZEITUNG"

The New York *Volkszeitung*, the daily organ of the German-speaking Socialists of the United States, keeps in the closest touch with the German situation, has always supported the German Party, and has stood with Bebel, Kautsky, and the Center group. Freed from all censorship it has been able to express freely what many German Socialists feel. Selections from two editorials, out of a large number opposing the action of the German Party during the present war, will show the reasons why the *Volkszeitung*, together with most of the other German Socialist papers of America, takes this position. The first is from the editorial of August 19th, when the news of the support of the government by the German Socialists on August 4th first reached America. Its most important paragraphs were the following:

To-day, according to reports appearing in another column, it appears to be a fact, quite beyond doubt unfortunately, that the Social Democratic section of the Reichstag has voted five billions for the war.

Indeed, we must admit that the trend of the Haase speech renders this decision of the Reichstag delegates only all the more incomprehensible, because not even the slightest motive may be traced in explanation of that change of opinion which has undoubtedly occurred since July 25th-29th, the time of the last war protests.

For it is simply unbelievable that our comrades suffered

themselves to be driven into their incomprehensible position through fear of the bugaboo of Russian despotism. Yet we were fully aware how skillfully the present German Government has always understood the proper manipulation of its scarecrows in order to seduce the stupid people into a national enthusiasm.

The "Septennats election" of 1887, the "Hottentot election" of 1907, the Chinese campaign, and the "editing" of the Ems dispatch represent some examples of this which are not easily forgotten. A war against France or England would have been highly unpopular and therefore the adoption of this roundabout course by way of Russia.

The position of the Social Democrats, however, could not have been in any way determined by the fact that Russia stood in the field against Germany, as there was no evidence that the former was the attacking party, the inciter of war. Perhaps von Bethmann-Hollweg, the philosophic Imperial Chancellor, who conferred with Social Democratic delegates on the morning of that eventful Reichstag session, presented satisfactory evidence of this nature to our comrades; if he did this, it must obviously have been a bit of the most skillful fabrication to have thus misled the strongest party in Germany. This much at least is most clearly evident from the text of England's current *Blue Book*: the curse of having caused this slaughter of millions will always be upon the Austrian Government.

This is the documentary phase of the case. Austria made its insolent ultimatum to Serbia after she had assured herself of the help of Germany; just as Russia and France would never have begun the war without the help of England. Germany had it in her hands to maintain peace on both sides if she had really wished to.

Under these conditions, the German Social Democracy had no grounds whatsoever, according to our opinion, for altering its fundamental point of view.

Applause gained from "patriots" is indeed too dearly bought.

The second editorial, which appeared about a month later, reviews the defenses of the Socialists' support of the war offered by Scheidemann and Bernstein:

We feel that Scheidemann and Bernstein had no right to publish a defense of their attitude at this time. It seems hardly honorable to defend a measure at the moment when the lips of its opponents are sealed. . . .

Bernstein declares that the demands made of Serbia by Austria-Hungary, the direct cause of the war, were a necessity, born of the needs of self-preservation.

"Necessity!" "Self-preservation!" This point of view leads us far back into the Middle Ages. It is a defense of the breaking of treaties, as Comrade Scheidemann, too, excuses the brutal disregard of Belgian neutrality with the statement that the Prime Minister had "acknowledged this infraction of Belgian neutrality openly and honestly"(!). Bernstein speaks of those "who raised a great hue and cry" over the Austrian attacks upon Serbia. May we ask why the workers in Austria and Germany protested so vehemently against the demands sent from Vienna to Serbia, and finally against the declaration of war? If Bernstein's attitude were justifiable, he, and with him those who share his views, should have protested against these demonstrations. It was their duty to declare: Austria is right! Russia stands behind Serbia! Long live the war against Russia!

Nationalist considerations set aside, the point of view of the thoughtful man towards the present war will be fixed by his attitude towards militarism on the one hand and towards Russian Czarism on the other. *He who believes that militarism is momentarily the greatest danger that threatens Europe will find his sympathies on the side of France and England.* On the other hand, he who sees in the power of Russian Czarism an impending menace for Europe may come to the conclusion that the defeat of the Allies is a consummation to be hoped for.

It would take us too far afield to consider here which might be the most harmful to the future of Europe, the growth of militarism, or the increase of the Russian power. The Social Democratic group of the German Reichstag, with its vote in favor of the war loan, has decided openly, "Official Russia is our enemy." And the articles of Scheidemann and Bernstein show that this consideration *alone* dictated their vote. They considered only the *national* question, disregarding entirely the point of view of the [international] working class.

Had the leaders of the German Social Democracy said to us: "We are not sure of the rank and file of our movement. We must keep our organization, our unions intact. We cannot do this and at the same time persist in our opposition to war." Had they said this, we might, perhaps, have understood.

But such was evidently not the case. At any rate neither Scheidemann nor Bernstein suggests anything of the sort. For them and for their colleagues in the Reichstag there was but one consideration, "Russia is threatening Germany." Their attitude was determined, therefore, not by the needs of the working class, but by purely national ideals. This was, to our mind, a mistake. They should have remembered that not only Russia, but also France and England stood on the other side, that this alliance effectively counteracts any special danger from Russia. They should have remembered that Marx once maintained that the great influence of the Czarism over Europe lay in its traditional supremacy within Germany, that the overthrow of this supremacy means the end of the Russian danger for Germany. They should have remembered, above all, the inaugural address of the old International, which affirmed that the liberation of the working class presupposes a fraternal unity and co-operation of international labor, that the workers cannot fulfill this mission, so long as they allow national prejudices to drive them into wars of robbery, that squander the blood and the possessions of the people.

When the War of 1870 and the development of the years that followed removed the center of the international movement from France to Germany, it likewise placed upon the shoulders of the Germans, above all other nations, the duty to preserve the integrity of the International. They should under no circumstances, therefore, have voted in favor of a war that was directed not only against Russia, but also against the French and the Belgians. Even if they could not see their way clear to voting against the measure, they should at least have refrained from voting at all. They need but have looked back over the history of Germany to find sufficient defense for their attitude. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Prussia-Germany drove France into the arms of Russia. It was this that caused the fever of armaments that turned Europe and especially Germany into a vast armory. This was what created in Europe an atmosphere in which

guns went off of their own accord. Prussia's policy towards Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 and its results made the present war inevitable. This alone would have justified the Socialist members of the German Reichstag in opposing the war loan, or in refusing to vote.

Our Social Democratic group did not consider the international labor movement. Solely national considerations determined their attitude when the government presented its demands. It has neglected the interests of the international labor movement. The International has suffered a severe blow,—we cannot tell as yet whether or not it has been mortal, but at best it will take long years of work ere the international movement of the working class will recover. International solidarity has, for the moment at least, dropped its colors before nationalist sentiment.

THE SOCIALISTS IN THE PRUSSIAN LANDTAG

A report that the Prussian Socialists in the Landtag had voted in favor of a war loan attracted widespread attention because Liebknecht and other radical Socialists are members of this body. The truth of this matter appears in the following report from the *New Review* and in a letter of Liebknecht.

The session took place on the 22d of October. The new loan was justified largely by the fall in the income of Prussia due to lessened receipts from railways and other leading sources of income. And although the Prussian Government, being more than half absolute in character, can use the money for any purpose it pleases, the government representative, Delbrueck, in asking the Landtag to grant the loan, mentioned specifically only certain purposes which every Socialist might approve. The loan was to be used chiefly for the purpose of affording relief to those suffering directly or indirectly from the war, and especially for the purpose of affording public employment. The state proposed to continue its building activities, to increase its construction of canals, to undertake a reclamation of waste land on a large scale, to give financial relief to the families of government employees, to provide for the increase of food and fodder, and to furnish four hundred

million marks for the relief of the districts laid waste by the Russian army in East Prussia.

The Socialists had decided to give this loan their unanimous support, and to define their attitude towards it by a declaration.

The Socialist position was brought out more clearly by the publication in *Vorwaerts* the next day of the following declaration of Karl Liebknecht:

"I must urgently ask you to report the following points, and to add them to your account of the sitting of the Prussian Legislature on the 22d of October.

(a) "In the reading by Dr. Delbrueck of the greetings of the Kaiser to the house, the whole house stood, with the exception of the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats, who were in their places, remained seated. This is not mentioned in the report. [This action would be *lèse majesté* in any other place but the House, and the *Vorwaerts* reporter could not have failed to notice it.]

(b) "In the closing words of Dr. Delbrueck about the war, applause was heard in the Right, in the Center Party, and among the Liberal Parties. But not among the Socialists. [This omission of *Vorwaerts* is noteworthy, as it is the custom of all German papers and especially the Socialist papers, to report the parties from which applause comes.]

(c) "In the closing speech of the President, *Vorwaerts* does not mention the fact that half of our faction had already left the room, and that the others surely did not take part in the applause.

"As to the cheers for the supreme war lord, it is said in the report: 'The house took part in the cheers.' Here, too, it is not mentioned that half of the Socialist members had left the room before these cheers, and that those who remained behind, if they were true to the plan of action that had been decided upon, only arose, but did not take part in the cheering."

Another Prussian Socialist Deputy (Hirsch), however, claimed, in *Die Sozialistische Monatshefte*, that this vote of the Prussian war loan "proved that the hope of Germany's enemies for internal discord had not been fulfilled," and that "in important national affairs Germany is unanimous."

At the session of February 9th, the Landtag Socialists took a far more radical anti-war stand.

On this occasion Hirsch read, on behalf of his party, a declaration, which was in part as follows:

"The Social Democratic Party maintains its opposition, based on principle, to the former government policy, which policy has remained in all material things unchanged. The party, however, refrains in this critical time from introducing discussions of a polemic nature into the consideration of the budget on its first reading."

Herr Hirsch added that his party would later call attention to complaints concerning the provisions for soldiers and dependents, the food supply for the nation, and restrictions on the free expression of thought. He could not permit the occasion to pass, he continued, without giving expression to the demand of his party that the government, in consequence of the situation brought about by the war, should concede certain measures desired by the great mass of the people. These included the demand that the police cease their battle against the labor movement in general, and in particular against the Social Democrats and other Socialist organizations.

Herr Hirsch said that his party was opposed to political oppression, but that the basis of all political reforms must be their equal application to all minorities, as in the case of the Danes and Poles. His party had hoped, he continued, that the government would fulfill its duty by granting uniform suffrage, with the secret direct ballot. He mentioned the desire of the Social Democrats for an honorable peace, and concluded:

"We know that this war is desired by the people in none of the belligerent lands; that its end is everywhere longed for by the people. We cherish the confidence that the voices demanding peace will grow more numerous in all belligerent lands, will make themselves heard in influential quarters, and that under the influence of this desire for peace, especially of the laboring classes of all lands, an assured peace may come speedily, to the advantage of the German people and of all humanity."

Herr von Heydebrand replied to Herr Hirsch on behalf of

the non-Socialist parties. He said that the present moment was not a suitable one for advancing special wishes or complaints. The situation was one which demanded that the entire Prussian people show itself united, as its soldiers on the battlefield were united.

Karl Liebknecht here interjected: "You have no right to speak in the name of the German people."

This remark brought forth cries of protest. Heydebrand continued his reply with an exhortation to the delegates to work together and make any sacrifices necessary for victory.

On March 2d, Karl Liebknecht made a speech in the Prussian Landtag so strong that the censor prohibited it in Germany. He said:

The minister refuses to give any promise of a general character. So the situation is cleared up. An effort is being made to fool the masses with beautiful sounding words about unity and the glorious enthusiasm of the people. The hateful, naked fact, however, is that everything remains as of old in Prussia, that everything is to-day the same as it was before the great victory. One reads glorifications of militarism, of monarchy, and of the three-class electoral system in our newspapers, not only in the Conservative ones, but also in those of the Liberals. How long will it be until it is affirmed that the victory of the German masses is solely a result of the three-class electoral system?

By the cry, "Down with the Czarism" and "For the freedom of Europe," an effort is made to awaken the enthusiasm of the people. . . .

Never was the contrast so clear as to-day between the privileged character of the state and government in Prussia and the most necessary duties of the community. The equal obligation as cannon food is not accompanied by equal rights in society. In semi-absolutism, in secret diplomacy, in personal government (monarchism), we see one of the most important of the immediate causes for the outbreak of this war—though it is conditioned by international capitalism.

If the imperialistic efforts of capitalism have given rise to the most serious dangers and even to war, yet we have always said that this makes all the more necessary the control of foreign politics by the people. A necessary condition for

this is complete democracy at home. I do not ignore the fact that even in those countries which are internally more democratized, very much still remains to be desired in this respect; but this is the only way to create a guarantee against the policy of imperialistic adventure. The sacrifice of millions by this war is in considerable measure due to the absence of rights of the masses in the countries at war. Whatever difference there may be among us we are agreed that in none of the countries at war have the masses wished it. ("Very true," shouted the Social-Democrats at this point.) This is why there appears at this very moment, when Europe is burying an old civilization and the bloom of its manhood in blood and murder and fire, the demand for the democratization of foreign politics based upon inner democratization.

I welcome the destruction of the illusions of the masses with regard to the readiness of the ruling classes and of the government of Prussia to grant a reform of the suffrage. This understanding reaches not only those who are trying to serve their country as civilians but also those who are out in the trenches, who, when they read the report of the Budget Committee of Saturday evening, will have grimly closed their fists in their pockets and sent their curses against those who try to awake illusions among them about the suffrage and to deceive them as to the truth—namely, that this war was not justified from the point of view of the interests of the great masses of the people, that the masses of the people will remain without rights after the war, just as before. With the German people the same thing is happening as has happened to the poor wretch in the tragi-comedy who for a short time was put in the fine clothes of a rich gentleman and played the prince. Many a man in Germany, after the events of recent days, will awake from the dream that he is a free and equal German citizen; sobered, he will then draw his conclusions relentlessly as to his political behavior even during the present war. . . .

In view of this attitude of the bourgeois parties and of the government, there is for me only one principle: Away with hypocrisy of civil peace, on with the international class struggle for the emancipation of the working class and against the war.

The *Vorwaerts*, in spite of the censor, described the

sensational scene that followed and gave Liebknecht its support:

March 2d will remain for all time a remarkable day in the history of the Prussian state.

Only one member, Dr. Liebknecht, treated the franchise question as thoroughly as it deserved. When he began to speak the Free Conservatives and most of the National Liberals and the Center left the chamber in a demonstrative manner.

But even if the government on the ground that it has nothing to do with the case refused to hear these words of the Socialist leader, the people themselves will hear him. We demand the democratization of the state in body and limb, in lawgiving, and administration. *Democratic control by the people would have prevented the war.* This gives us the right at this very moment to demand the democratization of the foreign policy. We demand a foreign policy which can only be built up and developed upon the democratization of the home policy.

In casting the ten Socialist votes *against* the budget, Hirsch declared in the name of the Landtag Group:

In spite of our repeated demands the government has not made the slightest concession either in respect to the repeal of exceptional laws or in respect to the granting of a free and equal suffrage or in respect to the abolition of the limitations of the right of association. From this it naturally follows that we must now vote against the Prussian budget.

The Group was unanimous, therefore, only in the decision to press its demand for political democracy during the war—in spite of the position of the other parties and of the government that all political struggles weaken the military power of the nation.

In the Reichstag session of March 18th, Scheidemann, speaking for the Socialists of the empire, took the same position. On the question of supporting the government and the war, public discussion showed that the Landtag Group was divided as in October—five to five (see

above). But the anti-Government Group in the Reichstag had doubled during this period, as we shall proceed to show.

THE SOCIALISTS AND THE SECOND WAR LOAN (DECEMBER 2, 1914)

On December 2d the Socialists in the Reichstag again voted the war loan asked by the government. Once more approximately the same number of members (fifteen) quietly abstained from the vote, with the consent of the Socialist Caucus. And again Haase read a Party declaration reasserting the position taken at the time of the first war loan on the 4th of August. But this declaration also contained some additional matter—as well as a new emphasis. It was as follows:

As an addition to the statement of the Imperial Chancellor about Belgium, I declare in the name of the group that the facts, which have later become known, are not sufficient to change our conviction, and to make us desert the standpoint which the Imperial Chancellor took on the 4th of August with regard to Luxemburg and Belgium. Besides, I have been given the task by the group of giving the following declaration:

We struggled against this war, the deeper causes of which are conflicts of economic interest, up to the last moment. The frontiers of our country are still menaced by hostile troops. So to-day also the German people must offer its whole strength for the protection of the country. Therefore, the Social Democracy grants the new credits demanded.

We remember with gratitude all the brave sons of the people who sacrificed their lives and health for us, and all those who have died with unspeakable pains and sufferings in the service of the country.

On the 4th of August, in agreement with the International, we announced the principle that every people has the right to national independence and that it is our unchangeable conviction that a prosperous development of peoples is only possible if every nation refuses to violate the integrity and

independence of other nations and in this way to plant the seeds of new wars.

Therefore, we stand by what we said on the 4th of August.

We demand that an end be made to the war as soon as the goal of safety has been reached and the enemy is disposed to make peace, and that this peace be one that makes possible friendship with neighboring nations.

The Social Democracy condemns those small but active circles in all countries, which are trying by all the means in their power and under cover of a special love of the fatherland to stir up the hatreds of peoples against one another, and in doing this forget all truth and decency.

The following is the exact statement of the German Chancellor referred to. It was made by von Bethmann-Hollweg, on the invasion of Belgium, in the Reichstag on August 4th, and was followed, after an hour's intermission, by the declaration of the Socialists in favor of the war loan:

We are now on the defensive, and necessity knows no law! Our troops have entered into Luxemburg, and perhaps have already entered upon Belgian territory. That contradicts the rules of international law. The French Government, it is true, declared in Brussels that it would respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as its opponents respected it. But we knew that France was ready for an attack. France could wait, but we could not, and a French attack on our flanks on the lower Rhine might have had fateful results. So we were forced to proceed against the Luxemburg and the Belgian Governments.

The wrong that we thus did we shall try to make good, as soon as our military goal is reached. He, who like ourselves, is fighting for the highest objects, can only think of one thing, that he must cut his way through.

We are now in a position to understand the Socialist declaration of December 2d. First of all, it must be recalled that the censorship made it absolutely impossible for the Socialists to defend in public their position

on certain points. This is the reason why, instead of stating their own position with regard to Belgium, they referred to that of von Bethmann-Hollweg.

The full significance of the declaration of December 2d has not only been lost to many because of this fact, but its meaning has been completely reversed in important quarters. The war editor of the New York *Evening Post*, for example, in the issue of January 20, 1915, interprets the Socialist statement as an endorsement of the German Chancellor's defense of the violation of Belgium's neutrality, as being "a military necessity." The preceding and surrounding circumstances indicate that the meaning of the German Party was directly the opposite. On August 4th, they had made no statement whatever with respect to invasion of Belgium, which they had learned of only an hour before the declaration was read. It had been written the day before, and it was held that the time was too short to change it so as to deal adequately with this question.

It is known that a storm broke forth in the whole world against the action of the German Government. There was an equally general consensus of opinion among the Socialists of the world against the action of the German Party. Our documents show that it was on the defensive for months after this statement. During the same period, the German Government changed its attitude toward Belgium and renounced its position of August 4th as having been *too favorable*. It claimed to have discovered documents showing a practical alliance between Belgium and the Allies before the war, so that no reparation was due to Belgium for damage done. Moreover, the demand for permanent annexation of Belgium had become very strong and had been openly opposed by leading Socialists with the consent of the government, as our documents in Part V demonstrate.

The Reichstag Socialists by their statement said, in a way not to be mistaken by the German Socialists or the German people, that they refused to follow the government and to abandon the ground previously taken by von Bethmann-Hollweg, namely, that Belgium had been wronged, and that reparation was due. "The facts which have later become known are not sufficient," they said, to make them desert the standpoint the Chancellor took on the 4th of August. No facts had been brought before the German public to prove that the invasion of Belgium was not "a military necessity." The statement, therefore, cannot be taken as having any reference whatever to the question, further than to imply that there could be no *other* ground for the invasion of Belgium.

DECLARATION OF KARL LIEBKNECHT ON DECEMBER 2D

Karl Liebknecht was the only socialist to vote "No" on the occasion of the second war loan—an act that created a world-wide sensation.

Liebknecht handed the following written statement of his reasons for so voting to the President of the Reichstag, who refused to read it to that body on a technical pretext. The German press was not allowed to print it, though a brief, but sufficient, notice appeared in *Vorwaerts*.

This war, which none of the peoples interested wanted, was not declared in the interests of the Germans or of any other people. It is an imperialist war for capitalization and domination of the world markets, for political domination of important quarters of the globe, and for the benefit of bankers and manufacturers. From the viewpoint of the race of armaments, it is a preventive war provoked conjointly by the war parties of Germany and Austria in the obscurity of semi-absolutism and secret diplomacy. It is also a Bonaparte-like enterprise tending to demoralize and destroy the growing

labor movement. That much is clear despite the cynical stage management designed to mislead the people. This is not a defensive war. We cannot believe the government when it declares it is for the defense of the fatherland. It demands money. What we must demand is an early peace, humiliating no one, peace without consequent rancor. All efforts directed to this end ought to be supported. Only the continuous, simultaneous affirmation of this wish in all the belligerent countries can end the bloody massacre before all the interested people are exhausted. The only durable peace will be peace based on the solidarity of the working masses and liberty. The Socialists of all countries must work for such a peace even during the war. I protest against the violation of Belgium and Luxemburg, against the annexation schemes, against military dictatorship, against the complete forgetfulness of social and political duties as shown by the government ruling classes.

Vorwaerts has suggested—by publishing several favorable news items without comment—its sympathy with the position of Liebknecht. While it did not approve of his violation of party discipline in breaking the unit rule and voting against the rest of the delegation, it pointed out, on its first page, that it was allowable, according to the party practice, for those who disagreed with the action taken to be absent from the vote, provided they did not leave the room in a demonstrative manner. *Vorwaerts* either could not name the Socialist members who took advantage of this rule on December 2d (in view of the censorship) or, for prudential reasons, did not care to name them, but we are assured by the reliable and well-informed organ of the Dutch Party (*Het Volk*) that there were fourteen, besides Liebknecht. We are, therefore, free to conclude that the representatives of some half million German voters were opposed to aiding the government to continue the war. (The pro-governmental minorities in these districts would be more than balanced by the anti-governmental

minorities in other districts.) And we are also probably justified, from the position of *Vorwaerts*, in believing that the majority of the half million Socialists of Greater Berlin took the same position. The anti-war position of the Leipzig *Volkszeitung* leads us to believe that the majority of the Socialists of that city and its manufacturing suburbs hold a similar opinion. At Stuttgart, a meeting of elected representatives, in December, passed a resolution indorsing Liebknecht by 90 votes against 42 delegates who left the hall and voted in a separate meeting to indorse the position of the Reichstag group. The Socialists of other places, such as Hamburg, Dresden, and Frankfort, are much divided. On the whole, there can be no question that there is a very powerful anti-war sentiment among the Socialists of the larger cities, though we have no ground to suppose it is equally strong in the smaller places.

MESSAGES FROM KARL LIEBKNECHT AND ROSA LUXEMBURG *

This anti-war sentiment is very well expressed in Liebknecht's anti-war declaration just quoted, as well as in his New Year's greeting to the British Socialists which follows:

It is painful for me to write these lines at a time when our radiant hope of previous days—the Socialist International—lies smashed on the ground together with a thousand expectations; when even many Socialists in the belligerent countries—for Germany is not an exception—have in this most rapacious of all wars of robbery willingly put on the yoke of the chariot of imperialism, just when the evils of capitalism were becoming more apparent than ever.

The example which the Independent Labor Party and our Russian and Servian comrades have given to the world will have a stimulating effect wherever Socialists have been en-

* The *Labor Leader*, December 31, 1914.

snared by the designs of the ruling classes, and I am sure the mass of British workers will soon rally to our help.

Confusion reigns in the ranks of the Socialist army. Many Socialists make our principles responsible for our present failure. The failure is due, not to our principles, but to the representatives of our principles.

All such phrases as "national defense" and the "freedom of the people," with which imperialism decorates its instruments of murder, are lying pretense. The emancipation of each nation must be the result of its own efforts. Only blindness can demand the continuation of the murder until opponents are crushed.

The welfare of all nations is inseparably interwoven. The world war, which destroyed the International, will surely be recognized as teaching a mighty lesson, from which the necessity of the building up of *a new International becomes clear, an International of another kind, and with a different power* from that which the capitalist powers shattered with such ease in August. Only in the co-operation of the working classes of the nations, in war and in peace, lies the salvation of mankind.

Nowhere did the masses desire this war. Why should they murder one another then? In order to end it? It is said that it would be a sign of weakness for any people to propose peace. Then let all the peoples together offer peace. That nation which does it first will not show weakness but strength, and will have earned glory and the gratitude of posterity.

Among the German working people there is already a greater opposition against the war than has generally been supposed. The more it hears the echo of the call for peace in other countries, the more passionately and energetically will it work for peace. (Our italics.)

Rosa Luxemburg, leader of the German women Socialists, wrote on the same occasion:

Under the murderous blows of the imperialist groups the working-class International, so recently our pride and our hope, has shamefully broken down; and, most shamefully of all, the German section, which was called upon to march at the head of the world army of labor. It is necessary to express this bitter truth, not to encourage futile despair and

resignation, but, on the contrary, to learn from the mistakes committed in the past and the facts of the existing situation, valuable lessons for the future. Already, after a few months of war, the jingo intoxication which animated the working classes of Germany is passing away; and, although they have been deserted by their leaders in this great historic hour, their sense is returning, and every day the number of workers who blush with shame and anger at the thought of what is going on to-day grows.

THE SOCIALIST PARTY EXECUTIVE AND THE LIEBKNECHT CASE

The remarkable feature of a resolution on Liebknecht's breach of party discipline, which was passed by the Executive Committee on February 2d, was its specific mention of the Socialist custom allowing Reichstag members to be absent when a vote was taken to which they could not consent—thus justifying the course of those deputies (fourteen in number, according to *Het Volk*—see above) who expressed their agreement with Liebknecht's anti-war views in this manner.

The resolution of the Socialist Reichstag Group was in part as follows:

The party is determined it shall vote as a unit in the Reichstag. If any deputy is unable conscientiously to participate in the voting, he may abstain, but he must not give his abstention the character of a demonstration.

The remainder of the resolution was as follows:

The group condemns in the sharpest way the Liebknecht breach of discipline. (This clause was passed by a vote of 82 to 15.)

It rejects his declaration of the reasons for his vote on December 2d as incompatible with the interest of the German Social Democracy. (Passed by a vote of 58 to 33.) It also condemns the misleading information as to occurrences inside the party which has been spread in foreign countries by Liebknecht. (Passed by a vote of 51 to 39.)

Since, according to the constitution of the party, the group does not have power to take further measures, it leaves the final decision to the next Party Congress. (Passed by 82 to 7.)

The motion as a whole was then passed by a vote of 65 to 26.

Let us now briefly analyze what these votes mean. Undoubtedly, the last vote, 65 to 26, represents the division between the friends and opponents of Liebknecht. However, it seems that seven additional members of the group were unwilling to condemn the Liebknecht declaration of December 2d, recognizing his right to make such a declaration, though disagreeing with it. Moreover, 13 additional members were unwilling to accuse Liebknecht of spreading false rumors abroad—an accusation which he flatly denies. In other words, only 51 of the 90 members voting, on this point were willing to go to the utmost possible length against him.

On the other hand, of the 26 who stood with Liebknecht on the whole, 11 were careful not to give any approval to his breach of discipline. We are entitled to draw the conclusion that they agreed, in large part, with Liebknecht but did not find that the situation justified him in going so far as to defy the party majority.

Finally, it must be pointed out that, whereas 15 members of the party were unwilling to condemn Liebknecht's breach of discipline they themselves did not participate in it. On the contrary, they adopted the entirely different method of being absent from the session (see above).

We see that a very decided majority of the group was ready to go to almost any length against the minorities which in greater or less degree oppose the party's support of the war. We see that this majority at a critical moment was able to strengthen itself by the ad-

dition of wavering numbers, until it contained at least more than two-thirds of the total.

On the other hand, we find there is a minority not far from one-third which was very decidedly opposed to the war. Of this minority, however, only about one-half were of a radical or militant character, willing to make great sacrifices or great efforts in the support of their views. In a word, somewhat more than one-half of the group were thorough-going supporters of the government and of the war; 15 out of 97 or a little less than one-sixth of the group are equally strongly opposed to the government and the war; approximately 30 members occupy an intermediate position.

THE SOCIALISTS AND THE THIRD WAR LOAN (MARCH 20, 1915)

The third war loan, of 10,000,000,000 marks—intended to cover the expenses of the war until autumn—was voted as a part of the annual budget which included all the ordinary government expenditures for times of peace. The Congresses of the German Socialists have decided repeatedly and by overwhelming majorities—after lengthy discussions—that the Socialist Reichstag members were to vote as a unit against all such peace budgets. Therefore a situation was created differing somewhat from that of August 4th and December 2d of the previous year. The majority of the Reichstag Group still decided to vote for the government, the larger part undoubtedly on the ground that an ordinary or peace budget could be supported in war times. A considerable number, however, who had voted for the previous loans—as specific war loans—now abstained from the vote. It does not follow that their motive in doing this was that the “ordinary” budget had nothing

to do with the war, and that therefore the ordinary oppositional principles of the Party must apply to it. On the contrary it is probable, from the position of Bernstein (see Part V), that some, if not all, of them seized this opportunity to indicate their opposition to the pro-government, pro-war policy of the majority. They were ready to support the war, but not to the extent of abandoning what they regarded as Party principles or of giving up all real or financial opposition during the war. It is also probable that some, if not all, of the new minority, felt that the character of the war had been changing for the worse (see above).

When the vote on the third war loan was taken, the vote of the Socialist Party was cast by Scheidemann in favor of the loan. However, thirty members of the Party absented themselves from the session instead of the fifteen as formerly, and not only Liebknecht but also Ruehle voted against it.

Scheidemann made the following statement:

The reasons which determined our action in voting for the war loans on the fourth of August and the second of December, continue in undiminished strength. Because of the marvelous performances of our troops and of their leaders we have the utmost confidence that we shall succeed in reaching an honorable and lasting peace. To strengthen our determination to reach this goal in inseparable unity with our people, we shall give our consent to the present budget.

Certainly the thirty party members—including Bernstein, Haase, and other well-known leaders—who refused to vote for this war loan, and the two who voted against it did not agree that the same reasons existed for granting the loans as on the fourth of August and the second of December. This is certainly true of the seventeen new members whose names were added on this occasion to the previous minorities of fifteen who had ab-

stained from the vote on August fourth and December second.

The representatives of considerably more than a million Socialist voters were now more or less opposed to the governmental war policy. This opposition had, apparently, doubled in three months and a half.

The voting of the war budget was defended by David in *Vorwaerts* as follows:

If the decision of the Party congresses already gave the right to vote in favor of a budget to prevent the adoption of a worse budget, how much more does it correspond to the spirit of this decision to vote for a budget for the purpose of preventing the political and economic collapse of our nation.

To this argument, *Vorwaerts* replied:

We take it as a matter of course that the comrades who gave their support to the budget did not agree with David that its purpose was to "prevent the political and economic collapse of our nation." On the contrary, they held the view expressed by David to be completely erroneous.

Here the issue is squarely joined. The budget was opposed by these thirty Socialists, according to *Vorwaerts*, on the ground that its support would be not a defensive but an aggressive act.

On March 10th, at the time of the Reichstag discussion of the budget, Haase made another speech for the Group. His references to the Socialist desire for peace we quote below in Part V. The rest of his speech was given up to two questions: the demand for more extended and efficient governmental control over the food supplies during the war, and the demand for full and equal civil and political rights both during the war and afterwards. We reproduce here his principal statements with regard to the latter question:

The thought which guided the Social Democratic Group at the outbreak of the war was: it is our duty to do everything to protect our own country. The Social Democratic Group never thought of demanding any compensation for its votes of August 4th and December 2d. To it the representation of the people is not a commercial affair. But we cannot justify the government in bringing before the Reichstag in the eighth month of a world-shattering war merely the budget. The people have made an unheard-of sacrifice and are still making it hour by hour, facing death on the field of battle. With almost superhuman strength they are performing their hard duty, without distinction and in the same way. So the government cannot much longer avoid the task of seeing to it that equal civil rights correspond to equal duties. It is intolerable that all citizens do not yet have the same rights without distinction of class, party, religion, or nationality.

The organizations of the working people have produced fully twenty army corps from their members. At war and at home, as the government has recognized, they have done great things. And now should a Reichstag session pass by without the repeal of the exceptional clauses of the organization laws which are directed against these workers? We demand equal rights in everything, not as a wage for the great sacrifice we have made, but as a fulfillment of a demand which has long been imperative. It has been ceaselessly said that we must take care that the state of mind of our brothers in the field, who are performing wonders in bearing suffering and misery, shall not be depressed. But he who desires this must first of all see to it that when our brothers come home they shall not remain a single day in the empire, state, or town, as second-class citizens. Nothing can wound the masses of our people more severely than the consciousness that they who, as a result of the war, have suffered a loss in their earning capacity on account of their lessened income, will be stamped as citizens of a lower grade.

For a suffrage based upon classes there is no longer any place in Germany. If the government strives with a forceful initiative in this direction, it will be supported by the great majority of the people and will conquer all obstacles that stand in the way. And the quicker and the more decidedly it acts, the quicker will it reach the goal. One thing could be done at once without parliamentary discussion: if the

imperial council would only consent to the changes in the imperial order with regard to associations which have long been demanded in resolutions passed by the majority of the Reichstag. But we see with growing indignation how even such freedom as has been acquired in the imperial law of association (applying to labor unions, Socialist Party, etc.) is being cut down and destroyed. If the government delays or refuses to act, our brothers coming home from the field of war, together with those that have remained at home, will stormily demand their rights. We must have no illusions as to this: that the struggle for popular rights and the democratization of the institutions of our government will be carried on more energetically than ever, when the blood and health of hundreds of thousands will have been given for the protection of our country.

It will be noted that Haase claims that the Socialists support the war purely through the one motive of self-defense. Yet in another passage (see Part V) in regard to peace, he says that Germany has already proven that its independence is not in danger of destruction in this war. Haase says, in behalf of the Socialists, that they did not support the war with the idea of winning greater civil and political rights at home by this means. But it will be noted that he claims that the government, in order to get the best support of the people, must grant these rights and also that he makes much of the fact that the large sacrifices made by the people will lead them to insist on having these rights and that they will conquer them. The question that will come into the reader's mind is whether the Socialist leaders were not fully aware of these two considerations before they voted for the government in August, December, and March. If so, and if this enlargement of civil and political rights is now the chief immediate object of the Socialists of all factions, is it possible that this consideration could fail to have been one of their motives for supporting the government? The reader must judge

for himself from Haase's speech and from the surrounding circumstances.

THE POSITION OF THE PRO-WAR FACTION

On February 22d, a Socialist member of the Reichstag, Wolfgang Heine, made a sensational nationalistic speech before the new Socialist organization formed at Stuttgart in opposition to the radical majority now in control of the Party in that city. This speech met the approval of the Socialist organs in Hamburg, Karlsruhe, and other places in control of the extreme right wing, but was attacked not only by the papers of the left wing, but also by the Socialist organ of Dresden and those of the industrial district of Northwest Germany. Its importance is shown by the immense amount of discussion it created in the German Socialist press. The leading paragraphs may be divided into two parts—an argument in opposition to peace and in support of the government in the present war, and an imperialistic argument giving reasons for supporting the government permanently in its foreign policy. These arguments are as follows:

We Social Democrats are no Chauvinists, we are not what is called "Hurrah-patriots." It is not the German way to be Chauvinistic. We are simply defending our soil, our economic life, our customs, our German culture, the independence and integrity of our realm. But we must not hold back in this. We must, as the German Chancellor says, hold out, not to crush all the world, but to maintain a sure, lasting, and honorable peace. . . .

But the time has not yet come to seek peace. Every untimely step is wrong and attains the opposite of that which we desire to reach. We saw that in the Socialist Conference in London. . . . There are also people with us who have fantastic peace plans. In the Prussian House of Representatives, the platonic peace declaration of the Social Democrats resulted

in all the members of the House, with the exception of the ten Social Democrats, issuing a declaration against peace. If we desire peace, we must at present trust the German armies, the German generals, the German people, the persons who are undergoing untold sufferings in the field. To-day the Army is the people and the people is the Army.

Let us trust in the love of peace and the desire for peace of the Kaiser. Twice during recent years he maintained peace by his personal intervention. Of importance also is the declaration of the German Government which is now going through all the newspapers, and warns us that it is too early to discuss conditions of peace. We can accept this declaration absolutely. On the German side it is not a war of conquest. If it is necessary, the Social Democracy will stand at the side of the Kaiser and the Chancellor if it is a question of obtaining an honorable peace which does not carry with it the danger of the renewal of the war. . . .

What shall we do in order to transform the country according to our wishes. Shall we encourage the thought of a possible revolution after the war? This question must be answered with an unconditional negative. Even if we shook the foundations of the state by a revolution, the enemies whom we hope to fight down by an army, would press into our Fatherland and fall upon the disunited and torn people. That would be the end of the German realm and the German people. . . .

The German labor movement arose out of class conflicts. Class conflicts will continue to exist as long as there is a capitalistic mode of production. But there is also a common interest which ties the workers to the employers. Our working people live from industry. Especially from export trade. If this is destroyed, the worker will be more damaged than the employer. The capitalist can take his money away and put it into other undertakings, even abroad. The worker, if he has no more work, is ruined. It has been said, "What difference does it make whether the worker has any longer a living in Germany? He emigrates and expends his labor power elsewhere." That is no longer such a simple affair, and our German working people are too good to serve as fertilizer for foreign civilization. In spite of all conflicts with the present State, the worker is bound to it.

If it is said by a German worker that he wishes to see to

it that the German export trade does not go to pieces, he is told that that is imperialism, labor imperialism. Do not allow yourself to be driven into the horn of the dilemma by this word. You know what it means to the worker to have paying work. He does not care to have it taken away from him. If that is called imperialism, we advocate this imperialism.

Vorwaerts makes the following reply to this article, beginning with a brief summary of Heine's view, which indicates clearly enough *Vorwaerts'* own attitude towards it.

We are thankful to Comrade Heine that he develops his programme of the future in this way without circumlocution. With confidence in the Kaiser and Chancellor, he is opposed to independent party action for the present. After the war, according to his view, the Social Democracy will become a labor party striving for democratic and social political reforms. Talk about revolution is senseless. Our attitude towards the State must change. Militarism, which he believes has changed its character during this war, since Jews and Socialists may become officers, must see its just claims recognized by the Socialists. The rejection of the budget is senseless. The struggle about cheers for the Kaiser and participation in court functions (that is, Republicanism) is a thing of the past. We must win influence untroubled by so-called "principles."

We think that Comrade Heine, in these expressions, has given utterance to what is in fact the goal of a great part of our leadership. The attention of the masses of comrades and labor union members cannot be attracted soon enough to these efforts at transforming the Social Democracy into a nationalist Social Reform Party. For the masses must eventually decide.

CHAPTER XX

AUSTRIA

IF it were necessary to name the six most prominent Socialists of the world, the list would surely include the name of Victor Adler. In Austria, he stands alone as *the* Socialist leader. There is no German-speaking Socialist alive, except Kautsky, whose opinions have the same weight and authority. And his opinions have this advantage over Kautsky's, that they are not theoretical but are the views of an eminently practical statesman. At the same time, Adler's honesty cannot be questioned; he is no mere politician with hidden motives.

About the middle of February, the Austrian censor allowed Adler to make a long plea for peace (in the much censored *Arbeiter Zeitung*), which is probably the most important document on the Austro-German side since the beginning of the war—with the sole exception of the German Party statements of August 4th and December 2d (1914). This article will probably remain as the leading brief exposition of the German Socialist case, and it certainly would be indorsed by the overwhelming majority of those who support or sympathize with the German and Austrian Parties.

We give the article at length, with a few abbreviations, reserving only its concluding plea for peace for a later chapter (Chapter XXIX):

That which is in the minds of all nations, of all the hundreds of millions who are suffering under the unspeakable horrors of war, is the thought of peace. *We all desire to see it through; but we do not want only to keep firm to the end of*

our forces in warding off the enemy and in increasing the resistance of our country and our people, we also wish to be firm in every endeavor which brings us nearer to the end of the monstrous sufferings of the civilized world. Therefore, every sign denoting that this feeling is becoming more general from day to day must be carefully registered, examined, and weighed in all countries and in all classes.

The Social Democracy in Germany and in Austria has never neglected to call for peace, and whilst the class-conscious proletariat displayed all its resolution and efficiency to preserve the country from a defeat, and employed all its perseverance and experience in organizing in order to limit the distress caused by war, it has used every opportunity to express as passionately the desire for peace as it expressed the desire for victory. The Social Democrats of Servia must be thanked for having carried on, from the beginning till now, under particularly difficult circumstances, a self-sacrificing agitation in favor of peace. In England the most important Socialist party, the I. L. P., under the leadership of valiant Keir Hardie, has not ceased to wage a bitter war against the jingo war mongers, such as would be quite impossible in other less democratic countries. In Russia, *if we leave out of account in this connection the representatives of some groups who live abroad*, the official representatives of the Social Democratic party, its Duma members, have protested against the war, have not taken part in the voting, and are suffering for their heroic attitude in the prisons of the government of the Czar, who treads their immunity under foot; they are awaiting the verdict which is to be pronounced in the next few days. *Let us not speak of the Belgians, and let us speak as little of the Poles*. The unspeakable grief that has visited Belgium, the struggle for the whole future of a people which is conducted by the Poles, that struggle in which all the historic hopes dwell next to despair of seeing their country trampled under foot by million-headed armies, marks out Belgians and Poles for special consideration.

Quite different from this was, as far as we know, the attitude hitherto taken up by the French Socialists, whose speakers and newspapers expressed themselves against any peace which *did not bring the complete defeat of Germany and Austria*.

These last few months there has taken place a change,

which has manifested itself during these last few days in a series of signs which give one hopes that a certain change in the thoughts and moods of the Socialist groups of the Entente Powers is beginning to develop. Above all, in France. The French Socialists adopted from the very first minute of the war as a matter of course—as all of us Social Democrats did in all countries—the attitude that the country must be defended. *That was not only their right, but also their duty, as it was the right and duty of the German Social Democrats to declare in the German Reichstag on August 4th and December 2d*, with the greatest force and solemnity, that now that the war which they condemn was here, they would use their full force and spill their last drop of blood in defense of *German territory* and the German people, of which latter the German working class is the most valuable element.

And the Social Democratic group in Berlin has also spoken for us Austrians whom fate has indeed placed in a far less simple situation, and who, besides, had been deprived of the possibility of speaking. We have thus on both sides a good conscience as Social Democrats and as members of the International, which has always worked passionately against war and for the peace of the nations, but which has never prescribed for anybody the abandonment of his country as a proletarian duty. Every one of us felt in those terrible weeks of August the leaden weight of the tragic conflict, but nobody who does not regard the policy of the proletariat as a play with ideas in vacuum, and, above all, in a space denuded of human beings, could come to another decision or could ever expect another one. *If some comrades, in spite of all, criticised the decision of the German Social Democrats, and, be it noted, only their decision and not, for instance, also that of the French*, such a procedure must be regarded, with all respect due to every honest conviction, as the utterances of a naïve doctrinarianism, or, which would be worse, as a demagogic exploitation of the horror which, in face of all the terrors war has brought us, dominates all of us and the suffering masses in a daily increasing degree.

That game would long ago have come to an end if many false steps, which are even more inevitable in these than in other times, did not furnish malevolent critics with the desired material, and if a thorough defense against such demagogism were not impeded more by the press restrictions than that

demagoguery itself, which contents itself with uttering half its meaning, is not impeded by any sense of responsibility, and can finally take refuge in *the foreign press, which is completely unable to judge.*

Our French comrades have taken up the defense of their country with accustomed passion; they have looked upon it as the affair of the whole people, and naturally, as it is a democratic country, have also shared the responsibility of sending two members into the Cabinet. But that was not all. Whilst we Germans honestly strove to understand the French, whilst *we more particularly strove to comprehend the terrible position of the Belgian comrades*, whose unfortunate country had become the scene of the most horrible events, the other side made no attempt whatever to judge the German Social Democrats with any degree of impartiality and justice.

The attitude of the German and, of course, also of the Austrian Social Democracy, was denounced by the French Party press as a betrayal of the International; and it showed not the slightest understanding of the fact that we have done nothing but what the French Socialists had to do themselves.

But the French did not stop at that lack of impartial judgment; even the best of them indulged in language vying with that of the wildest jingoes and politicians of the "revanche" idea. Sembat, who less than a year ago published a book which is a real marvel of understanding for things German, and, above all, of courageous criticism of his own country, could not, if reports do not lie, express sufficiently his passionate rage against the Germans. He and Guesde have not denied that they intended to induce the Social Democrats of Italy and Roumania to come out against the neutrality of their countries and to work for war, which is an impossible policy for a Socialist, even if he be a minister of the national defense. And our old, worthy Vaillant, who has imbibed German culture as few Frenchmen have, wrote an article of such unbridled wildness in the *Humanité* that the falling back of this old fighter into all the extravagances of the Blanquism of his youth caused more astonishment than indignation. Dominated by the illusion that the cause of the Entente was the cause of democracy and Socialism and that the cause of the central European Powers was merely that of reaction and popular oppression, they finally come to convince

themselves of the belief in the Czar's manifestoes and the liberating mission of Russia. Every timid word spoken to make peace possible was passionately rejected at that time, up to about Christmas. Germany, "imperialism," a word which is not used in France in our sense, but which there means "Kaiserism," "must be crushed." Militarism, which they only saw in Germany, and not also in France—where they fought against it so bravely up to July—and not even in Russia and England, "must be finished by the Triple Entente; Germany must be humiliated, Austria must be annihilated; no peace before that is accomplished."

From the first passage underlined we see that neither the defeat nor the partial disintegration of Austria is desired by Adler or those Austrian Socialists he represents, that is, the Germans, Hungarians, and Poles, and a part of those of the other Austrian nationalities. We see also that he does not want Germany to lose any "German territory," which covers Alsace-Lorraine and German Poland. Finally, we see that he indorses wholly the stand of the majority of the German Party.

On the other hand, he also indorses the stand of those English Socialists who, on the contrary, opposed the war after it was declared. He approves the Servians and Russians, but throws aside those famous Russian leaders, Trotsky, Plechanoff, and Axelrod, who desire a French victory (see Chapter XXIV) on the ground that their prominence drove them into exile, or as Adler says, because they "live abroad." Adler knows that the leaders of the pro-German faction are also in exile.

Adler does not believe the progress of humanity and Socialism will be advanced by the defeat of Germany and Austria. His attack on the French Socialists, on the critics of the Germans, and on the foreign press, which, he says, "is not able to judge," is, therefore, impassioned. It leads him to two extremely important misstatements.

It is true that Vaillant attached some importance to the liberal promises of the Russian Government. This is not true, as Adler implies, of the French Minister Guesde (see Chapter XXII) or of the French Socialists generally, who, including Vaillant, attacked the Czar for his oppressive domestic measures within a few days of the time when Adler wrote (see Chapter XXIX).

Moreover, the French have not demanded "the humiliation of Germany" or "the complete defeat of Germany and Austria." Adler is not able to quote such expressions against them. He himself quotes the real expressions used by the French, that "Kaiserism must be crushed," and "German militarism" overthrown.

This does not justify him in saying, however, that they now see militarism "only" in Germany, or that they see no militarism in Russia or France. Their view is only that Prussian militarism is a greater evil than French militarism, and that it is largely the cause of French militarism—not wholly, however, since they place part of the blame on French capitalists.

That this is, indeed, the French view will be seen in Chapter XXII. It is of the utmost importance to note that Adler and many other German Socialists have another interpretation of it. But this interpretation cannot be allowed to pass without referring the reader to the original French documents.

Der Kampf is the leading periodical of the Austrian Socialists, with the sole exception of the *Arbeiter Zeitung*. The number of January, 1915, contains an important article on the German Social Democracy and the War, by Friedrich Adler, which at the time of publication undoubtedly expresses the opinion of a large part of the Austrian Socialists, not wholly in agreement with Victor Adler. The remarkable feature of the

article is its conclusion, where the proposition is made of an alternative course which the German Party might have followed with safety with regard to the war loan of the 4th of August—a course which Friedrich Adler believes would have been more in accord with Socialist principles than the one which was actually taken. The argument is as follows:

That the German proletariat would do their duty as soldiers was to be expected, but that the German working class as a party would suddenly and in all formality make a truce with the ruling class and join with them in common action was a surprise for friend and foe.

What was felt to be a shattering of the ideology of Social Democracy, a surrender of Socialism, was not the fact that the proletariat opposed one another in the trenches, but that in every country they united with the ruling classes. The point of departure for all the present problems of the party is not the war between the peoples, which in given conditions had undoubtedly to be recognized as *vis major*, but the peace between the classes.

The break-up of the International was joyously announced by enemies and bewailed by many comrades. A closer examination, however, was bound to lead to the conclusion that it was not the International that had received a blow, but chiefly *the predominance in it of the German Social Democracy*.

When the war brought the party into an entirely new situation there came about the deepest disillusionment among these comrades for whom the German Social Democracy embodied the highest ideal of the party movement, the model Class Party.

But much more unexpected than this discouragement of some [comrades] was the satisfaction and jubilation of others. Whence did the latter get their new sentiments? How came they overnight to a new knowledge, new feelings, a new goal? If one searches more closely among the proceedings of German Party Congresses one finds that these aberrations do not appear to be accidental and independent of one another, but in their entirety represent a clear development of one section of the party. If one reads over to-day the extended debate

in the Essen Congress of 1907, of the well-known speech of Noske, in which he guaranteed that in case of war he would himself take a gun on his shoulder, one sees with a growing astonishment that those sentiments which surprised us in August were already present at that time in this section of the party.

As unlikely as it sounds, the difficulties which the German Socialists have come upon, arose in no small part from the fact that they were not theoretically prepared. They were as little prepared as the Socialist Parties in other countries. Much was said about the dangers of imperialism, and, at the Chemnitz Congress of 1912, Comrade Haase made an excellent report. But the *acute* political interest and agitation *against war* never allowed the question to rise: "*What position shall Social Democracy take if war breaks out in spite of everything?*"

And so it happened that the pride of the German Social Democracy, *its schooling in Socialist principles*, when tested, failed in the most depressing way. Bourgeois phrases were taken up, and often no effort was made at all to bring them into relation with Socialist principles. But the Social Democracy can maintain the respect of its enemies as well as that of the comrades only if it succeeds in representing its acts as a result of its *own* views of the world. If Social Democrats take their point of departure suddenly and directly from the principle, "Deutschland, Deutschland ueber Alles," then it does not need the contempt of enemies to disclose their stultification. The Socialist Party must explain its conduct and try to bring it into connection with its old and long-fought standpoint, "Der Sozialismus ueber Alles, ueber Alles in der Welt."

The German Social Democracy, like that of all other countries, has established with perfect clearness the fact that the responsibility for the outbreak of the war does not lie upon it, that it did not wish the war, and did everything in its power to prevent it. But just as it rejected all its responsibility for the war, so it can by no means take upon itself *the responsibility for defeat*. Its duty, first of all, was to make use of the old right of an opposition party to place responsibility. Its duty was to bring the condition of affairs into full consciousness, in order that the ruling class, they whose policies are actually carried out, who prepared, began, and executed these policies, should also bear full responsibility for

all of their results. Therefore, as soon as the prevention of war was beyond its power it could of course not check the raising of soldiers or of taxes. The war policy might claim unhindered everything that the proletariat had to give. The bodies of the workers as well as the pennies of their families. The only thing which ought not to be surrendered was the Socialist policy itself. The party ought not to take upon itself any responsibility for the results of the policies of the ruling class. . . .

On the 4th of August the German Reichstag group had to vote on the war credits. Parliamentary votes are not suited for differentiation along the lines of principles. As so often happens, there were united in this vote a whole group of meanings. A "yes" might be interpreted as an approval of the politics of the ruling class. A "no" might be pointed out as damaging the power of military resistance of Germany. The Social Democrats could take upon themselves neither the responsibility for the politics of the ruling class nor for its failures. . . .

At least we think that the Reichstag group had the opportunity to clarify the nature of this war to a far higher degree than they did. They could have demanded a public and clear answer from the government to the following question: "Is the government prepared solemnly to declare that for it also this war is solely a war of defense, that even in the case of victory it will renounce all conquests of foreign-speaking territory?" *Everybody knows that the German Government would not have been able to concede this declaration, that it would forthwith have renounced the votes of the Social Democrats.* For, like the governments of other countries, it is the government of a capitalistic state. The International of labor can distinguish between defense and conquest. In capitalism the war of defense is inseparably tied to the war of aggression. For the conquering power there is no choice. Imperialism demands its due. What was undertaken as a war of defense inevitably in the hour of victory turns around into a war of conquest.

A course is here suggested which would have led the German Party to *abstain* from voting the war loans—which is a condemnation of the course actually taken.

CHAPTER XXI

GREAT BRITAIN

THE remark made in Part III as to the present position of the British Socialists, applies here also. We are confronted both with a variety of Socialist Parties, and with what has been regarded as a changing attitude on the part of some of them. For example, one of the leaders of the Independent Labor Party and the Labor Party, James Ramsay MacDonald, has made a number of important declarations, some of which have been said to conflict. As Mr. MacDonald denies that his anti-war opinions have been moderated, we reproduce them at sufficient length so that the reader may decide the question for himself. In showing the attitude of the Labor Party, we are hampered by the absence of an official declaration, prevented by certain articles of the Constitution which protect the minority. There can be no doubt of its position, however, in view of the Manifesto of the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress, and the declaration of Labor leaders signed by a large majority of the most prominent names.

We do not reproduce any documents of the Fabian Society, but we give a very important editorial of the *New Statesman*, which is edited by Sidney Webb and Bernard Shaw, as well as a brief summary of the views of Shaw. Though Shaw does not represent any organization, and has no official status in the Socialist movement, his position is important on account of the vast amount of discussion it has created. We reproduce, in this section also, some manifestoes of the vari-

ous parties on the matter of recruiting, not because we wish to take up this subject in itself, but only because these manifestoes throw light on the position of these parties toward the war. Finally, we give a report of the speech of James Larkin in America as organizer and chief founder of the Irish Labor Party; his publicly expressed desire for the victory of German arms was an important event, the most extreme point reached by the anti-war Socialists of Great Britain.

THE INDEPENDENT LABOR PARTY

The Independent Labor Party view is expressed in the *Labor Leader*. We quote from two editorials, the first written at the beginning of August, the second at the end of October. The first concerns itself not only with the Russian peril, but also with the menace of British navalism.

The *Labor Leader* says that the motive of the British Government was merely to crush Britain's commercial rival:

German militarism is, of course, arrogant, and no one hates it more than we do. But to suggest that all the war lords, naval or military, are resident in Prussia, and none in England, is either prejudice or cant. We are fighting Germany not because we think the mailed fist of her military caste is a danger to Europe or to small peoples or to German democracy. We are fighting Germany because we are jealous and afraid of her increasing power; for that reason, and that reason only. If we were in this war to uphold European civilization, the liberties of minor nationalities, and the freedom of the German masses, should we be allies of Russia? The defeat of Germany means the victory of Russia, and a Europe under the heel of Russia would be worse tenfold than a Europe under the heel of Germany.

It is all very well to speak of Germany's military arrogance, but what of Britain's naval arrogance? At The Hague Conference in 1907 the German representatives sup-

ported a proposal by which merchant vessels would, had it been accepted, have been made immune from attack in time of war. Because Great Britain had a supreme navy, the British delegates at the conference opposed this proposal; they knew that the British fleet, armed to the teeth and patrolling the trade routes of the world, could make short shrift of the unprotected ships of other nations peacefully carrying food, and the material and products of trade, from one land to another. The defeat of the proposal to remove merchant vessels from the stage of war made it inevitable that Germany should build a strong navy to protect her trading vessels.

The second article, of October 29th, deals chiefly with the violation of Belgian neutrality, and demands the fullest possible indemnity—a conclusion with which, as we have shown, German Socialists do not agree. The *Labor Leader* does not believe, however, that the war will lessen militarism or that the British Government can be relied upon to protect the rights of small nations:

The action of Germany in violating the neutrality of Belgium we passionately condemn, and our hearts bleed for the Belgian people in the terrible disaster which has befallen them. *When the war is over we shall urge that Germany must make the fullest possible reparation for the crime she has committed*, and the independence of Belgium must be wholly recovered. But, again, we cannot pretend that our own country is entirely free from blame. More than this, the British record in respect to small nations is not so clean that we can afford to adorn ourselves in any robe of righteousness. We have retained our power over Egypt, although we pledged ourselves in 1882 to evacuate that land when the native rising of that time, which threatened the security of the loans of British financiers, had been suppressed. We have encouraged the people of Persia to submit to the tyranny of Russia, although in the agreement of 1907 we pledged ourselves to maintain the independence and integrity of their nation. We have supported France in her violation of the independence of Morocco. With the memory of these crimes so fresh in our minds, can we accept unreservedly the protestations of our own government?

With these facts before us we cannot possibly justify this war. We are not pro-German. We are not anti-British. We are pro-peace. We are anti-war. Militarism, whether it be German or British, we hate; the intrigues of diplomats, whether they be German or British, we hate; the machinations of armament firms, whether they be German or British, we hate. We wish to see German militarism overthrown, but only the German people can accomplish that—and they were well on the way to doing it when this war broke out. Virtue cannot be forced on an individual, nor can it be forced on a nation. *If the Allies are to defeat German militarism, they can only do so by a more powerful militarism, and the grave danger is that this war, so far from ending the menace of militarism, will extend the rigor and tyranny of Germany's militarism to all the nations of Europe.* That is the disaster with which we are faced. It will only be averted by the democracies of Europe shattering forever the power of the militarists, the diplomats, and the armament makers. (Our italics.)

The quarterly publication of the I. L. P., the *Socialist Review*, feels that the Socialist Parties that have supported the war have abandoned both Socialism and Internationalism. It declares:

The Socialist movement could not prevent the governments from declaring war. No reproach can fairly rest with it on that score. But how has the movement itself stood the shock of the war? Has our great International proved true to its principles, proved worthy of our hopes in it, now that the first real testing hour in its history has come?

Alas! No. The International has given way lamentably under the strain. Its ties have snapped, the chief national sections have ranged themselves with their governments in the fratricidal strife. For the present, the International is become a spirit, a hope, a faith, a cause, deserted of all but a remnant of the millions of all nations whose love and enthusiasm but a month or two ago made Socialism seem the most powerful and glorious embodiment of human brotherhood the world had ever known. Like Christianity, free thought, science, art, literature, education—like all the great expected means of human deliverance, international Socialism has, at

this stage of its growth, at any rate, failed to endow men with invulnerability to the appeal of war.

The Socialist movement could not prevent war; it strove hard to avert it, and is in no degree responsible for its outbreak. The failure of international Socialism does not lie there. It lies simply in the fact that it has not been able to prevent the Socialist leaders and rank and file in the belligerent countries from participating in a war which they believed to be wrong and strove to prevent, and from murdering their fellow Socialists on the battlefield at the behest of their rulers. International Socialism which cannot prevent Socialists murdering each other and inflicting death, wounds, and misery on defenseless women and children, and in wreaking awful havoc upon cities and precious buildings, *is not international Socialism at all, is not Socialism at all. The international Socialist movement has failed, therefore, because its internationalism and its Socialism gave way even as Christianity and culture gave way at the first blast of the capitalist trump of war. (Our italics.)*

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD

(Chairman of the British Labor Party)

We give considerable space to the opinions of Mr. MacDonald and make a number of citations for several reasons. He was chairman of the largest labor organization in Great Britain, the Labor Party, when the war broke out, and he spoke for that organization at the session of Parliament at which war was declared. He is also one of the leaders of British Socialism. And in the next place, he has written and spoken more copiously on the war than any of the other British leaders, and his pronouncements are distinguished by the characteristic that they deal with facts and take up many different phases of the situation. Finally, his position has led to a very considerable controversy. By September, as his letters and speeches to his Leicester constituents (which we shall quote) show, he favored ac-

tive support of the war; his opponents among the Socialists claim that this meant a fundamental change of opinion, which he denied. We have naturally been forced to give his expressions, therefore, at some length, and without comment.

We first quote MacDonald's pessimistic views as to the probable results of the war from the *Labor Leader* in August:

I want to go right down to the foundation of things. German military autocracy was bad for Europe—so is British secret diplomacy. But to try and break either by a war is stupid and criminal. Is it really true that in *Anno Domini* 1914 the only way to dethrone the German military caste is for Britain, France, and Russia to fight it? It is not. The end cannot be secured in that way, and, if it could, the price is too dear. I would rather that militarism had flourished for another ten years than that we should have sent thousands of men along the path of privation, hate, and pain to death, that we should have clouded thousands of happy firesides, that we should have undone our social reform work for a generation, that we should have let loose in Europe all the lusts of battle and all the brutalities of war.

And that is not the full price. For a generation or so Europe will be paying for this war in an arrested civilization and a weakened population, an increased poverty. We are but replacing one European menace by a greater one. We hope to remove the fiend with blood-splashed foot from Berlin and take in exchange the dreaded rider on the white horse as the monarch of Europe. . . .

Well, when Germany is down who will be up? We can gain little. A colony or two to add to our useless burdens perhaps. France will also have a colony or two, maybe, and Alsace-Lorraine. It may or may not claim money payments. This will rankle in the German heart just as the loss of Alsace-Lorraine rankled in the French heart. But with strong democratic movements these things might be adjusted in a scheme of lasting peace. With Russia the case is different. It, too, will want something, but above all its autocracy will be rehabilitated, its military system will be strengthened, it

will become the dominating power in Europe. No invader can touch it, as Napoleon found to his cost, and as Germany to-day assumes in its scheme of military tactics. It will press in upon us in Asia. *Our defense of India will be a much bigger problem than it is now*; China will be threatened; Persia will go. *It will rivet upon us the Japanese Alliance, one of the greatest political menaces to our imperial unity.* Above all, it will revitalize the pan-Slav movement, and if ever Europe is to be made subject to a new barbarism this movement is to do it. I know that if the pan-Slav movement could be democratized it might be harmless. But the government of the Slav is just that which will yield last of all to democratic influences. (Our italics.)

MacDonald here reaffirms his well-known opinion in favor of maintaining British control over India, and also adopts the anti-Japanese views of the British colonials (see his volumes, *Socialism and Government*).

Several statements of MacDonald to his constituents in Leicester show his position on the crucial subject of recruiting. The first, from a speech made about the first of September, is introductory and connects his views about the causes of the war to his views about its prosecution. The second is from a letter to the Mayor of Leicester dated September 11th, the third from an article published in the *Leicester Pioneer* on September 24.

His speech in Leicester is reported as follows:

The explanation of the war lay in the fact that militarism had heaped burdens upon the backs of the peoples of the nations until every nation, on account of its burdens, had become more and more familiar with the idea that it was better to fight and be done with it than to go on suspecting each other and piling up more burdens in the shape of armies and navies.

We are not fighting for the independence of Belgium, he continued. We are fighting because we are in the Triple Entente; because the policy of the Foreign Office for a number of years has been anti-German, and because that policy has

been conducted by secret diplomacy on lines of creating alliances in order to preserve the balance of power. We are fighting because we have prejudices against a very strong commercial rival. It is our duty to put an end to these things as quickly as possible.

We are in it, and we must see it through. There is nobody who admires Germany more than I do. We owe far too much to it, and it is sad that we, being Britons and loving our own country best, must hope that we shall not be defeated, worsened, or disgraced. Is it not horrible that the counterpart of that desire is that this great nation of Germany should be worsened, defeated, disgraced? How one almost hates a statesmanship that has brought us into this. Don't let us forfeit any respect for fellow German workingmen. Let us keep our hearts so tender to them that afterwards they and we can meet together and think hand in hand—they of their sorrow and we of ours.

Whatever our views may be of the origin of the war, Mr. MacDonald concluded, we must go through with it, and he appealed to all labor organizations to take their part in the social work throughout the country connected with the present needs in this time of crisis. It was significant that the principles of Socialism had come to the country's aid. History would record its judgment of their views. Now was the time for deeds, and everything must be subordinate to pulling things together.

His open letter to the Mayor of Leicester went a step further and expressed the necessity of British victory. On this occasion he wrote:

My opinions regarding the causes of the war are pretty well known, except in so far as they have been misrepresented, but we are in it. It will work itself out now. Might and spirit will win, and incalculable political and social consequences will follow upon victory.

Victory, therefore, must be ours. England is not played out. Her mission is not accomplished. She can, if she would, take the place of esteemed honor among the democracies of the world, and if peace is to come with healing on her wings, the democracies of Europe must be her guardians. There should be no doubt about that.

On September 24th in the *Leicester Pioneer*, Mr. MacDonald wrote:

On one point I wish to be quite clear. I stated it when I spoke in the House of Commons on August 3d, but other controversies and interests have obscured it. We could not afford, either from the point of view of honor or of interest, to see Germany occupy Belgium. The war that comes nearest having a divine justification is the war in which a great and mighty state engages to protect a small nation. From that position I have never receded. In the controversies that have been raised I have doubted whether, when our diplomacy is judged with the whole of the facts before the judges, it will come well out of its trial on that point; but that, when the popular sentiment of the country is judged, it will come out clean and fine so far as Belgium is concerned, I am quite convinced.

These quotations show with sufficient definition MacDonald's attitude towards the prosecution of the war. But, as we have said, he has touched upon phases of the subject not discussed by other Socialist leaders, and since his opinions are those of a large Socialist group we shall refer to several later expressions.

The next quotations show, in very condensed form, MacDonald's position toward the Socialist Parties of the Continent. The first, containing his explanation of their conduct, is more or less apologetic, the second gives his criticisms:

When the war broke out everybody moralized on the failure of international Socialism. That was only in keeping with the general ignorance in which the war found the country. Nobody who knew the International was in any doubt on the following points:

(1) If Russia attacked Germany the German Social Democrats would fight whole-heartedly. The Russian Government is distrusted and detested by every Socialist in the world. Bebel and other German leaders have said repeatedly that they would fight Russia. That surprise should be expressed

that they should agree to attack France is only a proof of how little the European situation has been studied by the British people. An attack on France, since the Franco-Russian Alliance, was the first move in a war against Russia, and everybody knew it. A Cabinet Minister years ago said to me: "Germany must attack Russia through Paris."

(2) The French Socialists in such a war would help to repel the German invasion, first of all because it is an invasion, and secondly because they fear Prussianism.

(3) The Russian Socialists would be crushed at the very outset of the war, and their influence would be of no account.

(4) The British Labor Party would be divided.

(5) The Belgian Labor Party would merge in the government because their country being invaded, they would be covered by the Kautsky declaration at Amsterdam that in the event of a foreign army landing in a country the Socialists of that country would be justified in joining a coalition government of defense.*

But MacDonald by no means excuses the Continental Socialists; he blames equally the French and the Germans. We place his most extreme accusations in italics:

The activities of the European Socialists and labor groups, before the war, were directed to building up an international Socialist understanding so close and intimate that it would in the end have prevented diplomatists and military castes from bringing war upon Europe. We knew quite well that such an organization would be useless unless it reached a point of efficiency which was still far off when this war broke out. It is so easy for diplomatists to commit countries in such a way that their very existence is jeopardized and then turn to the citizens and say: "Unless you fight, the enemy will batter down your gates and reduce you to a state of subjection." In such circumstances peace organizations are shattered and the desire for peace becomes little more than academic. That is actually what has happened. Twenty-four hours before soldiers began to march, the peoples of Europe were at peace and harbored no hostile feelings against each other. Twenty-four hours after the soldiers marched the peoples were

* The *Socialist Review* (October-December).

enemies. Looking back at events, the position that some of us have taken up regarding Socialist method, both national and international, is fully vindicated. The German Social Democrats kept themselves far too much aloof from other German movements making in their direction and were thus never able to use their enormous backing in the country to destroy Prussian conservatism and its military organization. They were too much concerned in far-off events to pay that attention to the immediate political situation which was necessary. Had they done the latter *they could have overthrown Prussianism in Prussia* and with that would have gone Prussianism in the rest of Germany.

Our French comrades, on the other hand, *acquiesced too readily in the Russian alliance*, which was being exploited by the ordinary political parties for ends that were purely militarist and chauvinist. They talked in a vague way of ending war by international strikes and omitted to attack the political circumstances which made any thought of such a strike an utter impossibility. When the war broke out, they were supplied with the *excuse* for entering upon it that their country was invaded and they were compelled to join hands with everybody else in repelling the invader.

We, ourselves, in Great Britain, have, I believe, the best record of all. Whilst we were working for peace in a general way, we declined to support in any particular the policy and proposals of those making war. Our feebleness consisted in the fact that Great Britain was asleep in foreign matters. Our insular position has had the effect of cutting us off from continental affairs. Our people are indifferent to Foreign Office transactions and are perfectly content to allow their foreign relationships to be discussed and settled in secret by men who are not called upon to explain what they are doing and what they have in mind. The result has been that we never have been able to get up popular interest in foreign policy, and when the war broke out the minds of our people were quite unprepared to consider why we were involved, or what the issues of the war were to be.* (Our italics.)

* The *Intercollegiate Socialist* (December-January).

KEIR HARDIE

Keir Hardie is regarded as the founder of the Independent Labor Party. Though, like MacDonald, a supporter also of the Labor Party, he is often found in conflict with the majority of the latter organization. He represents the I. L. P. as such, and his position is, therefore, more radical than that of the Labor Party or of MacDonald, who has on more than one occasion voted with the Labor Party against the I. L. P. (of which organization, however, he is also one of the leading members).

An early statement of Hardie's in the *Labor Leader* is remarkable, in that it goes so far in its attack on the pro-war party of England as to seem to indorse the central position of the pro-war party of Germany.

Let anybody take a map of Europe and look at the position of Germany: on the one side Russia with her millions of trained soldiers and unlimited population to draw upon [its traditional policy for over a hundred years has been to reduce Prussia to impotence, so that the Slav may reign supreme], on the other side France, smarting under her defeat and the loss of her two provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, in 1870. For a number of years past these two militarisms have had a close and cordial alliance. What was it that brought the Czardom of Russia into alliance with the free republic of France? One object, and one alone, to crush Germany between them. German armaments, and the German army, were primarily intended to protect herself and her interests against these two open enemies.

A second article sent to the *American Socialist* (official organ of the American Party) in December, bristles with important statements—for Keir Hardie has been the most eminent of labor members of the British Parliament for the last twenty years.

Apparently, some of these statements are identical with those of the German Government itself; nor will

any Socialist deny that others of these utterances represent the prevailing Socialist standpoint. This is especially true of Hardie's opening expressions with regard to Russia.

Let us look for a moment at the reasons which led the party to come to its decision anent the policy which led to the war.

We fight as the allies of France and Russia. At the close of the Russo-Japanese War in 1906 the Russian Empire was bankrupt in every sense of the word. Her reason for making peace with Japan was more financial than military. Russia for over half a century had been the great outcast state among European nations.

From the days of the Crimean War in the middle of last century down to 1906 not a cent of money could be got on loan in Europe to aid the finances of Russia. She was loathed and abhorred, not only for her aggressiveness, but also for her treatment of her subject races, such as Finland and Poland, and her red-handed, ruthless suppression of every reform movement.

Who is there that has not shuddered over the tales of Siberia, over the tortures and unspeakable atrocities of her prisons and dungeons? Prince Kropotkin in a damp stone dungeon under the sea, where his very gums rotted, and his teeth fell from his mouth! That was Russia!

At the close of the war with Japan, as I have said, she was bankrupt financially, and an outcast from the nations of Europe; successful revolution was being waged within her borders, her army and navy were honeycombed with sedition, and prepared to join with the revolutionary movement in the overthrow of the Czar and all he stood for.

Who, then, came to the rescue of Russia, loaned her money, gave her moral prestige, and a standing among the nations of Europe? Great Britain. Why was it done? To re-establish that old worn-out fetish of what is known as the "balance of power." Our government formed its understanding and laid its plans with Russia, the monster of iniquity, and with France, to check the growth of Germany.

Six years ago Mr. Lloyd George declared in a speech that Germany in creating a navy was only doing so for her own defense, and that England in her place would do exactly the

same. *The "German menace" had no existence until after we had formed our alliance with Russia.* That was the origin of the present war, and the whole policy of Great Britain since, and its secret diplomacy, have been on the side of creating the circumstances and the situation which made the war inevitable.

One of the most popular justifications for the war in England has been the cry that we are out to protect Belgium. If that were the object it has failed. The neutrality of Belgium, which was guaranteed by treaty in 1839, was not made with the consent of, but rather in the teeth of the most bitter opposition from, the Belgian nation. That treaty was not made to protect Belgium, but to suit the plans of the great nations of that day. *When the Belgians were struggling so heroically in the defense of their country at the beginning of the present war, neither French nor British troops were there to help them to protect their neutrality and independence.*

Luxemburg was also crossed by German troops. Not a stone was displaced, nor the hair of a single head injured, nor was the fact more than merely mentioned in the British press, although Luxemburg is a protected state exactly the same as Belgium. And when one remembers Britain's attitude towards small states in South Africa, in Persia, in Egypt, in India, and elsewhere, it requires a very imaginative person to swallow the absurd statement that we are at war to protect the rights and liberties of Belgium. *As a matter of fact, France has simply used Belgium to suit her own military necessities, and our Foreign Office has aided and abetted the crime.*

I now turn for a moment to the position taken by the Independent Labor Party, which, as it is now universally known, is a Socialist organization affiliated to the Labor Party, on the same basis as are the great trade unions of England.

It cordially approved the policy set forth in the resolutions of the Labor Party [of August 5th and 6th—see above]. When, however, it was invited to take part in a recruiting campaign with the two capitalist parties, appearing on the same platform with them, and making itself responsible for all the blatant nonsense that is being talked as a reason for being at war, it at once declined.

It felt that, under the circumstances, to have done anything else would have been inconsistent with its position as a section

of the international Socialist movement. It realized that the object of those who promoted the war in Europe was certainly not love for Socialism or the working class.

We knew that already the growth of the Socialist Parties, particularly in France and Germany, was speedily bringing about the downfall of militarism in both countries, that in France the government could not be carried on without the sanction at least of the Socialist Party in the Chamber of Deputies, and the recent action of the government in extending the period of service in the army from two to three years had for all practical purposes been abandoned.

In Germany also there was a corresponding growth. When the German army was increased the only way in which the proposal could be financed was to place a direct levy upon capital, instead of the usual terms. Five years, ten years from now, and the Socialists of those two countries would have been in a position to compel their respective governments to settle such outstanding questions as those of Alsace and Lorraine and come to an amicable understanding one with the other. But that outlook has gone past forever, and capitalist militarism is giving itself a fresh lease of power, not only in France and Germany, but also in England.

In France the reactionary forces, Royalist and Catholic, are laying their plans for power at the end of the war. In England Lord Roberts has declared that the war makes inevitably for conscription. Russia is a great territory, rich in mineral and other forms of wealth, but poor and without capital. Germany, like England, has had great prosperity and an ever expanding trade. *The British manufacturer wants to "smash" German trade and get it for himself.*

The British and French millionaires want Russia opened up so that they may find fresh investments for their ever increasing wealth. And so they employ skilled diplomats, and create armies and navies to achieve their ends, and all the time they are fooling the workers in supporting their political parties and slaughtering each other when called upon to do so. We Socialists of the Independent Labor Party will oppose the whole system, whether in war or peace.

I conclude by saying that Great Britain is not in this war to protect Belgium, or to put down militarism. Our Foreign Office, in secret and unknown to the nation, so involved us in agreements with Russia and France in order to preserve the

ill-omened balance of power, that, as the official documents clearly prove, we were practically forced to join in war the moment it suited the purpose of Russia that there should be war.

Russia is the one country that will emerge from the conflict with increased prestige. It is the one power that can crush Germany, and no one will say it is fighting for democracy. (Our italics.)

H. M. HYNDMAN

The position of the British Socialist Party, as our documents of Part III demonstrated, is radically different from that of the I. L. P., and its best-known leader, H. M. Hyndman, has been a life-long antagonist of Keir Hardie. With the well-known Socialist writer and editor, Robert Blatchford (author of *Merrie England* and editor of the *Clarion*), he has for years preached the necessity of being prepared against Germany and the need of conscription—not only against Germany, but also in order to make of every citizen a trained soldier who could be used in the future for the purposes of a Socialist revolution. As Hyndman has been a special student of foreign relations we quote briefly from three of his statements. The first shows that, although he agrees with Hardie, in large part, as to Russia, he disagrees radically as to Belgium. He writes:

“We of the B. S. P., however completely some of us may have been convinced for years past of the detestable truculence of German militarism, were at one with the extremest of pacifists in our determination to avert war, if it was at all possible to do so. That is the reason why, as a party, we took our full share in the great peace demonstration in Trafalgar Square. That is why we joined with our comrades in every European country in their declarations against war, as injurious to the workers of the world.”

But after the invasion of Belgium the party's position, like

that of the French and Belgian Parties, was reversed. Hyndman continues:

"It has been my own personal opinion for many years that, had we acted in the best interests of humanity, Great Britain would have kept up an overwhelming navy and established long ago a citizen army on democratic lines. The objects at which Germany was aiming were quite clear. Had we pursued this policy and refrained from any secret agreements such as those to which the Czar referred in his letter, I am firmly convinced that peace would have been maintained, that we should not be calling, in semi-panic, for 500,000 untrained men, that we should not now be engaged in an offensive and defensive war in co-operation with Russia, and that we should have been in a very much better position than we are to-day to uphold our treaties, to defend the small powers, and to prevent France from being crushed.

"As it is, we cannot disguise from ourselves that, though everybody must eagerly desire the final defeat of Germany, in view of the crime committed in Belgium, nevertheless the success of Russia, which must inevitably follow, will be a misfortune to the civilized world."

Hyndman attributes the war to the German military caste. In an open letter to American Socialists, published in the *New York Times*, he says:

I observe that many American Socialists speak and write as if the war now being waged against militarist Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary, were what they call a "capitalist war." Perhaps you will allow me, as a revolutionary Social Democrat of thirty-four years' standing, as a member of the International Socialist Bureau for the first ten years of its existence, and as a lifelong opponent alike of British imperialism, French chauvinism, and Russian Czarism, to say that, on the side of the Powers of the Entente, it is nothing of the kind.

Hyndman asserts that in Great Britain at least not only Socialists, but the representatives of capital, were for peace.

Doctrinaire assertions by well-meaning champions of international working-class solidarity cannot alter plain facts.

Germany's great war is avowedly a war of aggrandizement on the part of her militarist caste. This is not disguised by the leaders of that caste. They hate the German industrialists and financiers, favored by the Kaiser, almost as much as they hate the German Social Democrats, denounced by the Kaiser. Germany as a whole (and not impossibly the Kaiser himself) was dragged into war by the Junker territorialists, not, assuredly, by the parvenu capitalists.

Do any American Socialists really imagine that veterans like Vaillant, Guesde, Vandervelde, Anseele, and others do not know when they are engaged in a capitalist war? Old and intimate friends of Marx, Engels, and Lassalle, of Blanqui, Lafargue, Delescluze, de Paepe, and Verrycken, men who fought in the Commune of Paris, who went through the dangerous struggles against Boulanger and the anti-Dreyfusards, and who upheld the great general strike in Belgium, are, I venture to think, quite capable of judging as to whether their present action is for or against the real interests of the international working classes of the world. I, at least, have no hesitation in declaring that, in my opinion, our French and Belgian and British anti-Prussian Socialists are absolutely in the right; and if I were not 72 years old I would go out and fight myself.

With Germany relieved from militarist megalomania and formed into a powerful federated republic, we may cheerfully anticipate the establishment of the United States of Europe; giving full outlet to democracy and Socialism and erecting at the same time a permanent bulwark against Russia should that vast empire, as some fear, threaten in turn the liberties of the nations.

In the *New Review* for February (1915), Hyndman hails the present struggle as a people's war:

This war of ours is, nevertheless, a people's war. The manifestoes of practically all the working-class organizations in Great Britain, the appearance of the labor leaders on public platforms as recruiting agents, and the march to the colors of a formidable array of trade unionists, who were earning good wages, prove this beyond dispute. The unions alone have sent between 150,000 and 200,000 men to take part in the fray. These men have assuredly not been forced into the ranks by

severe poverty. They have gone forward, as they believe, to fight the fight of liberty against despotism, of peace and fair play against treacherous brutality. As a Social Democrat I marvel that men so plucky and so determined as they are showing themselves to be have not long since decided to fight a far greater fight against the tyranny of capital here at home. But disappointing as this may be, we have to look at things as they are, and, to my mind, the miners and other trade unionists, taking the present momentous issue by itself, have chosen the better part. They have decided, that is to say, that humanity and the world at large would fare worse if Germany and Austria should win in this terrible struggle than if the Allies should be victorious. They would probably come to the same conclusion and would go forth to fight on the same side if they were all of them to-day class-conscious Socialists. For the success of Prussianized militarist Germany would set back democracy as well as Social Democracy in Europe for fully fifty years.

"Force is the midwife of progress," said Marx, "delivering the old society pregnant with the new." But force, as history too sadly tells us, is also the abortionist of reaction, strangling the new society in the womb of the old. The force of militarist Germany is the social abortionist of to-day. Destroy it before it can accomplish its hideous task!

BERNARD SHAW

It is needless to remind the reader that Shaw's articles about the war raised a vast amount of discussion; but it may be pointed out that they were even more important to Socialists than to the general public. Shaw's statements are undeniably the longest and most elaborate presentation of the Socialist case, and certainly quite eclipse all other presentations which have reached the general public. Many Socialists accept Shaw's view almost entirely. Perhaps an equal number reject the larger part of it; nevertheless Shaw writes as a Socialist, and some of his main positions are acceptable to Socialists without exception.

Shaw has issued very many statements about the war. The earlier ones, however, were unconnected, if not unrelated. He attracted universal attention only with the publication of his *Common Sense About the War*, in the *New Statesman*, and in the *New York Times* in November. This pamphlet, however, was so lengthy and involved and contained such a mass of material and arguments, that it was widely misunderstood. Aside from the attacks made upon it by non-Socialists, or by nationalistic Socialists of Great Britain, many friendly criticisms showed that Shaw had not succeeded in fixing the public attention on his main points. This is practically acknowledged by Shaw himself, in the later publication of a number of explanatory articles, some of them better received than his first statement.

It is on these later restatements that we chiefly rely in our quotations, both because they are his briefest and latest formulations, and because his copyright on his *Common Sense About the War* forbids any but the most cursory use of that document.

Shaw's statements were so numerous that we have arranged the material by topics rather than by sources. It suffices to say that they were all issued in November or December, and are taken for the most part from the *New Statesman*.

Shaw announces himself as favoring war under certain conditions; he attacks the British Government and capitalists not because they favor war, but because they claim they do not and pretend "that they were harmless Radical lovers of peace, and that the propaganda of Militarism and of inevitable war between England and Germany is a Prussian infamy for which the Kaiser must be severely punished." He continues:

I myself steadily advocated the formation of a formidable armament, and ridiculed the notion that we, who are wasting

hundreds of millions annually on idlers and wasters, could not easily afford double, treble, quadruple our military and naval expenditure. I advocated the compulsion of every man to serve his country, both in war and peace. The idlers and wasters, perceiving dimly that I meant the cost to come out of their pockets, and meant to use the admission that riches should not exempt a man from military service as an illustration of how absurd it is to allow them to exempt him from civil service, did not embrace my advocacy with enthusiasm.

The British public had all along been behind Mr. Winston Churchill. It had wanted Sir Edward Grey to do just what Sazonoff wanted him to do, and what I, in the columns of the *Daily News*, proposed he should do nine months ago (I must really be allowed to claim that I am not merely wise after the event), which was to arm to the teeth regardless of an expense which to us would have been a mere flea bite, and tell Germany that if she laid a finger on France we would unite with France to defeat her, offering her at the time as consolation for that threat the assurance that we would do as much to France if she wantonly broke the peace in the like fashion by attacking Germany.

The one danger before us that nothing can avert but a general raising of human character through the deliberate cultivation and endowment of democratic virtue *without consideration of property and class*, is the danger created by inventing weapons capable of destroying civilization faster than we produce men who can be trusted to use them wisely.

Late in December, the *New Statesman* pointed out that Shaw had from the first offered a pro-British and anti-German argument. It said:

With the exception, perhaps, of the British *White Paper* itself, we doubt if there is any document or article that has been published in America that is more likely to strengthen American sentiment on the side of the Allies than Mr. Shaw's article.

Shaw, himself, in a letter to the *Daily Citizen*, organ of the Labor Party, complaining of its publication of criticisms of his pamphlet *Common Sense About the*

War, said that, properly handled, this war can be led to a victory, not only over Germany, but for democracy over its worst enemies both at home and abroad.

I have shown that there is a tremendous case for pushing this war to a victory over Prussia from the labor point of view and that it is being spoiled by the official case, which is a bad one. I have stood for a brave and straight democratic fighting case and for an energetic pushing of interests of labor and democracy now that a formidable emergency has at last given to serious men an opportunity of making themselves heard above the din of party twaddle.

All of his later statements contained passages of a similar import. We reproduce only his leading generalizations.

After the attack on France and Belgium, Shaw did not put even *a part* of the blame on capitalist governments. He says: "Had the Foreign Office been the International Socialist Bureau, had Sir Edward Grey been Jaurès, had Mr. Ramsay MacDonald been Prime Minister, had Russia been Germany's ally instead of ours, the result would still have been the same."

And, finally, his enthusiasm for the war is not less than that of the French Socialists and Syndicalists and anti-militarists: "We are supporting the war as a war on war, on military coercion, on domineering, on bullying, on brute force, on military law, on caste insolence, on what Mrs. Fawcett called insensate devilry."

The British soldiers will never revolt because "in fighting Prussia, they are fighting a more deliberate, conscious, tyrannical, personally insolent, and dangerous Militarism than their own":

Our problem is how to make commercialism itself bankrupt. *We must beat Germany*, not because the militarist hallucination and our irresolution forced Germany to make this war, so desperate for her, at a moment so unfavorable to herself, but because she has made herself the exponent and champion

in the modern world of the doctrine that military force is the basis and foundation of national greatness, and military conquest the method by which the nation of the highest culture can impose that culture on its neighbors. . . .

Victory over British and French democracy would be the victory of militarism over civilization: it would literally shut the gates of mercy on mankind. . . .

The war should be pushed vigorously, not with a view to a final crushing of the German army between the Anglo-French combination and the Russian millions, but to the establishment of a *decisive military superiority* by the Anglo-French combination alone. . . .

We must, if we can, drive her from Belgium without compromise. France may drive her from Alsace and Lorraine. Russia may drive her from Poland. She knew when she opened fire that these were the stakes in the game; and we are bound to support France and Russia until they are won or lost, unless a stalemate reduces the whole method of warfare to absurdity. Austria, too, knew that the Slav part of her empire was at stake.

Germany flew at France's throat, and by incidentally invading Belgium gave us the excuse our militarists wanted to attack her with the full sympathy of the nation. . . .

There was nobody else in Europe strong enough to chain the mad dog. . . . For England to have refrained from hurling herself into the fray, horse, foot, and artillery, was impossible from every point of view. From the democratic point of view it would have meant an acceptance of the pretension of which Potsdam, by attacking the French republic, had made itself the champion; that is, the pretension of the Junker class to dispose of the world on militarist lines at the expense of the lives and limbs of the masses. From the internationalist Socialist point of view, it would have been the acceptance of the extreme nationalist view *that the people of other countries are foreigners, and that it does not concern us if they choose to cut one another's throats.* (Our italics.)

At times, however, Shaw seems to take a pro-German or anti-British stand.

He says, for example, that the British fail to realize

“the terrible military danger of Germany’s geographical position between France and England on her west flank and Russia on her east; all three leagued for her destruction.” But only a few lines below he very properly ridicules this same idea that the Allies are fighting for the “destruction” of Germany or that Germany is fighting for its life. He says that “the Imperial Chancellor, not being quite an angel, asked whether we had counted the cost of crossing the path of an Empire fighting for its life (*for these Militarist statesmen do really believe that nations can be killed by cannon shot*).” (Our italics.)

Some of Shaw’s statements seem to put England and Germany on a level, as for example, the following:

Neither England nor Germany must claim any moral superiority in the negotiations. Both were engaged for years in a race for armaments. Both indulged and still indulge in literary and oratorical provocation. Both claimed to be “an imperial race” ruling other races by divine right. Both showed high social and political consideration to parties and individuals who openly said that the war had to come. Both formed alliances to reinforce them for that war. The case against Germany for violating the neutrality of Belgium is of no moral value to England. . . .

Shaw points out that “the Prussian assumption that the dominion of the civilized earth belongs to German culture, is of the same character as the English assumption that the dominion of the sea belongs to British commerce”—though German imperialism may be more dangerous at the present moment. He shares the hope of revolutionary Socialists that the war may ultimately lead to results the opposite of what British “patriots” desire and hints that it may help to bring about the “freedom of Egypt and India.”

Let us not sneer at the German pretension to culture: let us face the fact that the Germans are just as cultured as we are (to say the least) and that war has nevertheless *driven them* to do these things as irresistibly as it will drive us to do similar things to-morrow if we find ourselves attacking a town in which the highest point from which our positions can be spotted by an observer with a field glass in one hand and a telephone in the other is the towering roof of the cathedral.

It had better be admitted on our side that as to the conduct of the war there is no trustworthy evidence that the Germans have committed any worse or other atrocities than those which are admitted to be inevitable in war or accepted as part of military usage by the Allies. By "making examples" of towns, and seizing irresponsible citizens as hostages and shooting them for the acts of armed civilians over whom they could exercise no possible control, the Germans have certainly pushed these usages to a point of terrorism which is hardly distinguishable from the deliberate murder of non-combatants; but as the Allies have not renounced such usages, nor ceased to employ them ruthlessly in their dealings with the hill tribes and fellaheen and Arabs, with whom they themselves have to deal (to say nothing of the notorious domestic terrorism of the Russian Government), they cannot claim superior humanity.

On December 19th, Shaw even published, in the *New Statesman*, a defense of the German invasion of Belgium—from which we quote the following passage:

To be neutralized means to be "neither-ized"—to be neither one thing nor another; to be as if you did not exist—whence it follows at this present moment, when Austria and France are at war, Switzerland is very far from being neutral; in fact, whatever she may be in law, she is a very solid obstacle to the military operations of the two Powers, and her legal inviolability may yet make all the difference between defeat and victory in a decisive battle.

Sweden is legally neutral at present; but she is none the less preventing Russia from sending troops to the west across the Scandinavian peninsula. Holland is legally neutral; but

she has prevented us from sending our warships up the Scheldt to relieve Antwerp.

Servia is a landlocked state. If the victim of the Serajevo murder had been the Prince of Wales instead of the Archduke, and the Serbs had refused us the redress they offered the Austrians, we should presumably declare war on them; but, though the countries through which our troops would have to pass on the march to Belgrade might declare legal neutrality, they could not be really neutral. We should have to treat the declaration of neutrality as a declaration of war on us and fight our way through—"durchhauen," in fact.

Anyone who has carefully followed the current discussions of Belgian neutrality will see that this has never occurred to the disputants. They are arguing on the assumption that neutrality in international law is the same as neutrality in physics. They think of Belgium not only as a legally neutral country, but as a vacuum. It is not a vacuum. Before its conquest by Germany it was a bulwark to France and an obstacle to Germany; now it is a bulwark to Germany and an obstacle to France and Great Britain, but it is not and never has been and never can be nothing. Respect for its legal neutrality may demand a heroic sacrifice from one belligerent while it confers a valuable advantage on the other.

Now, there are some sacrifices which no nation will make. Up to a certain point of sacrifice a nation will respect legal neutrality, but if the sacrifice threatens to be suicidal it will affirm that its exaction constitutes an act of war on the part of the neutral nation, and will declare war on it. In this way it evades its obligation, because a nation which guarantees the neutrality of another nation obviously does not thereby surrender its own right to make war on it. If it did, that nation could injure it with impunity.

If Belgium outraged us and refused redress we should make war on Belgium, and this would not even cancel our guarantee.

This is perhaps the position of the majority of the German Socialists as to this question (the invasion of Belgium), though a large section is rather less favorable to the German Government in this matter than is Shaw. In their official declaration on December

2d, they seem to favor an indemnity to Belgium, while Shaw opposes all indemnities for personal damage, and excepts only needless destruction of property—a somewhat surprising position for a Socialist (see Chapter XXX).

Shaw's most careful, condensed, and orderly anti-British argument appeared in the *New Statesman* on December 12th:

For centuries now the Lion has held to his one idea that none shall be greater than England on land, and none as great on sea. To him it has been nothing whether a rival to England was better or worse than England. When Waterloo was won, Byron said, "I'm damned sorry," and humanitarians and libertarians looked aghast at the re-establishment of the Inquisition and the restoration of an effete and mischievous dynasty by English arms on the ruins of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Little recked the Lion of that. England's rival was in the dust; England was mistress of the seas; England's general—what matter that he was an Irishman—was master of Europe, with its kings whispering in his presence like frightened schoolboys. England right or wrong, England complete with her own native corruptions and oppressions no less than her own native greatness and glory, had risen all English from the conflict and held the balance of power in her hand.

For a hundred years after that no Englishman knew what it was to turn pale at the possibility of invasion. For more than two generations of Englishmen the Lion lay and basked and smelt no foe that the pat of his paw could not dispose of. Then a rival arose again. Battles more terrible than Waterloo were fought against the same foe, but it was not England that won them. The Lion rose and began to watch. The old instinct stirred in him. He heard the distant song, "Deutschland, Deutschland, über Alles," and something in him said, "Never that while I live."

The rival built a warship and yet another, openly challenged the sovereignty of the sea. That was the end. From that moment it was only a question when to spring, for a lion with that one idea at heart, with that necessity deep in

his very bowels, must be crafty; he must win at all hazards, no matter how long he crouches before the right moment comes. You see it coming in the *Yellow Book*. Germany with Austria and Russia with France face each other, finger on trigger, France avoiding the fight, Russia gradually arming herself and training herself for it, Austria speculating on it all, even Austria afraid of the Lion's rival, Germany.

France, always maneuvering for peace, being outnumbered at last, finds that Germany, defiant of her and of Russia, contemptuously sure that she can crush the one with her right hand and the other with her left, yet fears the Lion and well knows that if he comes to the aid of France and Russia, the odds will be too terrible even for the victors of Sedan.

France sounds the Lion on the subject. The Lion, grim and cautious, does not object to his naval and military commanders talking to commanders of France and discussing what might happen and how, in that case, things might be arranged. France suddenly bullies Germany; tells her to clear out of Morocco and clear out sharp. Germany looks at the Lion and sees him with quivering tail about to spring. The odds are too great. With mortification tearing her heart, Germany clears out, successfully bullied for the first time since the rise of her star.

The Lion is balked. Another few years of waiting and the British taxpayer may tire of keeping ahead of that growing fleet. The old instinct whispers, "Now, now, before the rival is too strong." Voices begin to cry that in the London streets, but there are new forces that the Lion must take account of. If the rival will not fight, it is not easy to attack him, and Germany will not fight unless the Lion can be detached from France and Russia. Yet she is sick with the humiliation of that bullying and knows that nothing but the riding down of the bullies can restore her prestige and heal her wounded pride. But she must swallow her spleen, for at every threat France points to the Lion and saves the peace France alone really desires.

Every time Germany is humiliated the Lion is balked. Austria's Balkan speculation is postponed and Russia does not quite know whether she is balked or resented. . . .

The devil's own luck struck down the Archduke by the hand of the assassin, and Austria saw Serbia in her grasp. At last she flew at Serbia, Russia flew at Austria, Germany

flew at France, and the Lion, with a mighty roar, sprang at last, and in a flash had his teeth and claws in the rival of England and will now not let her go for all the pacifists or Socialists in the world until he is either killed or back on his Waterloo pedestal again. . . .

I am a Socialist and know well that the Lion's day is gone by and that the bravest lion gets shot in the long run. I foresee that his victory will not, like the old victories, lead to a century of security. I know that it will create a situation more dangerous than the situation of six months ago, and that only by each western nation giving up every dream of supremacy can that situation be mastered.

A lion within frontiers is after all a lion in a cage, and the future has no use for caged lions fighting to defend their own chains. In the future we must fight, not alone for England, but for the welfare of the world. But for all that the Lion is a noble old beast and his past is a splendid past and his breed more valiant than ever—too valiant, nowadays, indeed, to be merely Englishmen. *Contra mundum*, I take off my hat to him as he makes his last charge and shall not cease to wave it because of the squealing of the terrified chickens.

THE "NEW STATESMAN": WHY DID WE GO TO WAR?

There can be no question that a large part, if not a majority of the Fabian Society, agrees—on the whole—with Shaw. The *New Statesman*, however, of which Sidney Webb and Shaw are editors, takes a position that is more definitely anti-German and pro-British. It flatly disagrees with Shaw as to Belgium.

The *New Statesman* distinguishes between motives that were effective and motives that existed but were not effective in causing the war. In all countries there was a complex mixture of motives, but the effective motive that brought both the British Parliament and the British people into the war was the defense of Belgium. Sir Edward Grey's motives and diplomacy were of secondary importance. So we read:

That Sir Edward Grey was fully conscious of the limitation of his powers is perfectly evident in the *White Paper*. When he told the French Ambassador that he could not promise assistance until he had consulted Parliament he was perfectly sincere. Four days before war was declared a junior member of the government asserted in the most positive terms that if the Cabinet decided for war the House of Commons would refuse to vote the necessary supplies, and in the then state of opinion both inside and outside the House of Commons the assertion was unquestionably justified. In spite of the propaganda of the *Times* and one or two other newspapers, it was almost impossible at that time to find anyone who was in favor of intervention. The Cabinet itself was notoriously divided, with a balance in favor of peace. Then Sir Edward Grey, in a speech that produced a greater effect than any speech ever delivered in the House of Commons, or perhaps anywhere else, raised the question of protecting Belgian neutrality. Instantly it became clear that in acting on that ground the government would have the country enthusiastically behind them; and an ultimatum was dispatched to Germany.

If this account of what actually occurred is correct—and we do not think it can be controverted—it follows that the defense of Belgium was the effective motive which determined our entry into the struggle. Whatever Sir Edward Grey's private wishes may have been, he could not have carried the Cabinet, still less the country, with him if the German army had not invaded Belgium. It is possible that later on public opinion might have been converted to a policy of intervention by the spectacle of France prostrate under the mailed fist, but that is quite hypothetical. Our own conviction is that if Belgium had not been invaded the French army would have been able without difficulty to hold the fortified frontier, and Great Britain would never have entered the fray. That, at all events, it will be admitted, is what might quite possibly have happened. We suggest, therefore, that attempts to investigate the motives which inspired the Foreign Office are, under the circumstances, idle and unnecessary. *Cabinet, Parliament, and people consented to war for the sake of Belgium, and no matter what private desires—doubtless numerous and diverse—happen to have been gratified by the national decision, it is none the less true*

that it was on Belgium's account that that decision was reached. (Our italics.)

H. G. WELLS

The one world-famed British Socialist from whom we shall not quote at any length is H. G. Wells. This is not on the ground that Wells is no longer a Socialist. Though a member of no Socialist organization he still declares himself to be a Socialist, holds to many of the fundamental principles of Socialism, and is clearly more consistent and radical than many well-known party members.

Perhaps Wells has written more copiously on the war than any other well-known Socialist. Nor have all his writings been merely journalistic. Some have contained important material and have proved highly influential. But, like those of Robert Blatchford, nearly all have been ultra-nationalistic and, therefore, are typical only of a small minority of Socialists—though a moderately pronounced form of national egoism, as we have shown, is widely prevalent among them. We content ourselves with a brief quotation from the *New Statesman* showing the point to which Wells finally went:

During the past week [the first week of February] Mr. H. G. Wells, irrepressibly breaking out again in "war fever," has been urging us to look ahead to the time after peace has been declared, and to adopt the plan of "penalizing Germany's commerce." To him "Germany is an insane country, a devilized country," whom to defeat in war is not sufficient, and whose inhabitants must be deliberately and persistently impoverished during peace. Mr. Wells accordingly calls upon all the allied powers to arrange, with this view, as part of the terms of settlement, for a universal tariff discrimination against goods made in Germany. "It should," he says, "be plainly hostility." The nations of the world must set themselves to "bar or penalize German efficiency in their markets." Every article of German manufacture, after the

armies have been disbanded, and when commerce is resumed, is to be punished by the custom houses of the world with a definitely hostile surtax, merely because it is of German manufacture, in order, as he says, that we may induce in these hundred and twenty millions of people (for naturally Austria-Hungary must be included) a better state of mind!

JAMES LARKIN'S ANTI-BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA

The leader and chief founder of the Irish Labor Party went to great lengths against the war. The following is a press account of a typical meeting in Philadelphia (November 24th):

There was no mincing of words, no dodging, no diplomacy in what Larkin said. He deliberately preached revolution and appealed to the Irishmen of America, through the Irish-American League, under whose auspices the monster meeting was held, to send arms and ammunition to Ireland "for the glorious day of reckoning with England."

"Men and women," shouted Larkin, and 4000 hearts beat faster as he spoke the words, "give us money to buy guns and by the living God, who gave us life, we will not fail you and we'll not fail the mother of our race. I plead with you. For 700 long and weary years we have waited for this hour. The flowing tide is with us and we deserve to be relegated to oblivion if we are not ready to 'take occasion by the hand and make the bounds of freedom wider yet.' Give us the arms and we'll be ready with the rising of the moon."

Larkin denounced John Redmond as "a purchased traitor" and ridiculed the home rule bill as "a manifest lie and terminological inexactitude."

"Why should Ireland fight for Britain in this war? What has Britain ever done for our people?" asked Larkin. "Whatever we got from her we wrested with struggle and sacrifice. No, men and women of the Irish race, we shall not fight for England. We shall fight for the destruction of the British Empire and the construction of an Irish republic. We shall not fight for the preservation of the enemy, which has laid waste with death and desolation the fields and hills of Ireland for 700 years. We will fight to free Ireland from the grasp of that vile carcass called England."

Here the audience broke into wild applause and as the curtain was flung back, facing each other with arms in hand, a company of Irish Volunteers and another of German Uhlans were revealed on the stage. The commanders of the two forces, Major P. J. Jamison and Philip Rapp, crossed swords and shook hands as the German and Irish flags were unfurled above them. The audience sang "Die Wacht Am Rhein" and "God Save Ireland."

Larkin concluded his remarks by saying that the end of British sway in Ireland and all over the world was at hand. He expressed the hope that Germany would be successful.

THE I. L. P. CONFERENCE IN APRIL (1915)

The Independent Labor Party Conference held at Norwich at the beginning of April (1915) defined the attitude of this Socialistic wing of the Labor Party towards the war and the recruiting campaign. The National Executive Committee had declared in its report that "such matters as enlistment and the urging of recruiting are matters for the individual conscience." When this position was attacked as being a compromise, Bruce Glasier, one of the four members of the Committee (all of them re-elected at Norwich), replied.

Glasier said as a Socialist organization we could not recruit, and no man could recruit as a Socialist. The N.A.C. had dissociated the party from the campaign, but he appealed to the delegates to allow freedom of conscience. We didn't want to drive those who differed from us on this question out of the party. (Applause.)

The National Executive Committee's report was then adopted by a vote of 118 to 3.

But the majority was equally great against any active participation of Party officials in the recruiting campaign—on the ground, not that the war must not be supported, but that it must not be *justified*, nor the govern-

ment defended. The following resolution was passed by a vote of 243 to 9:

This Conference expresses its strong disapproval of the action of the Labor Party in taking part in a recruiting campaign, and of I. L. P. members of Parliament speaking from platforms on which attempts were made to justify the war, and the foreign policy of the Liberal Government which led to the war.

Finally, by the very close vote of 120 to 121, the following resolution of opposition to the present war and all other wars was *defeated*:

This Conference is of opinion that the Socialists of all nations should agree that henceforth the Socialist Parties should refuse support to every war entered into by Capitalistic Governments, whatever the ostensible object of the war, and even if such war is nominally of a defensive character.

In April, then, one-half of the I. L. P. opposed the war; the other half supported the war without justifying it.

CHAPTER XXII

FRANCE

THE French Socialists have not only remained practically unanimous—there has been no single challenge of the party's position by any generally known Socialist leader—but, apparently, they are becoming more and more confident of the justice of their position. The ultra-revolutionist and former anti-militarist, Gustave Hervé, has, indeed, gone to a point in his enthusiasm for the war where few non-French Socialists will follow him. Again, Guesde pleads, from the Ministry, that Italy should enter the war—a point upon which some at least of the Socialist friends of the Allies will not agree. The party as a whole, however, does not go so far, satisfying itself at the beginning of 1915 with a reiteration of its position of the previous August. Guesde's argument in favor of French Socialist support of the war is especially weighty—whatever may be thought of his plea for intervention of Italy—because of his high international position. But the official party statement of January 1 (1915) is the most significant of all our quotations, as it contains an exceedingly condensed but complete summary of the whole French Socialist case.

Gustave Hervé wrote the editorial from which the following passage is taken in *La Guerre Sociale* on the occasion of the formation of several regiments of foreign volunteers in Paris—in August. All the nationalities he mentions were included among the volunteers. He ends his editorial with this salutation:

Italians, Trente and Trieste are going to come back to their noble Italian fatherland!

Roumanians, your brothers of Transylvania will be given back to you!

Servians, your brothers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Croatia are going to be brought to you!

Hungarians, the great dream of Kossuth is going to be realized; Hungary is going to recover its independence with the establishment of a republic!

Czechs of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, to-morrow your Czechs' republic will be established, free from the German yoke you have submitted to for five centuries!

Poles, Poland has half left its tomb already, and is going to be resuscitated among its dead!

Jews, I do not know whether Zion will be revived some day; but you have heard the good news. Your brothers are going to receive civil and political equality even in Russia!

May you prosper, army of the nations!

Forward, United States of Europe!

The suppositions—or many of them—upon which Hervé evidently bases his enthusiasm may be gravely questioned. But the international feeling that inspires the passage is undeniable.

De Ambris, a revolutionary Socialist member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, published (in November) an interview with Guesde, the chief subject of which was the position of the Italian Socialists.

Guesde is reported by De Ambris to have said that he had no intention of prescribing modes of action to the Italian Party. But he complained of the fact that the Italian Socialists believed that they would be untrue to Socialist teachings and principles if they recognized facts which were evident to everybody. They lived in the illusion that they were fulfilling their duty if they denied the reality. Guesde then gave the following reasons why *it was the duty of the Italian Socialist Party, in his view, to enter into the war*. In the first place, the war would be shortened through the intervention of Italy, which would mean an immense saving of human life. If the Italian Socialists called themselves op-

ponents of war, they must do their best, by taking part in the war, to bring the butchery to a close. If they do not do that then they are not following any principle whatever, but solely regard their own convenience.

In the second place, Guesde regards the intervention of Italy as necessary so that in case of a victory of the Allied Powers, which he considers to be certain, Italy could strengthen the influence of the democratic countries, England, France, and Belgium, and serve as a counter-weight to the influence of Russia. At the same time, Guesde contends that Russia cannot be regarded as an exclusively reactionary element. Russian politics, because of the war, will automatically be made accessible to modern influences. Besides, a victory of the Allied Powers would free Russia from the economic servitude in which Germany has placed it; by this war the road to bourgeois development would be opened and the bourgeoisie would enforce liberal forms of government, as they have done everywhere. A counter-weight against Russia would be necessary, most of all, in the nationality question, since it must be demanded of the Russians that they recognize the rights of Poland and Roumania. When De Ambris interrupted that according to the views of the Italian Socialists the nationality question is of no moment, or, at least, does not concern the Socialists, Guesde replied that this was a great piece of foolishness. Before the solution of national problems, we cannot possibly lay the foundations for the International.

Finally De Ambris spoke once more of the amazement of the Italian Socialists that Guesde had taken part in the Ministry, in spite of his Marxist and revolutionary convictions. To this Guesde declared that one should not conceive radicalism as being the same thing as petrification. To-day, when it is a question of defending the country, Guesde had offered his co-operation with the government in the deepest conviction. Certainly the class struggle continues even during the war, but to-day the government is more one of national defense than a means for the protection of employers. If a proletarian lives on the fifth floor and the landlord on the first, the proletarian would not refuse his co-operation to save the house from burning. He would do it out of a spontaneous feeling of human solidarity, and also to save the few pieces of furniture of his attic room. He would do this

all the more gladly, if he is convinced that the house in which he lives, in spite of all faults, is better, or suits him better, than other houses. (Our italics.)

In January, a well-known Russian Socialist, writing in the *Novi Mir* of New York under the pseudonym of Woinoff, described another interview with Guesde, in which he gave the following very full analysis of the war and its probable results as viewed from his orthodox Marxian standpoint. Guesde is reported to have said:

"I am irrevocably convinced that this war will bring tremendous benefit to democracy and consequently also to Socialism. If I did not think so, I would not have taken this war post, and it is a war post. It was not my patriotic feeling, not my duty as a Frenchman, who certainly must put all other ideals aside in view of the threatened destruction of his country, that prescribed this step to me, but my confidence in the Socialist cause.

"We Marxists cannot lay aside for one moment our habitual analysis of humanity. Events confirm us. Naturally this is an economic war. Germany went to war because it was stifling within its boundaries. The growth of its population, the mighty development of its capitalism, forced it to expand in order to find a sufficient field for its energy. Likewise, England would not have gone into the war if it had not known that the war would assure it the dominion of the sea for a long time. *It is a conflict of imperialism on the part of both.* This does not concern us Socialists. We can remain indifferent to it. From this point of view, the war is a catastrophe of fate.

"From this basic tone, various overtones of an ideological character arise. I do not speak of the ethical grounds on which the various nations seek to justify the war. But there is a certain indirect result of this conflict which very nearly concerns us. A victory of Germany would mean not only an extension of its economic power, *which would not matter to us*, but also the predominance of *that peculiar amalgamation of a still surviving feudalism and of capitalistic civilization*, which flourishes in its classical form in Berlin. This is a strong and dangerous social phenomenon. If it were to

spread all over Europe it would swing Europe for a long time back into the night. Among the English and French bourgeoisie there are also, of course, plenty of persons who expect no good from the further development of democracy, but would gladly turn the wheels of progress backward. In seeking their imperialistic goals they, too, necessarily, strive to find some way to the people, to find some solution which may move the masses to go with them. For on that level of civilization which the French and English have reached people do not go to war simply because ordered, and so France and England, forced by their whole past, must go to war as the knights of democracy.

"And now as to Russia. In its imperialistic efforts for an extension of territory, Germany is moved to conquer the Slavs, and in doing so comes into conflict with the imperialistic egoism of the Petrograd Government. The government of the Czar, which necessarily must protect the freedom of the little Slavic states, thereupon writes upon its banner the motto, "The Freedom of Nationalities"—a paradox enough. I know very well that it wants to betray this motto. But it cannot do it. It will not only be outvoted at the coming congresses by the democratic countries, but after the war everything will rise up against it, in the isolated condition in which it will be—both inside the country and without. Everyone that is interested in progress will immediately turn against it, as soon as the greater danger, the danger of a victory of the powers of central Europe, is overcome."

Asked if the war might not lead to a combination of Germany and Russia against the European democracy, Guesde replied:

"That is absolutely impossible. We are on the eve of the intervention of Roumania and Italy in the war. The Czarism is conducting the war with such energy, has gone so far into it. . . . No, that is impossible. But if anything of the kind should happen, then the situation would be morally still more clear. The Czar would then cease to be the unfortunately indispensable ally of democracy, and the duty of the Russian revolutionists would be clear. As things are to-day, any continuation of the revolutionary struggle against the Czarism during the war, as far as it meant a weakening of its military power, would really work to the injury of mankind.

"Do not forget that if I expect the solution of national questions in this war—and I regard this result as its greatest probable accomplishment—I do not do this as a nationalist. The truth is that the question of the existence of one or another of the subject nations is of no importance whatever to me, compared to the question of the emancipation of the proletariat. But the national question everywhere disturbs the normal development of the class struggle. Marx was a republican, not because he really expected the solution of the social question by the bourgeois republic, or even a material improvement in the condition of the worker; but he was a most energetic republican because a republic, disposing of all other questions, brings into the fullest clearness the essential thing, the conflict of classes, the struggle between capital and labor. It is just the separation of this struggle from all alien elements that I expect from the victory of the principle of nationality. I repeat that I know the Czar is not easily to be won over to such concessions. Then will be the time to struggle against him with all possible energy. At the present we need him. If I had spent half my life at hard labor, if I had suffered from the knout and torture, I would nevertheless say, 'I shall do nothing which might weaken the military strength of Russia in its struggle against militarism.'

"German militarism, you must understand. Not the German nation. It is very sad that the German nation has declared itself united to its imperialism. But I do not give up the hope that these two different Germanys will fall apart as soon as militarism receives a decisive blow. In my view, there can be no possibility of the conquest of German territory or of the violation of German unity. We would permit this under no circumstances. Not one French soldier will set foot on German soil. Naturally I do not refer to Alsace-Lorraine. That is a piece of France. Moreover, when we free it, we will give it liberty to determine its own future. But I repeat, the French Socialists will not allow this war to turn from a war of defense to a war of aggression. As soon as the French and Belgian territory is freed, we shall turn, if possible, in the name of France, if not in the name of the French proletariat, to the German people with a manifesto. In this manifesto we shall offer it an honorable peace. We shall propose to it to overthrow its robber ruler, who has

blinded it, and soaked its soil in blood. And when the war is ended the proletariat, which will everywhere have done its duty to its country and to democracy, will have an undeniable right to carry out at least a part of the programme its nature demands. And it will bring about this indemnification with all its energy. We shall not allow the reservists and the territorial soldiers to lay down their arms until the working class has received its wage for what it has done." (Our italics.)

Guesde's position is undoubtedly that of the French Socialists as a whole. But we do not have to rely on his expressions exclusively. For, on January 1st, the French Party issued another declaration which covered the ground much more clearly and definitely than any of its previous statements. The declaration is addressed to the French public, and since it contains a number of new points we repeat it at length, placing the important sentences in italics and reserving our comments until the end.

To everybody we cry: Confidence!

Five months of war, five months of formidable trials have not shaken our faith.

To-day, as on August 4th, after the publication of the diplomatic documents which further illuminate the facts, we have the certainty that *we are defending our country, which was brutally attacked.*

To-day, as on August 4th, we are firmly convinced in our heart that we are fighting, in accordance with the noblest traditions of France, for justice and liberty.

To-day, as on August 4th, we are convinced of being engaged in *a war of liberation against the most brutal imperialism, against the most savage militarism.*

To-day, as on August 4th, *we are certain of winning over to our cause the Socialists of all countries, the entire International,* which can only have as an ideal the federation of free peoples.

Even on the other side of the Rhine, among those who in the past fought with us against the forces of imperialism and war, there are already some who begin to doubt and to see—

let us hope they are the Socialist precursors of a German republic. They have been able to see how their rulers understood the rights of neutral peoples and the respect due to treaties. In spite of wanton falsehoods, they can point to the atrocities organized by their military chiefs in unhappy Belgium or in our invaded provinces. And certain persons are already asking themselves anxiously if, even in face of foreign countries, the unity of Germany and her place in the world must be confounded with the domination of the Junkers and the ambition of the Hohenzollerns. Heroically Liebknecht has protested. But we know that there is already more than one troubled heart. And even at the hour when we are boldly defending our independence as a nation and our Socialist cause, those others may be asking themselves if the chief object of the war is not to bring about, by an immense circuitous route, their own emancipation!

With untroubled mind we pursue our course. Ah, certainly, we are well aware of the formidable difficulties we have to overcome. Now under the cover of the sacred union of the whole people, now by recalling, artfully and tenaciously, old issues, anti-popular forces would like to rob the republic of the benefits of its victory. Prejudices, bad habits, reappear and may paralyze the enthusiasm with which the people throws itself against the enemy. The necessary restrictions concerning military information are apt to limit sometimes the right of useful criticism. The families of the mobilized and unemployed men at times fall victims of the unconscious struggle of the classes. And into the administration of the war a corrupting capitalism and an insolent bureaucracy attempt to reintroduce their vices.

We shall overcome those difficulties. Our comrades who, in the hour of danger, are sent into the government of national defense have already shown in its councils the spirit of resolution and boldness which animates our party. They have done everything to call up, to organize the forces of the country for an altogether popular and methodical great war whence it will again come out victoriously.

Parliament, the expression of the national sovereignty, the depository of the rights of the people; parliament, which audits and controls, must henceforth help the government in that immense task. It must give its aid in completing and perfecting the formidable instruments which an armed nation

needs. It will stimulate the energy of all. It will animate the courage of the people. As heir to the great revolutionary assemblies it will give to the present struggle all its inherent popular power, all its emancipatory virtue.

Doubtlessly, the struggle is toilsome. Let us tell the truth—it may be long. It is the most terrible war of history.

It will not tire us out.

Socialists, we know for what future we are fighting.

We are fighting in order that French independence and unity may never again be placed in doubt. We are fighting *in order that the provinces annexed forty-four years ago against their will may freely come back to the fatherland of their choice. We are fighting in order that at last the right of peoples to dispose of themselves may this time be recognized by all. We are fighting in order that they may form themselves into groups and federations. We are fighting so that Prussian imperialism—so that all imperialism—shall no longer hinder their free development.*

Socialists, we are also fighting so that this war, this atrocious war, be the last war. We are fighting, as all of us together have fought for years indefatigably, in order that peace, not the lying peace of armaments, but the sweet peace of the peoples, may reign in Europe and in the whole world. We are fighting in order that at least the proletarians, who are really bearing the immense burden of armaments, may breathe freely and pursue the work of their emancipation. We are fighting in order that, with peace established, justice may at last prevail and our grandchildren may no longer fear the aggressive return of barbarism.

That is why the Socialists are fighting. That is why they are to be found, as old Homer said, at the point of the battle. *And that is why they are unanimously, more than anyone, resolved on victory.* (Our italics.)

This statement is sharply differentiated from that made by the German Party on December 2d, in several particulars. The French state their war to be one of defense; the Germans, in reaffirming their position of August 4th, state it to be a war of defense against Russia, saying nothing of France and England, and make it perfectly clear on December 2d that they regard

it as a war of aggression against Belgium—while they have not stated that they approve the invasion of that country, even as a “military necessity” (see above—Chapter XIX).

The French are resolved on “victory”; the Germans wish only to defend Germany from invasion, for, according to their statement of August 4th, the only victory they seek is one over the armies of the Czarism.

The Germans are fighting against Russian despotism, the French are fighting not only against imperialism, (*i.e.* absolute monarchy, the French meaning of the word), but also against “militarism”—a claim not made by the Germans.

The Germans claim that they are loyal to International Socialism in the position they have taken, but say nothing to deny the right of the French, from the international proletarian standpoint, to fight *against* the Germans; the French Socialists claim the *exclusive* support of the International for the Allies *against* Germany and Austria.

But the most momentous and important feature of the French declaration is their differentiation between the German Socialists of Liebknecht’s opinion and the rest of the party. For this portends, in the case of a split in Germany, the formation of two Socialist “Internationals.” It may also affect the peace negotiations; for the French Socialists may be willing to fight the Kaiser indefinitely, whereas apparently they are ready for peace the moment signs of the democratization of Germany make their appearance.

CHAPTER XXIII

BELGIUM

A DEBATE BETWEEN GERMAN AND BELGIAN SOCIALISTS

THE Belgian Socialists report [in *Justice* (London) January 7, 1915] a debate held with visiting German Socialists in the Socialist headquarters in Antwerp. We have only the Belgian report, which is probably reliable as to the Belgian side. The German case, however, is here presented in the same arguments used by the right wing of the party (see Chapter XIX) and internal evidence also indicates that it is reported with substantial, though doubtless not complete, accuracy.

A few days after Liebknecht's visit, the Belgian Socialists were honored with the presence of Comrades Noske, Reichstag deputy for Chemnitz, and Dr. Koster, of the staff of the *Hamburger Echo*.

Noske is a very militant revisionist, who distinguished himself in the Reichstag during the discussion on the war budget by his interpellations of a militarist tendency. On this subject he was taken severely to task at the Congress of 1911 by the delegates of Marxist tendencies, Rosa Luxemburg, Liebknecht, and others. Dr. Koster belongs to the staff of the *Hamburger Echo*, the Socialist journal which was quite recently called to order by the Party Executive, because of its ultra-chauvinist attitude, of which rebuke, however, the editor took no account.

The conversation turned rapidly to the burning question of the attitude of the German Social Democrats in the Reichstag.

To the Belgian Socialists who complained of the violation of Belgian territory, Dr. Koster replied with disconcerting

assurance, first by repeating the pretended Franco-Belgian agreement already mentioned by H. Wendell [Socialist Reichstag member and volunteer in the German army, whose visit among the Belgian Socialists had previously been reported in *Justice*], and then he added: "After all, what has happened is your fault. You had only to let us pass. You would have been amply compensated by our government, and we would have brought to you into the bargain universal suffrage, protective laws for women and children, general insurances, and many other laws which, notwithstanding your strength, you have not been able to gain for yourselves." And these Prussian Socialists, themselves crushed down by the three-class electoral system, went on: "Besides, everybody has known for years past that in the event of a Franco-Prussian war our troops must pass through Belgium."

"In that case," the Belgians replied, "when your deputies questioned your government in the Reichstag as to its intentions towards Belgium in the event of a Franco-German war, they were playing an odious comedy; as also when at International Congresses you met us to discuss and vote resolutions on the necessity for small states to defend their independence and the integrity of their territory. The honor of a nation, respect for its independence and its liberties, international treaties, have, then, no value in the eyes of German Socialists?"

"The honor of a nation," replied Koster, "is a piece of bourgeois ideology with which Socialists have nothing to do. As for the International, they cannot hold to it in time of war. Does not all historical materialism teach us that working-class development is intimately bound up with the economic development and prosperity of the nation? Therefore German Socialists must support the government, which is at this moment defending the very existence of the country against the attacks of England and France and Russian despotism."

"And is it for the defense of the German proletariat that you violate our neutrality and massacre the Belgian workers?"

"Do you mean to say that you place respect for your neutrality higher than the lives of a hundred thousand men? We knew that to cross the Vosges to enter France meant the sacrifice of a hundred thousand more lives than the passage through Belgium. The choice for us could not be in doubt."

“Is not the situation identical for Belgium? According to your reasoning, we ought to have stood aside to let you pass; without counting that England and France would have demanded, and rightly, a severe reckoning. In Belgium we are unanimous in placing honor above immediate material interests, and between our honor and the defense of our liberties, and the lives of a hundred thousand men, we should not hesitate an instant. . . .”

The two German comrades having repeatedly declared that Germany was only defending herself against the attack of England, France, and Russia, it was pointed out to them that such was not the contention of German Socialist journals until the eve of the war. Up to the last day they held the view that the danger was not at St. Petersburg, Paris, or London, but at Berlin, for the government by letting Austria take action against Servia, was defeating the evidently peaceful efforts of London and Paris, and making it impossible for Russia to follow up the pacific suggestions made to her.

“That is quite true,” said the two German Socialists, “but when we talked in that way, we knew it was not true; we did so for political tactics, the better to bring pressure on the government. At the most, if Russia did not want war, it was solely because she was not ready and the reorganization of her army was not completed. If we had waited a few more years Germany would have been crushed, and that we could not have at any price. But you, who criticise our attitude so bitterly, you say nothing about the French Socialists who are fighting with Russian barbarism against German civilization.”

“French Socialists have always fought with energy against the Franco-Russian alliance, consequently you cannot hold them responsible. But you cannot ignore that the initial cause of the Franco-Russian accord lies in German militarism and imperialism, which you have opposed in times of peace, but which you now uphold with all your might. And we are forced to ask ourselves what would have happened if our French comrades had been able to prevent this alliance, when, at the critical moment, you deny all the principles of the International, and that in your country the principal factor for peace, Socialism, takes the side of imperialism.”

“You cannot dispute our good faith as Internationalists!”

“The attitude of the German Socialists does not allow us

to consider them as such. You may be excellent national democrats, but you have not acted like Social Democrats. When we say 'you,' we speak, of course, of those who were in favor of voting the credits. We know that a minority declared against it, and that on the side of those fourteen members of the Reichstag there are others in the party, and particularly those who have devoted twenty years of their lives to fighting against Czarism, and who have seen clearly and have not allowed themselves to be carried away by the Chauvinist tide."

"How do you know that? Who has told you? Not one of those who declared against voting the credits, not even Liebknecht would dare, in any case, to declare so publicly, for he certainly would not be re-elected!"

Speaking of the fate reserved for Belgium, the two visitors, who did not for an instant doubt the triumph of the German armies, said that Belgium would not be annexed, but that she would not be allowed to maintain an army, that the forts of Liège, Antwerp, and Namur would be razed, and that Germany would make Antwerp the base of such a powerful fleet as would force England to abandon all idea of future war.

The Social Democrats were not supporting the war with enthusiasm, but concern for the maintenance of their organization did not permit them to take up any other attitude.

The last-mentioned argument, whether correctly reported in this instance or not, occurs frequently in the statements of the German Socialist majority, as several of our documents have shown. The preservation of the German Party organization, moreover, is regarded as important by the whole International Movement—*provided it is not done at the cost of the lives of Belgian, French, and British workingmen, or in a way to cripple the relatively advanced democratic or semi-democratic governments of these countries*. In a word the preservation of the German organization from attacks of the German Government and the militaristic part of the German people might (or might not) justify certain

concessions to militarism—provided these are not paid for by the Socialist organizations of other countries.

In a speech made in London (on January 8th) the Belgian Socialist Minister, Vandervelde, also discussed at length the German Socialist attitude to Belgium. He protested against any peace that might merely restore the *status quo*. He is reported to have said:

What shocks us is the way in which the German Social Democrats have taken part in the deliberate and cruel crushing of the Belgian people. German Social Democrats have seen what has been done in Belgium. They have not merely read about it as you have. They have seen the art treasures destroyed at Louvain; they have seen the destruction at Malines, and the massacres that have taken place, the desolation and ruin of the villages, the violation of women and girls and nuns in the convents; and they have made no real effective protest. One or two Germans have done so, and to them we render homage.

The Belgian Socialists protested that they were bound as a matter of solemn right and duty to defend the country. Oh, said our German friends, this is "bourgeois ideology"! But as Socialists and Belgian citizens we uphold a different code of honor. A signature of a Socialist is as sacred as the signature of a bourgeois, and the signature of the Belgian nation was affixed to the treaty of neutrality, and we must maintain it, not merely for our own sake, but also for the sake of Germany and France. Belgium fills the rôle of a buffer state, established on purpose to prevent Germany being invaded by France, and France being invaded by Germany, and it was our duty to fight against any power that violated that neutrality. We fight, not merely because we love freedom and independence, but because we know that without freedom Socialism will be impossible; and also because we would not quietly allow the Kaiser to stab the republic of France in the back.

We Belgian Socialists are fighting, and will continue to fight, for Belgian independence. What will happen if the partisans of Germany have their way? What is it they ask for? *The maintenance of the status quo ante*—that things are to remain as they were before; that in the future as in

the past the strong are to dominate the weak, and that might is to constitute right; that Schleswig is to remain part of Prussia; that Poland is to be held down by Prussian gendarmes; that Bohemia is to remain tyrannized over by Austria; that Trentino and Trieste are to remain in the grip of Austria; that Alsace and Lorraine, torn from France by brute force in 1871, are to remain German provinces. Then Belgium will lose her independence, and Holland become a mere vassal state to Germany. On the side of the Allies stood the liberation of small countries: Ireland liberated by England, Poland by Prussia and Russia, Alsace-Lorraine returned to their mother country, reparation and justice to the Balkan nationalities—these are the considerations which justify the attitude of Belgium and France.

There are some English people who do not feel this enthusiasm and display indifference. The Independent Labor Party had received [congratulatory] messages from Kautsky and Bernstein, who supported the voting of the war credits, applauding the I. L. P. for opposing such a course here. This will injure the Socialist cause in this country [Great Britain].

CHAPTER XXIV

RUSSIA

WHEN we come to Russia, we no longer find the same unanimity as we did at the outbreak of the war. Russia's leading Marxist, Plechanoff, who enjoys among the world Socialists a reputation as high as that of Guesde, and second only to that of Kautsky, has indorsed the French Socialist view of the war, and Axelrod, the next best known publicist of the same faction (the so-called Minority), takes a somewhat similar view. On the other hand, Martoff, and the other leaders of this faction and of other groups, still oppose the war, and are doing all in their power to utilize the present opportunity exclusively for the purpose of bringing about a revolution in Russia, as the arrest of a number of Socialist members of the Duma indicates. (As the article of Martoff refers to peace, rather than to war, we postpone our selections to Chapter XXIX.)

That is, both the "Majority" and the "Minority" factions of the Social Democratic organization, the Social Revolutionists, and the various national Socialist parties—the Finns, Poles, Lithuanians, Jews, etc.—are for the most part to seize the first opportunity for insurrection. The Lithuanian Nationalists, for example, have sought to strengthen their own position by aiding the Russian Government to conquer a part of East Prussia, on the ground that this territory once belonged to Lithuania and that a certain number of Lithuanians are still living there. To this the Lithuanian Socialists

of Russia reply that since the utmost possible persecution of Lithuanians has taken place under the Czarism, they do not wish to extend its boundaries, and that the Lithuanians in East Prussia form only a small part of the population (*Vorwaerts*, December 21st). The Jewish Socialists are even more revolutionary, since racial persecution has greatly increased since the war.

The position of the "Majority," or radical Social Democrats, is shown in their open letter to Émile Vandervelde, who had appealed to them to support the Russian Government in the present crisis. To this invitation they replied:

We are aware that this war concerns most deeply the interests of the world's democracy, on the one hand, by delivering the French republic and the Belgian and English democracies over to German militarism, and contributing, on the other hand, to strengthen in Russia the political power of the Romanoff dynasty and their despotic monarchy.

We Russian Social Democrats, while bearing in mind the anti-democratic character of the Prussian hegemony, must not forget the other enemy of the working class and of the whole democracy—Russian absolutism. The latter's home policy remains unchanged. In Russia we have the same old merciless oppression and the same old unlimited exploitation.

Even now, in war time, when one might have expected absolutism to have acted more carefully and also more generously, it has retained its old character, for it persecutes as before, and exercises the same pressure on democracy, on the various nationalities of Russia, and, above all, on the working class. All Socialist newspapers have been suppressed, all labor organizations dissolved; arrests and banishments are still taking place without trial and verdict. And should the war end with a complete victory of the reactionary Russian Government and no democratization of political power take place at the same time, that government will, even after the conclusion of war, continue its anti-popular policy in Russia as well as outside of it. In that case it may become the center and source of a reactionary world policy.

It is for that reason that the Russian proletariat cannot

in any case and under any circumstances conclude a truce with the Russian Government even for a short time, but must refuse it any kind of support. We consider it to be our task to continue our implacable fight against the Russian Government, proceeding from the standpoint of our old demands which were raised with such unanimity by the Russian proletariat during the revolutionary movement of 1905 and which it renewed during the mass movement of the last two years.

Our watchword is as before: the convocation of a sovereign national assembly, of a constitutional convention. We are working towards that goal, precisely in order to defend the interests of democracy, of which you speak in your telegram.

The Russian Social Democracy occupies an important position in the democratic world movement. We therefore believe ourselves to be acting in the interests of the world's democracy that are so dear to us. The absolutism reigning in Russia is a pillar of reactionary militarism in Europe; it is that absolutism which has made Germany's hegemony possible, and is the worst, most menacing enemy of democracy. We must also look to the future of our Socialist movement.

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST
LABOR PARTY (the Majority Group).

The Social Democrats, however, in a declaration issued later, differentiate sharply between the positions taken by the Socialists of the various countries. They are against the Czarism under all circumstances, they resent the imputation that they might be persuaded to support it for any object whatever, but they class the governments of Germany and Austria, together with that of Russia, as "the backward monarchies of Eastern Europe," and they go further and declare that the German Government supports the Czarism, and that the action of the German Socialists in aiding their government can serve only to re-enforce this sinister connection:

The manifesto strongly denounces the ruling classes of Germany in urging the people to defend their country against

the despotism of Russia. "As a matter of fact," the manifesto declares, "the capitalists of Germany by their servility towards the Prussian Junkers and their head, William II, have always been the most faithful allies of Czardom and the enemies of the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants in Russia. As a matter of fact, these very capitalists, in alliance with the Junkers, will, whatever the result of the war may be, do all they can to support the Czar's monarchy in its struggle against the Russian revolutionary movement."

"As a matter of fact German capitalists have entered upon a looting expedition against Serbia with the object of conquering her and thus stifling the national revolution of the southern Slavs, while, at the same time, directing the bulk of their military forces against the freer countries, Belgium and France, in order to pillage a richer rival. While circulating fairy tales about a defensive war, the German capitalists chose, as a matter of fact, the most convenient moment for the war from their point of view, taking advantage of their latest improvements in military technique to forestall the new armaments planned and already determined upon by Russia and France."

British and French capitalists are also severely condemned.

"At the head of the other belligerent group stand the British and French capitalists, who are trying to delude the working class by contending that they have entered upon the war for the sake of their respective fatherlands, for the sake of liberty and civilization as against Germany's militarism and despotism. But, as a matter of fact, these capitalists had hired long ago, at the price of their milliards, the troops of the Russian Czardom, the most reactionary and barbarous monarchy in Europe, preparing them for an attack upon Germany. As a matter of fact, the object of the war on the part of the British and French capitalists is to grab the German colonies and to ruin a rival nation, distinguished by a more rapid economic development. It is for this noble end that the 'progressive,' 'democratic' nations are helping the ferocious Czardom still more ruthlessly to oppress Poland, Ukraine, and other small peoples, still more effectively to stifle the revolution in Russia itself.

"But the greater the zeal of the governments and the ruling

classes of all countries in trying to disunite the workers and to incite them against each other, the more savage their system of military laws and military censorship, the more is it incumbent upon the organized working class to defend its class unity, *its internationalism, its Socialist convictions as opposed to the jingoistic orgy of the 'patriotic' capitalist cliques of all countries. To give up that task would mean the renunciation of all democratic, not to speak of Socialist, aspirations of freedom.*"

Criticising the attitude of those German Socialist leaders who have tried to justify the war "by pretending to fight the Russian Czardom," the manifesto says:

"We Russian Socialists declare this argument to be a mere sophism. The revolutionary movement against Czardom in Russia had again assumed gigantic dimensions recently. . . . On the eve of the war, the President of the French republic had the opportunity of seeing during his visit to Nicholas II barricades erected by the Russian workers in the streets of the Russian capital. The Russian working class did not shrink from any sacrifice in its endeavor to free humanity from the disgrace of the Czar's monarchy. We are bound to say that if there is anything calculated to retard the downfall of Czardom and to help Czardom in its struggle against the whole of the Russian democracy, it is the present war, which has placed at the disposal of the Czar for the accomplishment of his reactionary objects the gold bags of the British, French, and Russian capitalists. If anything may impede the revolutionary struggle of the Russian working class against Czardom, it is precisely the attitude of the leaders of the German and Austrian Socialists, which is constantly being quoted to us by the Russian jingo press as an example." (Our italics.)

Of special weight and significance is the indorsement by the Russian Socialists of that kind of internationalism which takes a definite stand *against* nationalism, and does not profess to *include* it.

At an early period of the war, Plechanoff, Russia's leading Marxist, wrote a letter in which he took the position that the defeat of Russia by Germany would

not only mean further reaction in Russia, but that it would block Russia's economic evolution, the basis of all other development in the Marxian view. The letter is very brief; we reproduce it in full:

Dear Comrades: For some time past there has been a good deal said in your journal about the Franco-Russian Alliance.

If I am not mistaken, there are those of our comrades in England who take quite seriously the statements of the German General Staff that, in beginning this war, they desired to fight against Russian barbarism.

This argument cannot be upheld: Russian barbarism is the despotism of the Czar. But how is it possible to believe that the Emperor of the Junkers has any intention of destroying the power of the Emperor of the "Black Hundreds"?

Since our revolution of 1905-6, William II has been the strongest support of his brother, Nicholas II. In Russia everybody knows it, and so true is it that even at the present time—even during the war itself—the extreme reactionary party leans towards William. The organ of this party, the *Russian Flag* (which is known in Russia as the *Prussian Flag*), is doing its best to exonerate the Germans from the atrocities which have called forth the just indignation of the entire civilized world.

It is not for freedom that Germany has declared war. No, comrades. She made war for the conquest of economic supremacy. This is the imperialist programme which she strives to realize.

And, so far as my country is concerned, once vanquished by Germany it would become her economic vassal.

Germany would impose upon Russia such onerous conditions as would render her further economic evolution terribly difficult. But as economic evolution is the basis of social and political evolution, Russia would thus lose all, or nearly all, the chances of bringing Czarism to an end.

That is why there is among us only the extreme reactionary party which can reasonably hope for the triumph of Germany.

The Socialist world must not be led astray by the phraseology of the great German General Staff. The victory of

Germany means the setback of progress in western Europe and the definite, or almost indefinite, triumph of Russian despotism.

Yours very truly,

GEORGES PLECHANOFF.

Paul Axelrod, one of the founders of the Russian Social Democratic Party, and one of the best known publicists, after Plechanoff and Lenin, wrote in a similar vein:

I do not belong to those who judge the conduct of all the various Socialist Parties in this war in the same way. According to my opinion, one cannot place on the same level the entrance of Guesde, Sembat, and Vandervelde into governments and the granting of the war credits by the German Social Democracy.

Those comrades who judge the behavior of the responsible representatives of the German Social Democracy and of the labor parties of France and Belgium in the same way base this action on the proposition that it would be both foolish and absurd to distinguish between aggressor and defender, between a government which is guilty of war, and those which to a certain degree were driven into it. War is the fruit of the capitalist régime, of the imperialistic politics of the ruling classes of most of the European nations, each one of which is driven to force a monopoly of economic and political world power for itself. Of course, all that is absolutely true, and yet I hold it to be altogether improper, in judging the conduct of the labor parties in the present war, that one should be led solely by the consideration that this war was a historic necessity. I do not see how, in thus discussing this question, one can leave it altogether out of consideration who provoked, or who bears the guilt of the general world catastrophe; who directly and intentionally conspired to bring it about, and thereby placed all the countries against whom the warlike attack was directed under the necessity of making a life and death matter of the defense of their independence. . . .

It is necessary to analyze the real conditions which existed in every country before the declaration of war. As has been shown, military circles in Germany were well informed as to

the fact that Russia and France at that particular moment were not prepared for war. They hastened to take advantage of this fact. The French militarists and imperialists were, of course, conspiring to stir up a war within two or three years. But would not the proletariat have perhaps been further strengthened within that time, and the prospect of peace bettered? And that in turn would have made easier the struggle of the German democracy against chauvinism in its own country. It is true, imperialism makes it to the interest of all the Great Powers to attack—and in this objective sense they are all at the bottom guilty. But we cannot on this account avoid the question as to which of the participants in the war is relatively more guilty. So I understand Bebel very well when he once said that the party of the proletariat would be in a very sad condition if it showed itself unable in case of war to decide on which side the guilt lay, which side was attacked. One can only say that Bebel overestimated the sharpness of vision of his party.

I do not accuse the German proletariat and its party of treason, I only say they did not display sufficient acuteness of vision; that they ought to have been able to understand, as Bebel declared in his speech (see Chapter XIX).

Germany declared war and threw itself with its whole power against Belgium. Could the Belgian worker console himself with the fact that the war was called out by the imperialistic politics of the Great Powers? Was not he right, when the German army pressed into Belgium, to seize his weapons in order to defend his very existence? To accuse the Belgian Socialists, as some do, because they defended their own country, to support this accusation by the proposition that perhaps in the long run the annihilation of Belgium is historic necessity—that is not Marxism, but cynicism.

The war disclosed the incompatibility of patriotism with the international interests, tasks, and principles of the proletariat, and if national governments continue to exist forever and unchanged,—one could almost doubt the realization of Socialism.

We see what took place in this connection in the German party. On the very eve of the war *Vorwaerts* wrote revolutionary, purely Marxist, articles, and disclosed the lie of the watchword, "War Against Czarism." Then came the 4th of

August, and all was changed. What had happened? The feeling of fear for the fatherland had seized the masses of the German people and working class. The threatening Cossack danger had created a peculiar state of mind. This state of mind was no mere ghost of the brain. All observers noticed it. Certainly one could speak in this connection of the deception that the ruling classes had practiced on the masses of the people; of a malicious manipulation of the hatred of the German Social Democracy against the backbone of the European reaction—Russian despotism. But the question remained, Why did people let themselves be deceived? What blinded them so—and not the masses alone? What brought the Social Democratic Party into such a position, that they allowed themselves to be taken in tow by their government? There is no doubt that the ground for this lies in the living, feeling, and consciousness of an organic connection with the spot of earth, “the Fatherland,” in which the German proletariat lives and works. *All this, of course, merely explains the behavior of the leaders of the German Social Democracy, without justifying it.* It has recently become customary to confuse the explanation of a phenomenon with its justification.

They ought not to have allowed themselves to be deceived by the talk of the struggle against Czarism. They should have at least declared that since the ruling classes were responsible for the war, since they had hurled the country into the adventure, they ought to pay the cost, that the party of the working class cannot, and will not, discuss war credits, and therefore refrain from voting. I repeat that was the minimum we could demand from the Social Democracy.

For the French Socialists there was far more ground for taking part in the national defense. Let us not forget that the German army was already on the road to Paris. French workingmen, who, in theory, are indifferent to political struggle, and regard the form of political government as unimportant, felt in the strongest possible way the danger of the German invasion, the difference between the half-absolute régime of Germany and the republican régime of their own country. This is why all of them, including Syndicalists, Anarchists, took such an active share in the national defense. The saving of the nation’s freedom for its further development, their cultural existence, was at stake. Although the

supposition of Plechanoff that a victory of Germany would enslave Russia—as far as France is concerned, there would be a very real danger of this.

In the present war the question of victory or defeat can arouse no such difference of opinion as in previous wars. Previous wars were on the road of social progress, which was represented by one or the other of the two sides in the war. To-day all the Great Powers are in such a situation that a complete defeat for any one of them would be a misfortune to all mankind. The annihilation of any one of them would be a great danger for the whole world, a source of new armaments, and obstacles to the economic evolution of the international labor movement. One must distinguish between defeats and defeats. The defeats which Russia suffered in the Crimean War and the war with Japan proved to be only a mighty influence for the further development of the country. I do not believe it is possible for Russia to come out of the present war as a beaten, subjected country. There is no reason for wishing for a decisive victory for Russia. Such a victory would be a new source of strength for the Russian Czarism. A defeat which is not so great as to disturb the organic evolution of the country might put an end to the old régime. (Our italics.)

Thus Axelrod does not agree with Plechanoff in desiring Russian victory, but neither does he wish or expect to see a very serious Russian defeat. He agrees with Plechanoff in justifying the action of the French Socialists and condemning that of the Germans. He believes the Socialists of the world must desire a moderate victory of Germany over Russia, but that they cannot desire the smallest victory of Germany over France.

The best known representatives of the "Majority" are similarly divided. Lenin, its chief publicist and political leader, takes a position against the Russian Government as outlined in the above Party statement. The world-famed Maxim Gorki, who belongs to the same faction, calls the Socialists of Russia to war against the

“barbarian” Germans in the name of international Socialism.

But hostility to Germany is by no means confined to leaders of party organizations in Russia. The working people go farther and give enthusiastic support to the war.

It is generally known that the industrial working people of the Russian cities have been thoroughly permeated with Socialism for many years. But they have not to any considerable degree shared the views of those leaders of the Socialist organizations who oppose the present war. This is definitely and conclusively shown by an article on Russian opinion in *Vorwaerts* on December 30th, which attempts to make the most of what anti-war sentiment actually exists among the Russian working people. It is in part as follows:

All Social Democratic activity is made extraordinarily difficult because of the feeling among the masses. The great masses of the working people are inclined towards “patriotism” and declare that the “Fatherland” must be “defended.” In the provinces there are here and there even traces of a pan-Slavic influence among the workers, who regard the “emancipation” of their “Slavic brothers” as a necessity. The advanced workers, however—and their number is by no means small—are hostile both to “patriotism” and to pan-Slavism. Their first question is, “Are you for the war?” . . .

In various inland towns attempts are being made to resume the activities of the Social Democratic Party. But most of these attempts are at present being shattered, not only because of unfavorable external conditions, but also through the confusion which war has brought into the ranks of the party comrades, even in Russia. It is to be remarked, however, that the ruling bodies of the great organizations of the Social Democratic Party: the Central Committee, Organization Committee, Lettish Central Committee, Caucasian Provincial Committee, and the organizations of the Poles, Lithuanians, have issued leaflets against the war, and endeavored to spread their views among the masses.

At the Socialist Peace Conference at Copenhagen, on January 16th and 17th, a report was made by a part of the Russian Socialists, including the Jewish and Caucasian organizations, perhaps a majority of all the Socialists of Russia. This report covers the same ground as previous statements, except that it makes a very careful differentiation between the positions of the two leading factions of Russian Socialists toward the war:

Great differences of opinion exist as to the causes of the war and the importance of its possible results. One group emphasizes general causes—the capitalistic competition of the various countries—and attaches no particular importance to the relative responsibility of those countries which have declared war. Another group does not deny the general causes, but believes that the specific aspects of German militarism should be emphasized, and regards these as the chief causes of the war.

In opposition to this the supporters of the first group, to which the majority of the present committee belongs, regard it as possible that the victory of either coalition in this war may bring advantages to the democratic and Socialistic movements, but they are of the opinion that Russian victory over Germany might bring with it a strengthening of reaction in Russia and so might imperil the democratic movement of all Europe. One must also point out that there is a small minority of Social Democrats, who, viewing matters from this standpoint, desire a victory of Germany over Russia in the interest of progress.

This last statement is important as implying that neither faction of the Russian Socialists, with the exception of a small minority, desires the victory of Germany over Russia. The larger part of the Organization Committee evidently desires the war to be a draw, while the other faction, it is clear, desires a victory of Russia. Though it is probable, as we saw from previous quotations, that they would not like to see too great a victory gained by the present government, and it is certain that

they do not want the Czar to win without being forced to concede the demands of the great masses of the nation.

In the Duma meeting of February 9th, the Socialists voted against the Budget, while the Labor Party abstained from the voting. The Socialists, through Tscheidse, made the following important declaration :

At the outbreak of the war the Social Democratic Party said it had no confidence in the government, and the six months that have passed show that its judgment was correct. The frightful results of the war are intensified in Russia by the politics of the government. The government began at once to strengthen its menaced position by means of reactionary measures. As usual, it attacked foreign nationalities. While promises were made to the Poles, the oppression in Finland became stronger, the Jews were persecuted, and even in the occupied parts of Galicia the Little Russians were attacked. In other countries everything was done to lighten the sufferings of war. In Russia the Social Democratic meetings for this purpose were broken up and the Social Democratic publications suppressed. The climax of this persecution came with the arrest of the five Duma members (Socialists). We protest before all Europe against this persecution. The government only turns to the Duma because it is convinced that it will get everything it wants. The war loans have been brought about by the increase of paper money and of direct taxes, by ukase, and were not brought before this body. The Social Democrats will struggle as formerly for the internal freedom of Russia. Moreover, the group declares that in accordance with the principles of the Copenhagen Conference, it will begin to work for the end of the war as soon as possible and for a peace in accordance with the desires of all the peoples thrown into the war.

One of the few Socialists left in the Duma after the arrests, however, was unable to consent to this declaration. Manikow declared that he could not accept the final sentence of the Social Democratic declaration which referred to the desirability of an early peace.

He declared that he regarded the war as a war of conquest on the part of Germany, and held that in the interest of the final destruction of militarism the word "peace" ought not to be used until the German junkers are conquered. Because of this declaration, Manikow was expelled from the Russian Party.

CHAPTER XXV

POLAND

THE American Alliance, representing Polish Socialist Parties of Germany, Austria, and Russia, is thoroughly representative and by its location free to voice Polish Socialist opinion. A large part of the Poles of the world are in America and no inconsiderable fraction of these are Socialists. Their declaration attacks the German government before the war almost as much as the Russian. As it was written before the German occupation of a large part of Russian Poland, it necessarily concentrates its attack on governments after the war against the Russians in Galicia.

The present war presents the highest tragedy for the Polish people. On the Polish soil German, Austrian, and Russian armies are fighting. Belgium suffered the same lot. But our Belgian brothers did not live through such an unheard-of horror as the Poles who were forced to join the colors of Russian, German, and Austrian armies, and, at the command of invaders, are pitted against one another and compelled to murder each other for the glory and power of their oppressors. Such is the horrible condition of our people.

The sufferings, unexampled in the history of mankind, of twenty-three millions of cultured people must be eliminated. And the only solution for this is the creation of the independent Polish republic. No larger or smaller autonomy will insure us free and unhampered development.

The democracy and liberties proclaimed by the constitutional manifesto in 1905 were revoked skillfully, one by one. Poland was divided again by taking out from it the province of Chelm. All efforts to spread education among the Polish people were prohibited and punished.

In the present war the commander-in-chief of the Russian army brazenly offers autonomy to Polish people on one condition, namely, that the Poles in all three parts of Poland should be loyal to the Russian Government. At the same time he orders that the meetings of the new Citizens' Committee, now formed in Warsaw for the relief among the poor, shall be held in the Russian language.

Immediately after the Russian proclamation of the manifesto promising local self-government to Poland, the general office of the press department of the Russian Government issued a circular to all Russian papers explaining that the so-called manifesto does not mean autonomy to Poland at all, but simply that all the Polish provinces now held by Austrians and Prussians will be annexed to Russia. The fate which will meet them is seen best in the behavior of Russia in the recently invaded parts of Galicia—announcing that from now on there shall be Russian customs and the Russian form of government in Galicia.

In the recently conquered Galicia, the Russians destroyed the Polish schools, closed down the university, abolished the provincial legislature, establishing Russian administration and even importing police from Russia.

Pleading in our cause, we at the same time bring to your attention the struggle for independence of our neighbor countries, Ukraina, Bohemia, Finland, and Lithuania, which at present suffer under the rule of foreign and oppressive governments.

CHAPTER XXVI

ITALY

THE Italian Socialist Party held firmly to neutrality. A certain number of leading Socialists, however, were in favor of war against Germany and Austria. Among these were the whole of the Socialist Reform Party, Battisti, a Socialist leader from the Italian part of Austria, and Raimondi, a Socialist leader only recently expelled from the Party and solely because of his Free-Masonry. Finally, we have Mussolini, editor of the *Avanti*, who admitted his position in favor of war and was forced to resign (see Chapter XVII). It will also be noted that even those leaders who favor neutrality, like Della Seta, and the moderate, Turati, express the wish to see the Allies victorious in the war. The Syndicalist-Socialist Members of Parliament, Labriola and De Ambris, are also in favor of war.

Suedekum and another German Socialist deputy, and also several well-known Austrian Socialists, visited Italy early in September, to try to defend the position of the German and Italian Parties. This led the Italian Party at Rome to issue the following statement:

We Socialists regard the dispatch of the German mission to Italy as an offense against the dignity and independence of Italian Socialism; the more so as the German Social Democratic Party, by supporting the German and Austrian policy of aggression, has forfeited the right to the title of Internationalist Socialists.

But if now this hope is vain, we express our desire that this infamous war may be concluded by the defeat of those

who have provoked it—the Austrian and German Empires. For the Empires of Austria and Germany form the rampart of European reaction, even more than Russia, which is shaken by democratic and Socialist forces that have shown that they know how to attempt a heroic effort of liberation. If the German and Austrian Empires emerge victorious from the war, it will mean the triumph of military absolutism in its most brutal expression, of a barbarian horde massacring, devastating, destroying, and conquering in violation of every treaty and right and law.

Nor do the German Socialists give us any confidence that they know how to prevent this; in the past they have only been able to realize advantageous contracts of labor and to attain gigantic election results without exercising any influence in the policy of their own country.

The defeat of the German Empire may, by breaking down the feudal political régime of the empire, taking away from Russian absolutism the assistance it has hitherto enjoyed, and contributing to alter decisively the aims of all European policy, offer German Socialism an opportunity to emerge from its voluntary impotence and to redeem itself.

Since, finally, the victory of the French Republic, now imbued with genuine Socialism, and that of England, where the truest democracy flourishes, means the victory of a European political régime open to all social conquests and desiring peace, and signifies the agreement between states at last free and nationally re-inforced by the substitution of a system of national militia for defense in the place of hordes professionally organized for aggression, this would also bring about the liberation of the German people also.

Therefore, under existing conditions, while nearly the whole of Europe is at war, we may well raise our cry of horror and of protest; but our protest strikes only those who desired the war, not those who submit to it in order to defend themselves against oppression.

In this war is outlined on one side the defense of European reaction, on the other the defense of all revolutions, past and future, brought about by an historical necessity stronger than the intentions of governments. And because of this we must affirm that there remains for us only one way of being internationalists, namely, to declare ourselves loyally in favor of whoever fights the empires of reaction, just as the Italian

Socialists residing in Paris have understood that one way only remains to the anti-militarist—to arm and fight against the empires of militarism.

This is our answer as Italian Socialists to the German Socialists.

The mission of the German Socialists in Italy was chiefly remarkable for a Socialist meeting in Milan at which a discussion between Italians and Germans occurred. The speech of Della Seta was especially noteworthy. Della Seta found it exceedingly strange that the German Social Democrats should turn to their Italian comrades in such a moment. He said:

"The defense of the conduct of the German Socialists does not convince us. You speak of that France which is allied with Russia, and of the English enemies of Germany, but we speak of our France, of revolutionary France, of the France of Jaurès, and of no other. The French Socialists continued to conduct an anti-military propaganda in a country clamoring for revenge. The French Socialists fought against the French preparation for war, which the Germans did not do in their country, or only did up to the point when the imperialistic feelings of the Kaiser and the bourgeoisie might be offended.

"German domination is a worse danger for us than that of Czarism, because Czarism keeps the German army from marching on Paris. Because the French banner protects everything that is most revolutionary in spite of all failures and errors. The German cry to-day is, "Deutschland über Alles," and German Socialists are not working against this.

"In the present case they ought to have acted according to republican principles. But the German Socialists published in *Vorwaerts* that the Kaiser had worked for two years against war.* You speak of German civilization being in danger, but we can see no civilization in the power that attacks neutral Belgium and accomplishes the destruction of Louvain. On the whole, you Socialists use the same arguments as the German bourgeois government.

* This is a misinterpretation of the position of *Vorwaerts*. See above, pp. 188, 189.

"To us the Kaiser is no better than the Czar. . . . And if there is a secret wish in your present words and steps, there is also a secret wish in our neutrality, but this wish shall be no secret for you, just as your thoughts are no secret for us. We say openly that we weep over destroyed Belgium, and follow the fate of France with trembling. And as to the relation of party to party we will, when peace draws near, call together an international conference as soon as possible."

In his reply, Suedekum stated that he had been sent by the German Party.

The neutrality proclamation of the Italian Party has already been reproduced in Chapter XVII. Their attitude toward peace, and incidentally toward some of the questions of the war, follows in Chapter XXIX. It may be noted here, however, that there are signs that they have abandoned their plan of a general strike in case of a declaration of war.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE UNITED STATES

THE Socialist Party of the United States has favored immediate peace at all stages of the war, and all its thinking about the great conflict has been more or less influenced by this desire. However, there is a very wide variety of opinion, and as there has been no official Party Congress since the war, we sum up this opinion by quotations from those two party leaders who have served longest as representatives to the International Socialist Bureau, Morris Hillquit and Victor Berger, from the presidential candidate, Eugene V. Debs, and from his most popular rival at the last convention, Charles Edward Russell. We also reproduce quotations from the *New York Call*, the party's daily organ in English, and from its official weekly, *The American Socialist*.

MORRIS HILLQUIT

The most copious and complete American discussion of the relations between the Socialist Parties and the war has undoubtedly been that of Morris Hillquit, who, besides a number of briefer statements on the subject, wrote a series of articles in the *Metropolitan Magazine*.

In the February number, Hillquit took a position which a number of Socialists have attacked as being nationalistic. Hillquit denies the justice of the criticism. The disputed passage is as follows:

What lies at the bottom of the Socialist attachment for the fatherland is not so much the abstract ethical sentiment as the solid material motive. The same, of course, holds true of all other classes of the population. *The country is the economic unit of modern society.* It supplies the food and sustains the lives of its inhabitants. The ancient and true formula of internationalism *Ubi panis ibi patria* may with equal justice be reversed into *Ubi patria ibi panis*: Where the fatherland is there is the bread.

The statement of fact underlined is the reason assigned by Bauer (see Chapter II) for the nationalism of the working classes—based on a conflict of immediate economic interests. Bauer believes that Socialism—if it is to exist—must combat the effect of this conflict of immediate interests by an appeal to larger interests. Hillquit regards the conflict of interest between nations as insuperable in present society, and its acceptance as in no way inconsistent with Socialism.

In the *Metropolitan Magazine* of March (1915) Hillquit makes a somewhat lengthy defense of the German Socialist Party's support of their government. He asks the following question:

It is true that neither the German nor the English Socialists are entirely unanimous in their support of the military operations of their respective governments, *but the opposition has so far not developed much strength in either country.* The great bulk of the European Socialists are in this war, if not with love and enthusiasm, then at least with the conviction of their duty to fight. The undeniable fact is that this most monstrous and seemingly most causeless of all wars in history is a popular war in each of the belligerent countries. How can this paradox be explained?

Hillquit proceeds to state that 15 of about 85 members of the Reichstag present at the party caucus on August 3d were opposed to voting the war loan. As these members represent some of the largest Reichstag districts in Germany, this fact in itself shows that the

party is very far from being so nearly unanimous as he says it is.

Hillquit only mentions the action of Karl Liebknecht on December 2d, although 15 members were opposed to the vote on this occasion as before. We have given other facts in Chapter XIX which show that the opposition among German Socialists is very considerable.

Hillquit continues his defense as follows:

The great bulk of the five and a half million Socialists and Socialist voters of Germany and Austria spontaneously and simultaneously rallied to the support of their countries as soon as war had been declared. They had no opportunity for mutual consultation. They acted on impulse, which broke through with elemental force. It was not a decision, not a policy—it was history, and history cannot be scolded or praised; it must be understood.

It is not our function to comment on the above argument. But one statement will be questioned by many Socialists. In view of the action of the German Socialists in voting for the second war loan on December 2d, the majority of Socialists outside of Germany will probably deny that the Socialist majority in that country acted “spontaneously” in supporting the war on this second occasion. Certainly they had “opportunity for mutual consultation” at this time and did not act “on impulse.”

The feature of the article in the March number is that this defense is extended to the Socialists of all countries. In this article Hillquit goes to the length of claiming that the International Socialist movement has suffered nothing whatever “spiritually and morally” from the Socialists’ conduct during the war—a position not shared, so far as we are aware, by any other prominent Socialist in any of the leading countries. His main points are as follows:

The danger of a country threatened by foreign invasion is not less real because it has been brought about by the arrogance or recklessness of its own government. . . .

It is this primordial instinct of national self-preservation which in the last analysis accounts for the "war enthusiasm" of the people in all countries threatened by foreign invasion, regardless of the causes or objects of the war. And the Socialists form no exception to this rule.

The Socialists of Belgium, France, Germany, Austria, and Serbia are *almost unanimous* in support of the military operations of their countries. Their countries are under partial hostile occupation, their territories are the theaters of active warfare, their national existence is physically threatened in each instance. The Socialists of England and Russia are divided in their war sentiments. In both countries there is considerable Socialist discussion for and against the war policies of their governments. Neither England nor Russia is seriously threatened by hostile invasion or occupation of its territory. . . .

Thus the differing war attitudes of the Socialists of the various countries is to be accounted for not on ideological grounds, not on the theory that one part of the Socialist International has remained true to its principles, while another large portion has betrayed them overnight, but by the much simpler explanation that the Socialists of each country have yielded to the inexorable necessities of the situation, and to the extent exacted by these necessities.

The Socialists of all belligerent countries have temporarily surrendered to the compelling forces of the great world catastrophe, but in no country have they abandoned their faith in the eventual coming of the brotherhood of all men. In no country have they modified their determination to continue their struggles for lasting peace firmly rooted in social justice.

Physically the Socialist International lies bleeding at the feet of the Moloch of capitalist militarism, but morally and spiritually it remains unscathed.

An article in the *American Socialist* (January 9, 1915) insists upon Socialist neutrality, and states that a drawn war is desirable from the Socialist standpoint and that "whatever the cause of human progress and

civilization may gain through a punishment of Prussian militarism, it will lose a hundredfold through the victory of Russian despotism."

This article is in part as follows:

American Socialists should not take sides with the Allies as against the Germans. The assertion that the forces of the Allied armies are waging a war of democracy against militarism is a hollow catch-phrase devoid of true sense and substance. The governments of France and England are not fighting for the liberation of the German people from the yoke of their reactionary and militaristic government. If they will be victorious, they will not force the abdication of the Hohenzollern dynasty and the establishment of a democratic republic in Germany. The militaristic imperialism of Germany can be superseded by a régime of peaceful democracy only through the action of the German people themselves, and principally through the struggles of the German Socialists and organized workers. Just as the working class as a whole must accomplish its own economic emancipation, just so must the people of each country conquer its own political rights and freedom. No nation in history has ever obtained true liberty as the forced gift of a foreign power.

Besides it will not do to speak glibly about France and England and conveniently and complacently forget about Russia. Russia is the most unrepresentable but by no means the least important member of the Allied family. In the final settlement of the European score, it will have as much to say as England or France. And when we speak of Russia, we do not mean the Russian people, who are never consulted, but that most hideous and perfidious of all European forces, the reactionary, absolutistic, militaristic, and brutal government of the Czar. *Whatever the cause of human progress and civilization may gain through a punishment of Prussian militarism, it will lose a hundredfold through a victory of Russian despotism.*

Nor should American Socialists favor the German side of this war as against that of the Allies. The claim that the German sword has been drawn in the interests of "culture" is just as false and hypocritical as the contention that the Allies are fighting for democracy. Whatever culture Ger-

many possesses was painfully developed by her people in times of peace and is now being ruthlessly destroyed by her government through its brutal exploits on land, in the air, and at sea. A victory of German arms will not enhance the "culture" of Germany nor contribute to the spread of culture in the vanquished countries. If anything was required to demonstrate the hollowness of the patriotic German pretenses, it was supplied by her recent alliance in this war—with Turkey. Russia as the apostle of European democracy and Turkey as the guardian of European culture, such are the absurdities of the conflicting ideological claims of the contending sides.

The ghastly carnage in Europe has no redeeming features. It is not a war for democracy, culture, or progress. It is not a fight for sentiments or ideals. It is a cold-blooded butchery for advantages and power, and let us not forget it—advantages and power for the ruling classes of the warring nations. For while the people of the warring countries are fighting this war, and perhaps have to fight it to save their skins, they have been drawn into it through the ambitions, intrigues, and quarrels of their masters, who will take all of the benefits of the victory, whichever side prevails. A decisive victory of either side is likely to foster a spirit of military arrogance and pseudo-patriotic exultation on the part of the victorious countries, lasting resentment and increased military activity on the part of the defeated nations, and a general condition of pan-European irritation with a tendency to another, perhaps even more, pernicious war.

From the true Socialist viewpoint the most satisfactory solution of the great sanguinary conflict of the nations lies in a draw, a cessation of hostilities from sheer exhaustion without determining anything. (Our italics.)

If the war is a draw that will mean, evidently, the restoration of the *status quo*; the nations will have the same territory and the same relative military power as before. Many Socialists feel that this would mean more militarism than ever; Hillquit, in the last paragraph, expresses the belief that it would mean less.

We have quoted at length from Hillquit's exposition

of the Socialist position on war in general in Chapter II. His views on peace follow in Chapters XXIX and XXX.

VICTOR BERGER

In the Milwaukee *Leader* of August 23d, Victor Berger gives us an excellent summary of his views—especially interesting because of his familiarity with the German situation, and especially important because, until 1915, he was the only Socialist who had served in the Congress of the United States.

Socialism is not yet the ruling force of Europe. In spite of the 10,000,000 votes for the various Social Democratic parties in the European countries—in spite of the many more millions that are banded together in trades unions and in syndicates—the best, the strongest, the healthiest men of every nation in Europe are killing and maiming each other more effectively and in more ingenious ways than the world has ever known before. All of them are men who hold no personal grudge against one another—many of them, especially in the German and French armies, are Social Democrats who in all probability would soon become the best of friends if they could have met under ordinary conditions. Why this barbaric war?

There has been much nonsense written about it by non-Socialists and Socialists alike. Some of our Socialists are apt to make their task easy by simply blaming capitalism for everything bad that comes up, including this war.

However, in an old and complex civilization like that of Europe, there are a multiplicity of factors that must be considered in judging the conflagration which the world is witnessing.

Capitalism is only one cause, and a minor one at that. Capitalism played the deciding part in determining the participation of England.

History will record that English commercialism of the most sordid kind found expression in the great war of 1914. England wants to annihilate its most dangerous competitor in the world's market. For this reason it threw the kinship of blood and the ties of a common culture to the winds and en-

tered upon a purely piratical expedition against Germany. And Japan—the “England of the East”—wants to make the best of the opportunity to grab the German possessions in China. In the end both are helping Russian Czarism and are undermining their own existence as Great Powers. The action of England is the most contemptible of any nation in this bloody struggle.

Another and far more important cause of this war is nationalism and race hatred—something that is very little understood in America.

National and religious prejudices, however, are still foremost in the political life of eastern Europe. Race and religious issues dominated the Balkan peninsula for hundreds of years in the form of Christianity *versus* Mohammedanism. The murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Austrian heir-apparent—who played the Catholic Slavic string against the Russian orthodox—by a young Servian fanatic, clearly shows the violence of the religious and nationalist feeling in those countries. Less than half of the Servians live in Servia. A greater Servia means the breaking up of Austria-Hungary.

And nationalism is also uppermost in the political life of Austria. Ever since 1780—when Joseph II, by trying to Germanize, waked the sleeping nationalities—it has become a question of life and death for the empire. The “sick man” of Europe to-day is Austria—it is made sick by undigested nations. Even the Social Democratic Party of Austria—thoroughly international as it is—did not entirely succeed in eliminating the friction between the various nationalities within its own ranks.

And nationalism in its most dangerous aspect, that of pan-Slavism—the Russian Czar aspiring to become the ruler of Europe and Asia—is the pivotal point of the foreign policy of Russia since the days of Peter the Great. For this reason the Russian Czar has always acted as the protector of the Slavs in the Turkish domains. And now he even presumes to act as their guardian in Austria, although the Austrian Slavs are in every respect better off than the Russians themselves, both economically and politically.

The success of Russia, however, would be a curse to them.

The third factor playing an important part in causing this war is militarism. Germany alone is usually blamed for this, and rightfully. It is a fact that of all modern nations, Ger-

many alone still has a fixed and hereditary class which makes war and service in the army its foremost business and occupation in life. The ruling element of Germany, the one that is really deciding the destiny of the empire, is not the wealthy and ambitious German capitalist class—contrary to the common conception of the average Socialist.

The ruling element in Germany is still the old feudal landed nobility—the Junker class. It is a hereditary caste like the castes of old India and Japan—with this difference that occasionally a man with much money may buy himself into it, or at least marry off his daughter to some Junker.

This nobility is favored in every possible way by legislation, protective tariffs, and freight rates.

This nobility furnishes the overwhelming majority of the army officers. It has a monopoly on all the higher posts of officialdom in Germany. *And the mere existence of a caste of that type is a standing menace to the peace of Europe, because Junkerdom is the personification of German militarism.*

German militarism, while everywhere hated, was everywhere imitated. But nowhere with the same success. In other countries it lacked the foundation—the co-relation between the Junker and the peasant. This relation was destroyed in France and England by successful revolutions. And it is on the point of being destroyed in Germany by industrial evolution and—by the Social Democratic Party.

German militarism, however, meant the heaping of almost unbearable tax burdens upon the people. All European nations had not only to support immense standing armies, but also to provide armament for the millions of additional men to be called in case of war. In Germany, the last war levy was no longer one on income—it practically began to confiscate at least some of the capital. Neither capitalism nor feudalism in Europe could stand that much longer. There was so much powder stored up that it exploded.

The fear of the rulers of Europe for the aggressive democracy of their countries also played no small part in starting this world war. Every autocrat fears the awakening of the demons.

The Kaiser of Germany felt the immense loss of prestige in his own domain from the rising flood of the Social Democracy. The Social Democratic Party has gained over 500 per cent. during the period of his reign. It must have been

galling to him to know that nearly 40 per cent. of his subjects are avowed anti-monarchists, and want a republic. Over half of Germany's voters to-day are anti-militaristic.

At the last budget for the army and navy of Germany the Social Democrats forced upon the wealthy some of the burden which in the past had been borne almost entirely by the common people.

The Kaiser's prestige was waning. He evidently was willing to risk the war to refresh it.

The Russian Czar was in even a worse plight. Two days before the war was declared, a general strike was on in St. Petersburg. Labor troubles are now chronic in St. Petersburg, Viborg, and Odessa. Just before the war broke out the English papers stated that the crisis in the Balkans presented the Russian Government a time-honored way of escape.

A foreign war has been habitually the palliative for domestic discontent with unscrupulous governments. "And war was resorted to by the Czar simply as a diversion," said the *London Daily News*, an organ of the English party in power which declared war.

Because England's ruling classes also welcome anything that takes the attention from the terrible "hard times" in England, both Liberals and Tories would rather have a dozen wars than let Lloyd George's programme go much farther.

As for France, that country is on the brink of a social revolution as everybody knows. The "revanche" on Germany offered a safety valve for a little while at least. (Our italics.)

EUGENE V. DEBS

In his Labor Day (September 1st) article in the *American Socialist*, Debs' main point was that under capitalism all governments are alike. In his article of January 9, 1915, he says that wars cannot be stopped as long as capitalism continues, but indorses the proposition of Allan L. Benson that there shall be a referendum before war is declared and that those who vote for war shall go to war.

In the *American Socialist* of September 1st, he said:

Despotism in autocratic Russia, monarchic Germany, and republican America is substantially the same in its effect upon the working class. At the behest of the ruling aristocracy, nobility, and plutocracy they murder one another in time of war that they may all be robbed in time of peace.

The article in the *American Socialist* of January 9 (1915) declared:

The war in Europe is a crime against civilization, but it had to come. It did not come by chance. Every war has its cause. Modern wars are between rival nations for commercial supremacy.

It is of little use to cry out against war while we tolerate a social system that breeds war.

Capitalism makes war inevitable. Capitalist nations not only exploit their workers, but ruthlessly invade, plunder, and ravage one another. The profit system is responsible for it all. Abolish that, establish industrial democracy, produce for use, and the incentive to war vanishes. Until then men may talk about "Peace on earth," but it will be a myth—or sarcasm.

But there is no cause for despair. The world is awakening and we are approaching the sunrise.

We cannot stop the European war. We can and will intervene when the time comes and do all in our power to restore peace. *To end the war prematurely, were that possible, would simply mean another and perhaps even a bloodier catastrophe.*

Let us show the people the true cause of war. Let us arouse a sentiment against war. Let us teach the children to abhor war. (Our italics.)

Debs, then, did not agree with Hillquit in desiring the immediate ending of the war.

CHARLES EDWARD RUSSELL

Charles Edward Russell has written at length about the causes and probable results of the war. He be-

believes that it was caused by a combination of world-wide commercialism and German militarism; he hopes peace will not be made until the latter is done away with, but he believes that commercial capitalism will require a more drastic remedy. His discussion of this question we summarize in Chapter XXX.

In the *New York Call* of September 14th, Russell points to the greed for easy profits from colonies as one of the chief motives for war on the part of the German capitalists and their Kaiser:

"In the event of another war like that of 1870, France would be shorn of these valuable possessions, which would then become German. More colonies meant more commerce, more commerce meant more profits, more profits meant more power. That way the pressure inevitably tended, and even if no one had ever designed war nor intended it, under the existing system war was certain.

"The apparent destiny of German commercialism, exalted by its many victories, was to annex the French colonies, to enlarge with Germany's enlarged borders, and to raise Germany above all competitors to the supreme commercial command of the world. It saw nothing but easy victories, added provinces, and added business. Controlling a great part of the press, and moving hand in hand with a government sympathetic and lusting for war, it dragged the sane part of Germany into the struggle, and down came the red deluge."

Capitalistic greed alone is not an adequate explanation. The political structure is an equally important factor. German imperialism is a fusion of capitalistic ambitions and militaristic delusions. It can flourish only in a country subject to an oligarchy headed by the Kaiser:

"It was so here. For many years men that knew better have acquiesced in the surviving feudalism that is expressed in monarchical institutions. We have tried to convince ourselves that if a nation had some kind of delegate assembly, a parliament, or a reichstag, meeting to pass some laws and fiddle about the skirts of government, why, all was well enough, though it still retained kaiser or king.

"What difference does it make? we said. It is but a name.

Each nation to its own taste. How smart is this kaiser and how clever is that king! There can be democracy in an empire, we said, and as truly might we have said that we could breathe in a vacuum or from darkness draw light.

"What difference does it make? We can see the difference."

THE NEW YORK "CALL"

In an August editorial the New York *Call* thus excuses the action of the German Socialist Party:

An unwilling man is caught in the war machine, and his being a Socialist makes no more difference than if in times of "peace" he were caught in the capitalist factory machine, as is the actual fact. But because a Socialist is forced to become a soldier it no more militates against his intention to destroy capitalism than when he is forced to become a wage slave and serve it in that capacity.

Our European comrades have done their best. Temporarily they have failed, but their turn will come soon, when militarism and capitalism commence to devour themselves.

German Socialists have taken the stand that it was necessary to repel the Russian invasion; that Russia, as a reactionary power, threatened the Socialist cause more than any other factor. But this does not mean that they have been reconciled to German imperialism and militarism. It is, in their minds, a case of choosing the least of two evils, and no Socialist is hypocritical enough to make a virtue out of necessity.

After Liebknecht had refused to vote for the second war loan, however, the *Call* changed its attitude, indorsing his position as against that of the party majority.

An editorial of September 12th, moreover, contended that the war was brought on by modern international capitalism in its struggle against the pre-capitalistic government of Germany:

Practically every influential paper in America takes the position that peace is not yet desirable, even were it pos-

sible. They all, of course, protest they love peace and are eager for it, but they don't want peace that isn't put on what they call "a lasting basis." It is better to have the war go on. And it is not difficult to see that their advocacy of the continuance of war is based on the belief that the Kaiser is now getting the worst of it, and that his ultimate defeat is assured. If it were not so, they would advocate instant peace at almost any price. . . . They are all saying exactly what the organs of the English, the French, the Russians, the Belgians, and other Allies, and even "neutrals" like Spain, Portugal, and Italy, are saying. Whether it is true or not may be left open to opinion. But the real question is, How comes this strange unanimity?

Capitalism from the very beginning has decreed the doom of the Kaiser and his imperialism, and its spokesmen are now beginning to show their hands and talk freely of the necessity of his downfall. The general rejection of peace at this particular time can mean nothing else, and it is but one of the innumerable proofs of the existence of this project. Capitalism is telling us that the Kaiser must go, and that there will be no peace until he does.

The motives of the world's financiers, according to a *Sunday Call* article, were, first, to subject the German military oligarchy to international capitalism, and second, to remove the danger that it might lead to a Socialist revolution.

THE "AMERICAN SOCIALIST" INDORSES LIEBKNECHT

In its issue of January 9, 1915, the official organ of the American Party also indorsed the stand taken by Liebknecht, in contrast to that of the German Party, in the following important editorial:

Karl Liebknecht's voice has again spanned the seas. Out of the wreckage of civilization that is now being strewn over Europe, while millions of men continue retrograding to savagery, we hear him pleading for peace.

While the toilers of every nation at war have rallied to

the cry of nationalism; while the masses have forgotten their allegiance to their own interests and enlisted in the cause of the oppressors, Liebknecht still stands where he stood before this carnage was inaugurated—he stands forth before all the world as the uncompromising foe of war.

He has been called “the bravest man in Europe.” It did take courage to war on militarism while the nations still slumbered at peace upon their heavy armaments. It takes greater courage now to assail the master class when every word so uttered may be labeled treason.

The Socialist movement of the world right now needs both courage and consistency. If some of the Socialists of Europe have for the moment been won to participation in the blood feast, their acts are inconsistent with the teachings of Socialism. Time and the courageous action and example of such men as Liebknecht will win the Socialist army back to consistency.

Socialist principles and teachings are not at fault. It is as Liebknecht says in his peace message to the world:

“Many Socialists blame our principles for our present failure. It is not our principles which have failed, but the representatives of those principles.”

From week to week, as this cruel war drags on, there is an increasingly noticeable return to consistency among the European workers who became very inconsistent in their action when they joined the armies of Kaiser, King, and Czar back in August.

In opposing war and militarism, Liebknecht is consistent. All Socialists in the least aiding the European war are inconsistent. When all Socialists become as consistent as Liebknecht then the death knell of war will be heard over the world, the reign of the oppressors will come to an end, and civilization will undergo a new birth.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE SMALLER NEUTRAL COUNTRIES

WE give documents illustrating the position of the Socialists of all the more important neutral countries. The Dutch, it will be seen, who were at first hostile to the German Party, later seemed to favor its position. In Switzerland a similar change occurred, and the Swiss Party Congress shows that the majority there, opposed by the French Swiss and a few Germans, also favors leniency toward the German Socialist majority. In Sweden, on the other hand, the anti-Russian attitude of the ruling class has thrown the leader, Branting, on the anti-German side, while in Roumania it is doubtless the strong tendency of the government toward the Allies that has brought the Socialists to lean so strongly in the opposite direction—though the proximity of the Czarism is an equally important cause. The Spanish Socialist leader, and the sole representative in the Cortes, while naturally declaring for Spanish neutrality, is very strongly in favor of the Allies.

HOLLAND

We quote the following from an editorial of *Het Volk*, the central daily organ of the Social Democratic Party of Holland, August 8, 1914:

We must assume that our German comrades did not protest, with all their might, against the violation of Luxemburg's neutrality and Belgium's independence. In 1870 Bebel and Liebknecht refrained from giving their support. But they

did not wish to vote the war loan because they thought that Germany had been attacked and because they were, as yet, unaware of the fact that Bismarck had himself contrived the war. The other Social Democrats in the Reichstag voted in its favor.

The case of 1870 repeats itself. The German nation has forgotten Bismarck's imposition in 1870. Yet the imposition projected by the government at present is much greater and much more gross. In the Reichstag the Chancellor declared: "Russia is applying the torch to our door." This is the lie under the influence of which the German people entered upon their war of offense. It is a sudden war which is the natural result of what the ruling classes of Germany have upon their conscience in the way of nationalistic and capitalistic trespass; a war in which the word of honor given Luxemburg as to neutrality is broken without scruple, in which Belgium's independence is trampled under foot; a war of offense against France, where Jaurès, as his last act, constrained the government to maintain peace. Our German comrades seem indeed to be of the opinion also that the war is being waged against Russian Czarism. This is the single explanation we have for their conduct.

A special importance was given to the Swiss Party Congress on November 1st by the presence of Troelstra of Amsterdam, who brought the greetings of the Dutch comrades.

His talk was a brotherly offer of the hand in all directions, a mild pardon for errors of the past, but a bitter sentence of guilt against the political and economic powers which have caused the war, and not least worthy of mention was his hearty warning in these difficult times not to make attacks against the comrade parties of other countries, but to seek and understand their thinking and action.

Troelstra said that nationalism is *not* opposed to internationalism, but internationalism is the organization of the nations, especially in proportion as each nation is won for Socialism. Because we know this we shall find our way for the first time when the comrades of the warring countries are no longer obliged to listen to their generals. Because

they must do this to-day, and murder one another without being enemies, is the reason why we have not yet conquered the nations. Therefore we do not call the comrades of other countries to account for their conduct. We do not blame them, but consider how in the future we can more effectively break the chains of capitalism in common with them all.

Van Vliegen, Chairman of the Party, and Van Kol, one of the two Socialist members of the Dutch Senate, took a far different view. Van Vliegen went so far as to advocate the cause of the Allies, and was rebuked by the Party. From a close contact with German and Belgian Socialists, Van Kol reached the following conclusions (in an interview in the New York *Volkszeitung*, April 15, 1915):

Three days after the declaration of war [August 3d], as you know, Hermann Müller of the German Party Executive was present at Paris, where a conference was called to reach an understanding. Huysmans [Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau] pleaded that the Germans should abstain from voting the war loan [on August 4th]: "We understand the difficulty of your situation, the French on one side [towards whom no German Socialist hostility had been expressed] and the Russians on the other; don't vote at all, abstain." Müller answered that they had decided to vote *against* all war credits. Soon there came the unanimous affirmative vote. The French, on the other hand, declared at once [on August 3d] that they must vote in favor of the war credits if they were to be attacked.

It is not the [German] vote in favor of the war loan that makes the international Socialist situation so critical, it is rather their silent consent to the violation of Belgium. If, after they had learned the whole truth, they had published a public protest, all would have been forgotten. But nothing happened, no protest came, "military necessity" had also conquered the Social Democracy of Germany.

SWITZERLAND

We are able to give a good account of Swiss Socialist opinion because of the Party Congress held on November 1st. This is particularly illuminating because of the close contact of the Swiss with the French and German Socialists. It will be noted that, as in the case of the Dutch, the opinion of November is much more friendly toward the position of the German Socialist majority than that of August (see Chapter XVIII).

According to the Bern *Tagwacht* of August 31st, the Socialists of the neutral countries are of the opinion that the German Government, well knowing that a war against the resistance of the Social Democracy is an impossibility, had loosened somewhat the fetters it had bound upon the labor movement. This was the probable cause for the desertion of the German comrades from the old standards of our movement.

Comrades in Switzerland, the Bern Party paper goes on to say, cannot understand the attitude of our German comrades and feel that "the situation was too big for the leaders of the German movement, that the diplomacy of the German Government had caught our comrades napping. We might understand, had our German comrades hesitated to vote against the budget, but we fail to see the reason for the decidedly nationalistic fervor which emanates from the German movement. Nor does it make the situation clearer that Bernstein, in an attempt to justify himself and his colleagues, quotes extracts which Marx and Engels wrote in reference to entirely different political situations."

The leading Swiss Socialist paper, the Zurich *Volksrecht*, which defended the German Party for some weeks, finally accused the Germans of not having done what they should have done in the course of the war to distinguish their position from that of the military Junker caste. It continues:

"Or was it the will of the German Social Democrats that Belgium should be attacked, that the chief attack of German military power should be directed against France? As international Socialists, did they also wish to declare themselves

in favor of this plan—so long ago openly prepared for and adopted by the German General Staff—in spite of the fact that they claim to be fighting against Russia and Czarism?

“We have already seen from the way in which Comrade Fischer, in the *Volksrecht*, has tried to explain and excuse the violation of the neutrality of Belgium, that the eyes of the leading comrades of Germany are remarkably blinded.” [Richard Fischer, Reichstag Member for Berlin, had just visited Switzerland for political purposes.]

On October 26th, the Socialist Party meeting of Zurich took place to discuss the Congress of the following week. John Sigg, of the Party Executive, spoke in defense of the German Socialists:

To make attacks was not at all the purpose of the Swiss comrades, since they would have done the same thing as the German Reichstag group had done, and with an equally complete conviction. The German group had been brought to their position by events, by the attack of the Czarism, and further, the German Socialist Reichstag members were only defending their fatherland, just as the Swiss comrades in the national parliament had done when they voted for mobilization and the war loan. But the Party Executive would bring forward a resolution which declared against the violation of Belgian neutrality by German militarism; in this matter there were no differences of opinion in Switzerland, so that this resolution would undoubtedly be accepted unanimously.

After the report of Sigg, which was opposed in certain points by Trotsky (a prominent Russian exile, formerly chairman of the St. Petersburg council of Labor Deputies), and a member of the Party Executive, a resolution was passed which demanded a conference with the comrades of other countries, *including the countries at war*. (Our italics.) [See Chapter XXIX.]

The Swiss Congress, when it met, followed the policy proposed by Sigg.

The Congress refused to investigate the problem of

how the Socialists of the warring nations ought to have acted, and whether they were right or not. The Congress refused to attack the violation of the neutrality of Belgium in a separate resolution. It contented itself by using the laying waste of Belgium, and the invasion of any army in a neutral country, as an illustration, in the general resolution on war and the International, of the undesirability and horror of war.

The principal subject of discussion was: Our Party, the War, and the International. The official speaker, Otto Lang of Zurich, said:

It is senseless to raise the question who is the aggressor in this war—we hold now, as before, by the declarations of the International. The war is a violent quarrel of capitalist imperialism; therefore, we do not understand the conduct of the German labor press, which appears to us in many things both partisan and short-sighted. Undoubtedly the argument about the Czarism is the strongest of all, but Germans should not forget that Russia will remain the enemy of all of us after the war, the same as before, even if it is conquered! And Russia will lose more by the victory of the Allies than by that of Germany.

This war is at no point a question of civilization or freedom, but only of the profit of capitalists; the end of the war will be a strengthening of militarism. . . . Nowhere are we a single people. Not even in Switzerland, not even here. For we are a number of classes among whom the conflict of interests cannot be bridged. Therefore we do not understand the frequently Chauvinistic attitude of the German Party press, we do not understand why it pictures the dum-dum bullets, but does not picture the soldiers torn to pieces by bombs. Therefore we do not understand the position of the *Wahre Jakob* and of the *Simplicissimus*. We know the frightful situation in which they find themselves, which partially excuses them. So we will not be unamiable towards our German brothers, but will appeal out of a full heart to their proletarian and Socialistic feeling. We will hope that the comrades coming back from the war will make great demands upon life, we confidently trust in the German

workers, though we do not understand their press—even making allowances for the censorship. And what we here say of the comrades in Germany, we feel also of the comrades in France and England, and especially in Austria. We seek to keep their confidence in us, even if we do not understand them.

This speech certainly contains little of that critical attitude towards the German Party seen in the editorials of the Zurich and Bern papers above quoted.

SWEDEN

No Socialist has spoken more strongly for Belgium than Karl Branting, editor of the Swedish *Social Demokraten*, and founder of the Socialist Party in Sweden.

We quote the following from that organ:

Short-sighted wiseacres may calculate that Belgium ought to have yielded after a first resistance sufficient to mark her neutrality. No, in the midst of destruction and despair, it must be said: Only now, when the young Belgian nation has shown how thoroughly she has taken over from her ancestors the heritage of courage and power of sacrifice, only now is her liberty, her place in the chain of brother nations irrevocably secured for all time. The fact that the whole Belgian nation, her Socialistic working class not least, has staked so much more than feeble protests of words has made her cause sacred to all those men and women in the whole world who still value justice and liberty.

Therefore: Hail to Belgium! And my sincerest wish as a Swede must be this: if in spite of the hope we cherish and the peace between the nations we are trying to prepare, the day should arrive when our own neutral country is threatened by violation, may we then unanimously follow the magnificent example of Belgium, securing victory in the midst of apparent ruin. "Rather die than become a slave," says a Frisian proverb. It is the same spirit as in the song from the fifteenth century by our Swedish Bishop Thomas:

"Liberty is the best of all things
That can be sought in the whole world,
Because with liberty comes honor."

ROUMANIA

In January the well-known Roumanian Socialist, Racovsky, the Roumanian member of the International Bureau, has an interesting letter on the situation in the *Golos*, the Socialist daily published in Paris by Russian Socialists, in which he writes:

No power on earth will induce us to give up our Socialist position. We are fighting energetically against the bellicose temper. But the saddest thing is that our adversaries are taking the weapons they use against us from the Socialist arsenal of France and Germany. For instance, German Social Democratic representatives appear against us, and Hervé, as well as *L'Humanité*, is criticising us. In order to drive us into war, articles by Vaillant are translated for our benefit, in which he calls upon the Socialists of the neutral states (excepting those whose neutrality has been guaranteed by treaty, as that of Switzerland) to enter the war, and in which he characterizes us as pro-Germans if we should refuse to follow his un-Socialistic advice. We seek to explain to ourselves the blunder of a man like Vaillant, who is so devoted to Socialism, by the immense sorrow by which the French proletariat has been visited in consequence of the assassination of Jaurès and the invasion of the Germans. . . .

You can imagine the difficult situation in which the Socialist Parties of the neutral countries are placed if our comrades in the warring countries communicate with our ruling classes over our heads, incite our proletariat to war, shake hands with our jingoes and reactionaries, and openly countenance the apostate and renegade. . . .

The French comrades seek to convince us that the Allies, Russia among the rest, are fighting for the principle of nationality. We, the inhabitants of the east and immediate neighbors of the Muscovite Empire, would like to utter some doubts on that point. We recognize the desire of conquest characterizing Austria's Balkan policy all the more readily as we have criticised it more than once at International Congresses. But who is there to deny the danger that threatens both Roumania and Bulgaria, countries which occupy the road to the Dardanelles, from Russia?

Why, therefore, are the proletarians of all countries pressed into an anti-Socialist and anti-national co-operation with Russian absolutism and their own bourgeoisie under the pretext that they are thus serving the interests of Socialism in the warring states?

We appeal to our comrades in the countries at war, and ask them not to give way to the particular moods produced by war. While bearing in mind the distances and viewpoints that separate us, we might recommend to them our own attitude. After the terrible Balkan War the Socialists of the belligerent countries met again at their Congress. The Bulgarians visited the Servians, and these visited the Bulgarians; we, too, visited the Bulgarians, and they paid a visit to us, forgetting all the evil that our government (and in what manner!) had done them by taking the best province from Bulgaria. I am mentioning this in order to protest in advance against the attempts of some Socialist Parties in the belligerent countries that intend continuing in the future their opportunist policy, the policy of the present unhappy division.

We have already pointed out that the Roumanian Socialists are able to speak for only a small part of the people of the country, and for a minority only of its town population. They were able, however, to continue their demonstrations in Bucharest as late as February.

SPAIN

Pablo Iglesias, who is the single Socialist in the Spanish Parliament, gives his views on Spanish neutrality in a Spanish newspaper, as follows:

As a member of the Socialist Party, the general union of workers, and the Socialist-Republican Alliance, I am, like them, a partisan of neutrality, and, like them also, consider that Spain ought not to abandon the pacifist position so long as the integrity of her territory is respected. If this integrity should be violated, I think that it would be the duty of every Spaniard to defend it with arms in his hand.

Being a partisan of neutrality does not prevent me, as it does not prevent the organizations mentioned, from desiring the triumph of the ideas of liberty and democracy which France and England represent, and, in consequence, the overthrow of Austro-German imperialism. But to shake our country from its neutrality would be a tremendous error amounting to a crime.

PART V
THE SOCIALISTS AND PEACE

We review in this, our concluding section, two closely related questions:

(1) In the light of the present war, how are future wars to be prevented and peace made permanent?

(2) On what basis is the present war to be stopped and peace secured?

In discussing the present war and its causes many Socialists, probably a majority, were disposed to make the claim that it had proved the Socialist position to be sound and in need of no radical amendment. In the discussion of possible ways to make peace permanent *after* the present war, on the other hand, there is noticeable a far more wide-spread tendency toward innovation, toward a re-examination and further development of the Socialist peace policy as it existed before the war.

The general discussion of the means of preventing all wars and the discussion of the basis on which to end the present war, have been taking place simultaneously. But the movement for immediate peace, which at first began in the shape of a demand for mediation—peace at any price—was soon subordinated to the discussion of the larger question.

CHAPTER XXIX

SOCIALIST EFFORTS TO END THE PRESENT WAR

THE first Socialist peace proposals came from the American Party, and from the Swiss Party, demanding mediation by the United States and by the Swiss Governments respectively; there was no discussion at the time as to just which peace terms the Socialists considered practicable or desirable.

About a month after the beginning of the war, the American Socialist Party issued a call for mediation by the Government of the United States, and it took the form of the following telegram, which was sent to one or more leading Socialists in Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden: "In present crisis before any nation is completely crushed, Socialist representatives should exert every influence on their respective governments to have warring countries accept mediation by the United States. This can still be done without loss of prestige. Conference would be held at The Hague or Washington. Have cabled Socialist parties of ten nations urging this action. Wire reply."

We next give an account of the preliminary demand for an International Socialist Peace Conference on the part of the American, Italian, and Swiss Parties. The mere call for this conference indicates a feeling among Socialists that before they can demand peace effectively they must agree on what terms of peace they would consent to.

It will be seen from this language of the American Party that it still demanded immediate peace without reference to the terms of peace and excused the action of all the Socialist Parties that supported the war.

THE CALL OF THE AMERICAN PARTY FOR A SOCIALIST PEACE CONFERENCE

We do not presume to pass judgment upon the conduct of our brother parties in Europe. We realize that they are the victims of the present vicious industrial, political, and military systems, and that *they did the best they could under the circumstances*.

Our country, however, has remained neutral in the present conflict. We therefore consider it our duty to address an appeal in favor of peace to our unfortunate comrades in the nations at war, as well as to our comrades in the nations not at war.

We are not now concerned as to which government was the aggressor in this terrible conflict, nor is that the question of greatest importance. History will sit in judgment on this also. We appeal to you in the name of Socialism, and acting in agreement with your own proclamations, we ask you to help us to stop this mass murder. You, yourselves, in every country have declared that this war was not of your choice. Your noble and eloquent declarations still hold good. *We know that no nation can gain by the continuation of this war.* Whatever rewards and advantages will come from it will go to the ruling classes: and all the sacrifices, sufferings, and sorrows it will entail will fall to the lot of the workers. And every day that the slaughter continues thousands of our comrades and brothers are killed.

At the International Congress at Stuttgart a resolution was adopted by which the international Socialist movement pledged itself not only to make every effort to avert the outbreak of war, but also, should war break out, to strive with all our might to bring the war to a speedy termination.

The Socialists of the war-stricken European countries have worked faithfully and heroically in the spirit of the first part of this resolution. But their voices were silenced by the

cannon of the hostile armies. Capitalist militarism proved stronger than the young spirit of Socialist brotherhood.

The Socialists of the world must now proceed at once to the realization of the second clause of the resolution—"to work for the speedy termination of the war."

The International Socialist Bureau does not function at the present time. Therefore the Socialist Party of America deems it its duty to invite all countries represented at the International Bureau to send their regular number of delegates to an extraordinary peace session of the International Socialist and Trades Union Congress, to be held either in Europe or in America, at a date to be fixed as soon as acceptances are received from the various Socialist organizations represented in the Bureau.

ORIGIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST PEACE CONFERENCE OF COPENHAGEN (JANUARY 16 AND 17, 1915)*

The American call had very little practical result, for the reason that its success depended upon the participation of the Socialists of the warring nations. This plan was modified by the Swiss Socialists, as related in the following account:

On October 11th a conference of Socialist delegates of the three Scandinavian countries took place. It was decided that an international conference should be immediately held to decide on the question of the moving of the International Socialist Bureau from Brussels. In the report of *Vorwaerts* it appears that it was decided that a general conference should be held, in which the Socialists of all countries should take part, including those of the belligerent nations. To this the *Vorwaerts* expressly remarks: "Naturally the parties of the belligerent nations are also to take part." But at the same time when the Scandinavian Conference was meeting, there took place in Italy a meeting of delegates of the French and Swiss Socialists, at which the question of the calling of an international conference was also discussed. The French declared that under the present conditions they could not

* Editorial in the New York *Volkszeitung*.

think of taking part in any conference. The Swiss comrades, who are in the closest touch with the Italian Socialists, now take the position that an international conference under the ruling conditions can have prospects of success only if it is a conference exclusively of the delegates of the neutral countries, in which the Socialists of the countries at war should not take part.

The Socialists of Scandinavia and Holland seem to have agreed to this view. In the speech from Copenhagen, in which the assembly of a Conference on September 6th is mentioned, it is expressly emphasized that only the neutral countries are invited to send delegates.

In the present situation it seems to us also that the Socialists of those countries which are not taking a direct part in the bloody struggle which is now laying Europe waste may easily come to an agreement, not only upon steps for an early peace, but also upon the rebuilding of the International. The participation of representatives of the countries at war would naturally bring questions into the discussion upon which, in view of the ruling national animosities, it would be impossible to secure an agreement.

A conference of representatives of the neutral countries alone promises success. And the discussion to admit delegates of the neutral states alone to the proposed conference has our undivided support.

PROGRAMME FOR THE SOCIALIST PEACE CONFERENCE AT COPENHAGEN

The Swiss Socialists, however, did not finally participate in the Conference. The Dutch and Scandinavians undertook further to limit its scope, by excluding not only the Socialists of the warring nations but also all discussion of their "standpoint" toward the war and the causes of the war, and by restricting it to three propositions specified in the invitation to the Conference:

It goes without saying that the Conference will neither occupy itself with the conditions which have caused the war, nor with the standpoint of the Socialist Parties in the various

countries towards it. Its only task will be to look for a basis on which Socialists can take action to secure peace.

The object of the Conference will therefore be as follows: To influence the opinion of the peoples in neutral countries in such a way that it shall be exerted in favor of a settlement which will guarantee a lasting peace, and, further, to strive for a united effort to secure: (1) That no changes of frontiers shall take place at the end of the war by which the right of self-government by the nations shall be lessened; (2) the restriction of military armaments, and (3) the establishment of a responsible International Arbitration Court.

The parliamentary groups of the Socialist Parties which take part in the Conference will be asked to lay addresses before the governments of their respective countries urging that they should take steps to bring about the finish of the war, perhaps through the joint action of all the governments of neutral states.

TROELSTRA'S PEACE PLAN

Troelstra, who attended the Conference as one of the Dutch delegates, had favored, in a meeting held in Holland on January 2d, two additional points:

- (1) Abolition of the Right of Capture at Sea, and
- (2) The Opening of All Colonies to all the Powers.

These points, similar to those later proposed by Dernburg, were not included, doubtless because they are directed against Great Britain. But nearly all Socialists, including many of those of Great Britain, would favor the first point, and all, with the exception of the British, would favor the second—*provided they are accompanied by equally important demands*—such as the independence of Alsace-Lorraine and German Poland, and the democratization of government, *directed mainly against the present rulers of Germany.*

Both of Troelstra's points are of vast importance. The first, taken in connection with the proposal of the American Party to internationalize strategic waterways, would mean *the neutralization of the seas* (see Chapter

XXX). The second would mean *the neutralization of backward territories*. Put into effect together they would mean the end of imperialism.

CRITICISM BY SPANISH SOCIALISTS

The programme adopted for the Copenhagen Congress immediately aroused the opposition of the Socialists of the Allied and neutral Powers, including the Spanish Party.

Our quotation from the Spanish Socialists shows that they believe it is the duty of all the Socialists of all neutral countries to give their moral support wholly to the more democratic and less militaristic nations, and that Socialism, even in Germany, would lose by a German victory or a drawn war, and will gain only by German defeat.

But the Spanish go farther. They are not willing to forget the position of the German Socialist majority, and they regard the effort of the Dutch and Scandinavians to prevent the Socialists at the Peace Conference from discussing "the causes of the war" as a cloak to cover their toleration of the German Socialists' support of the war. Therefore, they opposed the holding of the Conference:

In reply to communications received from the Socialist Parties of Holland, Italy, Denmark, Switzerland, and the United States, the National Committee of the Spanish Socialist Party declare that they welcome the interchange of communications between the parties of the various countries as proving that, notwithstanding the war, sentiments of solidarity exist among the workers of all nations.

They are compelled to examine into the causes of the war, the situation which it has created, and the consequences which will follow.

They find two influences, so to speak, entering into this sanguinary conflict. The one which has provoked the war

is the most thorough expression of imperialism; the other, though guided by capitalist interest, is less under the influence of imperialism, and is therefore imbued with a more democratic spirit.

If Austro-German imperialism is victorious, Socialism will receive a setback; if the Allies triumph, the Socialist cause will make great progress even in Austria and Germany.

The National Council is not in favor of an International Conference at the present time.

CRITICISM OF CONFERENCE BY LONGUET

A profound difference of opinion between Socialist Parties appeared. Jean Longuet, writing on October 19th in *L'Humanité*, for the French Party, denounced the plan of a peace conference at a time when the Germans were triumphant and were occupying Belgium and a considerable part of France, and his statement was later indorsed by the Party Executive. (See Chapter XXII.)

His argument was:

The Socialists of the United States are following up, in fact, are developing, the idea which predominated at the Italian-Swiss Conference at Lugano. Like our comrades in those neighboring countries, while animated with the most sincere and most noble internationalist spirit, they do not understand that their initiative is inopportune, and does not take into account the exact position of the problem at the present hour.

Imperialist and militarist Germany—whoever else may be responsible—more than all the other states desired this war, and has solely and with premeditated will precipitated this frightful horror upon the world—this struggle of blood and iron, not of words.

The most formidable military machinery has been thrown by her into innocent Belgium, and into France, which was peaceable from one end to the other, both doomed to destruction and pillage. It is the Borinage, the districts of Liège and Charleroi, that admirable industrial center and nursery of Socialism; it is our departments of the Nord, the Ardennes, the Pas-de-Calais, the Aisne, the Somme—these

densely-populated regions where dwells a vast factory and mine proletariat on whom our political and economic action had had the greatest effect—which have been devastated to the full, bruised and cruelly ravaged.

In face of so much ruin and mourning it is Germany which has remained intact, whose territory at least has not yet known the horrors of invasion. It is the abominable pride of the squire-caste (the Junkers), the great pan-German industrialists and the Bismarckian professors, rendered anxious certainly by the "untameable resistance" of our admirable little soldiers, to which the *Times* alluded, which is still unbeaten.

What peace negotiations could be entered upon under these conditions, after so much blood has been spilt, so many tears shed, and no definite result obtained?

On the other side of the Atlantic they do not perhaps sufficiently realize this situation. Even among sincere friends of France like A. M. Simons, who writes to me "that the scandalous propaganda of the German agents in the United States has revolted American sentiment, which is now almost wholly on the side of France," and understands that it is necessary to *finish altogether with Prussian militarism*, while at the same time not desiring to see the "German people humiliated, nor the German nation dismembered"; yet he believes in the utility of the Congress.

In order to carry out even the programme outlined by Comrade Simons, to crush the enemy of Europe's liberty—as *alas! the German people up to now have not wished or not been able to do it*—we must continue the struggle until a definite result has been obtained. We must continue it without savage hatred, without stupid chauvinism, without any spirit of barbaric revenge, but with force and dignity, to safeguard our republican France, and to create a new Europe.

Only after that will we be able to speak of common action by the Socialists of all countries to establish international peace on definite foundations. Then international Socialism will make its voice heard.

HOW HALF THE FRENCH LABOR UNIONS FAVORED THE CONFERENCE

On the question of peace, however, the French labor unionists, whose members, in overwhelming majority,

are Socialists, were by no means unanimous. Our next document shows that on the 6th of December, in a meeting of the National Committee of the General Confederation of Labor, there were 22 votes against participating in the proposed Socialist Peace Conference at Copenhagen, against twenty in favor of participation and two abstentions. Evidently, the minority felt very strongly on the subject, for one of its leaders, Pierre Monatte, editor of *La Vie Ouvrière*, until it suspended because of the war, and representative from the Department of Gard in the Committee, has since resigned, with the following statement of his reasons:

On the 22d of November, the Secretary of the Confederation announced to the committee an invitation to the Conference of neutral countries to take place at Copenhagen on the 6th of December. I made the following motion: "That the General Confederation of Labor should reply by showing the Scandinavian Socialists that while it would be impossible for us to send a delegate, we should follow their efforts for peace with the greatest sympathy, and that we hope for the success of the Copenhagen Conference! At the session of the 29th of November the Federation of the Metal Workers brought up a resolution with a preamble in the same spirit, which I hastened to support. On the 6th of December the National Committee of the Confederation had three propositions before it: the first, by the Building Federation, requiring that no reply should be made; a second, by Luquet, comprising important restrictions and the agreement of the General Confederation of Labor and the party on a common reply. [This probably refers to the demand that the *causes* of the war be discussed, including the grounds upon which the German Party supports the war]; the third proposition, that of the Metal Workers' Federation. The committee considered first on the proposition of the Building Federation, adopting it by 22 votes to 20, and two extensions.

There is no question that the proposition of the Metal Workers' Federation would have been beaten on the 6th of December by a strong majority.

Thus once more the appeals of Socialists in favor of peace

will have found an echo neither in the central organizations of France nor in the labor press of that country, the latter even going so far as to refuse to print it. Yet these appeals and propositions are in accord with the resolutions of the International Socialist Congresses of Stuttgart, Copenhagen, and Basel, which declared: "In case war breaks forth nevertheless [in spite of Socialist efforts], it is the duty of the working classes to intervene to bring it promptly to an end and to utilize with all their power the political and economic crises created by the war, in order to stir up the lower classes and to hasten the fall of the ruling class!"

This duty Keir Hardie and the Independent Labor Party in England have fulfilled from the first day; the two Socialist Parties of Russia did the same; and also the Swiss and the Italian Parties in their Conferences at Lugano, and the American Socialist Party in its proposal for a special International Socialist Congress. It is this duty that Karl Liebknecht has just fulfilled, and with him a minority of the German Socialist Party, by his protest in the Reichstag, on the 2d of December, when he said:

"An early peace which humiliates nobody, a peace without conquests, that is what we must demand. All efforts in this direction ought to be welcomed. The only thing that can stop this bloody massacre before the complete exhaustion of all peoples engaged in it, is the continuous and simultaneous affirmation of that desire in all the countries at war. Only a peace based on the international solidarity of the working class and the liberty of all peoples can be a lasting peace. It is in this direction that the Socialists ought to make efforts for peace even in the midst of this war."

It is more or less comprehensible that the masses of the people should be deceived and excited by the press—by all the press—should have accepted all the declarations of the government as articles of faith. But that the militant representatives of unionism should have shown no more foresight, that they should have been no more critical in examining the assertions of the government, that they should have allowed themselves to be won over by the fever of national vanity, that they should have lost the memory of the principles which have guided their action up to the present time, this is the most astounding of spectacles. This war, foreseen, feared by us, this war wished for, prepared for, by our

nationalistic politicians, the majority of the Confederation Committee now regards as being a war for the liberation of Europe, a war capable of bringing liberty and a republic to Germany and of ruining universal militarism. What an illusion! This war for which the assassination of Sarajevo was only a pretext, has its real origin in the economic duel between England and Germany and the Teutonic and Slavic rivalry.

The Russian Alliance, already the shame of the French republic, has precipitated our country in the gulf, the Russian Alliance and the Morocco ambition of our colonialists.

The Kaiser merely moved forward the hour of the European conflagration. Therefore his responsibility is heavier than that of any government; but the responsibilities of the French, Russian, and English Governments are not small.

Nor is it yet established that the French Government did everything it could to preserve peace in the last week in July. Nobody doubts that secret diplomacy—the misdeeds of which have been so often announced—played a considerable rôle in the declaration of war.

The conscious workers of all warring nations cannot accept the least responsibility for this war; it rests entirely on the shoulders of the ruling classes of their countries. And far from discovering in the war any reason for drawing nearer to these ruling classes, it can serve only to redouble their hatred of capitalism and of governments.

To-day we need more than ever to preserve jealously our independence; to hold absolutely to our own conceptions, which are our reason for existence. If they are false let that be stated. Only then shall we have the right to participate in nationalism in all its forms, political nationalism, economic nationalism.

But I fear very much that our central organizations in France, as in Germany, General Confederation of Labor, as well as Socialist Party, the International Union of Labor Federations, as well as Socialist International, have gone into bankruptcy.

They have just shown themselves as being too weak to stop war after so many years of organizing propaganda. But one could still say that the responsibility for this rested perhaps upon the masses who had not been reached and had not understood the duties of internationalism. This last ray

of hope is flickering out in the words of the active members of the unions and Socialist Parties in the two countries. The fire, that is to say, the faith, has failed at the very center. If humanity is some day to know peace and liberty in a United States of the World, only a more real and a more ardent Socialism, arising from the disillusion of the present, dipped in to-day's rivers of blood, can lead us to it.

In any case, neither the armies of the Allies nor our old dishonored organizations can accomplish this. That is the reason why, dear comrades of the Gard and the Rhone, the General Confederation of Labor has dishonored itself by the vote of the 6th of December, and why I resign, not without regret, the representative function with which you had intrusted me.

(Signed) PIERRE MONATTE, Representative of the Union of the Gard, and alternate of the Union of the Rhone.
(Specially printed in the office of *L'Emancipatrice*, December 14th,—probably refused by or censored in the Socialist and labor union papers.)

THE PLAN APPROVED BY MARTOFF

A part, at least, of the Russian Socialists approved the Conference, though as belonging to a belligerent nation they sent no delegate.

Martoff (in the *Novi Mir* of New York) indorsed the conference held by the Italian and Swiss comrades in Lugano, where they had decided to work to prevent the extension of the war among the now neutral countries. He made a strong appeal to the American Socialists to concentrate their efforts and fight for the ending of the war. Especially, he said, they must appeal to the workers of the warring nations and tell them that they cannot expect any liberating influence from the war, and that only through a "war on war" can the proletariat of all nations regain its position.

Martoff suggested that the greatest duty before the Socialists of the world was the work for immediate peace. He criticised the French Socialists who say that they

will fight until Prussian militarism is crushed, and the German Socialists, who also say that they will fight till Russian absolutism is crushed. He claimed that the Socialists will be the losers if the war goes on, no matter who wins, for the Socialists never expected to gain anything through war, and the International never suggested that the Polish question, or the Balkan questions, or that of Alsace and Lorraine should be settled by war. He rejoiced at the stand taken by the Russian Socialists and claimed that that must be the stand of all the Socialists in the warring nations.

HILLQUIT, AS AMERICAN DELEGATE, RENOUNCES PARTICIPATION IN THE COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE

The American Party determined to send a delegate and appointed Morris Hillquit. Hillquit, however, decided at the last moment not to go and gave his reasons in the following important letter, which reviews the whole story of the conference:

New York, December 28, 1914.

To the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party.

Comrades: The information which I have recently obtained in connection with the proposed International Socialist Conference, scheduled to be held in Copenhagen on January 17th, is of such a nature that I strongly question the expediency of American participation in it.

The Conference as originally planned, or at least as understood on this side of the Atlantic Ocean, was to include representatives of all Socialist Parties in the neutral countries affiliated with the International Socialist Bureau, *i.e.*, Bulgaria, Denmark, Holland, Italy, Norway, Roumania, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States.

It appears, however, that the Socialists of Bulgaria and Roumania have either not been invited, or have declined to accept the invitation. The Socialist Party of Spain was requested to participate in the Conference, but has deemed it inadvisable to accept the invitation.

The Socialists of Italy and Switzerland had held a joint

conference in the early days of the war, and agreed upon a common programme of action. It was hoped that they would join their comrades in the northern countries in the effort to secure a more representative and authoritative expression of neutral Socialist opinion. Within the last few weeks, however, several statements have appeared in the Socialist press of Germany and Switzerland which seemed to indicate that neither the Italian nor the Swiss Socialists intended to take part in the Copenhagen Conference.

In an effort to ascertain the exact situation I cabled to Comrade Stauning, of Copenhagen, who has charge of the Conference arrangements, inquiring which countries had agreed to the Conference. The cable was sent on December 18th, and on the next day I received a reply to the effect that the only countries to be represented outside of the United States were Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.

Immediately thereafter the New York *Volkszeitung* cabled to Comrade Hermann Greulich, the veteran leader of the Socialist movement in Switzerland, for information about the intentions of the Swiss Socialists, and received the categorical reply that Switzerland would not take part in the Conference.

Thus the much-hoped-for International Conference has dwindled down to a meeting of the Socialists of the three Scandinavian countries with the participation of the neighboring Holland.

That changes the entire aspect of the situation. The voice of a general council of the Socialists of the neutral countries might be expected to carry considerable weight with their comrades on both sides of the conflict; to influence their mutual feelings during the war and to aid them in the formulation of a uniform programme in connection with the future negotiations of their respective countries. A purely local conference, such as the Copenhagen assembly will unfortunately be, can hardly be expected to have such an effect. Moreover, the four countries which will be represented at Copenhagen have certain specific local and sectional interests, which are not shared by the other neutral countries, and I am inclined to believe that the United States would be out of place in such a conference. The neutrality of the countries of Europe is not as absolute as that of the United

States. Owing to their geographical positions, commercial interests, and racial ties, most European countries are somewhat biased in favor of one or the other of the belligerent forces, and before the war is over some of them may be drawn into the active conflict. The very fact that even the Socialists of all neutral countries refuse to meet in common conference at this time indicates that the feeling among the neutral nations is somewhat strained. America alone has no interest in this war except in its speedy termination, and American Socialists above all others must studiously avoid even the slightest appearance of bias or discrimination among their unfortunate comrades in Europe. This war will end sometime, and when it ends somebody will have to initiate the work of reconstructing the shattered International of the workers. This great task will logically fall to the Socialists of America, the Socialists of the most important and least concerned nation. I fear that this mission, the largest that will ever come to our movement, may be jeopardized by the participation in a somewhat one-sided conference, and therefore have concluded not to go to Copenhagen.

It may be pointed out that the Socialists of the Allied Countries take a position which denies the neutrality of this letter, and that they are supported in this stand not only by the Socialists of Spain, by part of the Socialists of Russia and Italy, and by American Socialist leaders such as Eugene V. Debs and Charles Edward Russell. For none of these Socialists agree with Hillquit that the Socialists of the world or of America have "no interest in the war except its speedy termination." On the contrary, they do not want to see it end as long as Germany holds her present conquests—at least on the west front. (See Chapters XXIV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII.)

RESOLUTIONS OF THE SOCIALIST PEACE CONFERENCE AT COPENHAGEN

When the Copenhagen Conference finally met no delegates whatever were present besides the sixteen

delegates of the countries which had issued the invitation. The following are the principal paragraphs of the resolutions passed:

The Conference declares that capitalism in its imperialistic form, accompanied by the uninterrupted increase of military preparations and the unrestrained policy of expansion, together with the secret and uncontrolled diplomacy of the Great Powers, has brought the world to the catastrophe which the Social Democracy predicted and against which it has continually warned.

The Congress at Copenhagen, held in 1910, summed up these principles in such a manner that they compelled the Socialist members of the representative bodies:

(a) To work for the establishment of compulsory international courts of arbitration.

(b) To demand a limiting of armaments with an absolute disarmament as the ultimate outcome.

(c) To demand the abolition of the secret diplomacy and the publication of all existing treaties and understandings between the governments; and

(d) To act in behalf of the right of all people to decide their own destiny and to defend this right against military conspiracies and brutal oppression.

The Conference, therefore, considers it the duty of all Socialistic Parties to work *in the direction of an early peace*, and in this connection to use all their powers to formulate peace proposals, which will not carry with them the germ of new wars, but which will constitute a basis for international disarmament and for a democratization of foreign policies.

The Conference *protests against the violation of the law of nations committed against Belgium*, and expresses its expectation that the Social Democracy of all warring countries will protest against each infringement of the inalienable rights of autonomy through a forced annexation.

The Conference, therefore, calls upon the laborers of all countries to concentrate their entire energies to the bringing nearer of an *early* and lasting world peace.

The Conference at the same time charges the Social Democracy in the neutral countries by means of the parliaments or other useful ways to submit to their respective governments

the request to consider in how far they, either alone or in conjunction with the governments of other neutral countries, can apply with a chance of success their power of intervention [mediation] to make an end of the war and establish an *early* and lasting peace.

It will be noticed that the resolutions call three times for an "early" peace without much regard as to the kind of peace it is to be. The violation of Belgium (not merely of the paper treaty) is condemned; but this condemnation is linked with a protest against annexation only, leaving it to be inferred that this and not an indemnity is the main question.

At the time of this Conference, immediate peace would, beyond doubt, have been favored by the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, as well as those who voted for it at the Conference: Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Holland. Our documents show it would also have been favored by the United States and Switzerland. Outside of the Allies, then, only Spain would have opposed it, while in Great Britain one of the three parties admitted to the International Socialist Congresses had made it clear that it would probably favor peace at any time.

If the next Socialist Peace Conference is held in the near future, however, a more equal division may occur on this question. For, since the invasion of Belgium is held to have been a wrong by nearly all these parties, a large part, at least, would support the demand for a sufficient indemnity. If, then, the German Government refuses to grant this, which now seems its probable course, each Socialist party will have to choose between immediate peace and the relinquishment of the Belgian indemnity and acquiescence in "the violation of Belgian rights."

The discussion of the Conference programme by Lon-

guet proves very clearly that the minimum peace demands of the Socialists of France require an indemnity to be paid by Germany for the damage actually done to life and property in Belgium. Indemnities in general have been condemned by the Socialists of all countries. Both Kautsky and Bernstein, for example, in the documents we quote in the next chapter, reject the proposition of the German militarists that a war indemnity should be levied by Germany, and Kautsky makes this proposition general. The case of Belgium, however, is considered by most Socialists as a special one, since Belgium is not a belligerent in the same sense as the others.

Now it seems improbable that the German Government will consider the payment of any indemnity, even for the damage actually done to Belgium, until it either faces annihilation from abroad, or is menaced by a revolution at home. Thus one of the most widely accepted of Socialist peace principles seems to demand either a very decided defeat of Germany or a revolution within that country; while the other, the demand for immediate peace, is very nearly identical with the probable peace policy of the German Government, a return to the *status quo*, the maintenance of conditions as they were before the war, the abandonment of all demands for indemnity.

THE POSITION OF GUESDE AND SEMBAT

On February 14th, the French Socialist Party held a special meeting to instruct their delegates to the Peace Conference of the Socialists of the Allied Countries to be held on the following days. The two Socialist Ministers Guesde and Sembat spoke.

Guesde made a brief declaration: There could be no talk of peace until German imperialism was crushed. Ears must be stopped to all mutterings of exhaustion.

At the London Conference it must be declared—and this had not been frequently enough stated—that the fight was not against the German people, but against German imperialism. A new Europe must be created where there was room for the struggle of classes only, but not for the struggle of races. Such a victory of the French would be a victory of Socialism.

Sembat spoke as follows:

The war has been forced upon us. One must understand that the French and German Socialists cannot be placed upon the same level as to the justice of their cause. The Germans did not protest against the violation of Belgian neutrality, which was a wrong. One cannot negotiate with people who deny that. We call upon the neutral Powers to take part in the war, because we are defending a violated right. Such an intervention would make the struggle greater as to extent, but would shorten it as to time. In London we shall speak of peace, but shall not surrender ourselves to a peace propaganda which would only be a manœuvre of the German Government. Many say that a beginning of exhaustion is perceptible. This has its moral cause. The nationalistic exaggerations which threaten to disintegrate Germany have brought it about that the Germany now before us much resembles the Germany of 1813. Unscrupulous people in France are asking whether we should aim at nothing more than the defense of justice. We must repeat in London that we will have no conquests, no annexations, but only the independence of peoples. We cannot be thankful enough to England. Russia is suffering from a strong pressure at the present time, but it is resisting wonderfully. Without Russia we would have been overwhelmed. Think of this every time the inner conditions of that great country strike you. Do not forget that the Allies are fighting in union for the cause of justice. The Czar took the initiative when he proposed, like Jaurès, to lay the Austrian-Servian conflict before The Hague Arbitration Court.

THE CONFERENCE OF THE SOCIALISTS OF THE "ALLIES"

The Conference of the Socialists of the Allied Countries took place in London on the 15th of February. The Socialists of Belgium and Great Britain were fully represented, also the Labor Party of Great Britain and the Confederation of Labor Unions of France. Vandervelde and Lafontaine represented the Socialist Party and labor unions of Belgium. From Russia only the Social-Revolutionary party took part in the voting. The larger Socialist organization, the Social Democrats, refused to participate in the voting because the Socialists of Germany and Austria were not invited. Among the French representatives were all the best-known leaders except Guesde, who was detained in France because of his health and duties as minister. Among the English delegates were former opponents of the war such as MacDonald and Anderson and Bruce Glasier. Keir Hardie even presided over the conference.

Vaillant of France declared:

France was forced into the struggle and will not draw back until Prussian militarism has received its death blow. We have the following message for the German people: that we are fighting for your emancipation as well as for our own national freedom.

Vandervelde made an appeal to the Socialists of the whole world to use their power for the overthrow of German militarism, which had laid waste little Belgium. He said that he felt no animosity whatever against the German or Austrian people, but as long as they were not masters over the militarism of their rulers, there was no way to annihilate this militarism except by war.

The Conference passed the following resolutions: First, it declared that the war was a result of the policy of colonial conquests and aggressive imperialism of all the

nations engaged, and that all the nations shared the responsibility for this policy. The invasion of Belgium and France by the German armies threatened the independence of all nations and shattered all confidence in international treaties. Under these conditions *a victory of German imperialism would mean the defeat and annihilation of democracy and freedom in Europe*. The Socialists of the Allied Countries are not fighting for the political or economic subjection of Germany. They are not fighting against the people of Germany or Austria, but only against the governments of these countries, which oppress their peoples, while they demand that Belgium should be freed *and indemnified*. They desire that the Polish question should be settled in accord with the wishes of the people of Poland, either by economy or by complete independence within another nation. They desire that in all Europe from Alsace-Lorraine to the Balkans, all nations which *have been* forcefully annexed should be given back the right of disposing of their own freedom.

While *the Socialists are firmly decided to struggle until victory is won* in order to accomplish this emancipation, they are not less firmly decided to take a stand against every effort to turn this war of defense into a war of conquest, which would only prepare new conflicts, create new grievances, and deliver the peoples to a doubled burden of armaments and wars.

The victory of the Allied Powers must be a victory of the people's rights, of the unity, independence, and autonomy of the nations in a peaceful federation of the United States of Europe and the world.

This was the chief resolution. Another declared against secret diplomacy, the private manufacture of arms, and demanded a compulsory international arbitration court. A third resolution protested against the ar-

rest of Socialist members of the Duma and the persecution of Finns, Jews, Poles in Russia, and of the German Poles in Germany. These resolutions were all passed unanimously.

The two factions of the Russian Social Democracy believed it best to be present at the Conference, in spite of the fact that they disapproved of any meeting to which the Socialists of all countries were not invited. In a declaration made after the Conference, however, they explained their position as follows:

The efforts of the government Socialists of the Allied Countries in attempting a conference to give material and political support to the policy of the Allies, to maintain the illusion of a duty on the part of the Socialists to take part in "national defense," and the other illusion that this is a war of emancipation which, in the words of Grey, Viviani, and Sazonoff, must be fought to the end, is attempting once more a criminal misuse of the ideas and authority of international Socialism, by serving as a cloak to the interests of Russian, English, and French Imperialism, which are really hostile to it.

The fundamental task of the true Socialist elements of the Allied Countries towards the London Conference consists in exposing the tendencies of this war and of making it clear to the Social Democracy of "hostile countries" that the government Socialists do not represent the opinion of the Socialists of the Allied Countries.

It will be seen from the above that these Russian parties denounce the participants in the London Conference as having totally betrayed international Socialism. They claim that the other Socialists who disagree with them, do not represent the workingmen Socialists of Russia, and they mention the names of Plechanoff, Alexinsky, Massloff, and others. Axelrod should also be added to the list, together with Trotsky and Manikoff. Altogether, the list includes about as

many of the leaders as the party group which signed the above manifesto. The leaders of both sides are, of course, in exile.

Shortly after the London Conference another counter-tendency appeared where least expected. The British Socialist Party also declared for immediate peace:

Five peace resolutions and two amendments were adopted at the Annual Conference of 1915, most of them with large majorities, and one amendment—of pronounced jingo tendencies—was handsomely defeated.

The peace resolution, which was adopted by 78 branches against 57, reads:

“This Conference of the British Socialist Party condemns the cry raised by the capitalist parties in every belligerent country for a fight to a finish.

“It declares that the working classes can have no interest in prolonging this awful war until one or other of the groups at war is completely exhausted and their opponents are thus able to fully realize their imperialistic aspirations. The longer the war lasts the greater will be the destruction of human lives, and the greater the economic ruin. The prolongation of the war will not solve any of the outstanding historical political and economic problems, whilst territorial annexations will only lead to complications and increase the possibilities of further war.

“This Conference therefore fully indorses the efforts of Socialists in neutral countries to terminate the war, and declares unhesitatingly that it is the supreme duty of the Socialist Parties throughout the world to work for *an immediate peace* on such terms as will prevent the repetition of a similar war.

“In the opinion of this Conference only the establishment of a democratic federation of the States of Europe will put an end to the present ruinous forms of militarism and imperialism.

“This Conference further calls upon the Executive Committee of the party to give effect to the policy set forth above.”

A resolution which declared for the preliminary destruction of the “Central European autocracies,” after which the

workers should begin to work for peace, was defeated, 46 branches voting for and 81 against it.

In its annual congress, held at Norwich on April 5th, the Independent Labor Party also accepted a report from the National Administrative Council of the Party setting forth that the Party declared that it was the duty of the labor movement to secure peace at the earliest possible moment. The resolutions follow:

Resolved, That the conflict between the nations of Europe with which this country is involved is a result of the pursuit by Foreign Offices of diplomatic policies with the idea of maintaining the balance of power; that our national policy of understanding with France and Russia only was bound to increase the power of Russia both in Europe and in Asia, and to endanger our good relations with Germany; that Foreign Secretary Grey is proved by the facts he gave in the House of Commons Committee to have given definite assurance of support to France in the event of any war in which she was seriously involved before the House of Commons had any chance to consider the matter; that the labor movement reiterates the fact that it had opposed the policies which produced this war, and that its duty now is to secure peace *at the earliest possible moment* on such conditions as provide the best opportunities for the reestablishment of amicable relations between the workers of Europe.

But we have just seen that J. R. MacDonald and at least three out of the four members of the National Administrative Council of this Party were delegates a few weeks before at the Conference of the Socialists of the Allied Countries at London, at which it was voted *unanimously* that the war must be continued until victory was won. Had Hardie, Glasier, Anderson, and MacDonald changed their opinion? Or could their position at the April Conference in favor of immediate peace be reconciled with their previous stand? This

question was brought up at Norwich. We take the following account from the *Labor Leader* of April 8th:

Mr. Burgess (Bradford) directed attention to a phrase in the declaration issued by the Conference of Socialists from the Allied countries which said that "the invasion of Belgium and France by the German armies threatens the very existence of independent nationalities," and that "a victory for German Imperialism would be the defeat and the destruction of democracy and liberty in Europe." He asked whether Mr. MacDonald was as alleged the author of these sentences. He also quoted from the declaration the phrase "whilst inflexibly resolved to fight until victory is achieved," etc., and asked if it represented the view of the I. L. P.

Mr. Bruce Glasier said the National Administrative Council had issued its own manifesto, and by that it must be judged. The Conference of Socialists from Allied countries was a private Conference, and no account of what occurred was to be published. The declaration adopted was a compromise. It did not represent his (the speaker's) view, but each side had to yield something. The declaration was a great advance on previous statements issued by the Belgian and French Socialists at the beginning of the war, and except for the efforts of the I. L. P. it would have been very different and, in his view, harmful to the international Socialist cause. They had exercised a very moderating influence. (Applause.)

Mr. Burgess: Does the N. A. C. consider this declaration to be authoritative?

Mr. Bruce Glasier: It was not indorsed generally by the N. A. C.

Mr. MacDonald offered the following explanation:

The phrase "fighting the war to a finish" must be interpreted in a Socialist sense and not in the popular sense. The war had got to finish, and at the present moment it was no use to talk about "stop the war." He challenged anyone to point to clearer declarations than his that the war ought not to be carried further than the political point when the forces of democracy in Germany were liberated and prepared themselves to crush their own militarism, and thus place European peace on a firm foundation. The end of the war must date

from the time when the democratic forces of Europe were ready to take things into their own hands.

The Congress apparently accepted these explanations, as the National Administrative Council was re-elected by overwhelming majorities and its report was accepted by a vote of 188 to 3.

MacDonald thus adds a third clause to the conditions under which he and his followers will favor peace. Practically all British Socialists and Laborites had demanded a Belgian indemnity and a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine. He now demands, further, that the war must not end until the democratic forces of Germany are "liberated and prepared to crush their own militarism." Clearly this is not exactly the view of the majority of the I. L. P. But its resolution (above quoted), like that of the British Socialist Party, is somewhat ambiguous. To get the real sentiment of the I. L. P., we must refer to another resolution, about which the discussion chiefly raged (see above, Chapter XXI). The Conference divided almost evenly on the problem as to whether the present war was to be opposed, deciding by one vote (121 to 120) to pass over this question. The majority of the Congress, then, was *not* for immediate peace at any price. A considerable faction, as the applause showed, shared MacDonald's views, while the Congress as a whole refused to rebuke its representatives for voting for the resolutions of the London Conference.

THE GERMAN SOCIALISTS FOR IMMEDIATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

The demand of the Socialists of the Allied Powers was thus for a continuation of the war. This lends peculiar significance to the report that the German Party at the same period favored continuation of the war until

victory was gained on one of the fronts, which doubtless refers to Russia.

A dispatch to the Exchange Telegraph Company from Amsterdam, dated February 15th, says that at a private meeting of German Socialists it was decided, in view of the sacrifices already made by the laboring classes, not to support any peace movement until the Germans were victorious *on one front or the other*. The leaders of the party were instructed to support this position in the Reichstag.

While this report will be impossible to verify for a long time, it is worthy of reproduction. It is highly probable, for it would merely mean that the Center group in the party, represented by Kautsky and Bernstein (see Chapter XIV), had gained control. There are excellent grounds for believing that neither of these, the two chief intellects of the German Party, desires to see the semi-absolute government of Germany victorious over the capitalist democracies, England and France. Some of these grounds—of a private character—cannot be given until the end of the war. The above report is in accord with this fact—for which the editor of the present volume can personally vouch.

The overwhelming majority of German Socialists, then, want the war to end with a definite defeat for Russia. A certain part of them do not desire a defeat for England and France. This brings us to the following questions:

Does any large part of the German Socialists desire the war to end at the present moment—April 20th? If they do, this means that they are willing to see France and England defeated.

Does any large faction prefer that the war should end at a time when Russia is more or less beaten, but when the war between Germany and France and Eng-

land is a draw? If it does, this means that it is willing that the war, as a whole, shall prove a great victory for the Kaiser and the German military party.

Are any German Socialists ready to accept a defeat at the hands of France and England corresponding in magnitude to the expected victory of Germany over Russia? This would still mean a draw and not a defeat for the German Government, such as even Bebel deemed desirable—in so far as the matter is viewed from the standpoint of German domestic politics (see below).

From the quotations from *Vorwaerts* and Haase which follow, and from the opinions of Bernstein given in the following chapter, it is clear that no large group of the Party desires or expects any considerable advance of France and England. The pro-peace group is willing merely that peace should be made without any further victories in either direction.

Vorwaerts called attention to the fact that the resolution of the London Conference criticising the Russian Government, together with the demand that the people of Alsace-Lorraine should have the right to decide as to their own future, was received with a storm of protest and abuse from the French press. At the same time it attacked editorially the main decision of the Conference, namely, that the victory of the Allies was necessary in order to free the German people. *Vorwaerts* said:

A defeat of German militarism in war can only take place by a defeat of the German armies, the masses of which consist of German workingmen. And the German workingmen can no more desire a defeat than the French or English. At the moment when French Socialists demand the continuation of the war as necessary, they force the same position on all the other branches of the International which are at war, and if such a policy is truly the function of a French Social

Democracy, does it not mean a recognition of war, especially under present conditions, as a method of Socialist politics?

This criticism of *Vorwaerts* gives a special importance to the discussion of peace which took place in its columns about the same period. *Vorwaerts* made clear its position by quoting at length in three numbers (February 18th-20th) an article written by Fritz Adler in the official monthly of the Austrian Party, *Der Kampf*, in the February number of 1915. *Vorwaerts* explained that Adler's position was in large part its own.

The writer quotes the saying of Jaurès that experience teaches us that it does more harm than good to freedom if one seeks to carry it abroad with weapons in the hand. The writer then continues:

Even if it were true that Prussian militarism is truly the backbone of reaction in Europe and that France is waging an aggressive war for democracy, would it really be in the interest of Socialism that the French Social Democracy should carry on this war as their war? Is it possible from the standpoint of the International that the French Socialists should wage war against Prussian militarism without the consent of the International? In order that a war policy may be Socialistic, it must be recognized by the International.

The answer of the French Socialists to the latter argument has been that the German Socialists, who by voting the German Budget in 1913 had proved that they are no longer internationalists, yet controlled the International by means of their influence over the Socialist Parties of Switzerland, Holland, Scandinavia, and other small countries.

As to the speech of Jaurès, Adler himself gives an answer in a footnote, in the shape of a speech of Bebel, in which the latter declared that defeat in war benefited the country defeated—if it had an aristocratic form of

government. The quotation is from Bebel's *Memoirs*, published less than five years ago, Vol. I, p. 160, as follows:

My view is that defeat in war is rather advantageous than disadvantageous to a people in our unfree condition. Victories make a government that stands opposed to a people arrogant and exacting. Defeats compel them to approach the people and to win their sympathy. This is taught in the case of Prussia by the War of 1806-7, in the case of Austria by the War of 1866, in the case of France by the War of 1870, and by the defeat of Russia in the war with Japan in 1904. History shows that when the Prussian people, with great sacrifice of life and property, overthrew the foreign rule of Napoleon and rescued the ruling dynasty, the former forgot all its beautiful promises which in its hour of danger it gave to the people. Only after a long period of reaction did the year 1848 arrive, when the people were able to conquer what had been withheld from them for generations.

Again, if Prussia had been defeated in 1866, Bismarck's ministry and the rule of the aristocracy, which weighs like a nightmare upon Germany to this day, would have been swept away.

Bebel never withdrew this extremely important statement, which was made about 1910, within three years of his death, nor does Adler or *Vorwaerts* deny its truth, but Adler says that Bebel only spoke "of the objective effect of events and not of the position that the party takes in war." In other words, it may be—as so many German Socialists have declared—that victory in war is an evil for the people and that defeat alone will lead to democratic government. *But in spite of their knowledge of the certain gain for survivors and descendants, the people to be defeated cannot bring themselves to desire defeat or to consent to the colossal sacrifice it involves.* Their defeat may be the only hope for the existing democracies of other countries as well as their own, and yet the Socialists cannot bring them-

serves to desire it, will not lift a finger to hasten it, or fail to do everything in their power to prevent it.

On March 10th, Haase spoke for his Party on the Socialist position toward the third war credits, advocating an early peace partly on the ground that Germany's military successes had been undeniable—which means, of course, that in the peace negotiations the German Government would demand either advantages or a return to the *status quo*. Haase said:

The imperial chancellor wants the German people to become a free people. The conditions I have pictured, however (see above, Chapter XIX), are unworthy of a free people and imperatively demand to be abolished. A free people must have free speech. This is especially necessary when a war approaches its conclusion. The German people cannot allow itself to be eliminated when its future fate is being decided. It must take part in the discussion and participate in preparations for it.

In all countries the horrors of the war have strengthened the wish to prepare to end the frightful slaughter of the peoples. To say this openly is not a sign of weakness, and can least of all be so considered with us, *since our military successes are undeniable* and our economic life, as stimulated by the war, has developed in a surprising way, while our finances are on a solid foundation. *It is precisely the strong who can first demand peace.* (Applause from the Social Democrats.) My party, as a representative of international Socialism, has always been the peace party and knows that the Socialists of other countries think in the same way. Our wish is for a lasting peace which does not contain within it the germ of new complications and of new conflicts. It should be reached in such a way that no people shall be coerced by another, so that, on the contrary, all peoples shall regard as their peaceful task the exchange of the products of civilization. The illusion that the German people might be annihilated has been destroyed. (Applause by the Social Democrats.) Neither our people nor any other which defends its independence with all its strength can be destroyed. (Renewed applause from the Social Democrats.) (Our italics.)

It will be recalled that there was no demand for peace from high Socialist quarters in Germany while the victorious progress of German armies was still to be noted ; in March this progress had become very much slower, if it had not ceased entirely. Moreover, it will be seen that this Socialist demand for peace is based on the assumption that German military superiority had been conclusively demonstrated. These same motives with the Socialists of the Allied Powers would lead, undeniably, to the opposite conclusion, namely, that the war should be continued until the military superiority of the Allies was established or until no further victories seemed probable. A reference to the London Conference (see above) will show that this is precisely the position that was taken by the Socialists of England and France.

About the first of April a new difficulty appeared. Not only was there a fundamental difference between the middle group of the German Party and the British and French Socialists as to the desirability of immediate peace negotiations while Germany still held most of Belgium and a part of France, but a new difference developed separating even *the most extreme* pro-peace group in Great Britain and France from the most extreme pro-peace group in Germany. For it appeared that the Liebknecht group advocated neither a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine (or elsewhere) nor an indemnity for Belgium.

The Liebknecht group's peace manifesto appeared in the *Labor Leader* of April 1st, with the following explanatory paragraph of that organ :

Through our Correspondent at Rotterdam we have received the following manifesto issued by the Anti-War Group in the Social Democratic Party in Germany, with which Dr. Karl Liebknecht, Dr. Ledebour, Herr Ruhle, Herr Mehring, Clara Zetkin, and Rosa Luxemburg are associated. The manifesto

was conveyed to our Correspondent from Germany by messenger and fortunately escaped the censor. In a covering letter to our Correspondent, dated Berlin, March 12, the members of the Anti-War Group say:

"Please try your best to get this manifesto into all countries, above all into the belligerent countries, in order to make our comrades in these countries acquainted with the spirit and attitude of the German Socialists. Up to now foreign countries have only got to know our supposed opinion and attitude on the war by the expressions of a dozen leaders who have run mad. You can believe us, dear comrade, that the German proletariat has nothing in common with the utterings of Scheidemann or Heine, with the *Hamburger Echo*, or with the *Chemnitzer Volkszeitung*. You can see from the speech of Haase in the House of Parliament (10/11/15), that the Opposition to the war in Germany is growing ever stronger and is gaining influence, though under the heel of martial law we are prevented from expressing our opinion publicly, because the slightest attempt would be suppressed by force, yet the near future may bring surprises, and the situation for action would become ripe immediately if we had the certainty that our comrades in France, Britain, Belgium, etc., would make common cause with us against the war. Therefore, dear comrade, do help us to make an end to this murderous war (*before still other countries join*) and to make our comrades in France, as well as in Britain and Belgium, take the road of international Socialism. This manifesto is being, and will continue to be, distributed in Germany." (Our italics.)

The manifesto itself then follows:

Though at the outbreak of the war the watchword of "defense of country" may have been uttered in perfect sincerity, the Imperialists of both sides made it clear at once for what they were fighting. And to-day the true purpose of the war is revealed: the antagonistic Governments proclaim the prostration of the enemy nations.

They dread an armed peace which would only mean a pause before a new call to arms. Therefore, the foe must be crushed in such a manner that it will never rise again. Each of them wishes to strike at the roots of its enemies' existence. Such is

the cry sounded from Russia against Austria, such is the cry sounded from both sides of the Vosges and of the English Channel.

What will be the inevitable end if this unfettered fury is allowed to go on without resistance? Either the tyrannical rule of the conqueror, or—and this will be the more probable result—the mutual shedding of blood until each side is exhausted. In either eventuality, the economic and democratic and Socialist development of Europe will be hampered for centuries.

The ruling classes in such circumstances must resort to the watchword of despair disguised as the watchword of determination: "We must see the war through!" But the working class would betray its future as well as its past if, surrendering its reason, if it followed further the call of the war-trumpet like the befooled children of the rat-catcher of Hamelin.

This can and must not be!

The Socialist movement has been intrusted with the task of organizing the masses for action on behalf of peace. It has repeatedly committed itself to this duty. So the international congress at Stuttgart in 1907 decided; the congress at Basle confirmed its decision with consecrated solemnity. And our own Parliamentary group proclaimed this duty on August 4th and again on December 2d when it declared:

"We demand that, as soon as national security has been gained and the enemy is inclined to make peace, an end be made to the war by a peace which secures friendship with our neighboring peoples."

It is said that propaganda for peace would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Against that we say: Wrong interpretations are thwarted by hard facts. *And the incontestable fact is the favorable military position of Germany. The frontiers are secure, and the war is being carried on on the enemy's ground.* It is for this very reason that we can be the first to proclaim the word, "Peace."

And we have the certainty that our call will not die away without response. We welcome the growing recollection of Socialist duties in France. We greet Comrades Monatte and Jouhaux as leaders of the growing opposition to war in France, striving for the same aims as ourselves. We greet the Independent Labor Party of Britain and the Russian comrades

who are awaiting with yearning the awakening of the German Social Democrats.

Even in France no Socialist thinks of a policy of conquest. The Cabinet Minister, Comrade Sembat, has declared quite recently a kind of peace programme.

On this decisive point the Socialist International is united.

And if Sembat and Guesde desire also to crush German Imperialism and Militarism, this appeal falls to the ground so soon as we decide to raise the flag of peace—not of a militarist peace with the goal of annexation by force, not of a peace with the aim of Imperialistic conquest, but of a peace based on the principles laid down unanimously at the International Socialist Congresses at Copenhagen and Basle and accepted by the German delegates. The chief of these principles are:

No Annexations.

Political and Economic Independence of Every Nation.

Disarmament.

Compulsory Arbitration.

Therefore, away with fatalistic despondency and mutual accusations and distrust! Already some comrades amongst us have spoken. Behind the Social Democratic Group of the Prussian Diet the masses must now range themselves, and with their call for peace they must drown the war-trumpets. (See Chapter XIX.) The state of feeling among the rank and file in Berlin has already resulted in the adoption of a number of resolutions in favor of peace.

We demand the publication of the terms on which the Governments are ready to make peace (Comrade Milhaud and the British working-class leader, Jowett, have already raised the same demand).

We demand free discussion in the Press and at meetings as to the time for, and the terms of, peace.

We ask for co-operation with those of our comrades abroad who stand by the same principles, so that joint action may be secured. (Our italics.)

In view of the passages in italics many nationalists and militarists of Germany and Austria now also favor peace—*on condition of a return to the conditions before the war*, leaving the German Government and war party

in the same position as then relatively to other countries. For example, Count Andrassy, one of the leading Hungarian patriots, is reported to have said in the middle of April that the only possible result of the war was "no result."

Moreover—in regard to peace terms—the Liebknecht view, as expressed in this manifesto, differs in no way from that of the pro-war majority of the Party, as we shall see.

For about the middle of April, *Vorwaerts* reports, a Conference of German and Austrian Socialists was held at Vienna which adopted the following programme of guarantees to be secured after the war:

International arbitration courts must be developed into obligatory tribunals for settling all differences between nations.

All treaties and agreements of States must be subjected to the democratic parliamentary control of a representative assemblage.

International treaties for limitation of armaments must be agreed upon, with a view to disarmament.

The rights of every *nation* to determine its own destiny must be recognized.

Three of these points are identical with the four points of the Liebknecht programme. The other, demanding democratic control of foreign relations, is of course a part of the Liebknecht view.

At the present moment (April 20th) there is, then, no essential disagreement among German Socialists as to peace terms. The most extreme pro-war faction and the most extreme pro-peace faction are both ready for immediate peace on the basis of a return to the *status quo*. *Neither faction believes peace can be obtained from the German Government on any other terms, in view of its superior military achievements and position, and neither expects or wishes this superiority to be lost—*

in its public declarations. Both factions feel that it would be a great concession on the part of the German Government even to consent to return to the *status quo*, since a very large part of German opinion demands conquests or other advantages. And a return to the *status quo* provides neither for a Belgian indemnity nor for a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine—as demanded even by the pacifist groups among British and neutral Socialists.

But is there any chance of a change in German Socialist opinion? It seems that there is such a chance, though how great it is cannot be said. In a statement issued about April 1st of a secret meeting of the international Socialist women's organization at Bern—*under the leadership of Clara Zetkin*—an indemnity for Belgium was explicitly advocated. Here is the press account of this meeting:

The conference was called by the international secretary of the women's Socialist organization, Clara Zetkin, one of the leaders of the German Social Democratic party, to consider the policy to be adopted by the organization in regard to the present war. The delegates present represented Germany, England, France, Russia, Poland, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria.

A general resolution was adopted after lengthy discussion, calling for "a speedy ending of the war by a peace which shall expiate the wrong done to Belgium, impose no humiliating conditions on any nation, and recognize the right of all *nationalities*, large and small, to independence and self-government."

The resolutions referred in general terms to the capitalistic and imperialistic origin of the conflict, the menace of the armament interests and their huge international organization, and the extortions of contractors and food speculators.

Relations between the British and German delegates were entirely amicable, it is stated, and the cordial relations between the German delegates and those from France were equally marked.

We see, then, that there is already some sentiment for a Belgian indemnity among certain German Socialists, and we have no reason to doubt that there has already developed some sentiment for a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine. Perhaps this is a beginning—and the development of the sentiment may be materially hastened by military events. Both sentiments may be felt privately by a number of the extreme anti-war group. But in any case this group is at present a small minority, and Clara Zetkin is its only member who has been put on record as favoring any peace terms which Socialist pacifists outside of Germany would consider as a real concession.

According to a report of the last part of April a part of the German Party at that time was already in favor of a serious concession also as to Alsace-Lorraine. Dr. Breitscheid, then visiting Holland, is given as the chief authority for the following statement (see the *New York Times*, April 22d) :

The general view of the Socialists, it is said, is that Alsace and Lorraine should belong to neither France nor Germany, but should be autonomous. The argument is that if France regained the provinces a desire for vengeance would be entertained by a large part of the population, which it is asserted does not desire to be governed by the French, and that therefore the situation would be as bad as ever.

To this the advocates of a plebiscite would probably reply that it was open to the people of Alsace-Lorraine—under their plan—to vote for complete autonomy if they so desired. In any case, the spirit of the two plans is similar. The question remains: How many German Socialist leaders advocate the Breitscheid plan? Up to the time of going to press none have done so publicly—except Breitscheid.

CHAPTER XXX

SOCIALIST PEACE POLICY

KARL KAUTSKY

IN an article in *Die Neue Zeit* written about a month after the beginning of the war, Kautsky advocated three principles which Socialists should favor in the peace negotiations and which they might hope to see adopted:

- (1) The freedom of subject races of nationalities,
- (2) Steps towards disarmament, and
- (3) Steps towards world-wide free trade by means of what we in America call reciprocity treaties.

Of course, in speaking of oppressed nationalities the censor would not allow Kautsky to repeat the German Socialists' well-known demand for local autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine. And it is very probable that he has the same idea in mind for German Poland and, possibly, for Schleswig-Holstein, or for parts of these territories.

His position as to disarmament is equally radical. He does not demand international disarmament of all nations alike. For that is the demand of many non-Socialists and even of many nationalistic and militaristic statesmen in all countries. *He is willing that a start should be made with either group of nations—even if it is made by force*—in the hope that Socialists and democrats of the other group can then use this beginning as a ground for extending the disarmament to their countries.

In the commercial antagonism fostered by tariffs Kautsky sees one of the two chief economic causes of war—the other being the backward condition of great territories of Asia and Africa, which tempts the capitalist governments to exploitation and to hostilities over the division of the spoils (see above, Chapters II and XIX). As to tariffs, he proposes, not free trade or tariffs lowered on a *national* basis—which, as in England, means merely lowered prices accompanied by a corresponding lowering of wages—but the lowering of tariffs *internationally* by reciprocity treaties.

An international lowering of tariffs, according to this view, means an increase both of exports and imports for all countries, the development of industrial specialization in every country (one industry developing more than enough to compensate for another industry that develops better in another country), and finally a world-wide economic *interdependence* of nations that would soon bring it about that wars would be neither economically desirable nor economically feasible.

For the peace treaty that immediately follows this war he favors:

- (1) Any step that may be taken, even if one-sided, toward disarmament.

- (2) The widest possible independence for nationalities and races, even if it involves taking away large amounts of territory from one group of nations alone.

As policies that will make wars impossible *ultimately*, that is, policies which may be partially applied to the treaty that closes the present war but may require time to be fully carried out, he favors:

- (1) Democratic in the place of militarist governments,

- (2) International or reciprocity treaties working as

rapidly as possible towards *international* free trade, and

(3) Independent governments for, and encouragement of, the backward countries.

Here is the central part of Kautsky's argument:

Democracy can only find its best expression in a state which consists of one nation, speaking one language. Modern production brings the people ever into closer touch with each other. The more the inner divisions fall away, the more all the members of the state speak the same language, the more intensively can economic, intellectual, and political life proceed. And within this method of production is arising the co-operation of the lower classes in intellectual and political life, which means additional strength to every nation. In a national state both these tendencies combine and strengthen one another. In a state of various nationalities they come into hostile collision with each other, and have a paralyzing effect on the economic and political process, all the stronger as development progresses.

It would therefore be a sad backward step if any of the great national states which are at war were to use a victory in order to annex foreign territory, and thus become a nationalities state instead of a national state. That would be a great misfortune, not only for the defeated, but for the victors. Such action would also be an injury to the independence of nations, and each of the nations involved have sworn that they only wanted to protect their own independence and integrity.

That is not to say that any changes in the map of Europe would contradict this principle. Where nations are now under foreign rule, the overthrow of such rule would be beneficial in the above manner. If, for instance, Russia being defeated, the inhabitants of Poland, the Baltic provinces, and Finland were to claim the right to manage their own affairs without external coercion, that would be quite in accord with the laws of democracy. The same would apply to Egypt and Persia.

It is also of paramount importance to all nations that when the war comes to an end the causes which produced it should end likewise. A local conflict between Austria and Servia would not have been able to set the whole world on

fire in a moment if the armament competition had not already divided Europe into two hostile camps. To put an end to this state of things should be easier after the war. Probably the defeated nations will be compelled to disarm, and this will indirectly affect also the armaments of their antagonists.

In this *compulsory disarmament of the defeated* it must be our business as Social Democrats to protest against any humiliating or degrading forms that it may assume. But the thing itself *is most earnestly to be desired*. Social Democrats in all countries will support disarmament, and the diminution in the menace from their neighbors' armaments will give them a firm basis in so doing.

A third point to be considered is that of commercial treaties. The existing treaties will be destroyed through the war, and new ones will be concluded. Under the pressure of war much that was hitherto unattainable may become attainable. It is possible that the victor may find it to his interest *to force free trade, or something approaching it, on the defeated nations*. Or several nations may constitute themselves into a tariff union. *This would mean progress* if it is not used as a means of drawing free trade countries into a protected area, which latter must be fought against.

Kautsky's programme is evidently broader and deeper than that of the Copenhagen or London Conferences and may serve us as a standard in discussing Socialist peace policy. The questions now are: How far is Kautsky's programme supported by other leading Socialists? And, Do they bring additional elements to it? We shall now answer these questions, beginning with the views of the other great Socialist publicist of Germany, Edward Bernstein.

EDWARD BERNSTEIN

From an examination of the expressions of Edward Bernstein, it seems that he is probably in almost complete disaccord with Kautsky as to terms of peace—

and he represents a very large part of the German Party. Kautsky, it will be recalled, was careful throughout all his writings not to express a wish for the victory of Germany, and we are free to conclude that he would be glad to see England and France moderately successful on the west front and Germany moderately successful on the east. He does not believe a "drawn" war, as he believes this, would mean a return to the *status quo*, but on the contrary hopes for vast and beneficial international changes (see above, Chapter XIX).

In contrast to this, the only qualification Bernstein makes in his pro-German victory is to oppose annexations or indemnities *for* Germany:

On October 24th, Bernstein delivered a lecture to the metal workers, of which *Vorwaerts* prints the following account:

I hope that international trade relations will be resumed after peace is declared, and that peace will be declared before a very great time. In many circles of the people, even among the working people, the annexation of Belgium is demanded. As much as I desire the victory of Germany, I regard such a policy as completely mistaken. Belgium consists of three million Walloons, who speak French exclusively, and three and a half million Flemish, who, in spite of their Low German, are enemies of Germany. I hope and believe that the German Government will not agree to this demand for annexation. I regard it as especially necessary that a peace is concluded that makes possible the renewal of international relations among the civilized peoples. There is a disposition to demand thirty to forty milliard of indemnity from the enemy. In the first place, it is quite unbelievable that such a monstrous sum can be collected. Besides, one must not forget that if the other civilized nations are financially ruined, our whole foreign trade will be crippled. And in this case a great amount of unemployment will be an inevitable result. *We Social Democrats have the most earnest wish that victory should rest with German arms. It would be*

a misfortune for all civilization if this is not the case. But nevertheless we maintain our principles, and have the most earnest wish that the German Empire should not appear as a dictator in the making of the peace, so as to stir up the hatred and envy of other civilized nations. That this should not happen is doubtless the wish not only of the German workers, but also of the great majority of the bourgeois classes, who want, not only to preserve German trade and industry in its former condition, but to advance it even beyond the point reached before the war. I have the hope that the German Government will act along these lines in the negotiating of peace.

In answer to the Scheidemann article above quoted (see Chapter XIX), Bernstein wrote the following reply in *Vorwaerts* of January 29th, in which he pictures the war as a probable draw, and therefore implies that he favors a peace which would restore the *status quo ante*:

To advocate the earliest possible conclusion of peace and at the same time a determination to "hold out" are by no means contradictory ideas, that is, if a peace which assures the integrity and the conditions necessary for the life and development of one's own country is not to be attained.

The two chief nations opposing one another in the present war, the English and the German peoples, are near enough related to one another to have one peculiarity in common: toughness. Under many conditions this is a great virtue. But if both sides are tough then it may degenerate into unreason.

Bernstein then quotes a phrase from Graham Wallas to the effect that if England and Germany prove equally strong the war might last thirty years. And finally he concludes with a quotation from David Starr Jordan, that if the war lasted for years it could only have one result, England and Germany exhausted as to means and men, and America the winner over them both.

It is quite evident that Bernstein expects a tendency

toward this sort of a draw and believes that it is an argument for the restoration of all the conditions as they were before the war, without any change either in the territorial possessions or the relative military strength of any of the Great Powers.

Bernstein has made a courageous and aggressive campaign for peace. He was among those thirty Socialist members of the Reichstag who, on March 18th, refused to vote for the third war budget, "because it was necessary that a voice be heard crying for a common-sense peace," as he explained in the Leipzig *Volkszeitung*. But when we inquire what kind of a peace he wants we find he rejects the demands of even the ultra-pacifist wing of the British Socialists, the demands of the Copenhagen Congress and of the American Party (see below)—both so thoroughly friendly to the German Socialist majority. Not only does he reject all indemnity for Belgium, but he opposes a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine as a condition of peace—wishing this question to be left entirely to the magnanimity and liberality of the German Government and the pro-government majority of the German people. The argument is as follows:

Our French comrades do not at all take the point of view that the fate of Alsace-Lorraine should be decided by the fortune of arms. In a number of declarations they have limited themselves to the demand that the population of these provinces should be given the opportunity to decide as to their own fate.

We Social Democrats would be giving a very poor testimony of our feeling for democratic justice if we made any criticism of this French demand for the right of self-government for Alsace-Lorraine. The objection we have to make to the French is quite another one. We should and must try to make clear to them that this demand, under present conditions, means an indefinite prolongation of this murderous and wasteful war, since neither the rulers of Germany nor

the majority of the German people can be won over to the view that the question, to which country Alsace and Lorraine should belong, cannot be decided now during the war; since any solution which is forced in war leaves with the conquered the desire to win back by force what has been taken away. But a peace which would only be a truce is as little in the interest of the French as of the German people. We cannot ask that the French should abandon this demand for justice. But we can advise them, because of our mutual interest, not to insist upon it as a condition *sine qua non*.

And we can do this because it is a fundamental principle of Social Democratic policy both here and there to find solutions for the conflicting interests of the nations which do not need force for their accomplishment, but can be reached by means of voluntary agreement.

As this article appeared in *Die Neue Zeit* (of March 12th), it has a special importance, as probably presenting a common view in the German Party. (See Note 1, p. 478.)

JEAN JAURÈS

Jaurès, the reformist, agrees with Kautsky, the radical, on international policy. He demands (1) the independence of all nationalities, (2) freedom for the backward peoples, and (3) international commercial treaties bringing free trade and equal opportunities.

The following is taken from a posthumous article published in *L'Humanité* (Paris) on October 1 and 2, 1914:

Solicitude for peace does not in the least exclude, does not in the least diminish, in Socialism, the solicitude for national independence. And it is not, if I may say so, a theoretic solicitude expressing itself in general and inefficacious formulas; it is a solicitude very positive, very precise, and truly organic.

It may almost be said that what characterizes the present period in France is the interest that the proletariat, that Socialism takes in National Defense. It was an inevitable movement; for it is impossible for a great party to demand

from a nation that it should transform its social institutions, if it does not invite it at the same time to insure its independence against all exterior intervention, against all violence or every threat from without.

In proportion, then, as the Socialist Party grows, it is led to define its views on the Army as an institution, and to propose the form of army which seems to conform the best with a modern democracy in quest of social justice in a Europe still exposed to all risks. The law of three years has had this curious effect; it has quickened in the Socialist Party, in the working class, the study of military problems. The party has learned that it is not enough for it to criticise, but that it must, in addition, give to the nation guarantees of security superior to those which exist at present. Thence comes the necessity to analyze the terms of the problem, to define what is to-day the rôle of the forces actually in barracks, what the rôle of the reserves, and what ought to be the rôle of both to-morrow. The proletariat found in this research the pleasure there is in criticism. It could judge both with its natural good sense, and with the direct knowledge which every citizen-soldier now has of military life. Socialists were not astonished to find as the outcome of their awakened interest that their national institutions are pervaded by a spirit of routine and a tendency to decay; this being the inevitable result of the failure to adapt these institutions to the living forces of new thought, of the new ideal. At the same time Socialists have taken a very lively intellectual pleasure in devising a scheme for National Defense according to the conditions of modern life itself. The day when the transformed "états-majors" take this new spirit into account and devote themselves in all sincerity to the organization of the Armed Nation, they will receive support from all kinds of unexpected quarters.

Just as the Socialist Party has a precise plan of military organization, so it has a precise plan for diplomatic conduct, and, if I may say so, for the organization of the world at peace. To affirm the will for peace would be of no use if it were not known on what foundations this peace should rest. To speak of international arbitration for all conflicts would be vain if it were not known what rights and principles should inspire the awards. Such decisions would indeed be both arbitrary and hazardous; that is, they would

be violence in another form; and from this judicial disorder the most brutal forms of violence would not be slow to be born again.

In the judgment which they give on these events, in the conduct which they advise, Socialists are inspired with a triple thought. First they desire that the peoples who have undergone the violences of conquest should be endowed with guarantees of liberty, and with institutions of autonomy which would permit them to develop, to think, to act according to their own genius, without the necessity of rearranging or breaking by force the framework created by force. They do not admit that the rights of nationalities can ever be prescribed; but they think that the means of claiming and of realizing these rights can vary, just as do the conditions of civilization themselves, as well as the political conditions of the world.

Democracy is a great new force which furnishes, even for national problems, new solutions. Certainly the Irish, oppressed, expropriated, starved by aristocratic England, have more than once had recourse to violence. In the past they committed more and more "outrages"; but now, with the growth of English democracy, Ireland has no need to have recourse to a national rising or to constitute itself into a separate political State. To obtain Home Rule nothing more has been needed than to exercise a continuous action in the English Parliament. Let the democracy be entirely realized in Russia and Finland's liberties will be re-established; Finland, having regained its full autonomy in the great common liberty, would ask for nothing better than to remain associated with the immense life of the freed Russian people. [?] Let the democracy be entirely realized in Russia, in Germany, in Austro-Hungary, and the problem of Poland, the problem of Schleswig, of Alsace-Lorraine, of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia are solved without the people having been thrown against one another, without an appeal having been made to the sword. The direction of Socialist effort throughout the world is very distinct. It may be said with certainty that in this effort is the solution of the difficult problems which weigh on Europe, and only in it.

The most "nationalist" of Frenchmen, the most jingo, recognize this truth, since they proclaim that they do not wish in any case to take the initiative in a war, that they do not

meditate any "revenge," and that it was only from considerations of defense that they demanded the three years' law. Well, now, if it only depends on them, if Germany does not take the initiative in aggression, years will pass, generations and centuries will pass without the problem of Alsace-Lorraine arising. Thus would come about its eternal abandonment if the problem had no other solution than force. The progress of democracy and Socialism opens the one single way to a solution.

Our second principle, our second rule, is that Europe can and ought to pursue its economic expansion over the world without threatening the independence of States and without committing violence against the peoples. Wisdom and equity alike demand it. To divide up Turkey would be not only to commit an outrage; it would also be to awaken through the whole extent of Asia Minor the bitter rivalries of European governments. To dismember or try to dismember China would be not only to commit a crime, to arrest the formation of a great organism which is trying to adapt itself to the conditions of life of the modern world; it would also be to start a formidable conflict between the diverse European ambitions. It is true that the apparently most convenient procedure for greedy appetites is to cut up, to conquer, to enslave. It is, or at least it appears, more troublesome to bind oneself to a long and slow economic penetration, and to develop business relations with all the peoples without being brutal to them, without being offensive. But if this task is more difficult, it is also higher and more fruitful.

It is best, and this is the third rule proposed by the Socialists, to negotiate an entente of European peoples for a free association of industrial, commercial, and financial undertakings which tends towards a better management of this planet. No protective barriers, no monopoly; but a co-operation in which each national group will have an influence proportional to its real effort in the matter of the work which it has decided to put into the enterprise. There may be on such or such particular point difficulty in applying this rule; but it is precisely there that there will be the intervention of arbitration directed by a distinct principle. And, on the whole, it will be easy to reconcile all claims and to give free play to all the real and sincere forces of production.

Like the democracy, capitalism has subtle resources in facili-

ties for combination which render possible and even easy the solution of many problems.

BERNARD SHAW

Shaw's views, on the whole, seem more nearly to resemble Bernstein's than Kautsky's. On the subject of Belgian indemnity he is almost pro-German.

He feels the danger that peace may be postponed if a large indemnity is asked for Belgium, and proposes to compromise. He demands an indemnity for property destroyed in Belgium, but claims that lives destroyed cannot be paid for. This overlooks widows and orphans and disabled people, for whom financial assistance is a very important consideration indeed—as we see in the British Socialists' demands for soldiers in the following section. And a double indemnity covering both life and property would undoubtedly be a colossal one.

Shaw's central argument—in asking President Wilson to demand the evacuation of Belgium by Germany (and the Allies)—was that “there was no such case of overwhelming necessity as would have made the denial of a right of way to the German army equivalent to a refusal to save German independence from destruction, and therefore to an act of war against her, justifying a German conquest of Belgium.”

Shaw, the humanitarian, is chiefly concerned with the redemption of Belgium from the German occupation, and believes that a settlement may be accepted by the Allies on that basis:

It is by no means a foregone conclusion that a blank refusal would be persisted in. Germany must be aware that the honor of England is now so bound up with the complete redemption of Belgium from the German occupation that to keep Antwerp and Brussels she must take Portsmouth and London. France is no less deeply engaged. You [President

Wilson] can judge better than I what chance Germany now has, or can persuade herself she has, of exhausting or overwhelming her western enemies without ruining herself in the attempt.

In the following passages, in attacking vindictive indemnities, Shaw makes no exception for Belgium's widows, orphans, and invalids.

The blackmail levied recently by the Prussian generals on the Belgian and French towns they have occupied must, I suppose, be let pass as ransom, not as ordinary criminal looting. But if the penalty of looting be thus spared, the Germans can hardly complain if they are themselves held to ransom when the fortunes of war go against them. Liège and Lille and Antwerp and the rest must be paid their money back with interest; and there will be a big builder's bill at Rheims. But we should ourselves refrain strictly from blackmail. We should sell neither our blood nor our mercy. If we sell either we are as much brigands as Blucher. . . .

And we must not let ourselves be tempted to soil our hands under pretext of vindictive damages. The man who thinks that all the money in Germany could pay for the life of a single British drummer boy ought to be shot merely as an expression of the feeling that he is unfit to live. We stake our blood as the Germans stake theirs.

There could be no greater contrast than that between the views of Kautsky and Shaw as to Russia. Kautsky believes the war, if long continued, will establish democracy there either from above or from below and that Germany's democracy will come largely from democratic Russia (see Chapter XIX). Shaw believes that neither liberalism nor democracy is to be expected in Russia.

Shaw here expresses a widespread Socialist view. A large majority of Continental Socialists, however, disagree with his view as to the hopelessness of a Russian

revolution; on the contrary, they confidently expect one. Shaw writes as follows:

When all is said that can be said for Russia, the fact remains that a forcibly Russianized German province would be just such another open sore in Europe as Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, Macedonia, or Ireland. It is useless to dream of guarantees: if Russia undertook to govern democratically she would not be able to redeem her promise: she would do better with primitive Communism. Her city populations may be as capable of democracy as our own (it is, alas! not saying much); but the overwhelming mass of peasants to whom the Czar is a personal god will for a long time to come make his bureaucracy irresistible. As against Russian civilization German and Austrian civilization is our civilization: there is no getting over that. A constitutional kingship of Poland and a sort of caliphate of the Slavs in remapped southeastern Europe, with that access to warm sea water which is Russia's common human right, valid against all balances of power and keys to India and the like, must be her reward for her share in the war, even if we have to nationalize Constantinople to secure it to her. . . . Until Russia becomes a federation of several separate democratic states, and the Czar is either promoted to the honorable position of hereditary President or else totally abolished, the eastern boundary of the League of Peace must be the eastern boundary of Swedish, German, and Italian civilization. . . . Meanwhile, we must trust to the march of democracy to de-Russianize Berlin and de-Prussianize Petrograd.

The conclusion is that the Russian danger is such as to demand the earliest possible conclusion of the war.

As to the possible effect of the war in furthering the progress of the democracy Kautsky said, in his first article after the war, that he had great hopes but could not speak because of the censorship. Shaw takes advantage of the absence of any such political censorship in England to argue that a democratization of governments should be demanded at the peace negotiations. This is a distinct addition to the Kautsky policy, since

it regards democratization as an item of the immediate peace programme:

The simplest solution would be to take the sooner or later inevitable step into the democratic republican form of government to which Europe is visibly tending. Or, continues Shaw, a democratic monarchy, such as that of England or of Holland, is a fairly acceptable working substitute for a formal republic in old civilizations with inveterate monarchical traditions, absurd as it is in new and essentially democratic states. At any rate, it is conceivable that the western Allies might demand the introduction of some such political constitution in Germany and Austria as a guarantee; for though the demand would not please Russia, some of Russia's demands will not please us; and there must be some give and take in the business:

"Let us consider this possibility for a moment. First, it must be firmly postulated that civilized nations cannot have their political constitutions imposed on them from without if the object of the arrangement is peace and stability. . . . Nevertheless, we need not go to the opposite extreme and conclude that a political constitution must fit a country so accurately that it must be home-made to measure. . . . It is therefore quite possible that a reach-me-down constitution proposed, not by the conquerors, but by an international congress with no interest to serve but the interests of peace, might prove acceptable enough to a nation thoroughly disgusted with its tyrants." (*See Note 2, p. 478.*)

THE PEACE PROGRAMME OF THE INDEPENDENT LABOR PARTY

The British Independent Labor Party, in formulating its peace policy, says nothing about indemnities either for Belgium or for France, though its demand for autonomy for subject races, as a part of the terms, would mean the partial or complete liberation of Alsace-Lorraine, and perhaps of Prussian Poland and a part of Schleswig-Holstein, measures which would meet with even more vigorous resistance from the German Government and a part of the German Socialists than would

the most colossal Belgian indemnity. Here is the I. L. P. programme (as given by the *Labor Leader*) :

(1) Frontiers should represent nationalities and should be determined not by military conquests, but by the natural divisions of race, religion, language, and custom.

(2) Subject peoples should be granted self-government and should be allowed to decide by plebiscite whether they desire to be under the suzerainty of any Power.

(3) The policy of the balance of power by which the nations of Europe have been divided into antagonistic camps should be superseded by a League of Europe, of which all nations should be members and uniting whom there should be an international body to judge all quarrels and differences.

(4) The constitution of each nation should be democratized. The people should be given full control of the legislature, and women's claim to citizenship should be recognized. Secret diplomacy should be entirely abolished and foreign policy placed under the jurisdiction of parliament.

(5) The armament industries of the different nations should be taken out of private hands and placed under state control, so that syndicates may no longer be tempted to exploit national jealousies for profit.

(6) The ideal towards which we should move is a United States of Europe in which national armies and navies are replaced by an international police force.

This programme differs from Kautsky's by its demand for the democratization of governments as a feature of the coming peace—though there is no reason to suppose that Kautsky or the radical wing of the Germans would object to this. The nationalization of armament industries would probably be favored by all Socialists—though many consider it of secondary importance. Points 3 and 4 would probably be objected to by Kautsky and his group, but only because they would hold them to be impracticable. They also want a League or a United States of Europe, but they say Socialism is and always has been based on *economic* principles,

and as long as nations are in economic conflict in times of peace there will be danger of war. They would say that to talk of a United States of Europe without aiming at the removal of these economic conflicts would be to serve the military and nationalist parties by directing attention *away* from the true causes of war. An international tribunal, international police, and a political federation of nations, they hold are to be secured only when stronger economic bonds than at present hold the nations together and fewer economic conflicts exist to drive them apart.

THE "NEW STATESMAN" VS. THE I. L. P. PROGRAMME

While not directed specifically against the I. L. P. programme, an important editorial in the *New Statesman* attacks some of its main points:

There are some excellently-intentioned people, for example, who, having laid it down that the terms of peace should provide for (1) disarmament, (2) the abolition of secret diplomacy, and (3) the reconstruction of the map of Europe by plebiscites in all doubtful areas, appear to consider that they have solved the whole problem. But, so far from amounting to a solution, it is not clear that these suggestions are likely to help us at all. As for disarmament, it is, as we have pointed out before, inconceivable that it should come about as an immediate result of this war. After the lesson that we have had during the past five months there will certainly be no little navy school in British politics for a very long time to come; and if we are not prepared to abandon our policy of maintaining an overwhelming navy, how can we propose that other nations should abandon their policies of maintaining as large armies as they can afford? We may hope, of course, as a result of the war, to be able to effect an absolute reduction—though not a reduction relatively to other Powers—in our expenditure upon dreadnoughts; and, similarly, the Continental Powers may be able to reduce the scale of their military armaments. If, indeed, the settlement

does not make such reductions eventually possible it will have been proved a failure. But the reductions will come about, not as part of the settlement, but as one of its ultimate beneficial results. As for the abolition of "secret diplomacy," there is little, we fear, to be hoped from it if the reform is to be applied in this country alone—and we certainly cannot insist on its application elsewhere. Moreover, the present war has revealed no great divergencies between governments and peoples. More parliamentary control of the Foreign Office would be a good thing in itself, but it would not have prevented the war, or even our joining in it. As Mr. Bernard Shaw pointed out in his manifesto:

"Had the Foreign Office been the International Socialist Bureau, had Sir Edward Grey been Jaurès, had Mr. Ramsay MacDonald been Prime Minister, had Russia been Germany's ally instead of ours, the result would still have been the same: we must have drawn the sword to save France and smash Potsdam as we smashed, and always must smash, Philip, Louis Napoleon, *et hoc genus omne*."

The plebiscite seems to us a still less hopeful and pertinent suggestion. How anyone, indeed, who followed the Ulster controversy six months ago can remain a serious advocate of the plebiscite as a method of settling frontiers we cannot understand. For, inevitably, as we saw in Ulster, a dilemma is presented. If the vote be taken over a large area polled as a single unit its result can be quite easily manipulated, in fact, settled in advance, by those who define the boundaries of the area to be polled. If, on the other hand, the area is divided into a number of small and fairly homogeneous districts, each of which is polled separately, the results will certainly give a true idea of the wishes of the populations concerned, but they will also in all probability point to a quite impossibly complex frontier, or rather series of frontiers. In a recently published pamphlet Mr. Lowes Dickinson, after referring to the fact that Austria-Hungary contains a large proportion of Slavs whose wishes must be considered in the ultimate settlement, writes:

"The true solution would be a referendum to the Slav peoples included in the Austrian Empire on the point whether they wish to remain under Austria or to join Serbia or to come as a separate unit into a Balkan federation."

The Slavs of the Austrian Empire include large numbers

of Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. Are they all to be polled together or separately? And what is to happen in districts where these races are mixed with others? Probably Mr. Dickinson had only the southern Slavs in mind—but even so, the problem with its mixture of religions, Catholic, Orthodox, and Moslem, is infinitely more complex than the problem of Ulster. It may be suggested that it would be possible to divide up the country for the purpose of the plebiscite into districts which would be substantially of one mind. That no doubt is so, but the authority who arranged the division would also arrange the destination of each area and the holding of the plebiscites would be an unnecessary formality.

But there is another objection that seems to us even more fatal to the procedure which Mr. Dickinson suggests. Suppose the results of the plebiscites were a series of demands for complete independence, which is quite possible—Europe would then be faced with the choice of either ignoring the mandates it had invoked or else creating conditions infinitely less stable than those which existed before the war. With an independent Poland, an independent Bohemia, an independent Hungary, and perhaps even an independent Ruthenia and an independent Croatia, owing no allegiance to any Great Power, yet free to coquette with all, we should have the problem of southeastern Europe magnified tenfold and there would be no sense of international security, no slackening of the preparations for war, until the map had once more been recast. That is not the sort of solution Great Britain is fighting for.

Many Socialists both of the nationalistic and the internationalistic tendency agree largely with these criticisms. Bauer, of Austria, in his *Imperialismus und die Nationalitätenfrage*, has dealt fully with the complexities of the nationality question in Austria and has also admitted that the conflict of immediate economic interests throws the peoples themselves into antagonisms (see above, Chapter II), so that the abolition of secret diplomacy, desirable as it may be, would reach none of

the deeper issues. Both Kautsky and Bauer favor the earliest possible steps toward disarmament. If Kautsky expects an important move in this direction as the result of the war, however, it is not due to any of the illusions of the "bourgeois pacifists," now shared by the I. L. P., that an international agreement is possible. He is ready to have a partial disarmament forced on one side by the other—as a *beginning* in the right direction. The *New Statesman's* leaning in the opposite direction is so marked that it expects no limitation either of the Continental armies or of the British Navy "as a part of the settlement." It seems to feel that a sort of military balance of power must result and it relies only on voluntary and international agreement—as do the pacifists against whom the article is directed.

THE NEW INDEPENDENT LABOR PARTY PROGRAMME OF
APRIL 5TH (1915)

At its Congress on April 5th the I. L. P. adopted a programme similar to the one above quoted, except that points (1) and (2) were dropped and the following appeared in their place:

That the people concerned shall give their consent before there is transfer of territory.

That is, the Congress dropped altogether its demands on behalf of subject peoples, whose territory is not claimed by a government not now in possession, abandoned the demand for plebiscites, and took no stand as to the independence desired by certain subject races.

What was the cause of this change? There is only one plausible explanation. The new formulation corresponds to the position of the German Socialists on this question as published in the *Labor Leader* on April 1st immediately before the I. L. P. Congress. The German

pro-peace group, feeling the military position of its government to be impregnable, and desiring immediate peace, did not dare to ask for more, and so was ready to sacrifice the small nationalities. The British immediate-peace faction followed.

MORRIS HILLQUIT

The two American Socialists who have dealt with the peace problem at greatest length and whose voices have the greatest weight (among those who have spoken) are Morris Hillquit and Charles Edward Russell. Hillquit's first utterances on peace were in New York in November. As previous quotations have already indicated, his position differs radically from the internationalism of Kautsky. He wants no annexation on a large scale and no colossal indemnities, which is Bernstein's position. Unlike Bernstein, however, who wishes a German victory (though not necessarily on both fronts), or Kautsky, who hopes to see great changes brought about by the war, Hillquit believes that a good time to end it would be either immediately (see Chapter XXVII) or when it is a "draw."

CHARLES EDWARD RUSSELL

Russell's views are to be found in the *New Review* for January, and in *Pearson's Magazine* for February and March (1915). The first article, a very short one, we reproduce in its entirety. He does not want peace until Germany is sufficiently beaten to ensure respect for treaties and the rights of small nations in the future or until her aggressive military party and absolute form of government have received a blow that will bring about their overthrow:

If the present commercial and social system is to remain unimpaired, the end of the war will probably see the terms

of adjustment bedeviled by the powers of darkness for their own benefit, but that fact need not blind us to the only possible arrangement that would be of use to mankind.

Neither that nor the efforts of the worthy but deluded souls that for indiscernible reasons (if any) are trying to bring about a peace at the present time.

Peace is a lovely thing and usually above other blessings desirable, but a peace made now would be a greater calamity than the existing state of war. Peace now would be nothing but a truce in which everybody, including ourselves, would sedulously prepare for the next war, about five years off.

We might as well forget, therefore, any idea of a peace conference or congress to be held now. Being in this mess, there is no way out of it but to fight through to the end and have done with it.

For observe that the principles established at the present stage of this war are these:

(1) Treaties have no validity and can be broken at convenience.

(2) Small nations have no rights that great nations are bound to respect.

(3) A nation can reject arbitration and insist upon war, and still suffer nothing in the estimation of mankind.

(4) Absolutism is right, proper, and enduring.

If you make peace while these principles have the potent indorsement of success in arms you nail them upon the world indefinitely.

It might be possible under such conditions to maintain organized society and proceed with the work of civilization, but I don't know how.

If you utterly destroy every standard of national ethics and ideal of national good faith, how can you expect to have any standards of individual ethics? How will you preserve "the faith that holds the moral elements of the world together"? How will you have any standards except brute strength?

All the world's chances of enduring peace and of escape from profound reversion lie simply in this that the war shall be prosecuted to the cataclysmic end. Let us pray that this may be tremendous enough to smash the competitive system and abolish it from the earth forever. The chances, I admit,

would be greater for this delectable result if most of the enlightened men of the earth were not out on the firing line trying to kill one another; but anyway, that is the first and greatest hope.

And the second is like unto it, that the people of Europe shall perceive at the close of this war, or before, the monstrous idiocy and monstrous peril of maintaining in this day a monarchical form of government. The threat of war will never be removed so long as we go on fooling with this absurd and poisonous thing. A race of in-bred lunatics sits upon the thrones of Europe and directs the destinies of the nations. If this war is prosecuted to its logical conclusion, and the invertebrates that clamor for peace before there can be any peace do not muddle everything, there is a fair chance that Europe will come out of its trance and begin to live politically in the twentieth century instead of the seventeenth.

There is, I say, a chance. The great danger point will be when the job is about half done and weak souls, afraid of changes and appalled by the horrors about them, will be moving for peace at any price even though it shall mean infinitely greater horrors within a few years, even though it would mean the defeat of everything we believe in, and the long triumph of monarchical mediævalism. To smash up the armaments, sink the battleships, melt down the 42-centimeter howitzers, rid the earth of the blight and pestilence of militarism and imperial ambitions will take much more sacrifice than we have yet gone through. We should remember that monstrous crimes usually exact monstrous penalties. The world has tolerated these things and wallowed in them. We shall not throw them off like an old garment; the price is yet to be paid, now, or in the next world convulsion, take your choice. Men not afraid of their own thoughts will hope that it will be now and that the work in hand will not be interrupted until it is done so thoroughly that it will not have to be done over again.

In an article in *Pearson's Magazine* (February) he defines his attitude to peace policy *in general* in the following six propositions:

LESSONS OF THE WAR

Under the existing commercial system, which causes all the international strife, treaties are no protection against war. Treaties are not worth the paper they are written on. Treaties bind no nation. Treaties impose no obligations.

Under the existing system the work of the peace societies is futile.

Under the existing commercial system, which makes all the wars, talk about disarmament is all bosh.

Under the existing commercial system, which makes all the wars, protestations, professions, and declarations in favor of peace mean nothing, all talk of arbitration is only an idle dream.

There is nothing in the idea of untrained volunteers rising to the defense of their country in the hour of its need.

Under the existing system to oppose a great navy is mere folly.

Russell then presents this alternative: either the continued development of militarism and wars or the abolition of "the present commercial system"—in which he includes, of course, imperialism and tariff wars.

TENTATIVE PEACE PROGRAMME OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN PARTY

The following programme was submitted by the Executive Committee (Berger, Maurer, Germer, Wilson, and Duncan) to the American Socialist Party for the purpose of discussion on December 31, 1914. We abbreviate only the preamble:

Immediate Causes of War

All are familiar with the more superficial and immediate causes of the war. Previous wars and the terms of settlement which created lasting hatreds and thoughts of revenge; commercial rivalries and colonial antagonisms; the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente dividing all Europe into two armed antagonistic camps; the remnants of a feudal system which retarded modern social and political progress; racial and religious prejudices; secret intrigue of diplomats, and the

lack of democratic control by the people; vast systems of military equipment; fear and suspicion bred and spread by a vicious jingo press in all nations; powerful armament interests that reap rich harvest out of havoc and death—all these have played their sinister part.

The Fundamental Causes

Back of all of those, however, lie the deeper, more fundamental causes which give rise to them. The fundamental causes are economic.

Every capitalistic nation on earth exploits its people. The wages received by the workers are always less than the market value of the goods which they produce. Consequently when the workers enter the market they cannot buy back an amount of wealth equal to that which their labor created and put into the market. A surplus accumulates. The capitalist class cannot consume it all or profitably invest it in a nation suffering from capitalistic exploitation. Thus sooner or later each capitalistic nation is suffocated with the surplus products resulting from its own exploitation. Having exhausted its home market, unwilling and unable to readjust its processes so as to eliminate exploitation, every capitalist nation is compelled to enter the struggle for foreign markets.

All the rest of the tragedies of capitalism follow upon this fundamental feature. Each capitalistic nation enters the list to fight for foreign markets. Hence arise the commercial rivalries of nations, the policies of imperialism, the conflicts for commercial supremacy, ever growing more intense and fierce as the nations expand and the world's field of conquest narrows. Hence arise the policies of armaments every year more immense and monstrous. Hence arise the strategy, the intrigue of secret diplomacy, till the world is involved in a deadly struggle for the capture and control of the world market.

Thus capitalism, functioning through the modern nationalistic state with its vast armaments, secret diplomacies, and undemocratic governments, inevitably leads to war.

Socialists Warned the World

For more than half a century the Socialist movement has warned the world of this impending tragedy. With every

power at their command the Socialists of every nation have worked to prevent it. But the warning has gone unheeded and the Socialist propaganda against war has been ignored and suppressed by the ruling powers and the majority of the people of all the nations.

To-day our prediction has been only too swiftly and too tragically fulfilled. War, with all its horrors, is upon us.

And it has come as the logical and inevitable outcome of the forces of the capitalist system. It has come in spite of the warnings and protest of the Socialist and labor movement and indeed in spite of the personal desires of many of the capitalists themselves. The capitalist system is a modern Frankenstein which is destroying its own creators.

The Supreme Duty Now

We refuse to believe our comrades wholly false to the principles for which they have suffered so much and which they have labored so long to plant in the hearts of men. The tidal wave of nationalism may for the moment overwhelm, but it cannot destroy the ideals of international brotherhood which you have cherished. To you, also, we extend the summons of the constructive task that now awaits us.

Our Programme

I. Terms of peace at close of present war must be such as to protect the nations from future wars and conserve the identity of the smaller nations.

(1) No indemnities.

(2) No transfer of territory, except upon consent and by vote of the people within the territory.

II. International Federation—United States of the World.

(1) Court or courts for the settlement of all disputes between nations.

(2) International congress, with legislative and administrative powers over international affairs, and with permanent committees in place of present secret diplomacy.

(3) International police force.

III. National disarmament.

(1) National disarmament shall be effected immediately

upon the adoption of the peace programme by a sufficient number of nations, or by nations of sufficient power so that the international police force developed by the terms of the programme shall be adequate to insure the protection of the disarmed.

(2) No increase in existing armaments under any circumstances.

(3) Pending complete disarmament the abolition of the manufacture of armaments and munitions of war for private profit.

(4) International ownership and control of strategic waterways, such as the Dardanelles, Straits of Gibraltar, and the Suez, Panama, and Kiel Canals.

(5) Neutralization of the seas.

IV. Extension of democracy.

(1) Political democracy.

(a) The declaration of offensive war to be made only by direct vote of the people.

(b) Abolition of secret diplomacy and the democratic control of foreign policies.

(c) Universal suffrage, including woman suffrage.

(2) Industrial democracy.

Radical social changes in all countries to eliminate the economic causes of war, such as:

(a) Federation of the working classes of the world in a league of peace.

(b) Socialization of the national resources, public utilities, and fundamental equipment of industry of the nations.

(c) Elimination of all unearned income.

(d) Immediate and progressive amelioration of the conditions of labor.

V. Immediate action.

(1) Efforts to be made in every nation to secure the official adoption of the above programme by the governing bodies at the earliest possible date. The adoption of the programme (contingent upon its acceptance by a sufficient number of the nations to insure its success) to be immediately announced to the world as a standing offer of federation.

(2) The federation of all the possible peace forces that can be united in behalf of the above programme for active propaganda among all nations.

(3) Efforts through the International and the national

organizations of the Socialist Party of all nations to secure universal co-operation of all Socialist and labor organizations in the above programme.

This is a practical programme directed toward the future. Its conclusions, however, as to most of the practical matters with which it is concerned, are based on the general idea contained in the preamble. This idea is that the so-called "Imperialism" is the fundamental, if not the sole cause of war. The economic hostility between the nations is attributed exclusively to the capitalists, and capitalism is held to be solely responsible for war. On the other hand, it is very clearly implied—and indeed follows necessarily as part of this generalization—that there is no conflict even of *immediate* economic interests between the wage-earners of the various nations, as asserted by the Socialist authority Otto Bauer (see Chapter II).

It is not the purpose of the editor of this volume himself to discuss any of these questions. But we may point out that a large number of Socialists now take a contrary view, as a number of our quotations have shown. It is extremely important to recall this fact. We shall proceed to point out how many Socialists disagree with some of the points of this programme in detail, but we must first note that very many disagree with it *as a whole*, in view of the fact that it is based on the above assumption, which they hold to be largely, though not of course entirely, fallacious.

This peace programme of the National Executive Committee of the American Socialist Party contains both a *general* peace policy and a policy *for the present war*. The latter, entitled "terms of peace at close of present war," adopts the German view, advocated by Bernstein and Kautsky, that there should be no in-

demnities, making no exception in favor of Belgium, and limits the application of plebiscites to territories conquered in the present war, but does not apply them to all territories *in dispute*, or to territories wholly or partly *inhabited by alien nationalities*. This position as to plebiscites is also that of the Germans, as against that of the British.

As these two points constitute the whole of the "terms of peace at close of present war," it is clear that the *whole* of the *immediate* peace policy of the N. E. C. programme takes the view of the German Socialists as opposed to that of the British Socialists of the anti-war faction.

The general part of the programme might be taken at first glance as a summary of all the means proposed by the Socialists of the various countries for making peace permanent. And it does contain a number of these means, including one of the most important: neutralization of the seas (another object of the German, as opposed to the British Government—though a legitimate one from the Socialist standpoint). It takes up the subject of disarmament, but proposes only the very difficult plan of international action, rejecting Kautsky's suggestion that the coerced disarmament of certain nations be used as a lever for general disarmament. Nor does it take up Troelstra's extremely important proposal for the neutralization of colonies.

The preamble to the programme also fails either to mention high protective tariffs as one of the very greatest causes of the conflict of national economic interests, or to suggest the remedy—international treaties lowering these tariffs. Yet this evil has always been emphasized by the Socialists of all countries, and was proposed as one of the most important Socialist peace policies by Kautsky—and given all possible weight—

in one of the most important and widely read Socialist statements made since the war (see above).

The need is emphasized of a democratic control over diplomacy, and universal suffrage is advocated. But it is not stated that a democratic control over diplomacy requires, in some countries, something more than universal suffrage, namely democratic government and the abolition of absolutism—as the British Socialists point out (see the I. L. P. Programme).

This programme, moreover, does not mention either of the remedies against war which engaged the almost exclusive attention of Socialists for a quarter century and up to the very month when the present struggle began—the international general strike and the refusal to vote military supplies in parliaments. In this respect, as in its opposition to indemnities, its limitation of plebiscites, its failure to demand the abolition of Absolutism, and its desire for peace at the present moment (when Germany has the best of it), the programme follows the same lines as the policy of the majority of the German Party, for in 1913 the German Party had already voted money for military supplies.

And, finally, this programme says nothing about the menace of a general revolution, involving all the guilty governments, which was unanimously indorsed by the world's Socialists in Basel, as late as 1912. This is also in accord with the German Socialist position. For all their publications make it clear that—although the majority of German Socialists probably still favor and expect a democratic revolution in Russia—they no longer desire or expect such a revolution in Germany.

But perhaps the most significant omission is the failure to take up Kautsky's suggestion that a decisive defeat of one side or the other is probable in this war and desirable from the Socialist standpoint as alone

promising those radical changes Socialists desire. Disarmament, for example, could thus be forced upon the defeated, as he points out, and this would serve as an opening wedge as well as a practical ground for introducing this policy gradually also in the victorious countries, with the Socialists' aid.

CRITICISM OF THE PROPOSED PEACE PLAN BY A. M. SIMONS

We next give the views of one of the largest groups of the opponents of this peace programme, best represented by A. M. Simons. As editor of the *American Socialist*, in which the peace plan appeared, he was given half a page (an equal space) in that publication. Simons was formerly a member of the National Executive Committee of the Party, and is perhaps the leading Party editor, since before his connection with the *American Socialist*, he was editor of the *International Socialist Review*, of the *Chicago Daily Socialist*, and of the *Coming Nation*. The extreme importance attached to the above peace programme by Simons and those Socialists who agree with him is best known by his article in the *New York Sunday Call* (January 10th).

The following are the chief passages of the *Sunday Call* article, which was entitled "Compromising with Hell":

On this question of war and peace the Socialists of the older nations have made a blunder so horrible that they have involved you and me and every one of us, and our children for years to come, unless we cut loose from their teachings and profit by their terrible mistakes.

It was not last August that they made their mistake. Then they only took the final step on the road they began when they first tried to prove they were not "fatherlandless rascals" and "sans-patrie." When Bebel talked of "shouldering a rifle in defense of his fatherland," when even Jaurès wavered in his opposition to militarism and offered an "alternative plan"

[see Jaurès article, above quoted, in favor of a "citizen army"] for introducing hell, the first steps were taken. When at Stuttgart [1907—see above, Part I] a dozen German delegates, whose names I would not now wish to mention, assured me that we must not vote a complete repudiation of war lest we "outlaw" the great German Social Democracy; when the Reichstag members played smart politics with the war budget [1913—see above, Part I] and dreamed they were "shifting the burdens of taxation on to capital," they were taking the first steps on the road which finally not only left them helpless to stem the red tide of war, but so impregnated their minds with the poison of race hatred that they swallowed the Bethmann-Hollweg story of a Russian invasion and dashed away to the desolation of Belgium.

Now we are met with the sophistical hypocrisy that we must not make "moral judgments" on the war. That is the one thing we must do if we leave all else undone. Not to take advantage of the lessons of the war now that we have paid the fearful price for tuition is the climax of stupidity and cowardice.

Yet that is exactly what the committee failed to do that drew up the proposed programme. They have not one word to say against the swiftly-rising flood of militarist thought. They make no protest against threatened increases in army and navy, against proposed military training in schools and colleges, against even conscription, which is being proposed in powerful places in our government.

The reason for this position, as I happen to know, is that the members of this committee argue the need of "defense" and talk of "adequate armament" and possibility of invasion like veritable Hobsons and Roosevelts.

There can be no compromise here, because the roads run in opposite directions.

Most Socialists do not know that this compromise is being attempted.

I want to know the truth. If the Socialist Party is going to make terms with militarism in the face of the horrible results of a similar blunder in Europe, I want it done openly. I want to know just how far this poison has entered into the movement that I believe to be the only thing worth living for, and I want to know whether it is worth living for any longer when it makes compromise with the hell of militarism.

Simons continues his attack on the proposed plan in the article in the *American Socialist* (January 9th).

At least we should be honest and stand for one thing or the other. That programme, in its most essential feature, is exactly abreast of the Czar of Russia and Roosevelt. Both have spoken almost the same sort of brave meaningless words on disarmament and peace. If the Socialist Party is with them I want to know it.

Simons' alternative proposal is that Socialists should continue, as hitherto, to wage war against militarism and nationalism—and to do this that they should:

- (1) Favor international action in the direction of disarmament, and
- (2) Refuse to grant men or money for military purposes.

He does not offer disarmament as a panacea against war, but as a weapon against militarism, the spread of which would make the growth of the Socialist movement impossible. Wars are to be overcome only by removing the economic causes of national conflicts.

Disarmament alone will not insure universal peace. Only Socialism and the absence of the motives to national and race hatreds will do this.

But there can be no hope of a peaceful overthrow of capitalism until there shall be disarmament. Modern armament cannot be democratic. This war is being fought with artillery, dreadnoughts, airships, and mighty mechanical contrivances which democracy can never expect to possess in such a way as to use them against the class that is intrenched behind present economic and political power.

The great struggle of the future will come across class not national lines. Every increase in military power is an increase in the power that will be used to crush labor. If it is not used directly to smash the lives out of those who seek to free themselves it will be used indirectly to involve workmen in the fratricidal work of killing one another after they have been drugged with nationalistic patriotism.

The second plank in any programme that shall be truly Socialist must be opposition to any and all appropriations for military purposes, while class rule continues. "Not a dollar, not a man" for purposes of murder, was once the motto of the Socialists of nearly all the countries involved in war.

Because that principle was tampered with the Socialists of the warring countries were drawn over the brink into the bloody ditches where they are now wallowing in one another's gore. You can trace every step that led to this war and the terrible breakdown of Socialist morale to the day when Socialists first began to find excuses for the granting of some consideration to the beast of militarism.

A REPLY TO SIMONS

Dr. John C. Kennedy, Secretary of the Illinois Socialists, one of those who drafted the tentative peace plan of the Executive Committee, replied to Simons in the *American Socialist* of the same date (January 9th). His reply was in part as follows:

In preparing the first draft of our programme we made use of all material available which had been furnished not only by American Socialists but by Socialists, labor groups, and other peace organizations throughout the world. Programmes and manifestoes in favor of disarmament and world peace have recently been issued by the Socialist and labor organizations and other peace groups in Australia, Holland, Great Britain, Sweden, South Germany, and other sections of the world. There is a remarkable agreement in the main propositions found in all of these programmes and they are quite similar to the one which has just been adopted by the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party.

Evidently Comrade Simons is not satisfied with the section dealing with national disarmament because our programme does not call for immediate disarmament by the United States regardless of the action that may be taken by other countries. All the members of our committee believe in disarmament, but we do not believe that it is either feasible or desirable for the United States to disarm at once if the other

nations or some of them keep their armies and navies. The only member of the committee of six who advocated the policy of non-resistance was Mrs. A. M. Simons. It is our belief that disarmament can be accomplished only by international agreement. Otherwise a relatively democratic country such as the United States might by disarmament place itself absolutely at the mercy of an autocracy such as Russia.

When Comrade Simons states that no distinction can be made between offensive and defensive wars, he makes a criticism which will certainly require us to define the term "offensive" better than it has been defined in the past. Several comrades, including, I believe, Comrade Benson, have suggested that we use the term "wars of invasion" instead of the terms "offensive." If this is done I think that we can then draw a rather sharp line between the two types of war, and that much can be said for the proposal that a direct vote of the people must be taken before the United States shall invade any other nation.

In his reference to "invasion" in the last paragraph, Kennedy adopts the same criterion used by the German Socialists in defense of their support of the German Government in the present war (see the German Party statement of December 2d, quoted in Chapter XIX).

At the time the compilation of this volume was finished (April 15, 1915) the American Socialist Party had reached no conclusions on the issues brought up by the "Peace Plan." It was offered tentatively for the consideration of the National Committee (a far larger body, not to be confused with the National Executive Committee of five members). No final conclusions are likely before the annual meeting of this body, or perhaps before the next Party Congress in 1916.

It will be evident to the reader of the documents previously quoted in this volume that Kennedy is correct in saying that the tentative programme (as far as it goes) is in accord with the position of the Socialist movement *as a whole—that is, as it stood before the*

present war. But its omissions are extremely serious, as we have pointed out. Moreover, is it not clear, from nearly all of our quotations, that the war is already having a tremendous effect on the Socialist position? And is it not probable that this effect will be still greater before the war is ended?

NOTE 1 (*see* page 450).—In an article in the Leipzig *Volkszeitung* (which was confiscated in several cities) Bernstein explained that his refusal to vote the war credits on March 20th was due to his opposition to the government peace policy. He said: "It was a colossal sum that the Reichstag granted. But in regard to its final purpose we are in the dark. Influences that we cannot control may give this purpose a form that is opposed to our [Socialist] principles and, according to our deepest convictions, to the interests of the German people. . . . Under these conditions a vote of 'Yes' means an abject surrender to the decisions of the government as to war and peace. . . . Shall the Labor Parties on both sides continue indefinitely to transform the beautiful watchword, 'Workers of all countries, unite,' into 'Workers of all countries, shoot one another'? Sometime this must be brought to an end, and I am convinced that *the [favorable] war situation of Germany allows us to take up this position.*" (Our italics.)

NOTE 2 (*see* page 457).—The most complete and radical programme offered by any British Socialist is that of H. G. Wells. He demands:

(1) An indemnity for Belgium, her extension to Aix-la-Chapelle, Montmédy, and Montjoie, and the neutralization of the Rhine Province.

(2) The future of Alsace-Lorraine to be decided by France.

(3) An autonomous Poland under the Czar, to include all Poles but no non-Polish districts.

(4) A Greater Serbia, Roumania, and Bulgaria.

(5) An independent Bohemia.

(6) The division of Turkey.

(7) Serbia and Italy to jointly bar Austria from the Adriatic. (*See The New York Times*, May 1, 1915.)

Few Socialists would agree to the last-mentioned point.

CHAPTER XXXI

IS THE WAR DRIVING GOVERNMENTS TO SOCIALISTIC MEASURES?

WAR is generally supposed to be wholly destructive. But the world has recently awakened to the fact that war is also constructive—aside from the desirable results which every warring nation believes it will gain by victory. War requires an immense increase of effort, which means a vast amount of new organization by the government, the one organ which represents the nation—or rather claims to represent the nation wholly and does, as a matter of fact, represent it to a greater or less degree. Governments have been forced to undertake innumerable gigantic enterprises in direct connection with their armies. They have been obliged to take over, or to operate, or to reorganize and control, industry after industry. In order to supply these armies they have been compelled to organize a considerable part of the total production of the countries at war. In order to feed the people at home they have been forced, in scarcely smaller measure, to organize the distribution and sale of food. If the process is carried as far in the next eight months as it was in the first eight months of the war, it will hardly be an exaggeration to say that all these nations will be well on the road—for the time being—to governmentally operated industry, or collectivism.

Socialism is often defined briefly as collective democracy or democratic collectivism. As yet there has been

no advance in democracy through the war, nor can any such advance be expected while the war lasts. On the contrary, military organization always has meant and still means the reverse of democracy. But the war has shown that this militarist reaction is much less pronounced in proportion as countries have already advanced toward democracy and had established a firm democratic or semi-democratic foundation when the war broke upon them. So the anti-democratic results of war, while in evidence everywhere, are comparatively mild in England and extreme only in Russia. They are more marked in Austria than in Germany, and more marked in Germany than in France. And, moreover, revolutionary democratic movements have followed all recent wars which became unpopular, as we saw in France in 1871 and in Russia in 1905. It is not probable, then, that any very strong anti-democratic reaction will remain *after* the war, and it is highly improbable that any such democratic retrogression will take place as to compensate for the present startling progress in collectivism.

We are moving, then, in the direction of State Socialism. Nor is this all. For even before the war Germany resorted to an extraordinary increase both of graduated inheritance and income taxes and of taxes on the rise in rental-value of land. The stupendous burdens of the war cannot conceivably be paid in any other way except by the most extraordinary increase of such taxes, which will mean progress toward a radical redistribution of incomes by law. This is no longer State Socialism but Socialism.

It is true that the Socialists have not been and will not be chiefly responsible or even largely responsible for any of these policies. But their Socialistic tendency is shown by the fact that the Socialists were every-

where the first to demand them. They have followed the lines laid down by the Socialists, and if we wish to see where they may lead in the immediate future we cannot do better than to look at the criticisms and the further demands the Socialists are now making.

Let us turn, for example, to the German Socialists' programme elaborated a few weeks after the outbreak of the war, let us compare it with what the government has carried out, and note what is still demanded. The German programme was put forth as a demand for the governmental organization of consumption—especially of the food supply. This leads at once to the organization of agricultural production, and, as it will be noted, to other radical steps related to this.

GERMAN SOCIALIST DEMANDS

(1) Measures for the regulation of production.

(a) To organize the harvest and its utilization.

(b) To make it the duty of farmers to raise specified crops. Immediate planting of waste land with rapidly-growing edible greenstuffs and vegetables. Organization of cattle and dairy production.

(2) Measures for the provision of the means of production.

(a) To supply fertilizers and seeds through public institutions and to regulate their use.

(b) To provide machinery by means of community organizations to encourage intensive agriculture.

(c) To open up woods and moorlands to the public for the production of litter.

(3) Measures for securing labor power.

(a) Public regulation of employment.

(b) Fixing of a minimum wage.

(c) Abolition of servant laws and exceptional laws against farm hands.

(4) Measures for the use of foodstuffs.

The prohibition of the use of potatoes and grain for the production of spirituous liquors, regulation of the production of beer, sugar, and starch.

(5) To make it the duty of farmers to sell their products to public institutions (imperial, national, and communal).

(6) To fix prices for means of production and products for producers and middlemen.

(7) To encourage production of foodstuffs and the regulation of their distribution by communities.

(8) The suitable application of these regulations to the fishery, forestry, coal-mining, and chemical industries.

The above programme was passed on the 13th of August and was supported by the Federation of Labor Unions as well as the party.

In the middle of November, both organizations once more put their programme before the government in the shape of the following demands:

(1) The obligation of producers and traders in the means of life, to sell their products to public bodies (imperial, state, and local).

(2) Lowering of the maximum prices contained in the order of the Imperial Council of October 28th.

(3) Fixing the minimum prices upon all kinds of grain, potatoes, sugar, flour, bread, alcohol, and petroleum for producers and middlemen.

(4) Lowering of the supplies for the production of spirits. Limitation of breweries.

(5) Abolition of the sugar taxes.

(6) The addition of potato meal to flour on the basis of 10 parts by weight to 90 parts of rye flour.

(7) Measures against speculation in industrial raw materials.

The only one of these policies that *Vorwaerts* admits was carried out on radical lines was that aiming to prevent speculation in raw materials.

The imports and exports of Germany, as well as the labor supply, were much more seriously interfered with than those of England, therefore the government in reorganizing industry for war purposes was forced to more radical measures in order to secure the continued

supply of necessary raw materials. We take the following account of these measures from *Vorwaerts*:

Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the military authorities established a central office to assure the supply of raw materials. But since all these raw materials, metals, chemicals, textile materials are also used in many branches of private industry, the Central Raw Material Office was forced to concern itself with the compromise between the interests of the army and those of private industry. The interference in the whole raw material business, therefore, arose wholly from purely military reasons, and only to that degree in which it appeared necessary to the war administration in its own interests. And since a sufficient supply of raw materials is partly dependent on the results of the campaigns, in certain circumstances private use had to be abrogated in favor of use for war purposes.

The task fell to the Central Office to turn over the raw materials to the various army contractors. The division among the various contractors was left to the industries concerned, themselves. Each was organized into special associations under the control of the state. The form of organization chosen was a stock company controlled by a State Commissioner with a veto power.

Up to the present (March 1st) the following raw material associations and statistical offices were set up:

The Combed Wool Association.

The Wool for War Purposes Association.

The War Chemicals Association.

The War Metals Association.

The Rawhide Association.

The War Leather Association.

The Linen Statistical Office.

The Flax Statistical Office.

The Jute Statistical Office.

The Rubber Statistical Office.

The Cotton Statistical Office.

The Horsehair Statistical Office.

The further task of the War Raw Material Department consists in the evaluation of confiscated goods. To prevent price speculation, such as were seen at the beginning of the

war, maximum prices were established for copper, brass, bronze, aluminum, nickel, antimony, tin, and the products of copper, brass, and aluminum. Also for ammonium sulphate, wool, and wool products.

Vorwaerts, on February 24th, complains that the other measures, for the benefit of consumers and not of manufacturers, had only been very partially carried out. The maximum prices, as far as they had been established, had been circumvented. Speculation continued. In the middle of January, a new conference had taken place with the government. On the 25th of January the government had issued an order for the confiscation of grain and flour, but all the other demands still remained unfulfilled. *Vorwaerts* continues:

The raising of the price for potatoes and preparations of potatoes, the undisturbed speculation in cattle and meat, the increase in the prices of industrial raw materials through combinations, the holding back of potato supplies, the raising of the price of bread by flour dealers and bakers, all showed something else than the accomplishment of the Social Democratic demands, necessary as these are in the interests of the population which has remained at home, and that which is found in the field.

The government has done as good as nothing to assure the increase of the production of the coming harvest. The cultivation of a few waste lands and the free gift of railway and forest lands for the cultivation of potatoes and vegetables does not help much. What is needed in this regard is the systematic utilization of already cultivated land for the services of the community, to the exclusion of the interests of private producers.

Up to the present day everything is completely unorganized in agricultural production, in spite of the fact that it has been shown that the free play of private interest is incapable of guaranteeing the necessities of life to a population of seventy millions.

Vorwaerts was especially dissatisfied with the high

maximum prices fixed for grains and adds: "If the people can no longer do anything to modify these abnormal maximum prices, nevertheless, it will be their passionate wish that now at least all special profits should be taxed away by a war tax on the increment of property, the proceeds of which should be used for social purposes."

Vorwaerts pointed out that those who recommend rigid economies to the people can have no objection to a tax of this kind. If such an agitation as this continues to go on during the war and after, it may easily become ominous for the ruling classes in Germany.

Gradually a considerable part of the Socialist policies were practically adopted. There were inevitable and important exceptions. The government, not being democratic, could naturally not satisfy the Social Democrats as to the organization of the labor force, nor would it extend the new policies to other than agricultural industries except as it was driven to do so. However, the states and municipalities have taken very radical steps to provide work for the unemployed, if at an unsatisfactory wage. And they are rapidly operating new industries.

In an undemocratic country and during war, none of these policies are being carried out to the satisfaction of Socialists. Nor are they Socialistic as at present administered. But they would become Socialistic with the greatest rapidity if the Socialists secured an influential voice in the government—which they may soon do now that their patriotism is unquestioned—especially in those countries where governments fail to achieve what the people expect from the war.

By 1913, as we have said, the German Government had already made a good beginning in graduated taxation against the rich. Two years before a tax had been

leveled against the rise of urban land values reaching in some cases 30 per cent. In 1913 the largest fortunes were made to pay—through income and property taxes—an amount that was estimated at one-third of the income. By extending these rates to fortunes of middle size the financial results would probably be all that *Vorwaerts* at present hopes for—provided the money were used for “social purposes.”

Up to the present, however, *Vorwaerts* does not believe any really Socialistic steps have been taken. It says:

Let us recall the contents of the order of the Imperial Council. After a period of six months, during which a still worse speculation had been carried on in grains than in times of peace, the government decided upon the confiscation of the supplies of grain and flour. The confiscation followed at the market prices which had been driven up for six months, or at least with the unnecessarily high legal maximum price. The producers and traders from whom the supplies were taken away, therefore, obtained about the same price which they would have secured by free trading. Therefore the confiscation resulted in no curtailment either of the ground rent or of the trading profit. The whole measure represents neither the nationalization of the products of the land, nor even the nationalization of the grain trade.

Vorwaerts proceeds to prove this point by citing the details of the government measures. It then continues:

The assertion that the present order of the Imperial Council is partly or wholly on the road to Socialism rests upon a confusion of Socialist with Social Democratic demands. Our programme contains a whole group of demands (for example, the separation of religion from the public schools) which are wholly realizable inside of the present society and contain nothing whatever specifically Socialistic. Their accomplishment would, therefore, be in no degree progress

towards Socialism. Moreover, the Erfurt programme (the present programme of the German Party) contains no demand for the creation of state monopolies. The party has always occupied a critical attitude towards such demands. At the Erfurt Congress in 1891 a motion that the Socialist Reichstag group should demand the nationalization of the grain trade was rejected. . . . In any case the introduction of state monopoly does not mean the triumph of Socialism over capitalism, for if this had been the case Socialists would already have celebrated tremendous triumphs in Russia and Austria.

The Erfurt Programme says very clearly what Socialism is: "The transformation of capitalistic private property in the means of production—land, mines, raw material, tools, machines, means of transportation—into social property, and the transformation of production for private profit into production carried on for and by society."

Vorwaerts concludes that to welcome the war measures as being in any degree Socialistic is a very dangerous illusion for the working class.

It repeated these criticisms again on February 22d, pointing out that the government, in fixing the prices of grain but not of flour, and in regulating the sale of potatoes without confiscating and retailing them, had failed to render satisfactory aid to the consumer.

It is not only the radical wing of the Socialists as represented by *Vorwaerts* which denies that the present State Socialist measures of the government are Socialistic, but also Edward Bernstein, intellectual leader of the moderate wing. He points out that a distinction must be made between what looks like Socialism and what is really Socialism. Bernstein begins an article in *Vorwaerts* of March 7th with a quotation from the well-known British Economist and Publicist, Chiozza Money, M.P. (from the *Daily Citizen*), claiming that similar measures taken by the British Government are to be considered as Socialistic, in spite of the denial

made in Parliament by Runciman, a member of the Cabinet.

Chiozza Money had said:—

At the present time the nation is, in far the larger part of its activities, a Socialistic undertaking, created for the purpose of the war as such. . . .

We have nationalized the railways; helped the banks; monopolized sugar; empowered the Board of Trade to confiscate imports; rescued shipping by state insurance; set in motion state Socialism for the establishment of a dyeing industry, which capitalism has so absurdly neglected, and done a number of other things that the public knows nothing about, but which will be learned after the war.

The ministers [concluded Money] have given to the Labor Party the material for a crushing reply [to the government statement that the war measures were not Socialistic].

Bernstein then takes up the argument against Chiozza Money as follows:

If he meant to say by this that a government has unlimited rights over the economic life of the community during war, then naturally Mr. Money is right. But otherwise, his masterpiece consists in this: that without further ado, it makes state operation the same thing as Socialism. That may be effective for rhetorical effect, but it accomplishes nothing for the clarification of ideas. With his logic, one could prove that the war censorship is Socialistic. But it is only an exceptional institution necessitated by war.

Certainly war, and the measures to which it gives rise, have many characteristics which seem to resemble Socialism. In the very nature of armies there is hidden a piece of Communism. General and compulsory military service has a Socialistic thought at its foundation, and the interferences with private rights and private property which takes place during a war are little different in their immediate effects from expropriation for economic purposes of an organic nature. But they are not, on this account, to be considered as essentially the same thing, since they have to do, not with the normal life of society, but with an exceptional situation.

Conditioned by these circumstances, such measures are, in their fundamental principles, independent of the stage of social evolution reached, which is not true of Socialism as we understand it. They are, if the expression may be permitted to me, intersecular, belonging to all ages, and not the peculiarity of any particular country.

Bernstein denies absolutely the Socialism of all of these measures, but he by no means denies that they may have a favorable effect upon the development of Socialism. He concludes as follows:

Now, of course, the war may give rise to the establishment, or to the demand for the establishment, of institutions which will be permanent, and this is the result which those comrades have in mind who speak of the success of Socialism in war or by means of war. As far as they concern themselves with the recognition of the value of labor organizations, which has taken place in several countries, I hope that they are not mistaken. But one should be ruled by caution in these matters. Our deceased Wilhelm Liebknecht used to quote an English verse:

"When the devil was sick
The devil a monk would be,
When the devil was well
The devil a monk was he."

Necessity teaches one to beg, and the monstrous tasks of a war such as the present one may open many eyes to social truth which would otherwise be closed. The only question is, How long will these results last and how many will they affect?

The recognition of labor organizations of which Bernstein speaks, has taken a number of forms: the invitation to Vandervelde, Guesde, and Sembat to join the ministries of France and Belgium, the appointment by the British Government of a commission to satisfy labor union demands and to fix the wages and labor conditions in the establishments used by the State, and the close relation of the government with the unions in

Germany. The full effect of these policies has not yet appeared; everything depends on whether the popular forces in the countries at war are strong enough to make themselves heard now that their representatives have secured an official or semi-official status.

In the official weekly of the German Socialist Party, *Die Neue Zeit* (of March 7th), Karl Kautsky, its editor and the intellectual leader of the radical Socialists, takes a position toward the new or proposed State enterprises very similar to that taken by Bernstein, leader of the moderates. Kautsky is concerned especially with the State enterprises that are likely to follow the war when the governments will probably establish additional monopolies in order to pay the interest on the colossal public debt created by the great conflict, since they will naturally prefer this method to heavy income taxes against the wealthy. Like Bernstein, Kautsky admits that nationalization, and still more municipalization, usually means progress; "in general it can be said that government monopolies present considerable advantages over private monopolies."

But this by no means implies that every intervention of the state in industry is Socialism. We have even seen Socialists proclaim martial law as the open door to Socialism.

According to its equipment and functions the state represents the permanent interests of the possessing classes as a whole as against the temporary interests of separate groups, though often the state does this very imperfectly, because some of these groups rule it more than others.

It follows from this that industrial activities of the present State, even when desirable and thoroughly approved by Socialists, are not Socialistic.

Kautsky shows how little may be expected from the impending nationalization of certain private monopolies. If the coal mines, for example, were bought out without

any confiscation, the State would have to pay a colossal price. This would force it to continue the present monopoly prices for coal. And it might even have to raise them, for it would have to pay the present market value for the mines, which is based upon the expectation of a still higher price in the future.

Now if nationalization were carried through for the express purpose of furnishing *additional* governmental income, the prices would have to be raised higher yet. "Such an increase of prices would have the same effect as an ordinary tax on consumption when placed on a necessity or on an indispensable means of production."

The situation at the close of the war will be of the very kind to increase all the dangerous sides of governmental monopoly and to prevent all its good sides from going into effect. We must certainly expect attempts to introduce governmental monopolies. We shall have to use all our power, if they cannot be prevented, to see to it that their features which are opposed to the interests of labor and of the consumer are restricted.

As against government ownership thus used as a means of indirect taxation to pay the war debt, Kautsky proposes a graduated tax on incomes and property. That is, heavily graduated taxation against the rich with the exemption of the lower incomes, is far more Socialistic than any form of government ownership under a non-Socialist government.

It seems there is very little hope, then, for democratic State Socialism in Germany *unless the people secure some control both over the Imperial Administration*, which is now wholly in the Kaiser's hands and even enjoys an enormous income independently of the Reichstag, and over the Prussian legislature (which legislates for two-thirds of Germany on matters of the first importance), since this latter body is now wholly in the hands

of the landed nobility, the bureaucracy, the military, and the wealthiest classes. It is for this reason that the Socialists of Prussia, since the war, have subordinated all social reform agitation to the one demand for the immediate grant of equal suffrage.

The internal war programme of the British Socialists, worked out under the direction of the Webbs and the Fabians, is no less scientific and radical than that of the Germans. Nor has the British Government been less enterprising than the German. Indeed, considering the vast advance the German Government had already made in monarchic collectivism long before the war, the progress of England has been even more astounding. Here is the programme adopted by representatives of all the leading Socialist, labor, and co-operative organizations in November:

The nation is only at the beginning of a crisis which demands thorough and drastic action by the state and the municipalities. Any bold, far-reaching change, which will probably be resisted by official bureaucracy, can only be made possible by the strong pressure of well-organized, well-directed popular agitation. Hence the committee submits in broad outline the programme it thinks essential in view of conditions that have either already arisen or are certain to arise in the near future.

We call upon the entire labor and Socialist movement, through all its national and local organizations, to force these demands upon the government by an immediate national campaign expressing itself in public meetings, the distribution of literature, the passing of resolutions by affiliated branches of labor and Socialist bodies, and in such other ways as may be deemed effective.

The programme should include the following demands:

Labor representation (both men and women in proportion to the workers in the area concerned) on all national and local committees of a public character established in connection with the war.

The inauguration of a comprehensive policy of municipal housing.

The establishment of co-operative canteens in connection with the army, to insure that food is supplied at reasonable prices to the soldiers in camp or barracks.

(a) Provision of productive work, at standard rates of wages for the unemployed.

(b) Where the provision of work is impracticable, maintenance to be granted on a standard sufficiently high to insure the preservation of the home and the supply of what is necessary for a healthy life, and the immediate abandonment of all the inquisitorial methods now too often used in order to restrict the amount of relief.

(c) Trade unions to be subsidized out of national funds to such an extent as will permit them (where provision of work is impossible) to pay members unemployed benefit without bankrupting other resources.

The encouragement and development of home-grown food supplies by the national organization of agriculture, accompanied by drastic reductions of freight charges for all produce, in the interests of the whole people.

Protection of the people against exorbitant prices, especially in regard to food, by the enactment of maxima and the commandeering of supplies by the nation wherever advisable.

National care of motherhood by the establishment of maternity and infant centers, the provision of nourishment for expectant and nursing mothers, of doctor or midwife at confinement, and of help in the house while the mother is laid aside.

The compulsory provision of meals and clothing for school children, three meals a day, seven days a week.

The continuance of national control over railways, docks, and similar enterprises at the close of the war, with a view to the better organization of production and distribution.

Like the Germans, the British Socialists demand the inauguration of a legal minimum wage. If this is established—no matter how incompletely nor how low the wage—it is needless to state it will in itself mean a revolution in the *organization* of labor and of industry.

The proposed aid to mothers and children is not a feature of the German programme. Nor has it been adopted in Great Britain as yet, but so many innovations have already been introduced that there are good chances that it will be.

But it is the progress of complete operation of certain industries, like railways, that marks the greatest progress toward State Socialism in an individualistic though democratic country like Great Britain.

The *New Statesman* describes as follows the control of the railways as worked out at the end of 1914:

On the outbreak of war an Order in Council was made under Section 16 of the Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, declaring that it was expedient that the government should have control of the railroads. This control was to be exercised by a Committee of General Managers, with the President of the Board of Trade as official chairman. The result of this was that the railways were promptly treated as one unit; the fight for traffic—what little fight there was left—ceased. The Railway Clearing House was practically closed, hundreds of the clerks from there being utilized (mainly through the efforts of the officials of the Railways Clerks' Association) in various ways by the various companies. As everyone knows, under the new régime the service was wonderfully efficient. Troops were transported and embarked with marvelous speed, and everything worked as smoothly as possible. This was largely owing to the fact that, unknown to most people, the Committee of Control had been in existence for some considerable time before war was declared with definite and well-thought-out plans. Thus, whilst opponents were declaring the impossibility of nationalization, railway managers were quietly and successfully working out the details of a national system. Now for the terms.

The Regulation of the Forces Act provides that full compensation shall be paid to the owners of the railroads for any loss or injury they may have sustained whilst under government control. "His Majesty's Government have agreed with the railway companies," in this instance, "that, subject to the under-mentioned condition, the compensation to be paid them

shall be the sum by which the aggregate net receipts of the railways for the period during which the government are in possession of them fall short of the aggregate net receipts for the corresponding period for 1913." The "under-mentioned condition" is that, as trade had declined slightly during the first half of the year, an adjustment was to be made to cover that. Practically this means that the railways are guaranteed dividends on last year's basis or very near last year's basis. Not only that, but they are guaranteed against any "injury" they may sustain. We leave it to those best informed as to what is the practice of the companies to say how this will be interpreted. It is, shall we say, possible that a good deal of latitude will be taken and many repairs put in hand which, in the ordinary course of things, would not be touched.

Up to the time of writing this describes the degree to which nationalization had gone. The *New Statesman*, organ of England's most scholarly and practical Socialists, does not expect it to go farther, except to satisfy the more moderate demands of railway employees. Nor does it feel confident that even this conservative policy of semi-nationalization will last after the war. It says:

The business of the country had to be carried on, especially the primary business of transporting soldiers and munitions of war, and if the government had not taken control this business would have fallen to the companies in the ordinary course at some recognized rate. It is true that most of them would probably in this case not have made nearly as much out of the state as they will make under the existing arrangements; but while we permit them to hold the position of privilege and influence which they enjoy in government circles to-day we cannot be surprised if they secure good terms for themselves.

How has all this affected the prospects of railway nationalization? In some quarters it seems to be taken for granted that permanent state control must follow as a logical result of the government's recent action. But it is not clear, to say the least, that this is what will happen. Logically, of course, it ought to happen; but then, logically, railway nationalization

ought to have come about years ago. On the whole it would appear that the railway companies are likely to be strengthened rather than weakened by the war. Alone among business enterprises in this country they are guaranteed against loss; and it may be assumed that they will not miss this unique opportunity of permanently reorganizing their services and considerably extending their joint working arrangements, which, whilst removing many public grievances, will effect appreciable economies. Still more important, if the war should last for a considerable time, they will have standardized their dividends at a comfortably high rate; and so increased the price at which the public would have to buy them out. Meanwhile the public debt will have greatly increased and the state of the money market will not be such as to make any Chancellor of the Exchequer very anxious to attempt the flotation of the enormous amount of public stock which railway purchase would require. The fact remains that private ownership will still be as great an anomaly and as much in the way, for example, of any effective land reform after the war as it was before; and its fate, like the fate of a great many other things, will depend upon the general condition of domestic politics and of the public attitude in regard to them.

The *New Statesman*, however, and the British Socialists generally, are so anxious for railway nationalization that such half-way measures would naturally seem to them like no progress at all. And it may well be that the war will bring about nationalization either at its close or within a few years, not only of railways, but of docks and perhaps even of other branches of production such as coal mines—so fundamentally vital to every industry. *The necessity to improve the efficiency of the nation in competition with other nations, and thus to recoup the losses of war, may prove as strong an impelling force as the necessities of the war itself.*

But the need to supply the vast armies in the field and the need to feed the people at home are only a part of the forces compelling State Socialist policies. The inter-

ruption of foreign trade compels the governments to come to the rescue of threatened industries, as we saw in the case of Germany. Thus aniline dyes, no longer to be secured from Germany, enter into products of British industry valued at \$1,000,000,000 annually. The government took up this problem at once. Again the steps taken were petty and slow. The government first proposed a loan to a private dye-manufacturing corporation. It finally decided—for technical reasons—to supply certain Swiss establishments with chemicals they lacked and to get the chief supply in this way. It contributed \$500,000 for experimentation over a period of ten years, but it was found that one of the large German establishments was expending this much on experiments every year. Nevertheless a beginning has been made and the government will be forced to see the new undertaking to a successful conclusion.

Direct war needs, however, compelled a far more rapid evolution, as witnessed by the law giving the government power to take over any industrial establishment for war purposes. Such establishments will not remain in the government's hands after the war. But many new methods will be introduced, especially in the handling of labor, and a large part of these will doubtless be permanent. Moreover, wherever the government will have proved equally efficient with, or more efficient than, the private owners, an unanswerable argument will have been given for later nationalization or municipalization. As Lloyd George pointed out, the success of this policy will be the strongest possible argument for collectivism, "since the British people are essentially a people who act on example and experiment rather than on argument."

And above all, the nation may come to feel that certain other objects—such as an efficient population—are

quite as important as success in war. When it does this the whole machinery will be prepared for the partial or total nationalization (or municipalization) of all the more important branches of manufacture.

But there is another branch of collectivism equally important with governmental operation of industry and governmental organization of labor, the new and radical increases in taxation. These, as I have said, are almost bound to rise still further *after* the war, when the interest on the huge debts now being contracted will have to be paid. After the war, too, the democratic forces will be freer to act and these taxes will be graduated still more heavily against the wealthy. Since the war the income tax has already been doubled in Great Britain, and one-fourth is now taken from the "unearned" income of the wealthiest group, *i.e.* from income derived from bonds, dividends, etc. If this process of doubling is extended during the war to other forms of taxation, the inheritance tax will take 30 per cent. of the largest fortunes, and 40 per cent. will be taken from the rise in urban land values.

After the war, when political democracy resumes its advance, its leader, Lloyd George, his prestige enormously increased as the Great War Chancellor, will have two courses before him. The high income and inheritance tax rates now directed against the wealthiest alone may be directed against the merely wealthy also, they being then forced to pay 25 or 30 per cent. Or the wealthiest may have their taxes further increased until, say half their fortunes and incomes are expropriated. Or the two methods may be combined, which is the more likely course. *At the same time the tax on the rise in land values could safely be raised to 50 per cent. and extended from the cities to all rural land not in the possession of small holders.* If these tax methods are

not sufficient they may be supplemented by nationalizing the railways and using them as the German Government does for the purpose of augmenting its income—a policy which is similar in some ways if not indetical with indirect taxation. Steamship lines, coal mines, etc., may also be nationalized largely with the same object in view—though this method, as our quotation from Kautsky showed, is the very reverse of Socialistic—at the outset.

Mere nationalization, as the examples of Russia, Austria, and Germany show, does not necessarily mean progress in the direction of social democracy. The reduction of inequalities of income by means of taxation *does* mean social democracy—in two ways. Large fortunes are immediately reduced and their power over society diminished. In the next place, persons of smaller income are almost certain to get, sooner or later, a direct and positive individual benefit. Not, of course, at first, since the money is to go for war purposes or to pay interest on war loans. But it is highly improbable that when such war expenditures grow less these most popular taxes will be reduced. They will be used for public education, the public health, and other social reform purposes. They will replace unpopular forms of indirect taxation that increase the cost of living of the masses.

At the same time nationalization and municipalization may prove equally Socialistic—at a later date. Used at first as a means of indirect taxation, they afford an excellent business investment for the government. These policies also fit in admirably with graduated and land increment taxation—from the Socialist standpoint. If a part of the proceeds of these taxes is used to pay the debt of the governmental railways, etc., then the latter become in fact as well as in name governmental property. This is collectivism. It only remains to make the

government democratic in the fullest sense, in order that the new government properties be used either directly to reduce the cost of living or to pay for some other popular benefit, and we have an installment—a very large installment—of Socialism.

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